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Signs Special Issue: War and Terror: Raced-Gendered Logics and Effects

$\mathcal{S}$ *igns: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* invites submissions for a special issue titled "War and Terror: Raced-Gendered Logics and Effects," slated for publication in Summer 2007. "In war time, only men matter," claimed Mary Sargent Florence and C. K. Ogden, two British antiwar suffragists during World War I.[1] Writing in *Jus Suffragii*, the newsletter of the International Woman Suffrage Association, they noted that hostility to feminism was a deliberate, sustained, and central project of nations involved in war making. More recent studies of women and war, as well as feminist studies of war, suggest the intensification of deep-seated cultural, racial, and gender stereotypes during wartime. Peace is commonly associated with "feminine virtues" and war with regimes of masculinity. Rape in war seems to reinscribe violent subjection as a normal facet of racial, ethnic, sexual, and gender relations. The logic of "feminization" appears to structure practices of terror deployed to induce helplessness, dependence, fear, and compliance. As the enemy is feminized, the warrior-hero mythos reestablishes linkages between citizenship and military service, as well as leadership and presumed male superiority in managing national security, remasculinizing the domestic politics of warring nations.

Although proponents of democratization optimistically predict the elimination of war, the specter of war continues to haunt the global community. Depending on the definition of war, there are between sixty-five and two thousand sustained wars ongoing in the twenty-first century. The once inviolable boundaries of the nation-state have become permeable to terrorism, transnational policing, and international peacekeeping forces, as state and antistate terror refigure space, hierarchies, and freedoms. Taking on the mantle of the national security state, some liberal democracies have joined their authoritarian counterparts in violating the rule of law.

How do contemporary armed conflicts and terrorist engagements challenge received views about the dynamics of race, gender, ethnicity, na-

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[1] Mary Sargent Florence and C. K. Ogden, "Women's Prerogative," *Jus Suffragii* 9, no. 4 (1915). 218–19, cited in Karen Offen, *European Feminisms* (Stanford, CA. Stanford University Press, 2000), 252.

tionality, and sexuality in violent conflicts? Are feminism and feminist scholarship becoming casualties of growing militarism? Do feminist analyses of war and terror offer unique insights into these phenomena?

For this special issue, we invite submissions that address the complex dynamics of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality in war, in war making, and in the uses of terror against and by states in the prosecution of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and nationalist and imperialist military interventions. We welcome innovative analyses of women's involvement in war and terror (as combatants, military and political decision makers, interrogators of military captives, providers of logistical support, medical personnel, sex workers, hostages, political prisoners, UN peacekeepers and peace builders, human rights workers, nongovernmental organization activists, and activists in resistance to occupying forces); of the impact of war on women (as direct casualties, as mothers, as war refugees, as victims of sexual violence by militants, combatants, and domestic partners, and women's experiences of loss in relation to families, communities, and nations); of factors that contribute to women's support for and resistance to specific wars and terrorist campaigns; of racial and gendered processes and effects associated with specific kinds of war (civil, ethnic, nationalist, imperialist); of the gendered and racialized logics and rhetorics of war; of the production and reproduction of gender, race, and sexuality in and through war and terror; of unintended racial and gendered consequences of war and terrorism; of cultural representations and cultural productions of and about race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality in war and in terror; and of historical approaches to these complex questions. Analyses that encompass transnational and comparative perspectives are particularly welcome.

Please send submissions for this issue to *Signs* between March 1 and July 1, 2006. Guidelines for submission are available at http://www .journals.uchicago.edu/Signs/instruct.html or in the Guidelines for Contributors section.

Joyce McCarl Nielsen

Robyn Marschke

Elisabeth Sheff

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Vital Variables and Gender Equity in Academe:
Confessions from a Feminist Empiricist Project

It was a feminist's dream project. We were invited to be part of a larger research team whose goal was to "permanently transform the University. . . . [This project] is not designed to be a remedial program. . . . We do not want to teach women how to play the game by the existing rules—we want to change the rules."[1]

Echoing the institutional transformation theme of the funding agency, the proposal outlined a variety of strategic actions for change. These included leadership workshops, mentoring/coaching, guest speakers, networking opportunities, course development, postdoctoral and graduate student fellowships, research appointments, and select faculty administrative appointments. The purpose of these interventions was to change university policies, structures, and climates, more or less permanently, in ways that would increase the number of women in the sciences, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) disciplines. Although the National Science Foundation (NSF)–funded project targeted the advancement of women in STEM disciplines, it recognized that such progress is accomplished only with the participation and involvement of all faculty in all disciplines. Thus the strategic interventions listed above would be implemented at all levels of the system and in all units on campus.

Our assignment was to evaluate the long-term impact and efficacy of

Pretest Measures	Intervention Strategies (Project Initiatives)	Continuing and Posttest Measures
• Gendered salary gap • Number of women faculty in sciences • Retention rates • Distribution of women faculty • Climate survey: leadership, mentoring, diversity, support, feminist consciousness	• Curriculum development • Leadership workshops • Coaching/mentoring faculty • Guest speakers • Administrative apprenticeship • Networking opportunities • Outreach activities • Graduate research appointments • Exhibits/public display • Newsletter	• Gendered salary gap • Number of women faculty in sciences • Retention rates • Distribution of women faculty • Climate survey: leadership, mentoring, diversity, support, feminist consciousness

Figure 1   Evaluation research design

the various intervention strategies.[2] As evaluators, our methodological question was, "If the project is successful, how would we know it?" Or, more to the point, how would we convince others that the project itself (rather than external forces or normal growth and development) had generated the desired changes? We initially conceptualized this task in relatively straightforward and conventional terms, as outlined in figure 1. We would monitor major indicators of women's status such as the earnings differential between male and female faculty, the number of women in STEM departments, and the general climate as perceived by teaching and research faculty. The last category includes feminist consciousness (defined as having awareness of and opposing gender-related inequities) on the part of faculty and administrators. We would do this both before (at the beginning of the project) and after (toward the end of the five-year period) to determine long-term effects of project initiatives.[3] In other words, we

[2] A separate research team is independently evaluating specific initiatives such as the leadership workshops. Indeed, the larger project is a triangulated research plan that includes ethnographic analyses of individuals' career paths in addition to the work described here. The goal is a comprehensive look at women's status in the institution.

[3] The indicators of change that we emphasize, listed in fig. 1, are derived from a longer list of measurable items compiled by a dozen principal investigators representing similar projects at other institutions. The longer list, endorsed by the NSF, includes number and percentage of women faculty in science/engineering by department; number of women in tenure-line positions by department, rank, and ethnicity; tenure and promotion outcomes; years in rank by gender; time at institution and differential attrition by department or rank; number of women in non-tenure-track research and instructor positions; number and percentage of women scientists and engineers in administrative positions; number of women scientists in endowed/named chairs; number and percentage of women scientists and engineers on promotion and tenure committees; space allocation by gender; and start-up packages by gender

hypothesized that the major indicators listed above, along with others outlined in figure 1, constituted dependent variables in a cause-and-effect or pretest/posttest model.

The before-and-after research plan diagrammed in figure 1, using primarily quantitative measures, though not perfect, seemed rather elegant and parsimonious in the best tradition of positivist social science (Campbell and Stanley 1966). That, anyway, was the plan. This article is a report of what actually happened.

We began the project as feminist empiricists using traditional methods of observation and analyses (e.g., longitudinal and statistical analyses of aggregate data, survey instruments, and hypothesis testing). Because the proposal was written by a physicist and the project funded by the NSF, we assumed that a quantitative, quasi-experimental approach would be well received. Nevertheless, it was not long before we began asking feminist-inspired critical questions about these same methods and their results. The first section of this article, then, describes how a series of quantitative analyses of salary data led to a search for interpretive context and for what we call vital variables. We then describe efforts to measure feminist consciousness as a theoretically relevant and major indicator of the campus climate using standard survey instruments. We conclude that feminist thinking about feminist consciousness and similar constructs has outpaced available methods.

Finally, we come to terms with what had been an implicit distinction between the action and evaluative aspects of the project, realizing that as researchers we were indeed very much a part of the action itself. As feminists successfully working within the university and as agents of social change, our perspective has both insider and outsider elements. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this dual status as well as two other issues related to social action research, obtrusiveness and resistance. The concluding section describes several ways in which feminist empiricism is in transition in the project.

The report is roughly chronological, documenting a process of theoretical and methodological paradigm shifts cutting across different feminist perspectives. Throughout this backstage tour we focus on seemingly minute and mundane yet consequential tensions that affect everyday decision making. Our work confirms and elaborates feminist empiricism as subversive, transitional, emergent, and revolutionary.

Vital variables

In our regression analyses of gender pay gaps among faculty at this uni-

versity, what initially had been large gender differences in salary diminished after controlling for—that is, taking into account—the effects of academic discipline, tenure status, seniority, rank, and age.[4] Most regression models, ours included, rely on variables such as these because they are readily accessible in spite of the fact that they are often inadequate or controversial.[5] Nevertheless, these variables are considered legitimate justification for pay differences as outlined in the 1973 Education Amendments (see Nelson and Bridges 1999).

Using a standard regression model (see "typical regression model variables," bottom of fig. 2), our results show that these "legitimate" variables, of which academic discipline is the most important, account for 72 percent of the variance in salaries.[6] This is called explained variance. Results like these are satisfying from a purely quantitative point of view because the R-squared—the percent of variance in salaries attributed to the variables in the model—is high, but one wants to know more about the 28 percent unexplained variance, which is usually attributed to discrimination.[7]

Further, one wants to know more about the larger context in which salary differences occur. To what extent, for example, do women earn less because they start with lower salaries and/or because they do not negotiate the way in which men do at the time of hire (DeRiemer, Quarles, and Temple 1982)? Do male faculty enjoy a "housewife bonus" (Bellas 1992)? Does women's work in the domestic sphere hinder their ability to achieve and be successful in academia? Do women perform more service and spend more time with students than men? Most of these questions were unan-

[4] In regression analysis, a dependent variable (in our case, salary) is considered to be a function of independent or predictor variables. When there are several independent variables, the regression equation weeds out the effect of other variables and calculates the unique change in salary for a unit increase in each variable while holding the other variables constant. These relationships are often illustrated in scattergrams, with the values of an independent variable on the X-axis and the values of the dependent variable on the Y-axis. The scattergram shows numerous observed points (e.g., the education and salary of each faculty member). The regression equation estimates a line that fits the scattergram values by calculating minimal distances between the points. We used an ordinary least squares regression model. *Least squares* refers to the way that the distances are calculated, and *regression* refers to the practice of fitting values to a line. The line shows how the independent variables cause the dependent variable to change. For further explanation, see Berry and Feldman 1985, as well as Haignere 2002.

[5] See Bellas 1992; Becker and Toutkoushian 1995; Boudreau et al 1997; Barbezat 2002; Haignere 2002.

[6] *Variance* is a statistical term that captures the spread or range of individuals' salaries.

[7] See Oaxaca 1973; Barbezat 2002; Oaxaca and Ransom 2002; Toutkoushian and Hoffman 2002

Vital Variables

occupational
segregation

social networks

climate

family &
marital
status

market
forces

hiring,
retention,
& equity
policies

achievers
of
cohort

domestic
work

productivity

starting salary &
negotiations

feminist
consciousness

Typical Regression Model Variables

Dependent
Variable:
Salary

gender

race/
ethnicity

discipline

rank

age

administrative
position

experience

tenure
status

Figure 2   Salary regression models

swerable with our data because so many variables were omitted or obscured by university record-keeping systems. We dubbed these *vital variables* because of their potential explanatory and generative power (Gergen 2001). (Vital variables, then, are similar to but not exactly the same as what Michel Foucault [1981] calls subjugated knowledges on the part of the marginalized—that is, knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate, naive, or low ranking.) These vital variables are contextual and can be seen as part of researchers' taken-for-granted background assumptions, as independent determinants of salary, as variables that may also be influencing the variables whose measures we do have, or all of the above. Without knowing more about them, regression results seem superficial and even atheoretical.

One also wonders about the particular history of salary-setting policies at this university. What have been the effects of various university-wide salary equity adjustments over the years? One wants to know how and why disciplines, which are often segregated by gender, have such large effects on salaries. (Our data show, e.g., that average salaries in disciplines that are 80 percent male are approximately $10,000 higher per year than average salaries in disciplines with 60 percent male faculty.) These and related questions generated a series of investigative projects designed to add context in order to interpret the quantitative salary data. These projects include a historical policy comparison, a longitudinal analysis, a cohort study, and an analysis of demographic inertia.

Historical policy comparison

We generated historical context by gathering information on the university's uneven history of programs designed to create gender/race pay equity from 1970 to 2002. This effort is still in progress, but we can say that the strategies implemented by our university mirror those used in other universities during this same time period. That is, they used regression statistics to identify outlying cases in the 1970s, a counterpart method in the 1980s, a mixed model in the 1990s, and more sophisticated regression analyses in the 2000s.[6] At the very least, this activity showed that there was enough concern or enough gender and race disparity in salaries that either the concern, the disparity, or both prompted organized action sanctioned by university administrators.

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[6] In the counterpart method, each female and/or minority faculty member identifies a white male peer for comparison in terms of salary, longevity, productivity, etc.

Table 1.   Female-to-Male Pay Ratios in 2002 by Rank and Cohort (%)

Cohort (Hire Date)	Full Professors	Associate Professors	Assistant Professors
<1966	68		
1966–70	70	90	
1971–75	114	87	
1976–80	92	117	
1981–85	94	91	
1986–90	81	89	71

Longitudinal and cohort analyses

To explore the issue of whether women simply start with lower salaries than men, which then has a cumulative effect over time, and to examine possible cohort effects in salaries, we looked for data prior to the year 2000, when salary data became available electronically. We found this information in the basement of the main library, recorded inconsistently and unevenly in large notebooks of archived computer printout. Because of the magnitude and messiness of this information—the data were literally "dirty"—we limited this recording to five-year data points, beginning with 1965.

The longitudinal information, combined with the history of pay equity adjustments referred to above, led us to hypothesize cohort effects in salaries. That is, some cohorts of female faculty seemed to fare better salary-wise than others, possibly the result of their being more politically active. For example, female professors hired throughout the 1970s and still at this university are the only women who earn the same or more than their male equivalents. This is illustrated in table 1.

Another effort to put context into the numbers involved the idea of tracking women who had participated in the university-wide counterpart salary adjustment processes in the 1980s and comparing their and their counterparts' current salaries. We thought that this would be an opportunity to find out if there were backsliding effects of the adjustments, to see whether the adjustments corrected problems over time, and to look at race/ethnicity by gender (all women and minority faculty were involved). Alas, we discovered that only a handful of the white women and minority faculty from the 1980s counterpart studies were still at the university, and some had forgotten who their counterparts were. Further, many of the counterparts had retired, died, or left by 2002, the first year

of our study. Records of the counterpart process were nowhere to be found, though we did make extensive formal and informal inquiries.

Demographic inertia analysis

With the same longitudinal data set, we were able to expand our analysis of the distribution of women faculty over time. Specifically, we were able to speculate about possible long-term effects of demographic patterns on the gender composition of the faculty population (Hargens and Long 2002). This analysis of demographic inertia generated population pyramids that can be used to make the case for an interventionist strategy regarding the recruitment, retention, and hiring of women faculty.[9] See figure 3 for graphic display of the slow pace of change even when a good number of new faculty hires are female. These results and their interpretations are the subject of an unpublished paper (Marschke et al. 2005).

To return to the issue of quantitative salary differentials, we underscore the lack of coherence between the theoretical and methodological literatures on the earnings gender gap. Theories regarding pay equity are well developed. They range from explanations based on economic processes to those based on sociological processes (Barbezat 2002; Orenstein 2002), from employer to employee behaviors, and from individual to structural and/or organizational forces operating in the workplace.[10] Yet empirical studies rarely investigate the full range of factors discussed by these theories and instead feature refined regression analyses using easily quantifiable and available variables similar to those we initially examined.

These regression studies therefore fail to include the full scope of theoretically designated variables. To fully examine earnings differentials, one wants to not only know more about structural features of the workplace

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[9] We use the term *demographic inertia* to refer to the analysis of population pyramids over time—by gathering the gender composition of incoming and outgoing faculty, we can illustrate and project what the pyramids may look like in the future. A population pyramid is a graph that illustrates the age and gender composition of a population or group of people. A normal pattern of population growth reveals relatively equivalent numbers of men and women, and, because there ought to be few old people and many young people simply based on mortality rates, the graph should look like a pyramid. When a pyramid is shaped irregularly it reveals demographic patterns. In this study the pyramids of faculty are lopsided and top-heavy, showing a predominant older-aged male population (see fig. 3)

[10] On explanations based on employer and employee behavior, see Cohn 2000; Reskin 2000; Padavic and Reskin 2002; Jacobs 2003. On explanations based on structural and/or organizational forces in the workplace, see Bellas 1992; Glazer-Raymo 1999; Nelson and Bridges 1999, Kulis, Sicotte, and Collins 2002.

Full-Time Male and Female Ranked Professors by Age Group
Year 1990

Full-Time Male and Female Ranked Professors by Age Group
Year 1999

Figure 3 Population pyramids of faculty in 1990 and 1999. Color version available as an online enhancement.

setting itself—for example, demographics, discipline differences, market factors, and gatekeeping practices (Reskin 1988)—but also more about the individuals in question. One wants to know about women's and men's productivity, their access to collegial networks, tenure clocks, and even more about what are usually considered domestic sphere variables—for instance, marital status, number of children, division of labor within the household, and so on. And, of course, one needs to know how these different dimensions work together. A more complete model that shows vital variables is illustrated in figure 2. We say this because, despite increased awareness and public attention to salary issues, there has not been much nationwide change in the past fifty years in the gendered division of labor by sex, organization of paid work, or distribution of wealth and poverty (Padavic and Reskin 2002). Taken as a whole, the larger picture is one of occupational sex segregation. Despite elaborate models and calculations (Lieberson and Carter 1982), the gendered nature of academia— the significance of occupational gender segregation in and across disciplines—is not fully encapsulated in regression analyses of salary differences.

We seriously considered collecting data on domestic sphere or second-shift vital variables but then had second thoughts. We realized that gathering such data might be unethical even if feasible and, more important, that emphasizing their inclusion in analyses to explain women's lower pay would unintentionally reinforce women's stereotypical association with the domestic. In support of our decision, Linda J. Sax et al. (2002) show no difference in faculty productivity that can be attributed to family-related factors such as marital status, children, spouse's job, career interruptions, elder care, financial stress, marital friction, and hours spent on household or child-care duties. Apparently, women with family responsibilities are finding the time and energy to produce as much scholarly work as peers who do not have family responsibilities. Yet, as Sax et al. (2002) point out, there are widely held assumptions that family responsibilities compromise faculty careers, and, they argue, these assumptions affect the recruitment and retention of female faculty.

In the midst of the search for vital variables we realized that in many instances we were deeply involved in regression mode thinking—that is, adding variables to a model in order to increase the explained variance and thus implicitly justifying the salary differences we documented. This was contrary to our original intention, which was to delegitimize the gender gap in salaries. We realized that strict adherence to regression models limited our thinking and distanced us from the original attraction of the proposal itself, which was to understand in order to effectively challenge, change, and transform rather than to explain and justify. The

difference may be subtle, but the experience underscores the importance of maintaining linkages between feminist goals and feminist methods.

To end this section on a positive note and to reinforce the epistemology-method linkage, we introduce the Oaxaca regression technique (Oaxaca 1973; Oaxaca and Ransom 2002) as an intentionally feminist method. Rather than explain away gender pay differences, the Oaxaca technique begins with the assumption that there is a pay gap and then explores how men and women are paid differently even when they share the same characteristics. The technique expands a typical regression model into two equations to analyze salary structures and to calculate estimates of discrimination, taking into account the possibility of different returns on independent variables. For example, our single-equation regression model shows that tenure status is worth $17,400. The Oaxaca two-equation model shows that women, if they were paid like men, would earn.$7,100 more than they do now for being tenured. Conversely, men would earn $23,000 less for tenure status if they were paid according to women's salary structure. In other words, if women were paid like men on this one variable, their overall advantage would be smaller than the disadvantage that men would experience were they paid like women, again on this one variable. This paradoxical effect reflects the fact that the salary structures of the two groups are different, their characteristics are different, and more than one variable is entered into the equations. Using this strategy, our analysis also indicated that women show a higher return than men on some variables (age, administrative experience, and whiteness)—a nuanced finding that is worth further exploration and, ultimately, explanation. We consider this a nice example of expanding feminist methods to enrich understanding of the gendered pay gap.

Feminist consciousness

We discuss the play of feminist consciousness in this project in two ways. First, as already described, it is an integral part of the research process insofar as the researchers self-identify as feminists, such that the project's questions and strategies are informed by various degrees and kinds of feminist thinking. At the same time, feminist consciousness is part of that which is being studied, the substantive subject matter of the project; it is a construct to measure, monitor, and thus operationalize as hypothesized in the original research model.

Figure 1 illustrates our reasoning that, if the project strategies work successfully to increase numbers of women in science, decrease the gender gap in salaries, or in other ways improve the climate for women, surely

part of that change would be an increase in gender awareness if not feminist consciousness. We speculated that absence of widespread feminist consciousness on the part of university faculty is a factor in the university's current climate and plays some role in women's overall status and well-being. In short, we hypothesized that some degree or level of feminist awareness is an intervening, if not major, dependent variable. That is, independent variables such as leadership workshops and other intervention strategies would generate a measurable increase in feminist consciousness among faculty, and this in turn would lead to more female faculty through higher retention rates, through more female hires, or both.

We initially attempted to measure feminist consciousness as one of many indicators of "climate" in a general survey sent to a stratified random sample of instructional and research faculty on campus (oversampled for women). There is a relatively well-developed literature on the measurement of feminist consciousness and related concepts (Cook 1989; Morgan 1996; Reingold and Foust 1998). For our purposes, however, published instruments were either too lengthy or too generic (i.e., developed and created for the general population but not as fitting for faculty in higher education). For example, Betsy Levonian Morgan's (1996, 380) eleven-item short form includes statements (to be endorsed or rejected by respondents) such as "Doctors need to take women's health concerns more seriously" and "Women should be considered as seriously as men as candidates for the Presidency of the United States." We needed items tailored for a population of university faculty. Rather than general attitudes about women in society, we hoped to capture specific thinking about women in academia.

We first conceptualized feminist consciousness in terms of stage theory (Schuster and Van Dyne 1985; Tetreault 1985) because of stage theory's connection to feminist pedagogy and academic curricular reform (Nielsen and Abromeit 1993). The identified stages of feminist consciousness in this context overlap and are not necessarily sequential. They are, first, unrecognized absence of women; second, recognition of women's underrepresentation; third, development of bifocal scholarship and critique of the canon; fourth, intellectual pursuit of feminist scholarship; and, finally, multifocal scholarship that includes of all intersections of inequality, difference, and diversity. We translated published questionnaire items into questions about women's status in academia and piloted the resulting instrument among colleagues.

The results were disastrous but informative. Both feminist and non-feminist colleagues were either offended by the questions, did not understand them, became defensive, could not respond without considerably

more clarification and context, or some combination of the above. They criticized both the wording and implied meanings of the items. More important, responses to the items did not distinguish between those with no feminist consciousness and those with a highly developed sense of women's situation in academia. This is primarily because early stage items (no awareness of women's invisibility) are superficially similar to later stage items (inclusivity that transcends gender). In this regard, our experience corresponds to that of Celia Kitzinger (1999), who reports similar results with measures of homophobia. She points out that the meaning of responses to statements like "lesbians pose a threat to nuclear family and society as we know it" and "what people do in bed is their own business" are not fixed, that no response is innately homophobic, and that their interpretation depends on how one responds to other items in the same scale. Both Kitzinger's and our examples illustrate what happens when multidimensional, context-dependent, and perhaps situationally dependent constructs are measured in paper-pencil format as if they are linear, finite, and categorical.

It became increasingly clear, as it has to others (Snelling 1999), that theoretical distinctions of levels of feminist consciousness such as those implicit in feminist phase theory and others in widely cited categories such as liberal, radical, Marxist, cultural, postcolonial, third world, and the like are too refined, too specific, and perhaps too academic to encapsulate general populations, including university faculties. Even among the authors—all self-labeled feminists albeit from different generations—there were substantial differences in thinking, and these varied by situation.

Experiences such as those described above with pilot survey respondents, combined with acute awareness of our own inconsistent and situationally specific thinking—which was always feminist, sometimes more liberal, sometimes more radical, and sometimes postmodern, sometimes 1990s feminist, sometimes 1970s feminist, sometimes all these in one day—confirmed that gender consciousness is multidimensional, dynamic, elusive, contradictory, ambiguous, interactional, situationally specific, shifting, and contextual.[11] The contrast between our seemingly sophisticated and relativist conceptualization of feminist consciousness and the static, flat, two-dimensionality of survey questions was unnerving. It became clear that thinking and conceptualizing about feminist consciousness had outpaced available quantitative measurement strategies. We

[11] The interactional yet constitutive nature of consciousness is nicely expr[...] Eagleton· "Consciousness is less something 'within' us than something aroun[...] us, a network of signifiers which constitute us through and through" (1991, [...]

close to concluding that measuring gender consciousness in order to assess institutional change, at least with items on a questionnaire, is impossible. At the same time, we realized that identifying, clarifying, and describing such climate changes in complex detail would contribute to eventual understanding of, if not resolution of, gender and race issues in the university.

Precisely because of this kind of thinking—social constructionist reminders of the extent to which knowledge is generated by both researchers and respondents—we had initially resisted using survey instruments earlier in the project. (Such misgivings regarding the assumptions of traditional empiricist methods for feminist work are a common theme in the feminist literature.) Review of the project as a whole by an external consultant, however, convinced us that some form of "objective" evaluation was necessary to provide benchmarks for the project that would help convince others of its value.[12] Just as in the case of the salary survey, the clash between the practical need for usable results and our relativist, contextual, qualified thinking and conclusions created a quandary. A sense of responsibility to the funding agency to provide a usable evaluation of the project intensified the magnitude of the dilemma. Explicit tension between project goals and feminist thinking was palpable. The external consultant reminded us that surveys still work well in the larger context of research. After all, to some extent we are still playing to a male audience. Although the decision to use a survey format in order to communicate more effectively with the funding agency was a practical one, it also shows how a dominant paradigm works to reinforce itself.

In the end, we abandoned direct measures of feminist consciousness and constructed broader measures of how the campus work environment is perceived. These included, but were not limited to, the following: access to resources, institutional support for family-related issues, quality of faculty mentoring, quality of department leadership, perceptions of interpersonal relations and collegiality, and support for and commitments to gender and racial/ethnic diversity. The latter included an item about how often one discusses issues of gender, ethnicity, and race diversity.

Of course, this did not lead to clean and unambiguous measures. For example, respondents were moved to clarify answers that might otherwise have made them appear less than pro-women. As a case in point, one person who indicated that she does not discuss gender issues at work and

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[12] We endorse objectivity in the sense of making information public rather than in the sense of distance from the subject being studied (Nielsen 1990, 31).

who was apparently concerned that her response might make her sound like one who is resistant to gender issues writes:

> My department is and has been for years well above the national average for female faculty and females in positions of authority. Therefore, I can say it is not a topic of discussion because we just hire the best person for the job and sometimes those are women. We don't actively look for women, we look for the best. I don't have discussions of gender issues within my department or in my personal life because there is no need. I was hired initially as an instructor, I have been elected director of a predominantly male public service unit, and I was recently elected to a leadership position in my department—what's to discuss? (Written comment to open-ended survey question by anonymous respondent, Boulder, CO, October 2003)

The use of "frequency of conversation about gender issues" as one indicator of gender consciousness, then, did not resolve issues of meaning and interpretation. And, as in the case cited, the value of providing open-ended space to interpret otherwise yes/no or quantitative responses was not lost on us as we bounced back and forth between needing quantitative and seemingly "objective" data and realizing that such data are always already contextual. Contextuality makes data richer but less generalizable; here we see a clash between traditional social science goals and postmodern feminist realities. We stayed with the survey, though, well aware of the contradictions and frustrations inherent to this feminist work. Feminist scholars (e.g., Westkott 1979; Harding 1986) define such tensions as creative and generative as well as uneasy. This now familiar tension intensifies as we move to a discussion of insider/outsider status in social action research.

Social action research

Social action research, unlike traditional research, is designed to simultaneously affect and monitor changes in a nonexperimental, ongoing social system (Lewin 1948; Whyte 1991). In traditional evaluation research the intervention and evaluative components are usually separate tasks carried out by different parties. In this project we became acutely aware of the significance and effects of being both social change agents and researchers—that is, both generating and monitoring change. In keeping

with the backstage story, we highlight three issues relevant to this project: insider/outsider status, obtrusiveness, and resistance to the research itself.

Insider/outsider status

There is considerable documentation and description of women's and others' dynamic, conflicted social positioning and the resulting disparities between action and consciousness.[13] These are defined in feminist literature as assets, as a source of creative tension, and as a basis for standpoint epistemologies, which emphasize the historical and situated nature of knowledge. Most writers emphasize outsider or shifting status rather than insider status per se. We instead discuss the advantages and complexities of insider/outsider and shifting status specific to this large-scale social action research project in which the target is the university itself.

To begin, the insider status of two members of the research team—both full professors, one the project's principal investigator, the other an associate dean—was a research bonus and gave us privileges and advantages not otherwise available. First, there was access to administrative deans and chancellors, whose participation and affiliation with the larger project were secured from the beginning.[14] Second, university staff and officials readily honored our requests for information otherwise not easily available, in part because they came from "the dean's office." Indeed, some key variables—such as gender and race/ethnicity—are normally confidential and not published or associated with individuals' names. Nevertheless, we were able to merge certain databases and thereby connect this information to salaries. In addition, some sensitive nonpublic information about who left the university and why was obtained via phone calls and e-mails through networking and contacts as part of normal work activities. There was no deception here, but the process was definitely more informal than a typical research survey or report would have been. Finally, we capitalized on our insider connections by listing well-known administrators and advisory board members on letters sent to survey nonrespondents in order to increase the response rate. And it apparently worked; the number of responses doubled after we distributed that letter.

These examples illustrate that in some respects we were more insider than outsider vis-à-vis the university system. This had its downside as well

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[13] See Du Bois (1903) 1997; Simmel (1908) 1999; Beauvoir (1952) 1989; Smith 1974; Westkott 1979; Moraga 1981, Lorde 1984; Anzaldúa 1999; Collins 2000; hooks 2000.

[14] This endorsement was required by the funding agency in keeping with its promotion of institutional change.

as its benefits. Indeed, Marcia Westkott's insightful description of insider/ outsider status in academia as "women opposing the very conditions to which they conform" (1979, 428) often felt like "conforming to that which we oppose"—a subtle but important distinction. This expression began to haunt us as we found ourselves increasingly embedded in and familiar with the institution's decision-making bodies, both as regular faculty members and as researchers. Challenging the source of one's institutional power is tricky business. At times it became too easy to agree with, even repeat, some authoritative rationale for administrative decisions and policies. At other times strong feminist responses to untenable policies were alive and well. In other words, we experienced firsthand the extent to which structures permeate and shape consciousness, even though at other times we were critical of the institution. The research experience highlighted tension (as well as agreement) between consciousness and behavior, as described by Westkott (1979). We continually had to remind ourselves that the project was to support major challenges to and changes in the environment in which we were so successfully working. We had to remind ourselves, also, that this same environment was our "ongoing source of institutional power" (Bensimon and Marshall 2003, 347).

In at least one instance insider status and its relative influence may have led to unexpected, unintended, and undue influence. To illustrate, we relate an anecdote. The setting is the annual evaluation process to determine salary raises for the next year. The chancellor's office announces that this year, unlike the past three years, there will be no gender equity adjustments made. The rationale for this decision is that although there remains a gendered salary difference, it is not statistically significant. Surprised at this announcement, and already aware through informal networks of critical statements about the specific regression analysis that led to the conclusion of no significance, one team member queried a high official via e-mail for additional details about the decision. The senior official's response was to defer responsibility for the decision—it was not his doing. "You can't pin that on me," he said jokingly. The team member immediately clarified that the query was meant to be inquiring, not accusatory. A few days later, the chancellor's office announced a revised policy; indeed there would be a gender equity adjustment process after all.

We do not assume that the contact caused the change in policy; it is likely that several other campus activists made the same inquiry. More to the point of this project, simply by requesting more information about the decision the researcher in effect became both subject and object of the pay equity process. She was simultaneously researching pay equity on campus and involved, even if peripherally and inadvertently, in the deci-

sion-making process regarding salary adjustments and, as a female faculty member, could have benefited directly from the policy change. Although the latter was unintended, from the point of view of traditional research the incident illustrates "contamination," the researcher affecting the very thing she is researching. So much for the positivist ideal of unobtrusive measures (Webb 1966). Ironically, this is an example of the type of success that the project wanted to generate.

The example just cited is entirely consistent with action research, which differs from traditional science research norms by purposefully affecting that which is under study (Whyte 1991), usually for emancipatory reasons. The example in this case is similar to Ann Oakley's (1981) experience of interviewing pregnant women. She was affecting (by giving advice and information) the parenting as she studied it. Insider status, then, became insider influence at times.

Action research is as disruptive as traditional research tries to be un-obtrusive. But as researchers we found that our insider/outsider status meant walking a fine line between working with and against the system, not only choosing our battles but choosing the appropriate argument or rationale. We found, for example, that liberal feminist arguments work well with university administrators. They cannot disagree with arguments for an equal playing field. Implicit here is the liberal assumption that equality means sameness and sameness means equity. Even as we articulate it, though, we realize that sameness is not necessarily equitable. And the wonderfully audacious goal, as announced in the proposal—to change the rules rather than the women—will no doubt require arguments in the tradition of cultural and radical feminism (women's contributions are different but equally or more valuable; women's needs are different and need to be recognized). Again, there is a clash between liberal and more radical feminisms—this time in relation to the social action aspect of the project.

Obtrusiveness

From its beginning, the action part of the project was intentionally obtrusive. The target was the entire university campus, so we encouraged widespread publicity. Nevertheless, at one point a research-oriented team member proposed to the principal investigator that we use "College A" in the system as a comparison group to be contrasted with the larger, more central "College B." The researcher pointed out that College A had few women in its departments and was about to launch a top-down effort to increase the number of female faculty. As a result of strings attached to incipient and substantial funding, College A administrators had set a time-specific

mandate for hiring specific numbers of female and minority faculty. The research idea was that College A's top-down and externally imposed strategy to increase the number of female faculty contrasted nicely with College B's more bottom-up, internally generated strategy to achieve similar ends.

Even as we argued in favor of this plan, though, we realized that the publicity about the project and its obtrusiveness rendered untenable the possibility of an uncontaminated comparison group on the same campus. Again, it is a minor but consequential clash between what would have been an ideal unobtrusive field experiment and the obtrusive goals of the project. In any event, the principal investigator understandably rejected the idea because we could not contain the project as defined, practically speaking. More important, for purely ethical and liberatory reasons, we could not pass up the opportunity to buttress support for and facilitate the planned change in College A. It would be ironic indeed if we as feminists intentionally held back project benefits from some faculty for the sake of a clean comparison.

A second issue has to do with obtrusiveness of the survey. As executed, it potentially would have negative effects on the very people it was designed to help. Several respondents expressed fear of being identified and of subsequent negative repercussions based on their responses. One respondent, for example, left us to ponder the statement, "I fear I will be punished for taking this survey." Minority and/or untenured faculty appeared to be especially vulnerable, but even tenured full professors expressed reluctance to respond honestly and straightforwardly to the survey for fear of jeopardizing relationships with colleagues. Another reluctant respondent raised an important issue we had not anticipated. She did not want to reveal her location in the university and, at the same time, evaluate the leadership in her department because it would undercut her strategy for survival and advancement. Consider her comments:

> I was looking forward to participating in your questionnaire, as the issues of academic women have always been of the utmost importance to me. But I will not send in material assessing the chair of my department in the areas about which you've asked and then identify my department, therefore him. . . . I have a professional relationship with this man which is based in good will on both sides. . . . I will not compromise this relationship. One of the things that women in academe must learn is how to function and survive in a system that is by definition sexist and racist. . . . If you are trying to take care of yourself in the wilds of academe, you need to cultivate a relationship

of some kind with your chair. (Written comment to open-ended survey question by anonymous respondent, Boulder, CO, October 2003)

This respondent did complete the survey after learning that she could skip potentially identifying questions, but doing so made it more difficult for us to identify and address specific problem areas in the university. This was especially an issue in cases where departments are predominantly male. Thus, exposure, though necessary in one sense, increases vulnerability and undercuts the goals of the project in another sense.[15]

Resistance

Ours is not the first feminist project to show that efforts to stimulate change generate resistance (see Aiken et al. 1987). The following excerpts from the open-ended section of the survey illustrate that not everyone in the university agreed with the premise of the project (that some groups are disadvantaged) and that some therefore opposed the project itself. For example, two different respondents wrote: "Need less emphasis by women on making gender an issue. . . . There's too much political correctness. Instead of focusing on someone's gender or ethnicity or background and looking for victims among women or minorities, people should just treat each other with respect. . . . Too many people are slackers." And, "May I comment about this survey? . . . The authors seem to assume that questions of gender/ethnicity, etc., are at the center of everybody's attention. . . . How about including some questions about increasing the number of professional, hard-working people regardless of their sex or ethnicity? Thank you." (Written comments to open-ended survey question by anonymous respondents, Boulder, CO, October 2003.) Although both respondents returned the survey partially completed, the message is that they were endorsing a return to traditionally egalitarian, perhaps prefeminist values rather than the kind of change advocated by the project. The research dilemma here is that the survey itself appears to have kindled mobilization against the kind of change we are hoping to achieve.

Discussion

The now substantial literature on the topic describes feminist research as

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[15] We considered the above respondent's criticism as advice and incorporated it into our faculty workshops on networking, mentoring, and coaching among faculty. The result, though unintended, is a nice example of synergistic feedback across different parts of the larger project.

"passionate, scrappy, energizing" (Garko 1999, 167) and also as contra-dictory, controversial, revolutionary, dynamic, problematic, oxymoronic, ex-plosive, and filled with creative tension. Deborah L. Tolman and Laura A. Szalacha refer to "epistemological unrest" (1999, 10). Michelle Fine and Susan Gordon describe feminist psychology as an inherent contradiction, pointing out that psychological laboratory studies, with their isolation, ste-rility, and lack of relationships, are designed to "drive women mad" (1992, 11). Elizabeth Merrick (1999) describes her complex feminist reanalysis of data on teen pregnancy as "like chewing gravel." There is agreement in the literature that traditional methods need feminist-inspired interruption (Har-ding 1987). Indeed, Ellen Scott and Bindi Shah (1993, 99) cite Beatriz Pesquera as wondering if "we can develop empowering methodologies with-out examining the whole process of academic production within the uni-versity." Certainly we have accomplished one goal of this article, that is, to capture the contradictory, emergent, and potentially revolutionary nature of feminist research as it is practiced.

Backstage, inside-story accounts of research in progress have been con-tributing to improving methodologies at least since Julius A. Roth's "Hired Hands Research" (1966). Feminist research is especially known for its reflectivity. It is not surprising, then, that there is a substantial literature of case studies of feminist research projects.[16] Indeed, there is so much that Jane Ussher (1999) asks if feminist researchers are obsessed with methods. A second purpose of this article is to contribute to this literature.

Our focus is specifically on feminist empiricism, something described in the literature as in transition and controversial even (or primarily) among feminists. See, for example, Sandra Harding's (1993) detailed com-parison between the feminist standpoint, on the one hand, and prefeminist and spontaneous feminist empiricist epistemologies, on the other; Rich-mond Campbell's (1994) model of internal feminist empiricism; Helen Longino's (1993) philosophical model of contextual empiricism; and Lynn Hankinson Nelson's (1990, 1993) naturalized empiricism. Thus, juxtaposing our reflective thoughts on feminist empirical work with writ-ings by theorists and philosophers on the topic should be informative. Not surprisingly, we do not exactly fit any one description of feminist empiricism—not completely and not yet anyway. Certainly we recognize what Harding (1993) calls spontaneous feminist empiricism in the earliest

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[16] See Belle 1982; Aiken et al 1987, Ladner 1987; Halloway 1989; Riessman 1990; Acker, Barry, and Esseveld 1991, Brown and Gilligan 1992, Wasser and Bresler 1996.

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stages of this project. But our thinking quickly became unstable, transitioning across different feminist approaches.[17]

To contribute to current discussion and debate around feminist empiricism, how it is practiced, and how it is transitioning, we present a few close-to-the-ground conclusions based on this particular research experience. As stated earlier, we recognized, perhaps agonizingly, that our feminist thinking had outpaced available methods and strategies. This was most obvious in efforts to measure feminist consciousness when we realized that it was impossible to capture conceptual complexities and refinements in a few or even a series of survey questions. We also realized that to generate useful data and capture the thinking of our respondents, we had to abandon our own constructs and temporarily adopt our respondents' points of view.

We saw the same pattern—that our feminist thinking had outpaced our empiricist approach—with respect to understanding salary differences between male and female faculty. We began with an effort to explain (away) via regression analyses the gendered gap in salaries at this university. We ended with critical questions about the larger social structure and culture—questions that are unanswerable within regression-mode thinking. The questions that emerge when one attempts a deeper—behind the numbers—understanding of this pattern relate to the division of labor by sex. That is, answers to questions about salary differences are found in patterns of sex segregation by academic discipline and likely by associated patterns of work distribution (research, teaching, and service) across and within disciplines. These in turn are patterns that reflect the larger societal division of labor by sex. It is interesting that these kinds of substantive questions begin to approach those that constitute starting points for feminist standpoint theory. We cite, for example, Harding's description of Dorothy Smith's questions about women's work that are generated by a strategy of grounding knowledge in women's everyday experience: "She [Smith] points out that if we start thinking from women's lives, we (anyone) can see that women are assigned the work that men do not want to do for themselves" (Harding 1993, 53).

We come to a similar conclusion—that our feminist work developed similarities to standpoint and postmodern approaches—from our experience of dual vision. That is, as we shifted between views of the university from central and from marginal social locations, from both the inside and the underside, we experienced firsthand the multivocal and complex nature of the realities we were studying. In other words, this process erased,

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[17] Harding (1986) defines feminist conceptual categories as appropriately unstable. One can say the same about feminist methods, epistemologies, and methodologies.

eroded, and undermined any semblance of the monologic voice that usu-
ally underlies and characterizes prefeminist empiricism and much of fem-
inist empiricism.

Does it matter what we call our practice of feminist research? Does it
matter whether what we have described is contextual (Longino 1993),
spontaneous (Harding 1993), positivist, internal (Campbell 1994), or
naturalized feminist empiricism (Nelson 1990, 1993)? It does insofar as
feminist empiricism is still emerging and this work can be seen as part of
the transition toward delineating an effective, successful, and transforming
version of feminist research. As a feminist project whose researchers are
cognizant of the variety of feminist alternatives, it has descriptive and thus
epistemological value. As an actual project against which primarily the-
oretical work can be compared, its value is in its very doing.

Why confessions? This account feels confessional in the sense that al-
ternatives to feminist empiricism—standpoint and postmodern femi-
nism—seem more cutting edge because they are more deliberately critical
of traditional ways of producing knowledge. We felt apologetic for con-
tinually falling back on known empiricist strategies when we were thinking
more radically and aware of being constrained methodologically. This is
an odd stance to take, though, since feminist empiricism has been revo-
lutionary in its contribution to women's liberation, and, as Francesca
Cancian (1996) and Longino (1993) point out, despite much writing
about creating innovative methods, most feminist work revises mainstream
methodologies. (An oft-repeated theme in the literature is that feminism
is not in the methods per se but in their use.) Postmodern thinking in
particular is often more exhilarating and challenging theoretically, yet in-
sofar as it rejects grand theory, large-scale models, and indeed any kind
of generalization, it poses almost irresolvable empirical challenges. Our
theme that feminist empiricism is outgrowing its traditional methods is
worth pursuing through further analysis of specific research projects such
as the one we describe. For now, we continue to stretch and expand the
research paradigm with which we began.

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"You're calling me a racist?" The Moral and Emotional Regulation of Antiracism and Feminism

> Presuming innocence, each of us is consistently surprised when we are viewed by other women as agents of oppression.
> —Fellows and Razack 1994, 1048

Rage, tears, and confusion often follow even the most tentative discussions of racism and explorations of antiracism. Feminist scholars in particular have observed that antiracist challenges in feminist organizations and classrooms can elicit emotional responses from white feminists (Anzaldúa 1990; Friedman 1995; Fellows and Razack 1998). Ruth Frankenberg's well-known research on whiteness, for example, stemmed from her own "despair" over white feminists' "limited repertoire" of emotional responses to charges of racism (1993, 2). It becomes clear that while emotional aspects of solidarity have always been vital to building progressive communities of feminists and other activists, they are also the unsteady foundations on which antiracist change falters. However, there have been few sustained observations of how and why these emotional responses have been able to block, defuse, and distract from change in feminist, pedagogical, and social movement sites. I should emphasize that my aim is not to critique or dismiss the range of excellent antiracist work that has been undertaken by both white and nonwhite activists, and most notably by feminists, but rather to explore the subtle and not-so-subtle resistance to this work as well as the pitfalls of well-meaning efforts. While some might suggest that resistance to antiracism is a minor or temporary blot in the history of social movements rather than an ongoing phenomenon, we must acknowledge that there is ample evidence to the contrary (hooks 1983; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983; Dua and Robertson 1999).

How do we explain these kinds of emotional and resistant responses

to antiracism? Elsewhere I have shown that problematic emotional responses during discussions of racism are cultivated in feminist organizations by histories of consciousness-raising, feminist therapy, and feminist theories of emotion (Srivastava, forthcoming). In this article I suggest that if we look again at these emotional debates and volatile exchanges over racism we can also hear their moral undertones, undertones with roots in feminist community, imperial history, and national imaginings. It is these narratives of morality that help to undergird inequitable relations of race in social movement sites such as feminist organizations. My own research in Canadian feminist organizations over the past two decades shows that in the face of antiracist challenges many white feminists may feel that it is their self-image—as good, implicitly nonracist people—and particularly their shared moral identity as feminists that is under siege. In other words, we can see that the typical pattern of emotional responses to antiracist challenges—anger, fear, and tears—is in part produced by implied challenges to what counts as a good feminist, a good person, a good woman, and a good national citizen.

Writers such as Mariana Valverde (1991), Ann Laura Stoler (1995), and Richard Dyer (1997) provide an important beginning to my analysis, showing that colonial and contemporary representations of virtue, honesty, and benevolence have been a historical foundation of whiteness, bourgeois respectability, and femininity. My contribution is to show further that the history of Western feminist movements adds another layer of moral imperative to these historical constructions of racial innocence. Many authors have already elaborated on the state as a regulator of gendered and racialized systems of morality and social control (Corrigan 1981; Little 1999). However, we must recognize that social movement organizations have also been important in promoting values that support state moral regulation and nation building (Valverde and Weir 1988, 32; Valverde 1991, 17). At the same time, social movement organizations are also active in creating their own social spaces, or "heterotopia" (Foucault 1986; Hetherington 1997), with local codes of morality that may counter state aims. So social movements may be both implicated in state multiculturalism policy and influenced by alternative discourses of equity and antiracism. My own study attends to these unique characteristics of contemporary social movement organizations—as well as to their historical particularity in the past two decades of feminist organizing. I argue that within social movements such as feminism, and in nations such as Canada, we can discern distinct moral accounts of self that disallow open discussions of what it might mean to be antiracist.

In undertaking this analysis, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing

historical shifts in the moral narratives shared by many white feminists. Over the past two decades, as Western feminist practice has gradually integrated antiracist thought, it seems that ideas about what makes a good feminist have also shifted. My analysis finds, however, that as some white feminists move toward new ideals of antiracist feminism, they often move toward deeper self-examination rather than toward organizational change. These findings suggest that some of the deadlocks of antiracist efforts are linked to these preoccupations with morality and self.

Method and methodology
The analysis here is based on semistructured interviews with feminists involved in antiracism, on the published reflections of feminists, and on observations of organizational efforts. I conducted twenty-one confidential interviews with fifteen feminists involved in antiracist efforts in eighteen women's organizations based in Toronto, Canada, including drop-in centers, shelters, feminist advocacy groups, and feminist publications and publishers.[1] Two-thirds of those interviewed identified themselves as women of color; one-third identified themselves as white. All those interviewed had been involved in antiracist efforts within at least one community or social movement organization. Some of the women were interviewed more than once, as several had been involved in antiracist efforts in more than one organization. I also draw on observations of twelve antiracist workshops or workshop series as well as on numerous organizational meetings in a variety of sites, including feminist, environmental, social justice, and popular educational organizations and an aboriginal youth conference. In five of these workshop series I was either participant or facilitator. While my interest is in the practice of antiracism within organizations, I do not focus on the structure, goals, or work of these organizations. While detailed interview accounts of personal reflections

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[1] To protect confidentiality, individuals are identified only by pseudonyms, and the interview transcripts are not identified by organization. The women interviewed worked in the following organizations: Sistering, a women's center and drop-in program; Women's Counselling Referral and Education Centre; Nellie's Hostel, National Action Committee on the Status of Women; Women in Transition shelter, Common Ground women's center; Central Neighbourhood House; International Women's Day/March 8th Coalition; Women's Network on Health and Environment; Greenpeace; *Fireweed*, a feminist journal; Toronto Women's Press; Oasis, a francophone women's counseling service; New Directions, a service organization for widowed and divorced women; the Disabled Women's Network; Foodshare; Canadian Women's Foundation; and Metro Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children.

and debates among activists are central to this study, I do not attempt to do a detailed analysis of or make proposals about interpersonal communication and individual motivation. Rather, I use these accounts by and about individual activists to understand better how discourses and practices of antiracism in organizations are shaped by broader historical relations of gender, race, and nation.[2]

I begin by tracing historical representations of white, innocent femininity and feminism and then show how these are conjoined with the moral conventions of the contemporary feminist community. I then turn to the observations and reminiscences of nonwhite and white antiracist feminists to illustrate these links in the context of antiracist debates.

Morality, whiteness, and women

A number of scholars have investigated the making of the white subject and its place in constructions of culture, nation, and empire. These studies provide the foundation for interpreting the racial and moral politics of antiracist debate between white and nonwhite feminists today.[3]

That representations of morality are racialized is well demonstrated. David Goldberg has argued that moral reason itself has been racialized by "constituting racial others outside the scope of morality" (1993, 39). Dyer (1997) demonstrates this racialization of morality in his close study of visual representations of white people in Western culture, showing that the moral symbolism of the color white is in turn reflected in the repetitive association of white skin with virtue. Tracing visual and literary representations from Renaissance painting to Hollywood film, Dyer argues that the equation of whiteness with goodness underlies all representations of white and nonwhite people. He concludes, "To be white is to be at once of the white race and 'honourable' and 'square-dealing'" (65).

Representations of morality have also been historically gendered. Dyer, for example, traces the historic tendency of visual depictions of white women to draw on images of the glowingly angelic. But the image of the good, caring woman has been further shaped by imperialism (Enloe 1989; Valverde 1991; Ware 1992). Stoler's work in particular shows that nineteenth-century imperialist discourses cast white women as the "custodians" of bourgeois morality (1995, 130). The protection of white women

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[2] Rosemary Pringle's study of secretaries and bosses, *Secretaries Talk* (1989), and Frankenberg's study of whiteness, *White Women, Race Matters* (1993), use similar approaches to integrating interview material into sociological analysis.

[3] See Goldberg 1993; Stoler 1995; Dyer 1997; Frankenberg 1997.

from the supposed immoral passions of men of color in the colonies, for example, was justified by gendered and racialized representations of virtue. The White Women's Protection Ordinance of Papua New Guinea is but one piece of colonial legislation that cemented these constructions (Stoler 1995). Furthermore, in their roles as missionaries and teachers, European women in colonial settings often styled themselves as the overseers of black souls and "guardian of white morals" (Ware 1992, 120).

However, not only feminine but also feminist moral identity has been historically focused on benevolence and innocence. Research has shown that these historical representations of the benevolent Anglo-Saxon bourgeois woman as a standard of moral and racial purity have also played an enduring part in first-wave feminist discourse (Valverde 1992), not only in colonial settings but also in U.S. and Canadian movements. Nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century maternal feminism, for example, reproduced images of women as keepers of morality in the family and the nation (Valverde 1992). Valverde (1992) shows how discourses of whiteness, light, and purity in the turn-of-the-century Canadian maternal feminist movement produced an image of vote-deserving women as the cultural, moral, and biological "mothers of the race," a position clearly inhabitable only by some white women. Vron Ware (1992) and Paula Giddings (1984) have made similar observations about the suffragist movements in Britain and in the United States.

The turn-of-the-century moral reform movement in North America, closely linked to first-wave feminism, echoed these constructions of femininity and gendered morality. By rescuing or studying immigrant, "feeble-minded," or poor women, middle-class Anglo-Saxon Protestant women thereby emphasized their own supposed benevolence, superiority, and innocence (Valverde 1991, 62). Similarly, the ideals of women's liberation that U.S. women brought to their work as missionaries in India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were bolstered by their belief that their superior domestic, cultural, and religious position must be adopted by supposedly "down-trodden" Indian women (Flemming 1992, 192). In other words, the role of moral leader, reformer, and expert allowed some white women to attain respectability and status (Valverde 1991; Fellows and Razack 1998).

Contemporary feminism: Threads of heterotopia, history, and nation
How, then, are these histories expressed in contemporary sites? While discussions of racism continue to be shaped by imperialist histories, these preoccupations with innocence and morality have a more contemporary

and more complex expression. Specific to Western second-wave feminist organizations are the ways that these historical and gendered representations of racial innocence and superiority come together with two other threads: feminist ideals of justice and egalitarian community and national discourses of tolerance, benevolence, and nonracism.

Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of social movement organizations—and that which is most relevant here—is that most contemporary social movements have focused not only on changing society "out there" but also on developing practices for looking inward, with the aim of shaping community and self. Using implicit guidelines for conduct as well as alternative moral standards, language, and practices, social movements such as feminism work at constructing imagined egalitarian communities and ethical selves—preoccupations that were not part of first-wave feminist movements.

The concept of heterotopia, used by Michel Foucault (1986) to refer to alternative moral orders or spaces, is useful in focusing on the moral dimensions of the social movement as imagined community.[4] Kevin Hetherington's (1997) historical discussion of heterotopia is helpful here; his study of the Freemasons of eighteenth-century England shows how an organization or movement can create spaces of social solidarity, or alternative community, that symbolize a new moral order. In particular, Hetherington argues, the Freemasons saw their organization as an alternative moral space, a "good place" characterized by humanistic ideals of fraternity, individual freedom, charity, and tolerance (12). Of course, as an exclusive men's social organization, freemasonry represents quite a different moral order from those of contemporary social movement organizations. However, we can see that Hetherington's description of heterotopia as an "other" social space shaped by the desire of Freemasons for a new moral order, or good place, is similar in form to the imagined, alternative community created by the feminist movement. To extend Hetherington's analysis, the alternative social movement community, like freemasonry, is also envisioned as a good place. In other words, social movements require a vision not only of a community of individuals but also of shared ideas, morals, and ethics.

For example, feminism's ideal of a global sorority of women (Morgan 1984) shares with freemasonry's ideal of fraternity a vision of an imagined family with shared commitments, values, or experiences. Although many

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[4] The phrase *imagined community* was conceived by Benedict Anderson (1992) to describe the development of "nationness" and nationalism.

feminists have criticized the particular notion of a global sisterhood, it is clear that feminist movements are often imagined as social, political, and moral communities—albeit recreated and re-visioned in a variety of physical and imagined spaces. In their discussion of "moral politics," Valverde and Lorna Weir argue that feminism provides an "alternative moral system" (1988, 33). In particular, feminist and "alternative" spaces are commonly associated with ethical practices distinct from mainstream institutions—including antioppressive practices and lifestyle, an ethic of care, emotional self-expression, and egalitarianism.[5] For example, some feminists have expressed the need to start "at home" by fighting racism "within our own community" (Broadside Collective 1986, 2).

However, even as they produce distinct ethical practices and moral communities, second-wave feminist efforts are also overlaid with the contemporary national discourses of tolerance, multiculturalism, or nonracism common to Western nations such as Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States. Here, I use the term *nonracist* to refer to a liberal discourse of equality that denies the systemic nature of racism and its presence in our everyday language and practices.[6] In Canada, the "national story" of benevolence and generosity toward outsiders is particularly powerful (Ng 1992; Razack 2000). In Carol Schick's study of Canadian student teachers' reflections on racism, Canada was described as a "lovable," "not evil" place where everyone receives equitable treatment (1998, 310). Not surprisingly, Schick found that the teachers' claims to their own innocence concerning racism drew on this national discourse of tolerance and benevolence. Similarly, in the Netherlands, writes Philomena Essed (1991), the reluctance of citizens to acknowledge racist acts is tied to the national self-image of tolerance and nondiscrimination. In Frankenberg's interviews with white women in the United States, a similar "color-evasive" and "power-evasive" repertoire was predominant (1993, 14). In New Zealand, Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1992) outline similar discursive strategies of denial that New Zealanders use to avoid being seen as prejudiced. As many have

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[5] In her study of a health organization, Sherryl Kleinman uses the term *alternative* to refer to an identity based in egalitarianism and in challenging conventional authority (1996, 5). Although a variety of labels is used and the specific attributes are varied, many social movement identities, including feminist ones, share these traits (see Carroll and Ratner 1996), and it is in this general sense that I use the term *alternative*.

[6] This term was suggested to me by Roxana Ng, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. Donna Baines (1998) has used Ng's term in her study of progressive social workers she interviewed.

argued, these kinds of liberal and "color-blind" representations have been central not only to the denial but also to the perpetuation of racism and exclusion (see, e.g., Razack 2000).[7]

These discourses have been influential in feminist politics as well, although here nonracism has been joined by antiracism, a political philosophy and practice committed to challenging racism as systemic in institutions and everyday life. As a historically humanist project, feminism, like liberal democratic nations, has often been imagined as inherently egalitarian and inherently nonracist. In other words, nonracist feminist discourse expresses concerns about racism not as an active political project but as an impediment to an otherwise inherent egalitarianism. Within feminist organizations, however, this broader liberal discourse is joined with a feminist vision of radical democracy and revolution. Ware argues that this implicit progressive egalitarianism was a tenet of British feminism in the 1980s, one that stood in the way of antiracist activism: "To begin with, there was almost an assumption among many women that as feminism was a progressive, even revolutionary force, it contained within it an automatic anti-racism position" (Ware 1992, 18). Lynda Hurst's *Toronto Star* article about racial conflict among feminists in Canada suggests rhetorically, "Surely feminism, a movement based on equality, has always been implicitly anti-racist?" (1992, D1). Feminism, in this representation, is a place of just practices, egalitarian relations, revolutionary goals, and good individuals.

These three threads—imperial representations of innocence, imagined egalitarian communities, and national discourses of tolerance—can become intertwined in contemporary women's feminist, service, and professional work. A number of writers have made links between the historical foundations of gendered and racialized morality and contemporary discussions of racism or oppression in feminist forums (Enloe 1989; Ware 1992; Fellows and Razack 1998). As Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack suggest, in contemporary feminist debates women whose dominance is contested often respond with an "emotional attachment to innocence" (1998, 343). Fellows and Razack argue that this attachment to innocence can be linked to colonial representations of white, innocent femininity. In other words, just as first-wave feminism was shaped by the backdrop of imperialism and nation building, contemporary feminist communities have been similarly shaped by representations of morality rooted

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[7] Frankenberg uses the more accurate terms *color-evasive* and *power-evasive* in preference to *color blindness* because the former refers to the strategies people use to avoid acknowledging racism rather than to their supposed inability to see racism.

in racist and imperial histories. Other scholars have convincingly dem-
onstrated that these nineteenth-century representations continue to struc-
ture many contemporary white women's motivations in feminist psycho-
therapy (Roger 1998) and international development (Heron 1999).
Barbara Heron shows that the desire of white Canadian women to do
development work in Africa is inextricable from the "enduring legacy of
. . . middle-class women's moral role" (1999, 86). The women she in-
terviewed, for example, typically said that their motivation to work in
Africa was to "make myself better by doing something for someone some-
where" (1999, 102). However, in the context of the feminist movement
or "progressive" communities, historical representations of white inno-
cence are also joined by the newly theorized ideals of social justice and
of the political integrity of an egalitarian community. Images of benev-
olence and nonracism remain meaningful, but they are also tied to pro-
found moral visions of social justice and commitments to activism. For
example, Heron quotes the white development workers she interviewed
as wanting to "do something to improve the state of the world" (1999,
107). Heron argues that although these statements can be read as an
expression of "white bourgeois subjects seeking to situate themselves in
a global context," they may also be read as "a determined resistance to
both racism and injustice" (107).

Links among these three threads may also be visible in the ways that
national ideals of liberal democracy, freedom, and equality have been sig-
nificant in some feminist and popular discourse on sexism and racism and
in some feminist and antiracist appeals to the state. We might suggest,
for example, that representations of women in Afghanistan and Iraq as
oppressed have not only been important in justifying "liberation" by the
U.S. military but have also reinforced implicit images of women of color
as needing liberation from men of color and of third-world women as
more oppressed than first-world women, assumptions that have been
prominent in some feminist commentary on female genital surgery, the
veil, and violence against women (see, e.g., Uma Narayan's 1997 essay
contrasting the ways in which violence against women in the United States
and in India are framed).

These links among discourses of nation, femininity, and feminism are
clearly demonstrated in some of the responses to antiracist challenges
within feminist organizations. With these challenges, the assertion of the
good, white woman easily becomes a spectacle within and outside feminist
organizations. A well-known Toronto example is the antiracist challenge
raised by women of color working at Nellie's Hostel, a shelter for battered
women. At a turbulent Nellie's board meeting in 1990, staff member Joan

Johnson read aloud a letter outlining concerns of racism. However, the chair of the board, prominent Canadian philanthropist June Callwood, was quick to remind Johnson of what she owed to white women at Nellie's—years earlier, Johnson had been sheltered at Nellie's Hostel while seeking legal immigration status. "Are you the same Joan Johnson all these women helped?" the chair demanded. Johnson understood the meaning of Callwood's reproach. She replied, "You want me on my knees forever" (interview transcripts, May 1996; Dewar 1993, 37). Any discussion of racism in the organization was stopped short by a reminder of the good women who had helped a needy woman of color years before. In this exchange, Callwood questions the gratitude of a woman who would raise the specter of racism against her rescuers. However, the woman's response—"You want me on my knees forever"—is an explicit political challenge to the historical representation of the benevolent, white, middle-class helper of the "less fortunate," to what has been called the "Lady Bountiful" image (Harper 1995). Furthermore, the vociferous public and organizational defense of Callwood, recipient of the Order of Canada, centered around familiar images not only of the good woman and philanthropist but also of the good nation.[8] However, Callwood's defenders were not only other prominent Canadians but also some other feminists, showing how the projection of innocence is crucial both to national self-image and to the white feminist political project. In other words, the defense of Callwood demonstrates a morality founded on representations of innocent femininity, the tolerant nation, and an egalitarian and nonracist feminism.

Moral Identity

A liberal nonracist discourse projects innocence not only onto the tolerant and benevolent nation but also onto the individual, by defining racism as acts done by bad or ignorant individuals and ameliorated by education. Because the heterotopias, or imagined moral communities, of social movement organizations are concerned not only with the production of ethical

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[8] Extensive newspaper coverage included a full-page spread in the national newspaper *Globe and Mail* (Rose 1992); a *Globe and Mail* editorial, "A Question of the Pot Calling the Kettle White" (Thorsell 1992); "If Callwood Is a Racist Then So Are We All" (Berton 1992); and "Unsaid Words on Racism" (Paris 1992). Magazine coverage included the now-infamous "Wrongful Dismissal" (Dewar 1993); a cover story in *Quota*, a lesbian monthly, "Checking In: June Callwood Talks about Her Feelings, Her Faults, and the Failing of Feminist Groups Struggling with Issues of Racism" (Douglas 1993); and Adele Freedman's (1993) "White Woman's Burden" in *Saturday Night*.

practices and values but also with the production of ethical selves, this notion of nonracism can have particular strength and unique manifestations. As Hetherington (1997) notes, the making of the good place is about creating a space for the perfection not only of society but also of the individual within it. Ethical practices, or the ways that we monitor and make ethical selves, are, in other words, of particular interest in understanding social movements and organizations that hope to change conduct and codes of morality.[9] In freemasonry, Hetherington suggests, the ethical practices of trust, tolerance, and fraternity transformed ethical selves and collective identities "from isolated stranger to trustworthy brother" (97). The phrase "the personal is political," for example, gives us the sense that we might create a more just world through the practice of ethical self-regulation. This used to be referred to in activist circles as "politically correct," or behavior that "adheres to a movement's morality and hastens its goals" (Dimen 1984, 139).[10]

Sherryl Kleinman uses the term *moral identity* to refer to "an identity that people invest with moral significance; our belief in ourselves as good people depends on whether we think our actions and reactions are consistent with that identity" (1996, 5). In social movements—or those social spaces that are organized around alternative social justice—distinct organizational rituals, discourses, and shared values can produce specific moral identities. These may be labeled variously as "activist," "feminist," "progressive," and so on, depending on the local social movement context; all moral identities, as Margaret Walker says, are "produced by and in these histories of specific relationship" (1997, 69).

However, not all measure up to these moral identities or participate equally in the moral community. Benedict Anderson (1992) reminds us that the making of nation or community requires not only imagining sameness and communion but also forgetting difference and oppression. The ideas of community are conjured, Anderson says, because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (1992, 7). The forgetting of difference has similarly been a central problem for social movements. It has been possible to imagine solidarity and sisterhood

[9] Valverde's (1999) study of Alcoholics Anonymous, for example, shows that the organization's primary practices can be described as ethical techniques—practices aimed at changing the self, one's own desires and habits—as opposed to medical or psychological techniques.

[10] In the past decade, this meaning of *politically correct* has been caricatured and remade by many conservative writers. For a discussion of this "anti-PC" discourse, see Richer and Weir 1995.

among all women only because relations of power and anger among women have been "forgotten." Imagining the good feminist requires similar omissions. We need to ask new questions about the ethical subject of feminism: Who is "good," or seen as good? Does *good feminist* mean good, white feminist? Does *good feminist* imply a nonracism that glides over inequitable relations of race?

My interview with Yasmin, a young Muslim woman active in making an antiracist challenge at a feminist agency, demonstrates that feminist moral identity has indeed been shaped by race and class relations and that not everyone therefore measures up to the community's moral scrutiny. Yasmin described "my fear of being seen as not feminist"; she was continually aware that she was constantly judged by coworkers on whether her lifestyle was "alternative" enough (interview transcripts). She highlights the omissions in the imagining of the just, "alternative" identity and world, suggesting that these are premised on racialized and classed conceptions of justice and gender: "Everything they embodied was this alternative way of being. 'I'm not going to drink tap water,' 'I'm going to send my child to an alternative school.' And it went on and on. . . . So in some ways, it prevented certain people from feeling comfortable here too" (interview transcripts, April 1996). Yasmin is neither invited to imagine nor desires to imagine the moral community and alternative identity that her coworkers imagine.

Similarly, the implicit nonracism that has been present in some feminist communities or discussions absents the antiracist concerns of Yasmin and other women of color and shapes talk and behavior on these concerns. Here *nonracist* may be used to refer both to those who do "not see" racial inequality as well as to those who acknowledge racism as a concern "out there" but deny that they, their organizations, movements, or nations are implicated in racist practices or discourses. My interviews and my review of feminist media suggest that many white feminists see nonracism or antiracism as integral not only to their identity as tolerant Canadians but also, and primarily, to their identity as feminists, as people working toward a more just world. As Frankenberg observes about her own growing awareness of antiracist feminism, "Because we were basically well-meaning individuals, the idea of being part of the problem of racism was genuinely shocking to us" (1993, 3). The incident at Nellie's Hostel, for example, reinforces the notion that if one is generous and committed to social change, the taint of racism is unthinkable.

The struggle by some white feminists and feminist organizations to maintain an ethical nonracist feminist identity can then become an impediment to meaningful antiracist analysis and change. Kleinman's (1996)

study of moral identity confirms that the struggle to maintain an "alternative" identity can ironically hamper social change. In the alternative health organization Kleinman studied, the members' sense of self-worth was dependent on their belief that they were "doing something different" (5), that they were truly alternative. However, Kleinman says, their deep investment in this alternative moral identity "kept them from seeing how their behaviours contradicted their ideals" when they perpetuated inequalities inside their organization (1996, 11). Kleinman argues that "we become so invested in our beliefs as radicals or 'good people' that we cannot see the reactionary or hurtful consequences of our behaviours" (11). In other words, an alternative moral identity can both foster and impede social change.

"You're calling me a racist?": Emotion and morality

The political context of alternative moral identities also explains why being seen as nonracist or antiracist is more likely to be a highly emotional concern for feminists and other activists or community workers and more likely to be crucial to their moral identity or sense of self. This political and ethical climate means that there is a great deal at stake—not only one's sense of goodness and sense of self but also one's political identity, one's career as activist or worker in a feminist organization. The effort to maintain an ethical, innocent, and nonracist face often produces an emotional resistance to antiracism, typified in my interviews by the incredulous or tearful phrase, "You're calling me a racist?" An understanding of the individual and psychic aspects of moral regulation gives us new insight into the emotional resistance to antiracism in feminist communities. We need to acknowledge that experiments in creating a new social order, a social movement, create not only spaces of new ethics but also new emotions. Historical analyses of the ethical and emotional climate of fraternity have some parallels to that of sisterhood: "Fraternity had a very strong emotional content, uniting something like the sentiments of kinship, friendship and love. . . . Hence—as in freemasonry—it also had a very strong ethical content" (Hobsbawm 1975, 472).

Similarly, new social movements produce moral climates that become emotional spaces for the production of ethical selves. In Kleinman's (1996) study, members of an alternative health organization used emotional rituals to reinforce their alternative moral community and identity. Rituals of emotional expression and personal experience have also been important in building feminist moral identity, particularly in organizations that draw on consciousness-raising and feminist therapy models. The U.S. National

Lesbian Conference in 1991 had several "vibes watchers"—women whose job it was to monitor the emotional climate and advise the participants when to take a deep breath, take a moment of silence, or scream (Taylor 1995). Staff at a feminist health clinic studied by Sandra Morgen (1995) had regular "feelings meetings" to air out the emotional "fallout" of their work and to deal with interpersonal conflicts: a typical comment might be, for example, "I'm getting hurt by your personal style" (245). There is a clear link between ethical and emotional practices in shaping the imagined feminist community.

So what happens when nonracist feminist discourses and identities are challenged? It is these discourses and rituals of emotion that have helped to maintain and defend the nonracist heterotopia and moral identities of the feminist movement. When this imagined nonracism is challenged by antiracist feminists, the denials and defense often are not only couched in personal ethical terms but also can be highly emotional. My interviews show that antiracist efforts are often met with emotional resistance by white women—with anger, even tears. According to my interviews about antiracist discussions, white participants may speak in an emotional manner about their commitment, hope, solidarity, complicity, guilt, lack of complicity, failure to understand, disbelief, hurt, and anger that they have been accused; tears are the most commonly described reaction. The problem, as the antiracist activists interviewed point out, is not that emotional expression is inherently negative; the problem is that discussions about personnel, decision making, or programming become derailed by emotional protestations that one is not a racist and by efforts to take care of colleagues upset by antiracist challenges. In other words, it is the effects and the racialized power relations of this emotional expression that are problematic rather than emotion itself.

One of the most common angry and indignant reactions described in my interviews was "How can you call me racist?" (interview transcripts, December 1996). Lynn describes the emotional aftermath after one particularly acrimonious board meeting: "And [one of the board members] was bawling her eyes out and saying that she wasn't going to apologize for anything that she had done" (interview transcripts, May 1996). Vijaya, one of the activists I interviewed, echoed a common sentiment that white women's tears flow more openly in these discussions: "White women cry all the fucking time, and women of color never cry" (interview transcripts, December 1996). Rayna's description notes that anger, indignation— "You're calling me a racist?"—and tears are typical responses of whites to organizational discussions of racism: "The indignant response, anger, the

rage that turns into tears, the foot stomping, temper tantrums, which are very typical responses. Every single organization that I have been in, every single one. So I realized that it wasn't about me . . . after a while [laughter]" (interview transcripts, April 1996).

If one's identity as feminist, as woman, as Canadian, as liberal rests on being tolerant and just, then antiracist challenges profoundly unsettle that foundation. Here, as elsewhere, some whites may direct anger and defensiveness at those who have disturbed that imagined identity. For example, the defensive reactions that accompanied antiracist change in a local feminist community organization are described by Samantha, a white manager whom I interviewed: "Oh, lots of defensiveness, definitely— 'That's not racism,' or 'I can't believe you think that.' Or, 'She didn't mean that.' Or, 'I'm not racist.' You certainly heard that a lot" (interview transcripts, December 1996). In my interviews this is a strikingly common description. Catherine, a white executive director of a women's agency, describes the kinds of reactions she sees as she begins to broach antiracism as an organizational issue: "'I'm not prejudiced,' 'I've never discriminated against anybody in my life'" (interview transcripts, December 1996).

Other white feminists respond with fear and terror that their moral accounts of self will be challenged. Minnie Bruce Pratt speaks of the "clutch of fear around my heart," the "terror" she feels on being "found out" as a white person who has "wronged others" and is about to be "punished" (1984, 17). Frankenberg's story of confronting antiracist feminism echoes these feelings: "And the issue was also terrifying, in the sense that we constantly felt that at any second we might err again with respect to racism, that we didn't know the rules" (1993, 3). She and her white feminist friends were terrified, she says, of "not being able to 'get it right'" (4).

Empathy
According to interview accounts, some white women openly demonstrate their remorse and empathy when they come face to face with the everyday meaning of racism for women of color. Samantha, a white woman involved in antiracist change in her organization, reflected on her own tearful reaction, saying, "One horrible incident makes me want to cry, when I hear about it" (interview transcripts, December 1996). We can see that, like anger, expressions of empathy and care help to construct and maintain a self-image of the good feminist. In feminist moral philosophy, displaying empathy and care for the other is generally characterized as a desirable expression of the caring and political connection among women, as well

as of egalitarian relations. In fact, feminist philosophers have argued for the importance of empathy in working across difference, as it is seen as central to moral judgment about oppression (Bartky 1997; Meyers 1997).

Ironically, this is precisely why the expression of empathy and sympathy can become problematic in organizational settings: empathic expressions often revolve around an individual's moral self-image rather than organizational change. In the context of feminist psychotherapy Kerstin Roger (1998) argues that empathy reinforces the notion of the universally kind, helping white woman. For example, Nina tells the story of her organization, one in turmoil over accusations of racism. One of the white board members showed up at the women of color caucus meeting to voice her support but instead spoke about herself and cried. Nina recalls: "She came to the women of color caucus, and then she just talked about herself. . . . And she started crying, she was bawling her eyes out in fact, and saying, 'It's terrible, I don't know how you guys stand it'" (interview transcripts, December 1996). This white board member clearly sought out a space to publicly display her revulsion of racism, even as the same self-preoccupation left her unwilling to actually do anything to support antiracist change. Her public display of revulsion—"I don't know how you guys stand it"—was also a necessary display of her inherent antiracism, inherent goodness.

Himani Bannerji, in her recollections of antiracist feminist discussions, writes that "claims about sharing 'experience,' having empathy" are meant to show that white feminists are "doing good" to feminists of color (1992, 10). Thus it is empathy "rather than questions, criticisms and politics" that emanates from these women: "Why" she asks, "do they . . . only talk about racism as understanding us, doing good to 'us'?" (11).

Contrary to the arguments of many feminist philosophers, these displays of empathy are clearly not helpful but offensive. Here we see that empathy about racism implies that the problem belongs to women of color and requires only the sympathetic feelings of white women—it emphasizes, in other words, the unequal relations of power. In the context of feminist discussions of racism, displays of empathetic feelings also reinforce the "goodness" in being a feminist—they show that one is highly sensitive to injustice.

Innocence and sin

As I have suggested, the defensive, angry, tearful, and empathic responses to antiracist challenges may be traced in part to the struggle to maintain a good, innocent, and egalitarian moral identity. When it comes to discussing racism, the moral terrain of the feminist movement can take on

a dramatic tenor: the nonracist must be not just good but also innocent and pure. That desire for innocence underlies many conflicts about social difference in feminist forums. Fellows and Razack (1998) describe several feminist roundtables in which they were participants and show how the presumption of innocence—this "deeply felt belief that each of us, as women, is not implicated in the subordination" of others—underlies the deep fracture that opens when feminists talk about race (364). These contemporary relations between white and nonwhite feminists have been shaped by an imperial history of respectability and benevolence on the part of white women—an image of benevolence that becomes difficult to maintain when women of color begin to highlight racism or to criticize efforts to make the movement more inclusive (Grewal 1996; Fellows and Razack 1998).

My interviews with Ginny, a woman of color active in antiracist struggles, echo Fellows and Razack's analysis. Reflecting on some of the common reactions to antiracism that she has experienced in women's organizations, Ginny notes that the resistance comes from a deep incredulity that women feel about being implicated in any oppressive practice: "I think a lot of time the white women that are in power, they don't actually think of themselves as having power, they think of themselves as victims, as women, so that when they're told that they've done something to hurt somebody, they just can't believe it. 'Me? But I'm the one who's been a victim all my life. I went through . . . ' de da de da de . . . " (interview transcripts, April 1996).

As I have argued, this profound belief in noncomplicity can be linked to the broader moral climate of feminist politics. Ellen Rooney (1989) argues that the very concept of sisterhood expresses a "longing for innocence" (233). Her reference to the longing for innocence and the "interest each of us has in her own innocence" (233) suggests a key critique of the moral climate of feminist politics. As the fiction of women's unity has been challenged, the women's movement has become a place where the nonracist image of goodness has been severely shaken. Kiké Roach, a young black feminist, argues that these investments shaped politics at the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), an umbrella advocacy group and Canada's largest women's organization: "I think that most white women think, 'Accept me as I am, I'm a good person, I'm involved in this social justice issue'" (Roach and Rebick 1996, 112). So the emotional reactions of some white feminists to antiracist challenges rest on attempts to recuperate a just feminist identity and community.

Not surprisingly, emotional and resistant responses to organizational

change efforts are often couched in terms of good versus evil—the good person versus the evil racist. *Racist* is seen not as a political analysis, organizational problem, or even as an insult but as a definition of character, one in conflict with a movement's and an individual's moral and political identity—"How can you call *me* racist?" Here *racist* is seen as an attack on goodness—a framing that is supported by a liberal, nonracist discourse that sees racism as bad acts done by individuals rather than as systemic. As Catherine, the white director of a feminist agency says, the personal defense can supersede a political analysis: "And so to get to the *analytical* understanding of racism, there's a lot of resistance. There's people who say, 'I'm feeling attacked'" (interview transcripts, December 1996). Ginny reflects on the typical reaction to antiracist challenges in organizations where she has worked: "So, it goes to the core of themselves, 'I am bad [if] you are calling me racist; how can you?—I have a vision of myself as good.' Well, no one is saying you're bad. This is something that needs changing" (interview transcripts, April 1996). Samantha, as a white woman active in antiracist efforts, elaborates on the good-versus-evil framework of responses to antiracist change in her organization: "People are so afraid, that people are going to get sued, or you're going to be labeled racist, and therefore evil, and you can never change" (interview transcripts, December 1996). The possibility of being touched by the "evil" associated with some imagined racist identity also calls up deep emotions—fear, anger, despair.

In both of the interview excerpts above, ironic references to the immutability of a racist identity are notable. One woman notes that suggestions of racism "go to the core" of a woman's identity; Samantha says it is assumed that "you can never change." It is clear that racism is seen by many as being an internal, fixed quality. Frankenberg's study of race in white women's lives found similar references to racism as a personal sin, or "original sin" (1993, 173). While the possibility of redemption seems unlikely, redemption is at the same time the only source of salvation. Because *racist* is described as a personal trait rather than as a practice or relation of power, the possibility for change is also located within the individual.

Strategic Innocence

In turn, protestations of innocence and expressions of empathy appear to be used as a way of tempering white women's feelings of desolation and of protecting them from anger and criticism by women of color. For example, Yasmin describes a typical reaction by some white women who were challenged for not having contributed to an antiracist workshop

exercise. That, Yasmin says, "just led to tears on the part of the white women . . . and blah, blah . . . things like, 'I've tried really hard to see where I've come from, and who I've oppressed as a white woman'" (interview transcripts, May 1996). One can hear these women's anxiety that their endeavors to be good antiracist feminists should be recognized; they remain anxious to present themselves as good feminists with good intentions.

There can be no clearer illustration of "innocence" as protection and strategic response than in the racial tensions documented by Métis writer Maria Campbell and white actor Linda Griffiths in the writing of their award-winning feminist play *Jessica*, based on Campbell's Métis ancestry and performed by Griffiths.[11] In reflecting on their difficult collaboration, Campbell explains that it was Griffiths's innocent facade, her smile, her "Virgin face" that both infuriated Campbell and compelled her to give Griffiths what she wanted—the painful details of her experience and history as a Métis woman (Griffiths and Campbell 1999, 70). As Griffiths admits, "It was the only way I could protect myself, with innocence, niceness. I just couldn't figure out why anyone would want to get mad at someone who was trying so hard. . . . My only protection was my innocence, my little white hand on your arm—'Maria, why are you angry? Why don't you like me?'—hating myself for the smile on my face" (Griffiths and Campbell 1999, 71). Griffiths's "innocence" protects her against Campbell's anger—anger at Griffiths's privilege and presumption. Like the women in Yasmin's organization who proclaimed, "I've tried really hard to see where I've come from as a white woman," Griffiths deliberately uses her innocent face to portray herself as "someone who was trying so hard"—a strategy she uses to not only shield herself but also to obtain the information she needs.

Trauma

Recent theorizations of the trauma people experience on learning about racism and violence are helpful in explaining resistance to antiracist change. Deborah Britzman (1998) argues that the trauma of learning "difficult knowledge" (117)—knowledge of ethnic hatred and social violence—leads to a crisis of the self. This crisis of the self, Britzman shows, also leads to a profound resistance to learning. She uses the term *passion for ignorance* for the refusal to learn from these traumatic moments, a passion we have certainly seen in accounts of some white feminists' angry and

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[11] *Jessica* had successful runs across Canada in the mid-1980s and won a number of awards, including the 1986 Dora Mavor Moore Award for Outstanding New Play.

tearful diversions. Shoshana Felman's (1992) psychoanalytic take on the trauma her students experience on hearing Holocaust stories is similarly helpful in understanding the intensity and limits of white feminists' emotional responses. Her descriptions of her students' panic, anxiety, anger, and tremendous "need to talk" (49) echo the reactions of white women on confronting the details of racism in women's lives and confronting their own complicity. The pedagogy of confronting antiracism has clear parallels to Felman's classroom; the trauma of facing questions of morality, complicity, or oppression is surely common to both pedagogical encounters. As I have suggested earlier, the refusals of some feminists to confront concerns about racism may also stem from a refusal to face certain questions of morality and complicity. These theorizations of trauma are relevant to understanding the responses of people when they confront the difficult knowledge that their self-image or moral identity as just activists, good feminists, alternative folks, and tolerant Canadians may be suspect; as we have seen, they may display a similar passion for ignorance and emotional and verbal expression.

The resulting emotional reactions are echoed in Dori Laub's (1992) analysis of trauma. He outlines the kinds of defensive emotions that people use to fend off the upheaval—the pedagogical opportunity—of confronting the difficult knowledge of genocide: "a sense of total paralysis . . . a sense of outrage and anger unwittingly directed at the victim . . . a flood of awe and fear; we endow the survivor with a kind of sanctity, both to pay our tribute to him and to keep him at a distance, to avoid the intimacy entailed in knowing . . . hyperemotionality which superficially looks like compassion and caring. The testifier is simply flooded, drowned and lost in the listener's defensive affectivity" (Laub 1992, 72). As we have seen, the resistance to learning about racism is suffused with similar refusals. Recall Nina's fellow board member who comes to the women of color caucus to "bawl her eyes out" and "just talk about herself" and the pain she feels. We might suggest that she has experienced the trauma both of learning about racism from the perspective of women of color and of having her moral identity challenged. She is feeling, as Felman and Laub predict, a tremendous need to talk, a hyperemotionality that helps her deal with that upheaval. Here Judith Butler's (1997) use of Sigmund Freud's concept of melancholia or mourning also aptly describes this coworker's tearful focus on herself. Melancholia or mourning is defined as the sorrow at the loss of a person or ideal—here, the loss of the ideal of a just, nonracist feminist community and identity. One of the expressions of this loss is the "shameless voicing of self-beratement in front of others" (181), a form of narcissism in which "I revile myself and rehabilitate the

other. . . . I refuse to speak to or of the other, but I speak voluminously about myself" (183).

It is important to extend these theorizations of trauma by reiterating that these preoccupations are also shaped by the unique history of feminist contexts, including imagined feminist heterotopia, feminist practices of emotional disclosure, and even colonial histories of white femininity. As Butler (1997) argues in her attempt to break down the categories of "inner" psychic life versus "exterior" social life, these psychic dramas are structured by social relations. For example, in feminist organizations, forms of social power emerge that regulate which losses can and cannot be grieved and who is allowed to grieve for which losses. In other words, the crisis of self that Britzman, Felman, and Laub discuss is colored by the unique heterotopic, emotional, and historic undertones of feminist organizations. In discussions of racial privilege in feminist organizations, white women's expressions of grief or loss are sometimes facilitated and are even respectable. Many feminist contexts have provided the political climate that allowed Nina's coworker to openly display her empathy and to receive care and understanding for her emotionality.

Shifts in moral identity, steps toward antiracism

At the same time, this social context of feminism, nonracism, and anti-racism has been continually shifting in ways that continue to shape emotional and organizational responses to antiracist challenges. Neither moral community nor identity maintains a static and homogeneous nonracist frame. As Walker points out, "Communities of people who hold each other morally accountable reconfigure over time [their] shared understandings" (1997, 71). Over the past two decades an antiracist ethical discourse has evolved after years of challenges and writing by women of color, who argued for an integrative antiracist perspective (Dua 1999). There have been accompanying shifts in the imagined moral community and in what makes a good feminist.

For example, a new ethical practice that grew out of early shifts was the prefacing of commentary with a statement of social location: "I am a white, middle-class heterosexual urban woman."[12] Within social movements such as feminism, antiracism has similarly often been interpreted as personalized ethical practice requiring the self-examination, declara-

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[12] For further discussion of the history of this practice, see Mary Louise Adams, who argues that "together we ascribed a moral significance to our individual htanies of oppression" (1989, 22).

tion, and regulation of an individual's racist beliefs. For example, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Srivastava 1996), many antiracist workshops use knowledge of the individual and self-knowledge to teach whites about and to challenge racism. In this model, antiracist practice is seen in part as providing a key to the self. We might call this a personalized antiracist ethic.

As Foucault has suggested, the historical development of techniques such as confession and psychotherapy means that modern ethical practices have become focused primarily on self-examination, "self-decipherment," and "salvation," with the goal being "transformations" of the self (Foucault 1985, 29). In other words, techniques of self-examination have become important in determining "how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject" (Foucault 1983, 238). These ethical practices of self-decipherment also describe the route of some white feminists moving toward antiracism.

This route has been influenced by the evocative accounts of many white feminists who in the 1980s began writing self-reflective accounts of their racial histories and antiracist journeys. Two of the best known of these is Pratt's 1984 essay "Identity: Skin/Blood/Heart" and Mab Segrest's 1985 *My Mama's Dead Squirrel*. Pratt, for example, argues that to regain the self-respect lost in becoming aware of racial privilege, "we need to find new ways to be *in* the world, those very actions a way of creating a positive self" (1984, 42). More broadly, the powerful discourse that "the personal is political" has also been influential in encouraging feminists to make these links between their personal lives and political change. In Frankenberg's 1993 study, the "race-cognizant" (159) white feminists focused on their personal identity, practices, and behaviors when asked about race. For many of them, the idea of "practising your antiracism" (168)—in other words, "the personal is political"—had become an ethical yardstick. This focus on self-examination and personal "process" is apparent when one of these white feminists talks about confronting the racism expressed by her old friends but remarks, "I think it's someone's own process to go through" (Frankenberg 1993, 166).

Unfortunately, as my interviews show, some women may become mired in self-examination and stuck in deliberations on morality and salvation. Not surprisingly, this ethical self-transformation is still framed by the poles of good versus evil, newly interpreted as the fraudulent nonracist versus the authentic antiracist. A number of the white feminists I interviewed, newly involved in antiracism, clearly struggle with their own place on this moral and political trajectory. Having started with a nonracist image of feminism and self, as they move toward a more systemic understanding

of racism they find they also need to shift their understandings of moral community and self. Look again at Catherine's full description of some of the other white women in her organization: "There's people who say, 'I'm feeling attacked. Why am I being attacked? I'm not racist, I'm not prejudiced. . . . I've never discriminated against anybody in my life.' *So you're at that stage*" (interview transcripts, December 1996).

Catherine's reference to "that stage" highlights the variability of responses to antiracism over time. It also signals the extended and predictable stages many white feminists move through as they learn about antiracism. As a closer examination of both interview transcripts and feminist literature will show, we may characterize the stages in this discourse of moral progression as follows: first, being color-blind, being unaware of color and race; second, becoming aware that racism is a problem and being committed to your own nonracism; third, becoming aware of your own racism and feeling terrible about it; and finally, being able to accept and live with the fact that you might be racist rather than fearing it.

Segrest (1985) uses much the same language of moral progression to speak about the disorienting process of finding a new basis for her identity as a white, Southern woman. She also describes the process as having four stages—beginning with total unawareness of privilege and moving, finally, toward connection with other women:

> First, I am so racist, class-privileged, Christian that I don't even realize it, but assume that I am naturally wonderful. . . . Then I begin to see the false status that I get from my race and class and Christian privilege. And as soon as I do, I begin to see lies everywhere, and everywhere my own responsibility, my own complicity. . . . As I begin to feel what slavery did to Black people, I look up and see—God, we killed the Indians too. Then I hit the third stage of intense self-hatred. . . . I think the reason why white women avoid their racism . . . and can act so weird around women of color is because deep down we are afraid that this third level is all that there is. . . . That we will end up stuck in despair. . . . But I believe that underneath there is another level, a self that longs for wholeness and connection. (Segrest 1985, 171)

Contained within these stages of moral progression are both the nonracist ethic and personalized antiracist ethic.

Yet the movement between these stages is neither smooth nor linear. These are unsettled and discontinuous states, for both individuals and organizations. Britzman's discussion of the pedagogy of "difficult knowl-

edge" as an inconstant process is helpful: "The psychic time of learning [is] one in which the confronted self vacillates, sometimes violently, sometimes passively, sometimes imperceptibly and sometimes shockingly, between resistance as symptom and the working through of resistance" (1998, 119). It is important to remember that for feminist activists, this learning is going on within a social movement and organizational context. As feminist activists learn about racial privilege, the context of a changing feminist moral order adds another unsettled layer. Since the mid-1980s the broader climate of feminist politics has shifted away from nonracism, and the imagined moral community is increasingly fragmented. Thus for those in the process of shifting their ethical self-image, the nonracist self-image no longer makes sense to them, but the antiracist ethic is still hazy within the larger feminist community. As the political and moral climate of an organization and a movement shifts, individuals also move slowly and erratically between these apparent poles. Not surprisingly, women hover between two unattainable poles, between two cloudy and unreachable spaces of purity—nonracist and antiracist.

If we follow Samantha, a white senior manager working on antiracist change, we can see that the movement from nonracist to antiracist ethical self-image is both ambivalent and highly personalized. Looking more closely at her reflections, we can trace not only her evolving emotional responses but also the shift in how she thinks about herself in relation to women of color and racism: "I can't imagine what it is like. I can hear people's stories that tell me a bit of what it's like. But I'm not dealing with it. Because one horrible incident makes me want to cry, when I hear about it. But, then think about it, if you had a life like that, each incident is just the accumulation of that experience—I can't even begin to imagine what it's like to be in that place" (interview transcripts, December 1996).

As Samantha struggles toward understanding the daily experience of racism, she falls into the expected tearful empathetic response common in this initial nonracist stage of ethical practice. Empathy is often the first step in dealing with difficult knowledge of others, suggests Britzman: "Initially the learner attaches to the experience of the other by way of wondering what she or he would have done had such an event occurred in her or his own life" (1998, 118). However, like the antiracist activists I have interviewed, Britzman notes that "this experiment in empathy" can not only provoke resistance but also "impedes an understanding of the differences between the learner's knowledge and the knowledge of the other" (118). Interestingly, even as Samantha expresses her empathy, she also appears to acknowledge the disjuncture of knowledges that Britzman

highlights, recognizing the difference between hearing or crying about racism and experiencing racism day to day.

However, Samantha's journey is still expressed as a personal moral progression. Even when Samantha discusses her organization, she describes progress on antiracism in terms of the individuals' ethical shifts: "I think that we got to the place where . . . we were working on discussions, and 'let's just talk about racism, what does it look like here,' getting to the point where we could sit at a table anywhere in the agency and say *racism* and people wouldn't run. . . . I think that is a really big step. And it is hard to acknowledge. And it's critical" (interview transcripts, December 1996). On the one hand, we can see how, within the four-step model of moral progression, getting individuals to talk openly about racism is indeed "a big step." In contrast, however, feminists of color to whom I spoke generally identify this stage—"let's just talk about racism"—as stagnation, even a frustrating full stop.

Samantha's own movement through these four stages, and her shift from seeing *racist* as anathema to seeing *racist* as part of her feminist identity, highlights not only her ambivalence but also the inadequacy of this framework for antiracism: "Throughout the agency . . . I think there was real fear of being called 'racist.' . . . It is hard for me to reflect back on where I was then, but I am sure that's where I was too. I was more afraid of being called 'racist' than anything else. And now, if someone were to say that, I would say, 'you're probably right'" (interview transcripts, December 1996). The four-stage moral progression traps Samantha between two unsatisfactory stages: if she were to say with complete ease "I am racist" to her colleagues or to the woman of color interviewing her, she risks criticisms that she is complacent or glib about racism. If she were to outright deny being racist, she knows she would be stuck in an unacceptable ethical position. Samantha's discomfort suggests that problematic narratives of purity and impurity remain from nonracist discourse.

Instead of innocent versus racist, however, the poles of purity versus impurity in commentaries such as Samantha's are more likely to signify knowledge versus ignorance, the antiracist feminist versus other unenlightened feminists. Samantha indicates that she has reached a more advanced understanding of racism than her colleagues. Similarly, when Catherine, another white senior manager, explains how routine practice can perpetuate racism, she says, "And even I—'even I'—after a lot of years of experience, I can find myself doing things a certain way, just because they've always been done that way" (interview transcripts, December 1996). With her phrase "even I," Catherine, like Samantha, gestures to

her higher level of awareness in comparison to other women in her organization. Both Samantha's and Catherine's commentary shows that a personalized antiracist ethical discourse contains a new yardstick for measuring other feminists: it is the self-made antiracist white feminist who is good, other white feminists who are not good enough. Catherine even catches herself perpetuating this dichotomy; repeating "even I" in an ironic aside, she mocks herself and her tendency to present herself as morally superior. Yet her slip shows that this dichotomy, between thinking of herself as "pure" and others as racist, ironically underlies her transition toward antiracism.

This discourse of moral progression and self-examination is further supported by feminist discourses of emotional self-care and therapy. In explaining why it is important to examine oneself in antiracist discussion, Samantha highlights the emotional benefits: "It's like doing any of your own work—it's really scary to look at the ghosts in your own closet. But if you know that by looking at them you're going to feel better, then you are more likely to look at them than just trying to keep the door shut" (interview transcripts, December 1996). In other words, we attempt to extirpate our racist beliefs because we will know ourselves better and "feel better"—therapeutic sentiments that are further shaped by a desire for ethical self-transformation. By remaining focused on the self rather than on organizational practice, these individualized discourses of therapy and moral progression make a broader antiracist analysis difficult.

Salvation

Despite the ambiguity of her position, Samantha's commentary shows that the focus on self-examination of one's personal antiracist practice leads ultimately to a "once was lost, now am found" narrative. As in "Amazing Grace," the slave trader's song from which this phrase is drawn, Samantha's redemption comes from a turning point of personal salvation.

In this muddy arena of moral uncertainty, antiracist caucuses, task forces, experts, facilitators, and antiracist policy can take on particular moral significance and moral authority. If one is failing in the task of self-contemplation, one may look to another person or policy to provide an easier route to salvation. Samantha reflects on the deference staff and board members have toward the new antiracist task force in her organization: "Like if someone says, 'the [anti-racist] task force says this,' people go, '*Ohhh.*' . . . I think partly it's that we don't really know all the answers. So, if someone thinks they know the answers, *that's great*" (interview transcripts, December 1996).

In Yasmin's organization, women's desire for moral guidance and salvation is even more strikingly expressed in their awe of a well-known black antiracist consultant from the United States whom her coworkers want to hire:

> She's seen as an expert, and . . . people take her word as the goddess's word. . . . There was this awe surrounding her. There would be this hesitation, by all three women, to even phone her. There was this reverence about her—"What are we going to say to her?" . . . I just really thought that was bizarre, that people were all tongue-tied at the thought of her. . . . Phone her up, she's charging us $1,000 a day, you can damn well think of something to say!
>
> It was like suddenly, she was this catalyst of change, just as Martin Luther King was. You could make that parallel: this great woman was going to make change for us. And I think that was the problem, that there was this dependence on her already, before they even phoned her.
>
> *Author*: She was going to make things right.
>
> Right. (Interview transcripts, May 1996)

Both goddess and godsend, the antiracist consultant appears to inspire the emotional and religious reverence of a spiritual leader, of a great civil rights leader. Without a clear moral guide to antiracist behavior, people look for guidance, even a savior. Yasmin's description of lost sheep looking for moral guidance suggests a moral community in transition, uncertain of its new parameters, ethical practices, and language, and preferring to follow rather than to act. People then pin impossible expectations for solving the problem on a brief visit by an antiracist facilitator and expert.

Yasmin's language also recalls Laub's (1992) description of the self-protective awe, fear, and sanctity with which people endow the recounter of genocide. Laub suggests this response allows people to put distance between themselves and difficult knowledge. In Yasmin's organization, by constructing a sacred image of moral superiority, those struggling with a new understanding of racism can distance themselves from their own responsibility for ethical decisions and organizational action.

Conclusions and Alternatives

Like the heterotopia of which Hetherington (1997) writes, feminism as a modern humanist project has produced a new ethical subject and social order. However, antiracist feminist challenges have highlighted the inter-

locking relations of race and gender that are implicated in the construction of this moral community. As we have seen in the rocky history of antiracism in the feminist movement, a crisis arises when people realize that the imagined utopic community, or the "transparent community of beautiful souls," is neither possible nor universally desired.[13]

One reaction to this crisis has been to reassert and refine feminism's moral boundaries. Wendy Brown's discussion of social movements facing the loss of universal visions is apt: "It is when the telos of the good vanishes but the yearning for it remains that morality appears to dissolve into moralism in politics" (2001, 28). We can see that this attempt to recuperate the vision of the just, nonracist feminist continues within organizations today. In tracing the narratives of white feminists in various stages of refusal, it becomes clear that not only imperial histories of innocent white femininity but also historical constructions of a just feminist community underlie some feminists' emotional protestations of innocence.

Of course, not all white feminists coming face-to-face with antiracist challenges react to the difficult knowledge of racial privilege with emotional refusals. Those active in antiracist work also struggle to find their own place in it. Yet in their desire to leave the nonracist ethic behind, they may still become trapped in attempts to construct a personalized antiracist ethic that implicitly relies on a discourse of moral progression, one that requires either self-examination, utterances of purification, or salvation by others. As the political and moral climate of their movement shifts toward antiracism, these individuals, and often the organizations they run, can become stalled as they vacillate between these apparent moral poles.

Yet why not be introspective about racialized ideas and practices and thereby become a "better person"? Frankenberg believes that this approach, expressed only in her interviews with white feminists, is important (1993, 159). According to Samantha, this approach did allow her organization to draft an antiracist policy and create an antiracist committee.

However, personal accounts of ethical practices that are framed around poles of purity and impurity in turn shape and limit the kinds of antiracist organizational debates and actions that are possible. Samantha recognizes that the "big step" her organization took when members acknowledged their own racism was also a resting place where organizational structure was not addressed. Says Samantha: "So, we got to that place. But what happened was that nothing happened because we weren't working on the structural stuff" (interview transcripts, December 1996). In other words,

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[13] Valverde, e-mail communication, March 2002.

practices of self-examination and self-improvement may shift the moral and ethical climate or facilitate antiracist initiatives but lead to limited organizational change. A liberalist discourse that frames racism as done by ignorant or bad people and extirpated by confession dictates an individual solution. In social movements, these broader discourses are interpreted within moral communities that tie the personal to the political, nonracism to political goodness, and therapy and emotional expression to social change.

Is there a way to shift the centrality of this moral preoccupation? Does racism inevitably raise questions of individual morality and personal ethics? Tracing the construction and conflicts of imagined moral communities within feminist politics opens the possibility that we may move beyond the seesaw of purity versus corruption that appears currently to structure responses to antiracist critique. These preoccupations may seem unavoidable in social movements directed by a moral code to not oppress others— to act, in fact, to challenge oppression. Yet certainly many white feminists do not frame antiracism as a question of innocence versus sin, and some openly criticize this approach. Frankenberg (1993) found that this is particularly true of older feminists involved in early antiracist struggles, from the 1940s on. Frankenberg shows that the historical context of race blindness, which necessitated white women's soul-searching in the first place, has not shaped older activists' responses. One of the younger white feminist activists whom Frankenberg interviewed perhaps provides an example of how a moral framework may move outside the poles of complicity versus noncomplicity. This woman reflects that it is important to finally admit, "Well, yeah, our hearts are in the right place, but it's still not coming together" and to discuss why (1993, 175). It seems that she too sees this as a moral obligation, yet her response to her feelings of guilt differs from earlier examples. She is more interested in why antiracist change is not happening and less interested in her own moral acceptability.

Many workshop and consciousness-raising approaches have taught us to "know better," "feel better," and be better people. Yet in addition to knowing more and feeling better, we might want to think better and do better. A comprehensive discussion of alternative strategies is beyond the scope of this article, but we must continue to investigate an alternative to these moral preoccupations—a third way that starts with the goal of systemic antiracist change yet still acknowledges the individual preoccupations that may impede that work. Could we not imagine discussions of racism as collective political and social analyses rather than as individual preoccupations with morality? For example, in one feminist collective, two women of color, fed up with the personalized focus of the antiracist work-

shops and facilitator, intervened by gathering data on the racialized division of labor among collective members and demonstrated that women of color carried a far greater burden of administrative and behind-the-scenes work.

Beginning with this kind of focus on political analysis and action rather than with nostalgic moral visions of a united community or attempts at ethical self-transformation might better avoid the pitfalls we have seen here. Bartky (1997) suggests that antiracist feminist change aims at a transformation of self. I would argue, rather, that an antiracist feminism might aim at an unbalancing of historical links between racism and the poles of innocence versus evil, knowledge versus ignorance.

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Analogy and (White) Feminist Theory: Thinking Race and the Color of the Cyborg Body

For some time now it seems to have been understood among feminist theorists, particularly white feminist theorists, that questions of race and colonialism are being suitably addressed within gender studies and that everyone is aware of the problems of approaching the questions of gender and sexuality from a seemingly unraced perspective, particularly since the very notions of race, gender, and sexuality have been thoroughly destabilized.[1] The consensus seems to be that the kinds of challenges posed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in her landmark 1981 essay "French Feminism in an International Frame" or even later by bell hooks in her book *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* (1984) have now been met. At quick glance, the contemporary situation of gender studies seems promising. There has been a proliferation of critical works theorizing gender from the perspective of African American women, Latinas, Asian American women, and third-world women, as well as those who identify with the larger constituency of women of color. Witness titles such as Hazel Carby's *Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist* (1987) and *Race Men* (1998), Trinh T. Minh-ha's *Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism* (1989), Patricia Hill Collins's *Black Feminist Thought* (1990), and Carole Boyce Davies's *Black Women, Writing and Identity: Migrations of the Subject* (1994), as well as classic anthologies such as *Making Face, Making Soul/Haciendo Caras: Creative and Critical Perspectives by Feminists of Color* (Anzaldúa 1990) and *Third World Women and The Politics of Feminism* (Mohanty, Russo, and Torres 1991). Of the multitude of recent works by white feminists and gender studies theorists, several have been particularly influential: Teresa de

[1] Throughout this article—starting with the title—I have put *white* in parentheses in several places because I want to supply the absent racial signifier that a lot of white feminism does not acknowledge. I retain the parentheses in order to mark the lack of racial recognition among white feminists.

Lauretis's *Technologies of Gender* (1987); Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990), *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (1993), and *Antigone's Claim* (2000); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's *Epistemology of the Closet* (1991); Jane Flax's *Disputed Subjects* (1993); Elizabeth Grosz's *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (1994); and Judith Halberstam's *Female Masculinity* (1998).

Even a cursory comparison between the titles of critical works by women of color and those by white women reveals an undeniable fact that I want to discuss in greater detail: while women of color theorize about a particular group of women, many white feminists continue to theorize about gender/sexuality/women in general.[2] Such a dichotomy reproduces the paradigmatics of imperialism wherein the colonizers speak for all humanity and the colonized simply talk about their own condition. The universalizing impulse implicitly draws on the legacy of colonialism and the project of modernity, albeit in a globalized, postcolonial world. However, it would be misguided to argue that nothing has changed within white feminism since the late 1970s. All of the texts by white theorists mentioned above are cognizant of racial difference and often include a chapter or more on racial analysis. Indeed, it has become almost a given that works in gender and sexuality studies acknowledge multiple axes of oppression or invoke the mantra of race, class, gender, and sexuality. It seems anachronistic, therefore, to name a project of universalism within white feminist theory today.

But it is precisely because universalism seems undone by the inclusion of racial difference that the terms of this incorporation need to be carefully scrutinized. In a remarkably prescient analysis of sexism and racism, with particular reference to black women, Elizabeth V. Spelman refers to the critical practice of seeing as extra the racial burden that black women had to bear as "additive analysis." Spelman writes, "An additive analysis treats the oppression of a black woman in a sexist and racist society as if it were a *further* burden than her oppression in a sexist but non-racist society, when, in fact, it is a *different* burden" (1982, 43). Additive analysis, in other words, seeks to incorporate particularities and differences as additions to a common universalist narrative. Two decades since the publication of Spelman's essay, additive analysis still continues, albeit in different forms. By examining the terms of racial incorporation in two essays pub-

lished in the mid-1980s—Gayle Rubin's "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality" (1984) and Donna Haraway's "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century" (1991; this essay first appeared in *Socialist Review* in 1985)—I argue that these essays offer the dominant paradigm for the imperialist incorporation of women of color in contemporary gender and sexuality studies: incorporation by analogy. This strategy denies primacy to the voices of the colonized that have proclaimed the preeminence of the racial difference, so memorably articulated by Frantz Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks*: "'Dirty nigger!' Or simply, 'Look, a Negro'" ([1952] 1967, 109).

I focus on these two essays written twenty years ago not because of a stubborn desire to pigeonhole white feminism within a time warp but because both essays were landmarks in radically reconfiguring gender and sexuality theory and because they proleptically configured the pervasive mode of analogical racial incorporation that continues, albeit with significant changes, today. My critique of these essays is thus made in the spirit of advancing feminist theory. It is in this spirit that I will turn briefly at the end of this essay to more recent texts. I argue that while Butler's *Bodies That Matter* (1993) and Haraway's *Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium* (1997a) substantially further feminist theory's investigation of race, they simultaneously continue to include race analogically.

The tradition of analogy and its role in feminist theory

Because analogy has become the omnipresent trope linking together gender, race, sexuality, and even class within feminist/gender/sex theories, it is instructive to turn briefly to the historical role of analogy within race and gender theorizing and within rhetoric in order to examine the ideological precedents for the use of analogy within feminist theory. In her essay, "Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science," Nancy Leys Stepan (1990) shows how race and gender analogies became paradigms guiding the research of nineteenth-century phrenologists and racial theorists. Having accepted analogies linking the low intelligence of (white) women and the "lower," nonwhite races, scientists proceeded to verify their findings empirically. Stepan writes, "In the metaphors and analogies joining women and the lower races, the scientist was led to 'see' points of similarity that before had gone unnoticed. Women became more 'like' Negroes, as the statistics on brain weight and body shapes showed" (1990, 51). Accepted as paradigms and circulated as knowledge, such analogies

helped maintain the racial and gender status quo through the paradoxical similarity between white women and black men. Black women, Stepan argues, were virtually ignored in phrenological studies.

Because of historical precedents such as these in which all women and nonwhite races were deemed intellectually inferior and because of cultural paradigms that both generated and were bolstered by such findings, the infantilization of women and people of color was strengthened in the nineteenth century. In using race as analogous to gender, white feminist theory understandably draws on this shared legacy of marginalization. Yet although this critical move to make race analogous to gender/sexuality draws attention to continuities of oppression that have had a long history in the West, such analogies also operate by eliding crucial differences. Stepan argues that analogies and interactive metaphors in science function by actively suppressing knowledge that challenges the analogy. Thus, for instance, nineteenth-century phrenologists, knowing full well that brain weights of women were heavier in proportion to their body weights than men, searched for alternative measures to arrive at knowledge about comparative brain weight and size; they asserted the similarity between the African and the ape on the basis of the shape of the jaw but ignored the white man's similarity to the ape on the basis of his thin lips (Stepan 1990, 50–51).

Sander Gilman's (1985) analysis of the nineteenth-century European obsession with the buttocks and genitalia of Hottentot women is particularly helpful here. French anatomist Georges Cuvier's dissection of Saartjie Baartman's body parts revealed her to be in close proximity to the highest ape—the orangutan (Gilman 1985, 232). Associated with animalism and animal appetites, the Hottentot woman became a marker of unbridled sexuality to whom "deviant" women in Europe could be compared. Thus Cesare Lombroso and Guillaume Ferrero in their 1893 study of criminal women found amazing similarities between the genitalia of prostitutes and those of Hottentot women, while others linked the physical anomalies of lesbians and Hottentots (Gilman 1985, 245). As Gilman concludes, "the colonial mentality which sees 'natives' as needing control is easily transferred to 'woman'—but woman as exemplified by the caste of the prostitute" (1985, 256).

Racial sciences at the height of colonialism thus demonstrate powerfully the dangers of the race and gender/sex analogy. Not only did this analogy function by suppressing crucial variations, it also foregrounded interesting racial fissures and power dynamics. Only "deviant" European women, for instance, could be sexualized like Hottentot women. Yet it would be a mistake to think of the situation of European prostitutes and lesbians as completely analogous to that of the Hottentot woman. To be sure, all

three groups were marked as sexually deviant; only the Hottentot, however, could be paraded naked for public view. Colonial power operated through white men who were also empowered to control white colonial women, but it was the natives who were disciplined by physical force. And as many African American feminists have pointed out, although white women were infantilized like African Americans, white women mostly allied themselves with a racist patriarchal order (Carby 1987, 6).

The epistemological function of analogy has also been a subject of vigorous debate among philosophers and rhetoricians. Ever since Roman Jakobson's famous (1973) postulation of the fundamental polarity between metaphor and metonymy at the very heart of language, the two poles have marked differences between relationships of resemblance and contiguity, Freudian identification and symbolism as opposed to displacement and condensation, or poetry and prose (Jakobson 1973, 126). For Jakobson, the two modes represent not only verbal differences but cultural patterns (1973, 123). Understandably, analogy and resemblance, as constituent elements of metaphor, have not fared well with poststructuralism's emphasis on heterogeneity. Although Paul Ricoeur ([1975] 1977) attempts to resuscitate metaphor from its disrepute by emphasizing the play of similarity and difference in metaphor and by associating resemblance "as the site of clash between sameness and difference" ([1975] 1977, 196), he does not bridge the divide between relations of likeness and unlikeness and those of contiguity. While I do not wish to claim any utopian possibilities for metonymy or posit a neat structuralist break between metonymy and metaphor, I find that the reliance on a dominant mode of analogy and metaphor amid postmodern gender/sexuality theorizing reveals the epistemological fracture caused by racial difference. Therefore, I argue that the role of racial analogy, resemblance, and metaphor within feminist/gender theory needs to be thoroughly investigated. Postcolonial theory has already revealed how analogy and metaphor have been fundamental in constituting colonial discourse. As Edward Said so powerfully demonstrated, Orientalism as colonial discourse operated in part by making woman a metaphor for the Orient (1978, 6, 187–88). And the disciplining of the colonies only involved the flip side of analogy—the postulation of absolute difference between colonizer and colonized, civilized and primitive—whether temporally, as Johannes Fabian (1983) asserted, or epidermally and ontologically, as Fanon ([1952] 1967) postulated. These binaries then depended on further analogies, such as those between primitives and children. Thus, part of the task of postcolonial studies has been to critique the exploitative analogies of colonial discourse.

The political role of analogy as epistemology is clear in Barbara Maria

Stafford's recent (1999) attempt to revitalize analogy for the present moment. Like Ricoeur, Stafford complicates analogy by stressing the play of similarity and difference within it. However, Stafford's impetus for reviving analogy within theory resembles all too closely the anxiety of white feminism in the seventies. Stafford writes, "Today . . . we possess no language for talking about resemblance, only an exaggerated awareness of difference. In light of the current fragmentation of social discourse, the inability to reach out and build consensus on anything that matters, analogy's double avoidance of self-sameness and total estrangement again seems pertinent" (1999, 10). Although Stafford stresses the complexity of analogy, her nostalgia for a unified past that we can readily decode as an unproblematic narrative of a unified Western culture, as modernity without the baggage of colonialism or modernism without postcoloniality, is apparent. Indeed, the absence of any discussion of race or postcoloniality in a work so concerned with an appropriate aesthetic for the present moment is telling.

In an interesting argument for analogy as a vehicle for a cross-cultural epistemology, Stafford writes, "Analogizing has the virtue of making distant peoples, other periods, and even diverse contemporary contexts part of our world. Only by making the past or the remote or the foreign proximate can we hope to make it intelligible to us" (1999, 51). While Stafford is right in suggesting that analogizing creates a familiarization of otherness, a familiarization we might well argue is preferable to the absolute difference postulated in colonial discourse, we also need to ask who is doing the analogizing and to what purposes. Whose "our world" and "us" is Stafford referring to? Should we (nonindigenous peoples), for instance, be able to understand Native American concepts of land through analogies from Euro-American Lockean individualism and capitalist relations? Should we (Westerners) be entitled to interpret subject formation within, say, Indian joint families through familiar Western Oedipal narratives?[3] I suggest that the analogizing move within white feminist theory, working similarly through assimilation and the incorporation of racial difference, may constitute a neocolonial moment more dangerous than the earlier absence of race and, thus, may need close scrutiny.

Thinking race

In "Thinking Sex" (1984) Rubin makes a powerful argument for articulating a radical theory of sexuality based on an analytical separation of

[3] For brilliant refutations of this formulation, see Nandy 1980, 13.

gender and sexuality, a recognition of sex as an independent vector of oppression, and a Foucauldian distrust of the idea of presocialized sexual instincts: "I hope to contribute to the pressing task of creating an accurate, humane, and genuinely liberatory body of thought about sexuality" (1984, 275). Rubin begins by demonstrating the political significance of sexual prohibitions and delineating periods of social stress during which sexuality becomes more acutely contested. In England and the United States, the late nineteenth century was an important era of sexual policing, resulting in the first antiobscenity law in the United States in 1873 (Rubin 1984, 268). Likewise, in the 1950s the red scare converged with the homosexual menace, leading to the surveillance and harassment of homosexuals. Emphasizing the social nature of sex and the production of new sexualities, Rubin points out five ideological formations that strongly influence sexual thought: "sex negativity, the fallacy of misplaced scale, the hierarchical valuation of sex acts, the domino theory of sexual peril, and the lack of a concept of benign sexual variation" (1984, 278). Finally, Rubin details the horrific sex laws consequent on the ideological formations that influence sexual behaviors and points out the limits of feminism in articulating a liberatory sexual politics, focusing particularly on the antiporn stance of Catharine MacKinnon.

As the broad outline of Rubin's argument suggests, race is not central to or an important part of rethinking sexual politics. If all references to race were entirely missing from Rubin's essay, that omission alone would be enough to give us pause. After all, the history of the United States is replete with instances of repressive state apparatuses meting out punitive justice for crossing the racial-sexual border. And as many African American feminists have pointed out, bourgeois white sexuality has always been constructed through its difference from aberrant black sexuality (see Carby 1987, 20–39). But race is not an absent signifier in Rubin's essay, and the point is not to fault Rubin for a lack of critical race awareness. Indeed, Rubin is very much aware of the ideological nexus of race and sexuality but chooses to treat race as peripheral to the articulation of a sexual politics. The problem, I will argue, is that, as in much feminist/gender theorizing today, race is incorporated in the essay through analogy and thus naturalized into an appendage of a more important discourse of sexuality.

Early in the essay, Rubin demonstrates a clear awareness of the prohibitive nature of the race-sex power apparatus. As an illustration of right-wing ideology linking sexual deviance with political weakness, she cites the pamphlet *Pavlov's Children*, which charged the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States with allying to "'destroy racial

cohesion,' by exposing white people (especially white women) to the alleged 'lower sexual standards of black people'" (Rubin 1984, 273).[4] The lines between sexual normality and abnormality, health and unhealthiness, and virtue and vice are sharply drawn through the axis of race. Indeed, as mentioned above, beginning with the advent of modernity and colonialism, the sexual mores of the West began to be defined in contradistinction to the practices of the peoples of Africa, Asia, and South America. The exhibition of Saartjie Baartman's body in Paris in the early nineteenth century was the culmination of decades of prurient Western male obsession with the supposedly lascivious body parts of Hottentot women (Gilman 1985, 225–40). In the United States, in addition to affiliation with Europeans, difference from African Americans has centrally defined white sexuality.

After this initial citing of the relationship between race and sexuality, race does not disappear from Rubin's essay but rather appears through a proliferation of analogies. It is this nature of racial incorporation that needs close scrutiny because it demonstrates not simply an omission but a problematic technique of appropriation via inclusion. Here are a few instances of Rubin's incorporation of race:

> It is impossible to think with any clarity about the politics of race or gender as long as these are thought of as biological entities rather than as social constructs. . . . One may then think of sexual politics in terms of such phenomena as populations, neighborhoods, settlement patterns, migration, urban conflict, epidemiology, and police technology. (Rubin 1984, 277)

> This kind of sexual morality [revulsion at homosexuality] has more in common with ideologies of racism than with true ethics. It grants virtue to the dominant groups, and relegates vice to the underprivileged. (1984, 283)

> This system of sex law [criminalization of sodomy] is similar to legalized racism. (1984, 291)

> The use of S/M [sadomasochistic] images in the movie *Not a Love Story* was on a moral par with the use of depictions of black men raping white women, or of drooling old Jews pawing young Aryan girls, to incite racist or anti-Semitic frenzy. (1984, 298)

> For most of this century, the sexual underworlds have been marginal

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[4] See *Pavlov's Children: They May Be Yours* (Los Angeles: Impact, 1969).

and impoverished, their residents subjected to stress and exploita-
tion. . . . The level of material comfort and social elaboration
achieved by the gay community in the last fifteen years is unprec-
edented. But it is important to recall what happened to similar mir-
acles. The growth of the black population in New York in the early
part of the twentieth century led to the Harlem Renaissance, but
that period of creativity was doused by the Depression. (1984, 296)

As the above examples make amply clear, although the vector of racial
difference is clearly present in the essay, racial analogies help mainly to
clarify the nature of sexual oppression and sexual intolerance. Let us focus
for a moment on the particular manner in which race and sex/gender are
linked: "race or gender," "in common with," "similar to," "on a moral
par with," and "similar miracles." First, in each case there is an assumption
of a problematic similarity that denies possible incongruities between the
two. Second, and more important, despite the seeming equivalence sug-
gested by the analogies, racial oppression as used above serves merely to
illustrate the horrific nature of sexual oppression. The category of race is
simply colonized under the broader category of sex, and the stark problems
of systemic racial oppression are elided. To state some obvious examples:
there is no parallel in sexual oppression to the racial oppression that le-
gitimized the enslavement of Africans in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries (although the latter certainly included elements of sexual op-
pression as well); racial difference is marked on the body with a visibility
not apparent in a person's different sexual practices, such as sadomaso-
chism versus "vanilla." The analogical relationships mentioned above,
however, function to suppress the specific differences introduced by race.

The seeming equivalence of the analogy and the horizontal seriality
suggested by the commas often used by gender theorists to include con-
cerns of race and class in routinely used phrases such as "race, class, and
gender" belie a hierarchy of ontologies that privilege whiteness. When
the (universalist) theorist of gender or sexuality argues that modalities of
race function similarly, the theorist's primary object of analysis is not simply
gender or sexuality but white gender and white sexuality, particularly when
gender and sexuality are not marked as such. For, as Langston Hughes
long ago recognized, and as theorists of whiteness have more recently
explained, whiteness has the privilege of being unmarked and simply un-
derstood as the norm (1926, 692) or, as Betsy Nies suggests, as "the
absent signifier" (2002, xv).[5] The theorist studying gender or sexuality

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[5] For a landmark analysis of white as unmarked norm, see Dyer 1988 Although whiteness

and, after a comma, race, simply repeats white privilege by assuming that whiteness need not be named and uses *race* to refer to people of color. At this point I wish to make the following assertion based on an analysis of Rubin but by no means limited to her text alone: racial analogy in white feminist/gender/sexuality studies functions as a colonial fetish that enables the (white) theorist to displace the potentially disruptive contradictions of racial difference onto a safer and more palatable notion of similarity, thus offering theory that can be easily assimilated within the politics of liberal multiculturalism.[6]

The (colonial) fetishistic role of analogy in "Thinking Sex" helps explain why, in an essay replete with concrete examples of homophobic harassment and the criminalization of specific kinds of "aberrant" sexual behavior, there is no mention of the horrific history of the systemic violence attendant on sexuality crossing the racial border. Surely if, as Rubin argues, sex has been policed and sexual behaviors have been subject to surveillance leading to the social, economic, and political marginalization of those deemed unacceptable, interracial sexuality has been the most vigorously prosecuted in the United States, except, of course, in the plantation master's rape of slave women. The race-sex anxiety consequent upon Reconstruction culminated in an orgy of lynchings only to be followed by stringent antimiscegenation laws in many states. These laws policed not only white-black but other white-nonwhite borders as well. Indeed, until 1931 an American woman could lose her citizenship if she married a man of Asian descent (Haney-López 1996, 47). Interracial dating, and certainly marriage, are still far from the norm in the early twenty-first century unless fueled by the third-world sex tourism industry, which provides Western men everything from prostitutes to submissive and pleasing mail-order brides.[7] But to conceive of interracial sexuality—marital or otherwise—as aberrant, along with sadomasochism, cross-generational sexuality, and homosexuality, would challenge Rubin's assertion about marital heterosexuality as normative. The contradictions posed by interracial sexuality to

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studies seem like a recent theoretical emergence, Nies (2002) usefully reminds us that writers of color have long studied the meanings of whiteness.

[6] My use of the term *fetish* here evokes Homi Bhabha's brilliant explication of the racial stereotype in colonial discourse as phobic and as a fetishistic disavowal of the split difference provoked in the colonizer by the colonized (1994, 71–75) I do not intend to attribute a negativity to the term *fetish* in its use in sexual practice

[7] For an analysis of the continuum between the sex industry organized for Western consumption and the mail-order bride business, see Enloe (1989) 1990, 36–40, and JanMohamed 1992.

what Rubin calls the "erotic pyramid" are therefore displaced onto analogy rather than considered at all.

Let us examine for a moment Rubin's figure of the sex hierarchy, with the charmed inner circle and the aberrant outer one. The racial exclusions of the outer circle or outer limits are readily apparent: the circle encompassing the bad, abnormal, unnatural, and damned sexuality makes no mention of interracial sexuality. By contrast, if we disavow the discursive privilege of whiteness and construe the partners of the charmed circle as interracial, the charmed circle—heterosexual, married, monogamous, procreative, noncommercial, in pairs, in a relationship, same generation, in private, no pornography, bodies only, vanilla—is obviously no longer charmed. I am not arguing that same-raced heterosexual, married, and monogamous sexual relationships are not the norm. It would be foolish to think otherwise. What I am suggesting is that once interracial sexuality enters the picture, the charmed circle gets disrupted, shattered, and rewritten. For example, because of the history of slavery and the oversexualization of African American women so well documented by black feminists (see White 1985), there may be more societal tolerance of a white man engaging in commercial sex with a black woman than of a white man being married to a black woman. Rubin's sex hierarchy, then, shifts significantly under the lens of interracial sexuality.

However, my purpose is not simply to call attention to what Rubin does not theorize but also to argue that what gets deliberately excluded—interracial sexuality—constitutively affects white sexuality itself; to ignore the effects of interracial sexuality is therefore also to stabilize (white) sexual hierarchies in the very act of critiquing them. Since Rubin is indebted to Michel Foucault for her ideas about sex as socially produced and her ideas about sexual stratification, it is significant to note that Foucault's omissions are reproduced in her work. As Ann Laura Stoler has argued, Foucault's specification of a history of sexuality in Europe problematically ignores how this sexuality was part of, and affected by, sexuality in the colonies: "In short-circuiting empire, Foucault's history of European sexuality misses key sites in the production of that discourse, discounts the practices that racialized bodies, and thus elides a field of knowledge that provided the contrasts for what a 'healthy, vigorous, bourgeois body' was all about" (2000, 6).[8] The same relationship might be posited for the exclusion of

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[8] Stoler also points out that in the 1970s, when Foucault was working on *The History of Sexuality* ([1976] 1990), scholarship in Britain and France had plenty to say about Western imperialism and disciplinary knowledge (Stoler 2000, 6).

considerations of race and interracial sexuality in Rubin's analysis of sex hierarchies and stratifications in the United States.

A final illustration proves my contention that inclusion by analogy functions fetishistically to exclude the disturbing and troubling aspects of racial difference by mimicking the politics of liberal multiculturalism. Rubin writes, "We have learned to cherish different cultures as unique expressions of human inventiveness rather than as the inferior or disgusting habits of savages. We need a similarly anthropological understanding of different sexual cultures" (1984, 284). Such an argument disturbingly resembles the right-wing ideology of the Reagan years that produced the oxymoronic term *reverse discrimination* and that argued the inconsequentiality of race. While cherishing different cultures might well be a marketing logo for Benetton, it hardly describes the interracial vicissitudes of Britain or the economic and militaristic disciplining of Latin America by the United States, both of which were apparent by the mid-1980s.

The color of the cyborg body

To turn from Rubin's analyses of (racially unmarked) sexual stratifications and oppressions to Haraway's utopian meditations on human-machine borders in "A Cyborg Manifesto" (1991) is to pose cognate, albeit different, questions about the relationship between feminist/sexuality/gender studies and race. Unlike Rubin, Haraway calls attention to her own raced subject position, stringently critiques the idea of a common feminist language, uses the insights of some men and women of color in her theory, and frequently marks the position of women of color as a site for her conception of a cyborg identity. But it is precisely because Haraway invokes women of color so frequently in her essay and because the cyborg myth has been so enthusiastically received by white poststructuralist feminists that we need to understand and interrogate the relationships between the cyborg myth and women of color.

What is a cyborg? Haraway provides different descriptions, all of which emphasize the cyborg's partial, shifting, nontotalizing, and subversive nature:

> A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. (Haraway 1991, 149)

> The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence. (1991, 151)

> Holistic politics depend on metaphors of birth and invariably call
> on the resources of reproductive sex. I would suggest that cyborgs
> have more to do with regeneration. . . . We require regeneration,
> not rebirth, and the possibility for our reconstitution includes the
> utopian dream of the hope for a monstrous world without gender.
> (1991, 181)

The cyborg is a resource for two major domains: the new computerized
and globalized mode of production and the need for a broad though not
totalizing feminist solidarity. The idea of the cyborg, derived from the
human-machine figures of science fiction, provides a resource, Haraway
suggests, for combating the information-based society of late capitalism,
which has intensified domination in new ways. She argues that the pre-
ponderance of computer technology in creating antilabor household econ-
omies and globalization can be significantly challenged by embracing the
breaching of the human-machine border signified by the cyborg. For
feminism, the cyborg promises possibilities other than those based on the
maternal, the pre-Oedipal, or the universalizing. The cyborg provides
"pleasure in the confusion of boundaries" (1991, 150) and critiques the
imperialism of a common feminist language. Haraway's aspiration is to
provide an image for a politics that can "embrace partial, contradictory,
permanently unclosed constructions of personal and collective selves and
still be faithful, effective—and, ironically, socialist-feminist" (1991, 157).

There is nothing particularly new or different about the politics Har-
away articulates if one compares it to the strategies of the New Left in
the sixties, to different versions of French poststructuralist theory, or to
some versions of postcolonial theory in their postmodern, discursive guise.
As Michael Ryan suggests, the New Left's strength was precisely its di-
versity and diffuse nature. He argues that the binarism posited between
a unified, authoritative, effective politics and ineffective anarchy is sim-
plistic: "It is possible to combine a sense of commonality amid diversity,
firmness of resistance, and aggressivity of attack with a plurality of different
struggles" (1982, 216). Similarly, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's
(1985, 167–71) ideas of resistance are based on radical pluralism, the
blurring of frontiers, and the unsutured character of the social. For Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1983, 76), the schizophrenic (like the cyborg)
ruptures wholeness and puts disjunctions to affirmative use: "He is and
remains in disjunction." Deleuze and Guattari's later concepts, such as
rhizomatic thought and nomadism, are similar attempts to name disruptive
ontologies. Finally, Haraway's politics has much in common with Homi
Bhabha's (1994, 11, 207–9) valorization of interstitial and border spaces

as sites for solidarity, and with his celebration of hybridity as a metaphor for postcolonial writing, colonial discourse, and colonized identities.[9]

I point to the similarities between Haraway's cyborg theory and theories of several other poststructuralists in order to suggest that there is nothing inherently subversive for feminism about such theorizing unless the theory can be shown to have specific, material, and located ramifications (a fact Haraway seems to have partially recognized in *Modest_Witness* [1997a], which I will briefly discuss at the end of this essay). Indeed, as Susan Bordo suggests, the epistemological *jouissance* suggested by the image of the cyborg denies locatedness and fantasizes itself as a postmodern "dream of everywhere" (1990, 136, 144–45).[10] Here it is important to distinguish between *locatedness* and a simple celebration of the *local* as endless possibility. I am not advocating what Manuel Castells (1997) describes as a defensive and retrenched localism (manifested most disturbingly in the "not in my backyard" ideal) in the face of globalization as a basis for feminist identity but rather a relationship to materiality and sociopolitical specificity as a basis for theorizing, much in the manner of Castells's own analyses (1997, 61–62). In arguing for a relationship to locatedness, I am taking a stance about critical responsibility in a postcolonial world. As third-world environmentalists such as Vandana Shiva (1997) and subaltern studies historians have demonstrated, policies and political concepts of postcolonial nations cannot be understood through universal (read: Western) concepts alone, even though local concepts need to be related to the global. Witness Shiva's call for international legal ecological policies based on an understanding of indigenous knowledges and Partha Chatterjee's (1986) critique of the Western idea of nation as inapplicable to postcolonial countries. In the United States, critical race theorists have argued for what legal theorist Richard Delgado (1995) terms the *call to context*, which challenges the traditional juridical preference for universalism over particularism and abstract principles over perspectivism. This is particularly important, Delgado points out, in normative discourse such as civil rights (1995, xv).

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[9] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have also argued that we are in an age of empire with no outside, no local-global dialectic, and only the universal. Yet Hardt and Negri's (2000, 212–13, 253) idea of a nonlocalizable empire is actually premised on a very specific migrancy—that of people from the underdeveloped world to the developed. These migrants, to a large extent, constitute the multitude that Hardt and Negri nebulously theorize as a possibility against empire. Thus, they completely ignore such major migrations as those from Pakistan to India, Bangladesh to India, Afghanistan to Pakistan, etc. (see Hardt and Negri 2000, 19)

[10] See also critiques of Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto" in Weed 1989.

Feminists and gender theorists might simply repeat the universalizing knowledge claims of colonialism by celebrating an ahistorical and acontextual blurring of boundaries. For instance, might the blurring of racial boundaries be an obfuscation of the systemic racial oppression and racial hierarchies that continue to affect women's lives? I will return to this point shortly, but for the moment I want to suggest that neocolonial and imperial knowledge claims can be contested only through theories derived from located knowledge. Indeed, my own arguments for context-specific theory derive in part from Haraway's own paradigm of situated knowledge. Positing an alternative to a value-free relativism that she declares to be the "perfect mirror twin of totalization" (1988, 584), Haraway suggests an alternative that is "partial, locatable, critical knowledg[e] sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology" (584). "Our problem is how to have *simultaneously* an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own 'semiotic technologies' for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world, one that can be partially shared" (579).

It is in the spirit of Haraway's own call for partial and locatable knowledge that I propose to examine the relationship between Haraway's concept of the cyborg and the women of color who figure so prominently in the essay. Such an analysis will also reveal the problematic nature of the concept of woman of color as used by Haraway. I have already mentioned the overly celebratory nature of Haraway's cyborg myth as a means of resisting the domination of a thoroughly technologized information culture and as a description of that culture. Haraway writes, "By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism: in short, we are cyborg. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. . . . This chapter is an argument for *pleasure* in the confusion of boundaries and for *responsibility* in their construction" (1991, 150). The cyborg enables a productive blurring of the binaries such as male/female, self/other, and culture/nature that have sustained Western cultural hierarchies.

Just as the cyborg provides the means whereby to resist repressive dichotomies through unnatural fusions and illegitimate couplings, Haraway suggests that the political constituency of women of color provides a means of constructing a political solidarity out of coalition and affinity rather than out of essential identity. Unlike identities based on sameness or unity, this postmodern identity is premised on "otherness, difference, and specificity" (Haraway 1991, 155). Chela Sandoval's (1984) model of

oppositional consciousness, which suggests a mode of articulation seized by those denied stable identities of race or gender, demonstrates to Haraway the subversive potential of the coalition of women of color (1991, 174). Thus *women of color* becomes for Haraway a cyborg identity, "a potent subjectivity synthesized from fusions of outsider identities" (1991, 174). By the end of the essay, the analogous relationship of women of color to the illegitimate and hybrid fusion of the cyborg is clear. Haraway moves to delineate aspects of the cyborg myth by looking at "two overlapping groups of texts . . . constructions of women of color and monstrous selves in feminist science fiction" (1991, 174). What follows are illustrations of subversive political identities formulated by women of color such as Audre Lorde and Cherríe Moraga and feminist science fiction writers such as Joanna Russ, Samuel R. Delaney, James Tiptree Jr., Octavia Butler, and Vonda McIntyre.

Following a partial trajectory of Haraway's complex essay still leaves us with a few nagging questions: Why are women of color needed in order to formulate a cyborg myth centrally based on the monstrous fusion of human and machine? Who are the women of color referred to in the essay? Let us attempt to answer the second question first. Clearly the term *women of color* (it usually appears in quotation marks in the essay) alludes to radical African American, Latina, Native American, and Asian American feminists who constituted themselves as a group apart from white U.S. feminists. Sandoval's (1984) formulation of oppositional consciousness, which Haraway cites, was preceded by the formation of Kitchen Table/ Women of Color Press and the publication of the influential anthology *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*, edited by Moraga and by Gloria Anzaldúa in 1981. Subsequently, the term *women of color* gained widespread critical and pedagogical usage.

Let us now see how Haraway explains the first question raised above. Haraway sees the writings of women of color as postmodern resistance writing or cyborg writing. Like all colonized groups, women of color seize the power to write in order to resignify hegemonic Western myths: "The poetry and stories of US women of color are repeatedly about writing, about access to the power to signify; but this time that power must be neither phallic nor innocent. . . . Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other. . . . Figuratively and literally, language politics pervade the struggles of women of color" (Haraway 1991, 175). Haraway's claims for the writings of women of color are similar to the arguments of scholars who see minority writing or postcolonial writing as resistance writing alone. However, such an ar-

gument not only reifies the very binaries of center and margin, colonizer and colonized, that Haraway as poststructuralist wishes to blur but also homogenizes, through a colonial imperative, the margin itself, a tactic strongly critiqued by feminists like Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991, 51). Let us revisit, for a moment, the two groups of texts Haraway compares: constructions of women of color and monstrous selves in feminist science fiction. One includes a variety of texts (presumably including autobiographies, novels, poetry, and drama) by a racially marked group, while the other deals with grotesque bodies in a specific genre. One would be hard-pressed to find similar generalizations about white U.S. women's writings, but women of color become fair game here, as did all third-world texts in Fredric Jameson's much contested claim about these texts being national allegories (1986).

Here I would argue in similar fashion to Aijaz Ahmed ([1987] 1992) that many texts by women of color are not about access to the power to signify or about subverting either the central origin myths of Western culture or myths of original innocence. Texts like Jade Snow Wong's *Fifth Chinese Daughter* ([1950] 1989), Le Ly Hayslip's *When Heaven and Earth Changed Places* (1989), and Bharati Mukherjee's *Jasmine* (1989), for instance, affirm to an extent the binaries of Western rationality, modernity, and progress and Eastern irrationality, prejudice, and backwardness. Furthermore, the very assumption that texts by U.S. women of color are centrally *about* subverting Western myths suggests that minority texts are significant only insofar as they relate to the center. Many texts by U.S. women of color—Toni Morrison's *Beloved* (1987) and Fae Myenne Ng's *Bone* (1993) are powerful examples—are not fundamentally about subverting Western myths. And simply to suggest that writings about women of color are "repeatedly about writing" is simply to reiterate the discursive postmodern truism that all fiction is metafiction. Moreover, the very distinction between women of color and feminist science fiction writers begs the obvious question: Is Butler (who is included in the category of feminist science fiction) not a woman of color?

Earlier in this essay I pointed out the similarities between the politics of the cyborg myth and that of poststructuralist theory. I would argue that the similarity also extends to the proclivity of some poststructuralists, in their attempts to question and destabilize Western ontologies to view the East, in a kind of reverse Orientalism, as a repository of horizontality, multiplicity, and difference. Thus Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic model is derived from the East, Oceania in particular (1987, xiv, 18–19, 22), while the idea of the plateau comes from what they see as Gregory Bateson's work on the nonorgasmic libidinal economy of Balinese culture

in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (1972). Poststructuralist feminism, of course, has a long history of romanticizing the East. Luce Irigaray's recently translated *Between East and West* (2002), which looks back to pre-Aryan India as a golden age of gender in a manner reminiscent of colonial British Indologists, is in line with Julia Kristeva's earlier analysis of foot binding as a strong cultural recognition of the phallic mother (1977, 81–84). I am not suggesting that Haraway's deployment of women of color is coded with the degree of nostalgia present in the uses of the East by Irigaray and Kristeva, but the need to locate a homogenized non-Western other onto which fantasies can be projected, precisely in order to subvert the hierarchies of Western metaphysics, is an overdetermined Western—and, I might add, neocolonial—gesture in which Haraway is implicated.[11]

If the constituency *women of color* names somewhat problematically the writing practices of these U.S. women, Haraway's broader use of the term to similarly encompass female workers in multinational corporations in third-world countries as well as in the Silicon Valley bespeaks an indiscriminateness that dangerously elides cultural, spatial, political, and class differences. Haraway's women of color include "unnatural cyborg women making chips in Asia" (1991, 154), women in the Silicon Valley, "young Korean women hired in the sex industry" (174), and the "real-life cyborg (for example the Southeast Asian village women workers in Japanese and US electronic firms described by Aihwa Ong)" (177). Of course one must praise Haraway as a feminist for drawing attention to the most oppressed of workers within the circuit of multinational capitalism. It is also scintillating to have these workers brought together in a subversive, oppositional moment with U.S. women writers of color. But juxtaposition does not translate into a connection or a relationship. Indeed, the obfuscation of the differences denies not only class differences but also the distinction between what Spivak calls the subjects of "post-modern neocolonialism" (1989, 226) who are reentering a "feudal mode of power" (226) and ethnic subjects in the United States who are "still caught in some way within structures of colonial subject-production; and especially, from the

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[11] Joan W Scott sees a similar problem in Haraway's use of women of color in relation to traditional socialist feminism Scott writes, "What is the difference between Haraway's looking to these groups for the politics of the future and (the association such a gesture has for me) the romantic attribution by white liberal or socialist women to minority or working-class women of the appropriate (if not authentic) socialist or feminist politics?" (1989, 216–17).

historical problem of ethnic oppression on First World soil" (226).[12] So while one might agree with Haraway that the alliance between Asian women workers making microchips and antinuclear demonstrators spiral dancing in Santa Rita jail would be energizing and powerful, it cannot be articulated without an acknowledgment of the spatio-political difference of the demonstrators that positions them, in however weak a fashion, as beneficiaries of globalization and with different interests than Asian women laborers who, in the interests of feeding their families, might not always join the protesters against multinationals.

I have focused at length on the deployment of the category *women of color* because Haraway's attempt to articulate an oppositional ontology and politically effective strategy for feminism that includes women of color is to be lauded. Yet if the practice entails a disregard for situatedness and locatedness, it avails itself of the universalizing and unmarked privileges of whiteness discussed earlier. As Abby Wilkerson suggestively points out, it might be worth asking "whether many white feminists have enthusiastically taken up the cyborg myth precisely because of what it does not say about race" (1997, 170). Wilkerson argues that taking up the hybrid identity of the cyborg might well be a way of not assuming responsibility for whiteness while appropriating the identity politics of women of color (1997, 170–71). The same might be said of similar universalizing gestures animating poststructuralist theorists' use of the East, as I discuss above.

We are now in a position to understand the relationship between the cyborg and women of color. At one level there is no relationship, only oneness. Since in the informatics of domination we all cannot help being cyborgs, women of color are cyborgs. But the ultimate relationship is again analogical. Just as the cyborg is a fusion of human and machine, a monstrous and illegitimate fusion, so, the argument goes, is the constituency of women of color, forged as it is without identity. Thus is it not surprising that race sometimes figures in Haraway's essay in a similar fashion as it does in Rubin's: "race, gender, and capital require a cyborg theory of wholes and parts" (Haraway 1991, 181); "the causes of various women-

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[12] Spivak draws on the distinction Chatterjee makes between the elaborate constitution of the subject through educational and legal apparatuses in the colonial era and the lack of any such constitution or training in the age of electronic capitalism, where subjects are reentering a feudal mode of power characterized by sheer dominance (Spivak 1989, 224). Spivak herself talks about the necessity of distinguishing between the subjects of postmodern neocolonialism and immigrants in the United States, but her argument only makes sense if we substitute *raced subjects* or *ethnics* for the term *immigrants* Native Americans, African Americans, and many Latinas, for instance, are not immigrants, and the argument would not hold for white immigrants.

headed households are a function of race, class, or sexuality" (167); and "some of the rearrangements of race, sex, and class rooted in high-tech-facilitated social relations can make socialist-feminism more relevant to effective progressive politics" (165). Cyborg identities, mediated through the politics of women of color, help defuse—or to use Wilkerson's terminology, deny the responsibility of working with—whiteness and white feminist social location. Haraway's stated reasons for turning to women of color make this clear. Haraway writes: "For me—and for many who share a similar historical location in white, professional middle-class, female, radical, North American, mid-adult bodies—the sources of a crisis in political identity are legion. The recent history for much of the US left and US feminism has been a response to this kind of crisis by endless splitting and searches for a new essential unity. But there has also been a growing recognition of another response through coalition—affinity, not identity" (1991, 155). I argued earlier that analogy functions like a colonial fetish enabling the white feminist theorist to displace racial difference onto a safer notion of similarity. We can now add the following: racial analogy within (white) feminist theory helps whiteness retain its privilege by being uninterrogated.

Performance and Its others

I would like to examine the pervasiveness of the gender/race/sex analogy by briefly analyzing the methodology of Judith Butler, arguably one of the most influential theorists of gender/sexuality since the publication of her *Gender Trouble* in 1990. I do not intend this analysis to be by any means an exhaustive critique of Butler's impressive oeuvre but rather a focused examination of her theorizations about race and gender in a few limited moments. Because Butler has, in fact, made sustained attempts to think productively about race and gender, an analysis of her theories reveals both the limits and possibilities of taking race seriously as a systemic category within gender and queer theory.

In *Gender Trouble* Butler proposes the idea of gender as a performance constructed in the very act of performing, the performance a challenge to the ubiquity of gender categories. Although at moments Butler alerts readers to the punitive system of gender performances within compulsory social systems, the book proliferates the idea of gender as infinite, individualistic performance, as rebellious carnival, without much attention to the pains and problems of performing (1990, 139). Considerations of race are virtually unaddressed in the book. However, at the end, Butler confronts the epistemology of theories that "elaborate predicates of color,

sexuality, ethnicity, class, and able-bodiedness" and "invariably close with
an embarrassed 'etc.' at the end of the list" (143). Butler suggests that
the "etc." should not be read as a sign of failure but as a sign of the
"illimitable process of signification itself," the "excess that accompanies
any effort to posit identity once and for all" (143). Problematically, what
Butler questions here is the idea of an identity prior to signification, not
the analogizing of vastly different vectors such as able-bodiedness and
color.

In *Bodies That Matter* (1993), a book that begins, significantly, with
an epigraph from Haraway's "A Cyborg Manifesto" (1991), Butler begins
to ponder the problems of the analogical model, although race is arguably
still added to arguments about gender and sexuality. The bulk of the
introduction theorizes the constructedness of "sex" and interrogates the
critical assumption of a prior, unmarked category of sex onto which gender
is culturally imposed. Instead of constructedness, Butler proposes the no-
tion of matter, a process that *"produce[s] the effect of boundary, fixity, and
surface we call matter"* (1993, 9). Sex and the contours of the body,
Butler argues, are regulated by the heterosexual imperative. It is only much
later in the introduction, after the theorizations of the body, sex, and
matter have been made, that Butler introduces, as part of her chapter
summaries, the idea that "normative heterosexuality is clearly not the only
regulatory regime in the production of bodily contours" (1993, 17).
Structurally, that is, body, sex, and matter are constituted as the main
items of theory to which race is added. As Butler argues, race is not simply
another domain separable from sexual difference, "but . . . its 'addition'
subverts the monolithic workings of the heterosexual imperative as I have
described it so far" (18). Although Butler is clearly aware of the problems
of simply adding race to the understandings of the body and of sex, her
own positioning of race in the introduction is nonetheless additive. Yet
Butler goes on to suggest a focus on the specificities as well as intersections
of race and gender construction: "It seems crucial to resist the model of
power that would set up racism and homophobia and misogyny as parallel
or analogical relations. The assertion of their abstract or structural equiv-
alence not only misses the specific history of their construction and elab-
oration, but also delays the important work of thinking through the ways
in which these vectors of power require and deploy each other" (18).
Butler's attention to the problems of analogizing, though constituting
only a small portion at the end of the introduction, is a welcome turn in
gender theory and, indeed, a crucial methodological process that needs
to be sustained if race is not to be marginalized within gender studies.
Butler's decision to focus on texts such as *Paris Is Burning* (1991) and

Nella Larsen's *Passing* (1929) is also an important step in theorizing conjunctures, convergences, and relationships between race and gender. Yet in the spirit of furthering rigorous analysis into these very areas, I want to suggest that Butler's analyses need to be interrogated through the critical paradigms she herself sets up at the end of her introduction.

I want to focus here specifically on questions of race and appropriation, particularly brought to light by bell hooks's criticism of *Paris Is Burning*, to which Butler responds (see hooks 1992, 145–56). Butler considers the ways in which drag is a site that questions the manner in which hegemonic heterosexuality reproduces itself through imitation and performance. Reading the desire on the part of Venus Xtravaganza, the drag queen who is the subject of *Paris Is Burning*, to become a "real" woman, and drag performance as a "contesting of realness" (1993, 130), Butler argues that such performances expose the norms that regulate realness and also the fact that "norms of realness by which the subject is produced are racially informed conceptions of 'sex'" (1993, 130). hooks's critique of the film centers on director Jennie Livingston's role as a white lesbian woman ethnographer photographing subjects of color but imperialistically concealing her own standpoint in the film. Butler accedes to the problem of the raced gaze but offers a reading that presents itself as problematically analogical. Butler writes, "hooks is right to argue that within this culture the ethnographic conceit of a neutral gaze will always be a white gaze. . . . But what does it mean to think about this camera as an instrument and effect of lesbian desire?" (1993, 136). In other words, Butler rewrites the question of race as a question of sexuality, the underlying assumption being that one can be substituted for the other. Thus, although Butler suggests that to an extent the camera assumes the place of the phallus, she suggests that the cinematic gaze is not simply white and phallic *because* the occasion of drag balls constructs kinship relations outside the heterosexual family. Being outside heterosexuality, by analogy, means being outside whiteness. Butler writes, "If the signifiers of whiteness and femaleness . . . are sites of phantasmatic promise, then it is clear that women of color and lesbians are . . . excluded from this scene" (1993, 136). I do not wish to counter the claim that whiteness as hegemony legislates heterosexuality as the norm that, in turn, excludes lesbians from many articulations of whiteness, but this does not mean that lesbians are excluded from whiteness in the way that women of color are.[18] What the analogy

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[18] Mason Stokes (2001) offers nuanced analyses of the relationship between race and sexuality by focusing on antiblack writing between 1852 and 1915. Stokes cautions against always seeing queerness as a subversive way out of whiteness (183) He also suggests that

also excludes is the possibility that some lesbians might enjoy their access to the phenotypical privileges of whiteness at the same time as they are denied access to other aspects of white privilege.

The argumentative equivalence of race and gender in the analysis of *Paris Is Burning* is mirrored, in turn, in analogical descriptions that the film cannot sustain. Questioning the results of Venus's denaturalization of gender and sexuality, Butler writes, "As much as she crosses gender, sexuality, and race performatively, the hegemony that reinscribes the privileges of normative femininity and whiteness wields the final power to renaturalize Venus' body" (1993, 133). However, although one might well argue that Venus desires whiteness and its privileges, she never attempts to pass as white; she does not cross racial lines in the film (as she does gender lines) unless we, through a complete substitution of gender for race, consider any drag to be a subversion of whiteness, in which case whiteness becomes, as Richard Dyer powerfully argues, everything and nothing at once (1988, 45–46).

The subsumption of race under gender/sexuality via analogy—in spite of Butler's intentions to the contrary and the near absence of race in discussions of normative and radical kinship in *Antigone's Claim* (2000)— suggests that feminist/gender/sexuality theories have far to go before they recognize the racial projects to which we, particularly the formerly colonized, have all been subjected to since modernity. Although *Antigone's Claim* does not warrant extended discussion here because it does not invoke the race-gender analogy, it is worth pointing out that it does make universalizing claims about kinship systems without being sufficiently cognizant of its West-centered perspective. While challenging the heterosexual imperative of the Oedipal configuration for the family, for instance, Butler suggests a different familial configuration resulting from factors such as migrations, divorces, and blended families. However, the extended family structure endemic to many Asian cultures, and which third-world theorists such as Ashis Nandy (1980) have argued challenges Oedipal configurations (although not heterosexuality), is never mentioned.[14]

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the anxiety attendant on white reproduction makes heterosexuality (via miscegenation) a threat to whiteness unless heterosexuality facilitates white homosociality (18).

[14] Butler mentions African American kinship systems in *Antigone's Claim* (2000) but critiques the fact that these do not question but simply replace patriarchy. Her argument that African American theorists have not critiqued the patriarchy inherent in the theory that African American men have been denied masculinity (69) ignores the very same critiques made by Michelle Wallace (1978, 22–23) and by hooks (1990, 58–59).

Coda: On localization and vampirism

My analysis of the pervasiveness of the race-gender analogy raises the obvious question about whether it is possible to theorize race and gender in any way other than analogically. Has analogy been so powerfully deployed that we simply cannot escape it when we think of race and gender? To the extent that feminist theory—white or otherwise—refuses specificity, there is always a danger of analogizing. Take, for instance, Sandoval's attempt to articulate an oppositional politics in *Methodology of the Oppressed* (2000). Although Sandoval critiques Haraway's appropriation of the methodologies of women of color into examples of cyborg feminism (Sandoval 2000, 71), her book remains indebted to Haraway's construction of the cyborg as a generalized locus of difference and contradiction. Perhaps that is why the predominant mode of analysis in *Methodology of the Oppressed* is analogizing different forms of dissident consciousness, such as Roland Barthes's punctum (a meaning that cannot be named, because it is not part of a collective code; Barthes 1981, 27), Anzaldúa's *mestizaje* (mixture, hybrid; Anzaldúa 1987), and Haraway's cyborg feminism. While it might well be important to demonstrate the undeniable structural similarities among these concepts, the very methodology of generalization and analogy might blind us to problems apparent only through localized readings. For instance, to bypass the reading of Anzaldúa's *mestizaje* in the context of Mexico, where it was the official policy of amalgamation and adopted in order to disempower black races, is to miss the crucial contradiction here between progressive feminism and hegemonic racial hierarchies.[15]

Thus I would argue that while the analogical model continues to proliferate, there are other models that emerge from more localized studies. Collins demonstrates, for instance, how an emphasis on the interconnection of race, gender, and class has important ramifications for African American women who, by forcing courts to see them as doubly or triply oppressed, can claim better protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1990, 224).[16] Similarly, Anne McClintock, in her brilliant analysis of Victorian imperialism, argues that race and gender "come into existence *in and through* relation to each other—if in contradictory and conflictual ways" (1995, 5). And it is the contradictory and conflictual relationship that McClintock stresses. Different forms of fetishization, such as the fetishization of white skin, national flags, and lesbians cross-

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[15] For an analysis of the hegemonic problems of celebrating *mestizaje*, see Hedrick 2003.
[16] *Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*, Public Law 88-352, *U.S. Code* 42 (1964), sec. 2000(e).

dressing as men, McClintock argues, cannot simply be lumped under "a single mark of desire without great loss of theoretical subtlety and historical complexity" (184).

An important critique of the race-gender analogy has been offered by Siobhan B. Somerville (2000), who argues that simple analogies between race and gender/sexuality actually perpetuate a separation between the two and obscure the ramifications of a specific history of analogizing at a particular historical moment. Somerville's project is to demonstrate that such analogies have a specific history, that "the formation of notions of heterosexuality and homosexuality emerged in the United States through (and not merely parallel to) a discourse saturated with assumptions about the racialization of bodies" (2000, 4).[17] The discourse on race, that is, facilitates the discourse on sexuality. So I speculate that the possibilities for decolonizing (white) feminist/gender/sexuality theories might lie precisely in analyses grounded in a specific, local moment, for these analyses would begin the work of undoing the universalism that has been the mark of whiteness.

It is fitting to conclude my speculations on the disruptiveness of localization to the race/gender/sexuality analogy by briefly examining Haraway's analytics of race in *Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium* (1997a). Although the essay on race, "Race: Universal Donors in a Vampire Culture" (1997b), begins with a numbingly familiar series of analogies— "Race, like nature and sex, is replete with all kinds of rituals of guilt and innocence in the stories of nation, family, and species . . . race, like sex, is about the purity of lineage; the legitimacy of passage" (213)—the bulk of the essay derives its interpretive impetus from historically specific articulations. Through a table that periodizes twentieth-century kinship categories through key objects of knowledge—race, population, and the genome—in three periods in the twentieth century, Haraway both contextualizes the categories of race, sex, and nature and suggests related discontinuities and unfamiliar connections along the chart by seeing the chart as a hypertext. The most insightful of Haraway's observations derive from rigorous localized analysis. Thus Haraway demonstrates both the humanist impulse behind the Human Genome Project and the raced, colonial workings through which indigenous peoples were once again the objects of knowledge rather than partners in a research agenda (1997b, 249).

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[17] However, Somerville often uses strategies very similar to Butler's in seeing the primacy of the sexual. See, e.g., the analysis of Jean Toomer based on the term *queer* (Somerville 2000, 136) and the insistence that compulsory heterosexuality is "integral" to the logic of racial segregation (137).

To trouble the categories of biological kinship, Haraway draws on the figure of the vampire. The vampire "both promises and threatens racial and sexual mixing" and "feeds off the normalized human" (1997b, 214). Suggestive of violence, pollution, and mixing, the vampire is a figure for the alien, the immigrant, and the cosmopolitan and is embroiled in racism, sexism, and homophobia. The figure of the vampire clearly facilitates Haraway's inquiry into leakages among kinship categories. Yet like the cyborg, the figure also tends to become, like whiteness, everything and nothing at once. Haraway asks, in response to *Time* magazine's 1993 cover of a morphed portrait of a woman's face created by a computer mixing of different races, a figure she labels SimEve, "Nothing here is scary, so why am I trembling?" (1997b, 264). In a similar manner, I ask about the figure of the vampire: Everything is so messy, so why am I so suspicious? My suspicion arises from the ease with which Haraway's use of the vampire allows us to be on the other side of kinship and the dramas of identity and reproduction. As Haraway concludes in her chapter, "I believe that there will be no racial or sexual peace, no livable nature, until we learn to produce humanity through something more and less than kinship. I think I am on the side of the vampires, or at least some of them" (1997b, 265). But where and how, within the specific matrices of racial and gendered/sexual oppression, can vampirism be a choice? I suggest that like the postmodern figure of the cyborg, the vampire, recuperated metaphorically for illegitimacy and racial crossing, can function to metaphorize the specificities of race and sex out of existence and once again make room for universalizing analogy.

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Race, Gender, and Antiessentialist Politics

Antiessentialist approaches to struggles for racial and gender justice attempt to revise the politics of identity in a way that can account for the social construction of race and gender. In this article, I examine the success of some of these attempts and suggest that struggles for racial and gender justice would do better to look to a hermeneutic or interpretive analysis. I shall begin with a brief account of the politics of identity and then turn to its antiessentialist version.

In contrast to older struggles for civil and political rights, which demanded equal treatment for minority groups and women, the politics of identity demands that social and political institutions acknowledge and accommodate differences in race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. Whereas earlier struggles minimized the importance of these differences and aspired to an integrationist ideal, identity politics emphasizes differences, denying that women and ethnic, racial, or sexual minorities need to reshape their distinct identities to fit a standard that adherents of this latter approach claim is modeled on the majority culture or on white Western European men. Instead, women and ethnic and sexual minorities are to demand a form of participation in social and political institutions that sufficiently respects who they are (Kymlicka 1989; Taylor 1994).

This sort of politics sees assertions of distinct social or collective identities as crucial to three projects. First, the assertions are expressions of authenticity. To embrace one's ethnic, racial, sexual, or gender identity is to declare who one really is, to discover the possibilities that are really one's own, and to assert the value of one's distinct identity. Charles Taylor traces this account of the importance of affirming one's identity back to the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried von Herder, both of whom reject the ideas of honor associated with social hierarchies in favor of the ideas of dignity associated with demands to be true to oneself and to one's *Volk* (Taylor 1994, 27–31). In this view, the social expectation that one conform to a majority or dominant culture is a violation of one's integrity. It is important to affirm who one is because only by doing so can one live an authentic life.

Second, the demand that one's society acknowledge one's distinctive identity is important because recognition by one's culture and society of one's particular racial, gender, sexual, or ethnic identity is crucial to one's psychic and social health. Individuals are constituted as who they are intersubjectively and dialogically. We learn to define, esteem, think about, and change ourselves in concert with, as well as against, those whom Taylor, following George Herbert Mead, calls "significant others" (Taylor 1994, 32). Moreover, these processes of self-definition continue within the wider contexts in which we act, work, and live. The importance of recognition thus pertains both to our development and to our ongoing sense of who we are. Consequently, the denigration of one's social identity by others is not simply an external annoyance but a deep undercutting of self (Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995). Indeed, because liberal democratic societies legitimate themselves in terms of their ability to establish and protect the rights of the individual, they must defend and protect the cultures, traditions, and intersubjective contexts that make these individuals who they are (Kymlicka 1995, 82–84).

W. E. B. Du Bois adds a third project in relation to what he sees as racial identities: not only is the preservation of one's culture and tradition crucial to an authentic life, and not only does the possibility of an authentic life require the respect of one's society; in addition, distinct social identities make distinct contributions to the progress of humankind. Du Bois insists that the English race stands for constitutional liberty and commercial freedom while the Romance nations contribute literature and art. That which the "Negro" race can contribute still needs to be determined, he argues. Nevertheless, because of the prospect of their separate contribution, blacks must work against assimilation to conserve their distinctness in the United States (Du Bois [1897] 2000, 112).[1] "We are Americans, not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political ideals, our language, our religion," he writes. "Farther than that our Americanism does not go. At that point we are Negroes . . . the first fruits of this new nation, the harbinger of that black to-morrow which is yet destined to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic today" (Du Bois [1897] 2000, 114). Lucius Outlaw echoes him: "Both the struggle against racism and invidious ethnocentrism and the struggles on the part of persons of various races and ethnicities to create, preserve, refine, and, of particular importance, share their 'messages'—that is to say, their cultural meanings—with human civilization at large, require that the constantly evolving groups

[1] I shall be using the term *blacks* in this article rather than *African Americans* because I am interested specifically in the way we construct and understand people in racial terms.

we refer to as races . . . be 'conserved' in democratic politics" (Outlaw 1995, 98–99).

Yet what are these "constantly evolving groups we refer to as races"? What are the messages or cultural meanings that races, whatever they are, are meant to share? By now problems with the concept of race are well cataloged. Du Bois himself denies that individuals can be coherently grouped together on the basis of color, hair, cranial size, or morphology since these features fail to offer strictly separable groups or to combine with one another in uniform ways. Groups vary in color, Du Bois says, from the "marble-like pallor of the Scandinavian" to the brown Egyptian; hair texture and skull size not only differ as well but are "exasperatingly intermingled" ([1897] 2000, 109). Those with dark skin may have straight hair like the Chinese and those with white skin curly hair like the Bushman; "nor does color agree with the breadth of the head, for the yellow Tartar has a broader head than the German" (Du Bois [1897] 2000, 109).

To Du Bois's exasperations, we could, of course, add others: darkly colored South Asians who do not count as black in the United States and lightly colored African Americans who do; asymmetries in heritage so that one counts as black in the United States if one has one African ancestor while one counts as white not if one has one European ancestor but rather if one has no African ancestors (Zack 1997, 33); the exasperations of genetic analysis in that the strands of DNA that distinguish human populations fail to connect up in any consistent way to the physical features we associate with races or with any other genetic features; and the fact that the extent of total genetic variance among individuals within so-called races typically exceeds the variation between races themselves (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 22–23). Indeed, while small population groups such as the Xhosa of South Africa or the Basques of Europe may share more similar gene frequencies with members of their own group than they do with others, their differences from other groups are gradual and shifting rather than strictly separate in ways that might be neatly cataloged as racial divisions (Haney-López 1994, 12–13).

Du Bois often tried to define race in cultural rather than biological terms. Members of a race, he said, share a "common history, common laws and religion, similar habits of thought and a conscious striving together for certain ideals of life" (Du Bois [1897] 2000, 111). Nevertheless, the questions this definition raises remain exasperating. Do South Africans of mostly Dutch ancestry and South African Xhosans belong to the same race because they share a history and tradition? Do they fail to share a history because the relevant history for the South Africans of mostly Dutch ancestry is the history of the Netherlands while the relevant history for

the Xhosans is the history of the Xhosa? But why are these histories the relevant ones? Why not the history they share of conquest and settlement in the southern part of Africa? Can we say that they fail to share this history because some trace their history through the line of conquerors and others through the line of the conquered? Can we say that Americans from the North and Americans from the South fail to share a history, then, because they occupied different sides in the Civil War? Similar questions arise with regard to common laws and religion, similar habits of thought, and a conscious striving together for certain ideals of life, since some of the people Du Bois thinks of as parts of the black, white, or "yellow" races share none of the above.

Du Bois, in any case, remains conflicted over the relative importance of history and ideas, on the one hand, and what he calls the "natural cleavage of common blood, descent and physical peculiarities" ([1897] 2000, 110), on the other. On the one hand, races are distinguished by "spiritual, psychical differences" (Du Bois [1897] 2000, 111). On the other hand, these differences either "generally [follow the] natural cleavage of common blood, descent and physical peculiarities" or are "undoubtedly based on the physical" (Du Bois [1897] 2000, 110, 111). On the one hand, race is a question of history, tradition, spirit, law, and religion. On the other, it is formed by "blood" and physical peculiarities. Du Bois concedes these contradictions with regard to his own identity. He admits that the culture in which he grew up was that of the Netherlands and New England, and the same, he says, held for his speech ("idiomatic New England with no African dialect"; Du Bois [1940] 1968, 115), his family's sexual mores, and his family customs. At the same time, he continues, "I felt myself African by 'race' and by that token was African and an integral member of the group of dark Americans who were called Negroes" (Du Bois [1940] 1968, 115). If neither culture nor color defines a race, however, and if, indeed, they can conflict, who are these "dark Americans . . . called Negroes"?

An antiessentialist approach to race tries to answer this question by denying that those who share a racial identity need to share a common characteristic or essence. Instead, an antiessentialist approach defines racial identities as social formations constituted or constructed through particular institutions, social relations, and histories that serve to establish available options for identity. Social identities are not pregiven pieces of matter but rather the results of history and power. They are constructed through the power of conquest and discrimination, for example, and through the workings of various institutions, including medicine, schools, religion, and systems of justice, as well as through practices such as child rearing and

work. They require a context or linguistic universe of terms within which they make sense, and they vary over time and cultural distance so that what is available as a possible identity at one time in history or in one culture is not always possible at another time or in another culture.

In this sort of analysis, the fact that the concept of race involves inconsistencies and even contradictions does not preclude the possibility of a racial identity. Indeed, Penelope Deutscher has claimed that, far from destabilizing social identities, inconsistencies serve to reinforce categories of identity (Deutscher 1997, 15–19). The instability the categories involve is simply the point of entry for a normative power to impose them all the more forcefully. Deutscher's remarks pertain to gender and sexuality, but the same argument presumably applies to race: if race is internally incoherent as a category, then legal institutions, social practices, and administrative actions must enforce its claims all the more powerfully. Courts decide who is to count as white for purposes of citizenship (Haney-López 1996); school boards decide who is "colored" for purposes of school assignment.[2]

Race is thus a process of racialization—indeed, a process of racialization that includes two elements. First, it involves the exercise of power. In the case of the black race, this exercise includes the conquest and colonization of Africa, the Atlantic slave trade, the institutions of slavery and segregation, determinations of whiteness by federal courts for purposes of naturalization, antimiscegenation laws, and so on. Second, the social construction of race involves an introjection or appropriation of particular racial categorizations on the part of individuals. For instance, because the slave trade broke up families and ethnic groups, slaves forged new kinship systems, customs, and forms of religion and expression in order to maintain their lives, health, and dignity. These new forms and systems served to draw them together as a group, as individuals similar to one another and different from white America. After the Civil War, this racial consciousness survived through racial ideologies, discrimination, and the efforts of blacks themselves, including Du Bois, to redress the inequality in assessments of black and white.

Currently, one's race appears on census forms, job applications, police reports, and enrollment and scholarship forms for schools. The 2000 U.S. census allowed individuals to choose up to six racial and ethnic identities, which has resulted in fifty-seven new possibilities, including white-Asian and black-Latino-American Indian (Moore 2001). Nonetheless, the census does not include a nonracial identity. Rather, indi-

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[2] See the analysis of *Gong Lum v. Rice* (275 U.S. 78 [1927]) in Kluger 1977, 120–22.

viduals continue to possess at least one race, and race remains a fundamental way in which we think about others and ourselves. Even where racial categories are consciously constructed—as was the category of Hispanic, in order to provide census takers with a convenient shorthand to cover Spanish-speaking people from Central and South America—individuals understand themselves in racial terms. Individuals internalize the categories that race serves up and introject them as descriptions of who they are, as identities that shape their prospects and life plans. In this way, race acquires a solidity in individuals' conceptions of themselves. It becomes a theoretical commitment, as K. Anthony Appiah puts it, an identity that is so interwoven with a form of life that it determines life conditions and self-expectations or what Appiah, following sociological practice, calls *scripts* (Appiah 1996, 97).

What form of politics follows from this social constructionist analysis? On some accounts this analysis is compatible with an appropriately deessentialized form of the politics of identity. The struggle for recognition becomes a struggle to transform scripts. If social identities such as race are the product of power, if they have been imposed on one as a source of negative expectations and restrictive, demeaning scripts, then to appropriate such an identity consciously, to take it up as who one is, is to defy the negativity associated with it. The politics of recognition transforms negative scripts into positive ones, moving from the script of the self-hating "Uncle Tom," for example, to that of the unassimilated advocate of Black Power (Appiah 1996, 99). As Appiah writes, one identifies with the black racial grouping one has been assigned not as a source "of limitation" but as "a valuable part" of who one is and as an identity that demands recognition for its virtues and character (1996, 98).

Yet this antiessentialist politics of identity raises at least two worries. First, it helps to reinforce identities even as it denies their essentiality. We are to accede to the identities that history and social power have forged, and we are simply to recalibrate their value. Yet if we know our racial identity to be a construction of who we are, an effect of forms of institutional, legal, and social power that we have internalized, why should we endorse the identities thereby created, even if we do so in defiance? Why should we appropriate these identities as valuable definitions of who we are or demand respect in their terms? Taylor's recourse to the politics of identity depends on the authenticity of our identities. But it is exactly this idea of a basic authenticity that antiessentialism questions.

Second, the strategy of transforming negative into positive scripts assumes that the forms of power that have created our identities have also contributed something out of which we can create value and for which

we ought to seek recognition. With regard to the white race, however, this assumption is frightening. With regard to oppressed minorities it is patronizing. It assumes that such identities are similar to the scarlet letter worn by Hester Prynne and that individuals can always make something of worth out of what began as a badge of ignominy. But why suppose this transformation is always possible? The designation of someone as an adulterer or, arguably, as a black incorporates a contempt that is the basis for his or her disrespect or inequality. Are we not asking too much, then, if we ask those identified in this way to recalibrate the meaning of their identity by dint of their own efforts to change it from a negative to a positive value? Because of the hypocrisy that her scarlet letter involved, Hester Prynne arguably deserved to go without it rather than to hope to transform its meaning.

Why suppose that we can or ought to redeem a racist history by appropriating its categories to advance a race? Suppose that a "savage" were to begin a campaign for savage rights or that an accused witch were not only to internalize the accusation but also to start a campaign for witches' rights. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, witches were part of the fabric of life; between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand people were formally identified- and condemned as witches (Wiesner 2000, 265–69). In colonial America, the power of religious and civil authority helped entrench the reality of witches, promoting forms of hysteria, using courts of law to convict people, and so on. Indeed, colonial Americans believed in the existence of witches as firmly as more contemporary Americans have believed in the existence of races. Yet surely if a seventeenth-century witch were to demand equal treatment as a witch or respect for her way of life she would be accused not only of witchcraft but also of incoherence. The designation of someone as a witch, savage, adulterer, or, arguably, as a black already justifies the punishment or unequal treatment he or she receives. Indeed, the creation of witches, savages, adulterers, and blacks simultaneously creates their status as unequals so that attempts to recalibrate their status are undermined from the start.

The sort of politics more appropriate to antiessentialism might seem to be one that tries to unravel the identities constructed through forms of power and to trace those identities back to more diverse or original ones: to Yoruba or Xhosa, for example, rather than to black. Yet this option is not available to antiessentialists for at least two reasons. First, given our history, we *are* races; we could unravel these identities only by unraveling who we already are. If we are to emancipate ourselves from our racial identities, it is unclear who is to emancipate us and who would be left after the emancipation. Second, Xhosa and Yoruba are no less

constructed identities than black or white. They are tribal identities forged through events, practices, histories of exclusion and inclusion, and so on. Why, then, get rid of one constructed identity for another? A racial politics of identity cannot justify its assertion of race as a valuable aspect of identity. An antiessentialist activism without the politics of identity cannot justify any politics at all, for it offers no reason to think nonracial identities are better than racial ones.

Examples of an activist politics that tries to circumvent these problems and to appropriate the insights of antiessentialism include Appiah's conception of recreational identities (1996, 103), Denise Riley's account of a strategic feminism (1988, 112–13), and Kate Bornstein's notions of gender ambiguity and fluidity (1994, 51–52). I shall look briefly at these three, since the antiessentialist politics I want to propose incorporates elements of all of them.

Appiah's account of recreational identities uses the development of an Irish American identity as a model. Americans with some amount of Irish ancestry have options: they may appropriate their Irish heritages as an important part of, or foundation to, their identity, or they may elect not to. Furthermore, although Appiah does not stress this point, even if they do take up identity as Irish Americans, at this point in American history this identity simply no longer has influence as a source of possible life scripts. Social practices and institutions no longer construct the Irish American as a socially meaningful type. In appropriating their Irish heritage, then, Irish Americans can look to a feature of their history that has no influence on what they can do or decide to do. Instead, being Irish American is an entirely personal feature of identity, a fact of heritage that one might refer to in casual conversation or use as a reference point for naming one's children. For most other aspects of life it is a fact with simply no bearing.

The Irish American example is an apt one for the case of race insofar as it involves a transition from what the nineteenth century understood as a racial identity to a nonracial, purely ethnic, and, indeed, recreationally ethnic one. In the 1840s, American Anglo-Saxons defined the "race" of new Irish immigrants in terms of their dark skin, big hands and feet, broad teeth, and pug noses (Jacobson 1998, 44). In addition, as an English observer wrote, they were "pot-bellied, bow-legged, and abortively featured . . . especially remarkable for open, projecting mouths, with prominent teeth and exposed gums, their advancing cheekbones and depressed noses bearing barbarism on the very front" (Nott [1849] 1969, 19). Characterized by a genetic propensity to violence and ignorance, their riotous behavior highlighted their difference from the civilized races. The

nineteenth-century Irish themselves acknowledged their racial division from the Anglo-Saxons. Engaging in a politics of recognition, they simply reversed the value of being Irish and demanded respect for an authentic Irish identity. In the course of American history, though not Irish history, the assertion of an authentic Irish identity intersected with other sources of identity, becoming gradually less monopolistic and more a fact of heritage, one indeed worthy now of only occasional and ceremonial comment.

If an African American identity is to follow the same trajectory, it will involve two steps: a move from the "black" race to African ethnicity and a move from African ethnicity as a socially important source of identity to African ethnicity as an entirely personal option with no bearing on one's opportunities, life projects, or possible achievements. Yet if this prospect seems promising for the case of race, it is nonetheless worth raising a caution: the transition an Irish American identity accomplished from race to recreational ethnicity itself served to reinforce the monopoly that a black racial identity had on those of more or less African descent. During the course of the nineteenth century immigrant groups such as the Irish were able to become integrated and even assimilated into parts of American society at least in part as an element in the justification of slavery. Because slavery had to be shown to be legitimate, other racial differences had to be distinguished from the African racial difference. Hence, one strategy for viewing the Irish immigrants was to understand them as simply a diseased stock of whites, a stock that over time could be restored to health. "It is wonderful," one observer wrote, "how rapidly the lower class of Irish . . . do improve in America when they are well fed and comfortably lodged" (Nott [1849] 1969, 43–44). The same could not be said for the Africans. They were, in the words of one proslavery advocate, "as absolutely and specifically unlike the American as when the race first touched the soil and first breathed the air of the New World" (Van Evrie 1863, 52).

Differences between Anglo-Saxons and Irish became matters of health and environment. Differences between Anglo-Saxons and Africans, conversely, became matters of nature. This example suggests that recreational identities depend on the assumption of some more basic identity that is not recreational. Indeed, the example suggests that we can possess recreational identities in the United States only because our racial differences continue to be fundamental. In the U.S. context, then, one remains fundamentally white at the same time that one may be recreationally Irish. The case of blacks remains more monolithic: one cannot be recreationally African because one remains fundamentally black. One still cannot be either recreationally white or recreationally black.

Gender politics offers another direction for an antiessentialist politics. Leaving aside for the moment both the question of how sex and gender may be related and the question of how sex is itself determined, we can understand gender as a constructed identity. If the black race is created by taking unrelated individuals and adding a series of identity-forming laws, institutions, practices, survival mechanisms, and so on, gender is arguably formed in the same way: through a history of legal discrimination, through institutions such as marriage, through child-rearing practices, through feminine survival mechanisms, and so on. As in the case of race, moreover, this construction encompasses a series of inconsistencies. To take one instance, while traits of care and nurturance are central to the construction of women, precisely these traits are ones that certain types of women are meant to lack. Slave women were meant to be indifferent to the fate of their children; contemporary working-class women are meant to put up with inadequate child care at the same time that upper- and middle-class women are meant to stay home to pursue an intensive form of mothering (Hays 1996).

Poor and nonwhite individuals thus hold only an inconsistent status in relation to the category of women. On the one hand, they are not meant to possess the traits that women are meant to possess as part of their identity. On the other hand, the ideal of women as centered on middle- and upper-class white women is firmly entrenched in "women's" conception of who they are. If women are constructed in terms of norms of a domestic sensibility and nurturing capacities that groups of so-called women are inconsistently denied, this conception of women nonetheless becomes part of all women's scripts. To this extent, legal norms, social practices, and cultural assumptions work in the same way as forms of power do in the case of race, as Deutscher (1997) points out: legal norms, social practices, and cultural assumptions exploit inconsistencies in the concept of gender in order to impose it all the more forcefully.

Given the constructed character of women, an antiessentialist feminist politics of identity will raise the same problems as an antiessentialist racial politics of identity. First, it will work with the forms of power it opposes to help entrench a historically contingent identity; second, it will expect a discriminated-against group to transform the value of an identity based on disvalue. It will take as its subject those who will struggle for rights, opportunities, and recognition, the same subject whose very identity is constructed on a kind of otherness, on a lack of rights, opportunity, and recognition. Consequently, campaigns for women's rights will pose the same problem as campaigns for adulterers' rights: they will bring into their struggle precisely the identities that were constructed in such a way as to

exclude their holders from what the fight is for. Why not, instead, use the inconsistencies in the identity against the forms of power that impose that identity?

Riley tries to employ something close to this line of attack (1988, 112–13). If the gender of women is a constructed identity that contradictorily demands of some women precisely what it denies others, a feminist politics can work to dismantle the category of women by pointing to these differences. At the same time, Riley thinks, feminism must yield to categories of gender in some contexts in order to promote women's rights. Hence, she looks to a strategic feminism that sometimes emphasizes the identity of women and sometimes denies it, using the differences among women to disassemble the gender grouping. She writes:

> Sometimes it will be a soundly explosive tactic to deny, in the face of some thoughtless depiction, that there are any "women." But at other times the entrenchment of sexed thought may be too deep for this strategy to be understood and effective. So feminism must be agile enough to say, "Now we will be 'women'—but now we will be persons, not these 'women.'" And, in practice, what sounds like a rigid opposition—between a philosophical correctness about the indeterminacy of the term, and a strategical willingness to clap one's feminist hand over one's theoretical mouth and just get on with "women" where necessary—will loosen. (Riley 1988, 113)

Riley offers the example of women workers to illustrate her point. Feminists, she thinks, should continue to argue against the idea that women workers are more interested in nine-to-five positions or positions with flexible hours than they are in positions that pay well. Although the former sort of job is better suited to caring for children and families, feminists need to insist that women workers are often just as interested in higher incomes as men are. On the one hand, this insistence admittedly leaves "the annoyingly separable grouping 'women workers' untouched" (Riley 1988, 113). On the other hand, by countering familiar stereotypes, the argument "successfully muddies the content of that term" (Riley 1988, 113).

In her comments on *Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears*, Joan Wallach Scott (1988) expands on this conception of a strategic feminism.[3] In this case, the U.S. government relied on statistics about Sears's employment practices to claim that the company discriminated

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[3] *EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill 1986); *EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988)

against women by denying them access to its better-paying commission sales positions. Both the government and Sears employed feminists as expert witnesses: Sears's witness, Rosalind Rosenberg, argued that female employees typically took traditional values of nurturing more seriously than economic advantage and, hence, that they would be unlikely to apply for higher paying positions whenever such positions meant a loss in family time (Rhode 1989, 180–81). The government, for its part, called another prominent feminist scholar, Alice Kessler-Harris, who tried to dismember the collectiveness of a feminine gender identity by noting the different job choices that different women make. In a book she had previously published (Kessler-Harris 1982), however, Kessler-Harris had argued that women preferred work that could be made compatible with domestic responsibilities. Although the government lost the case, Scott expands on a conception of strategic feminism: "In relationship to a labor history that had typically excluded women, it might make sense to overgeneralize about women's experience, emphasizing difference in order to demonstrate that the universal term 'worker' was really a male reference that could not account for all aspects of women's job experiences. In relationship to an employer who sought to justify discrimination by reference to sexual difference, it made more sense to deny the totalizing effects of difference by stressing instead the diversity and complexity of women's behavior and motivation" (1988, 170).

In relation to labor history, then, we are to take up the cause of those who fall under the designation of women as a firmly entrenched identity. In relation to employment discrimination, however, we are to stress the diversity of women, deconstruct the identity, and deny that women compose a general unity or coherent identity. Yet what is the basis for doing so, and how does a strategic feminism counter a strategic sexism? Why not, for example, take up the cause of those who fall under the designation of women as a firmly entrenched identity in relation to employment discrimination and stress the diversity of women in relation to labor history? Is it simply a question of strategy to decide when we will be women and when we will not?

As part of her reflections on her transformation from male to female, Bornstein offers another option for dealing with gender: namely, considering it a fluid possibility and treating it ironically (Bornstein 1994). Gender, for her, is a form of self-presentation, a way of portraying oneself that one can play with and perform in different ways. She therefore takes such phenomena as camp and drag to be significant subversive modes of action because they pick up on different aspects of gender and wear them in exaggerated ways, undermining any authenticity they might have been

thought to possess. We can, Bornstein thinks, intentionally mix and match gender traits with various sorts of bodies, twist them around "to a point of humor" (1994, 137), or intentionally confuse gender cues. "As part of learning to pass as a woman," she recounts about the counseling she went through as part of her gender change, "I was taught to avoid eye contact when walking down the street; that looking someone in the eye was a male cue. Nowadays, sometimes I'll look away, and sometimes I'll look someone in the eye—it's a behavior pattern that's more fun to play with than to follow rigidly" (1994, 27).

Of course, it is not clear how effective cross-dressing or toying with different gender possibilities can be for those who are subject to honor killings, for example, or for those without educational or professional opportunities. If we in the West can play with different wardrobes, what about those who are stoned unless they wear a veil? If genital surgery is optional for most individuals in this country, what about those facing clitoridectomies in other countries, either against their will or as a faithful submission to strict religious and gender requirements? For those for whom the smallest transgression of a rigidly defined two-gender system is grounds for exclusion or even death, highlighting the virtues of drag appears not only utopian but also inappropriate. Moreover, just as a strategic feminism lacks rules for which strategies we ought to adopt or when, an ironic feminism evades the question as to which identities we ought to be ironic about. If we are to appropriate our gender only ironically, which identities are we to appropriate in more sincere ways? And why should we only be women ironically? Perhaps we should be democrats ironically or play around with a fascist identity.

How might we preserve the insights contained in Appiah's attempt to individualize identities, Riley's attempt to decollectivize them, and Bornstein's attempt to make them fluid? How might we capture these insights without also preserving a problematic opposition between recreational and fundamental identities, a problematic reliance on strategy, and a problematic appeal to irony? Appiah's notion of recreational identities contains the insight that we possess more than one identity; Riley's strategic feminism likewise contains the insight that we are not always women; finally, Bornstein teaches us that all our identities may be temporary. The upshot of all these approaches is that who we are is contextual: in some contexts what is most important about us is that we play chess, and we are therefore, in that context, chess players; in other contexts what will be most important about us is that we talk about our children, and we are therefore, in that context, women. In what follows I would like to show how these insights follow from an interpretive conception of identity.

Constructions as black or white, men or women are, at bottom, ways
of understanding others and ourselves. We understand people to be certain
things: blacks, whites, men, women, homosexuals, and heterosexuals. But
if identities are ways of understanding—interpretations, in other words—
then we might look more closely at the literary domains where accounts
of interpretation have their primary home. We understand texts to be
certain sorts of texts, love stories, crime novels, passion plays, and so on,
just as we understand people to be certain sorts of people, blacks, whites,
Latinos, and so on. We can understand texts in these ways, however, only
because we already know what love stories, crime novels, and passion plays
are. We understand texts in terms that are familiar to us because of the
developments and literary traditions of the cultures to which we belong.
The possibilities for our understandings of people are historically rooted
in the same way. We understand people as blacks, Latinos, or whites
because these categories make sense to us, and they make sense to us
because of the developments and experiences of the history to which we
belong. Because of this history certain aspects of people are important to
us for the purposes of determining who they are—their skin color, for
example, and not their eye color. Both our literary and social interpre-
tations are formed on the basis of previous experience, socialization, and
traditions of interpretation (see Gadamer 1994).

To be sure, put in these terms, the language of interpretation seems
to do no more than parallel the language of construction. Both vocab-
ularies serve to point to the historical nature of our categories of identity
and to undermine essentialist presuppositions. Yet I think the idea of social
identity as interpretation holds more promise. Consider our interpreta-
tions of texts. Where we rely on the adequacy of a particular interpretation,
we nevertheless do not take it to be the only possible interpretation of
the text. Rather, we assume that different interpreters can understand a
given text in different ways and from different perspectives. We appreciate,
for instance, the extent to which *Twelfth Night* is a love story, but we can
also understand the play in different ways as well, attending, for instance,
to the way in which it plays with gender identities. From one interpretive
horizon *King Lear* is a story about family relationships; from another it
is a tale of hypocrisy and ingratitude. These different accounts of what
the text is answer different questions and reflect different concerns. Given
one set of concerns, an interpreter may focus on the relationship between
Lear and Cordelia; given another set of concerns, another interpreter may
focus on the relationship between Lear and the fool. In the interpretation
of texts we allow for different, equally valid interpretations that respond
to different issues and reflect different interpretive contexts.

Of course, one might say that the text is a play no matter how we interpret what the play is about. Yet we typically decide whether we need to attend to the text's theatrical elements, understanding it specifically as a play, or whether we are interested in its themes as we understand them apart from its theatricality. A critic might contend that one cannot understand the play unless one understands it in its theatrical dimensions. Critics have likewise argued that we need to attend to the theatrical dimensions of Plato's dialogues. Nevertheless, these arguments remain ways of approaching Shakespeare and Plato among a myriad of ways, none of which can plausibly claim to be exclusive or exhaustive. Indeed, the usual response to a claim that we can understand a text only as a play or as a novel is to show just the way in which we need not do so, in which we can understand it as a philosophical argument or a painting.

The same holds for questions of identity insofar as they are questions of how we understand who we are. From one interpretive horizon we are women; from another we are professors, siblings, novel readers, and so on. All of these interpretations offer ways of looking at ourselves that allow us to make sense of who we are. Yet they answer to different issues and reflect different interests. Given one set of issues, those related to the capacity to bear children and the social expectations of greater responsibility for child care, we may identify as women and be most appropriately identified as women by others. Given another set of concerns, those related to teaching workload, for example, we are not women but professors. Nor can we maintain that, although we are professors, siblings, and novel readers, we are more fundamentally women. We cannot maintain that *Othello*, for example, is fundamentally a play about race and only secondarily a play about jealousy or that *King Lear* is fundamentally a story of filial relations and secondarily a story of fools. Indeed, King Lear's tragedy is precisely that he insists on a solitary and exclusive definition of filial love. Instead, just as love comes in many forms, so too do meaning and identity.

The reach of any one interpretation of a text or identity is restricted. A Freudian interpretation of *King Lear* cannot claim to exhaust its meaning. Rather, in the literary domain we accept the fact that meaning is infinite; that new dimensions of meaning will appear from different vantage points; that new texts will shed new light on, and form different relationships with, older texts; that we will think of *King Lear* at least somewhat differently after we have read Jane Smiley's *A Thousand Acres*. The scope of race and gender interpretations is equally nonexhaustive and nonexclusive. If, because of the history of which we are a part, we are blacks, Latinos, and women, we are nevertheless not only and not always

blacks, Latinos, and women. These identities are at best only isolated ways of understanding who we are, apparent only from certain vantage points and related only to certain concerns.

Dimensions of significance come variously into light and darkness in both textual interpretation and accounts of who we are, depending on the questions we ask and the concerns we bring to our interpretive projects. What is problematic about gender or race identity, then, is not that neither is ever an illuminating or appropriate way to understand who someone is but, instead, that both try to monopolize a person's identity and to undergird all other identity interpretations. Race and gender are oppressive and dogmatic understandings of identity when individuals are never allowed to be anything other than particular races or genders or are understood to be most fundamentally races and genders. We can surely understand others and ourselves as races and genders, given the complexes of language and historical practice of which we are a part. Yet our history includes other options for identity as well, options that are occluded by the insistence that blacks and women are always or most basically blacks or women.

Racial profiling serves as a case in point. Rather than recognizing the multiple identities people have, it claims that one of them is always primary, that blacks or other minorities are always and most fundamentally blacks or minorities. Of course we might maintain that when we understand a driver of a car as fundamentally black rather than, say, as fundamentally, in this context, a driver, we do so because blacks and minorities are more likely to be involved in drug trafficking than whites. Hence, this argument goes, from the point of view of arresting criminals, racial ascriptions and even racial profiling are more than justified. Certainly, one response to this argument would be to point to how little profiling accomplishes. The number of law-abiding citizens who are demeaned and embarrassed by the practice and whose rights are violated vastly outweighs the number of drug traffickers arrested through it. As a policy, then, racial profiling is singularly unsuccessful. Yet even if racial profiling worked better than it does, it would still distort the understanding of identity by imposing on individuals an exclusive, monolithic, and inescapable identity without acknowledging that these individuals are open to other understandings of identity as well. Although one might maintain that certain people are blacks because of our history and traditions of interpretation, it remains implausible to maintain that they are only blacks. It is also implausible to maintain that they are fundamentally or primarily blacks. The Sears case runs a parallel course. Because certain workers were monolithically identified as women, as only women, and fundamentally as women, they were

denied certain opportunities. Perhaps some Sears workers are women, just as they may be chess players or baseball enthusiasts. Nevertheless, they can no more be understood always or most basically as women than they can be understood always or most basically as fans.

An interpretive approach to identity that allows for multiple interpretations of who we are thus adds an option to struggles for social justice that the politics of identity in both its original and antiessentialist forms overlooks. The politics of identity cannot explain why we should struggle for the recognition of identities that are constructions of power; social constructionist accounts cannot explain how we can struggle against the identities we already are. Nor can it explain why we should do so, since we will only abandon one constructed identity for another. In contrast, an interpretive approach demands recognition for our multiple and diverse identities, refusing to be restricted to or more closely identified with any one of them. Struggles for recognition on the part of blacks or women, then, will insist on the importance of race or gender. At the same time, such struggles will insist on the multiplicity of legitimate interpretations of who we are, denying that any of those interpretations is more or less fundamental than racial or gender ones. The politics of identity, from this perspective, becomes the struggle for the recognition of the plurality of identities we are, a demand that all be recognized and that none be understood dogmatically to be more or less basic than any other.

Such an interpretive account of identity allows for a politics of identity without entrenching those identities as it struggles for their recognition. Questions of race and gender are questions of context. Struggles against racial and gender discrimination can therefore concentrate on delimiting the appropriate contexts for racial and gender interpretations, insisting on their relevance where they are relevant and denouncing them where they are not. This analysis of social identity demands that no identity be seen as more or less recreational than any other, thereby clarifying Appiah's insight; it allows us to pursue multiple forms of self-understanding in diverse contexts, as Riley suggests, and thus makes identity fluid in the way that Bornstein desires.

Nevertheless, there seems to be an easy objection to this account in the case of women, since one might insist that their identity is always undergirded by their sex. Whereas there is no gene that correlates with our racial identities, this argument goes, there is a biological substratum to gender identity, namely, biological sex. Hence it may be that being black or white no more exhausts or underwrites one's identity than being a baseball fan or an opera buff. Yet, gender is more than simply one possible interpretation of who we are. Our biological sex underwrites our identities

as men and women in a way that nothing underwrites our identities as races. There are, however, at least two problems with this claim. First, it remains unclear how sex and gender are meant to be related. Second, it remains unclear why sex is not itself an interpretation. I shall look briefly at each of these problems.

Accounts of the biological roots of gender often appeal to differences in the shape and function of male and female brains. Women's brains are said to be less lateralized than men's brains, so that whereas men employ one side of the brain to concentrate on spatial-visual tasks, women more diffusely use both; research in the 1970s showed that the planum temporale part of the temporal lobe was more equal from left to right in women than in men, suggesting, again, that women use both sides of the brain whereas men use one or the other depending on the task (Blum 1997, 59). In addition, women have been found to possess more bulbous corpora callosa than men, more neurons packed more tightly together in the temporal cortex, and limbic systems that are more active in a region linked to a quick verbal response than are male limbic systems. Men's limbic systems, in turn, are more active in a region linked to a quick physical response (Blum 1997, 60–61).

These differences are meant to explain characteristic differences. Men, for example, are better at spatial and mathematical tasks. In tests of the ability to visualize and rotate three-dimensional figures in their heads, men outperform women by around 67 percent, and they have done better in maze performance, angle-matching tasks, and in a test called the block design test. Twelfth-grade boys outperform twelfth-grade girls on the Advanced Placement physics exam, while a study of thirty years of math and science testing found that boys outnumber girls in the top 10 percent of scores three to one and that in the top 1 percent there were seven boys for every one girl (Blum 1997, 58). Testing of verbal abilities moves in the opposite direction. The same thirty-year study that showed boys at the top in math and science found girls consistently at the top in reading comprehension and writing skills (Blum 1997, 58).

Although such studies are sometimes thought to confirm the biological causes for gender differences, the case is not so clear. In one of the popular versions of the tests for spatial abilities, for example, subjects sit in dark rooms in front of rods placed within large vertically held frames. Their task is to keep the rod perpendicular to the floor as the researcher tilts either the frame or the chair in various directions. In five of twelve such studies examined, no differences were found between men and women. In the remaining seven, men performed better. Yet does this superiority confirm a biological link, or are women perhaps less practiced in model

and block building than men or, indeed, less secure in dark rooms? Anne Fausto-Sterling, for one, has claimed that "sex-related differences in visual-spatial activities are strongest in societies in which women's social (public) roles are most limited, and that these differences tend to disappear in societies in which women have a great deal of freedom" (Fausto-Sterling 1985, 35).

Fausto-Sterling is suspicious of brain comparisons in general. Indeed, she finds it telling that the corpus callosum was once used to show the difference between "Negro" and "Caucasian" brains and, moreover, between Negro and Caucasian intelligence.[4] Blacks were found to have smaller frontal lobes than whites, larger parietal lobes, and a left-right asymmetry in lobes that was the reverse of those in whites. These differences were said to explain the "undeveloped artistic power and taste" of blacks as well as their characteristic "lack of self-control, especially in connection with the sexual relation" (Bean 1906, 377). Blind studies, however, found no group differences that could outweigh individual differences, casual inspection found no differences at all, and the arguments for an inherent racial difference failed to relativize their findings to brain weight or size. The same may hold of alleged differences in the corpora callosa of males and females. In the first place, given the extent to which the corpus callosum (CC) is immersed in the brain as a whole and connected in multiple ways to other parts of it, it is difficult to divide and measure it in replicable ways that could lead to meaningful comparisons between brains. In addition, recent conclusions from a meta-analysis pooling the data from a large number of smaller studies find "no gender difference in either absolute or relative size or shape of the CC as a whole or of the splenium" (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 134–35).

Some other attempts to link sex and gender are equally awkward. Testosterone, for example, is meant to explain male aggression: the greater the amount of testosterone, the more aggressive, competitive, and even promiscuous the person. Hence, because men usually have ten times the amount of testosterone as women, they are more competitive, aggressive, and sexually indiscriminate. Congenital adrenal hypoplasia (CAH) is a condition that leads to the presence of higher androgen levels in developing fetuses. Correspondingly, CAH females have been found to do better on mathematical tests, to be more prone to rough play, to be less interested in having children, and to be more interested in careers and "boys' toys" than their unaffected female relatives (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 74–75).

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[4] The terms *Negro* and *Caucasian* are Robert Bennett Bean's; see Bean 1906.

Yet once again, the studies that report such results are problematic. In the first place, they rely on self-reports and on descriptions by mothers who are aware that their daughters were exposed to elevated levels of androgens in the womb and who may therefore be hypersensitive to signs of tomboyish behavior (Fausto-Sterling 1985, 134–38). Further, the studies fail to include control groups or to consider the possible effects of the continuing cortisone treatments that CAH girls must take for health reasons. Finally and most important, the studies assume that certain toys, and certain traits such as an interest in careers or a desire to get married, are gender specific. If CAH girls are more interested in careers and less interested in getting married, then the studies assume that they are more like boys than other girls and more like them because of this increased exposure to androgens. But why suppose that an interest in getting married sorts by gender in the first place? Why does an interest in a career make one masculine?

Such objections to claims to the biological roots of gender are only suggestive, of course. That studies have thus far failed to prove the link does not mean that future studies may not be better designed and more successful. Yet we might also ask what the biology is that is meant to compose sex. Is our account of what biological sex is not itself an interpretation? Just as we understand people as raced by taking their skin color or ancestry to be important, we understand people to be sexed by looking to certain internal and external characteristics of their bodies. But how do we decide which characteristics to take as important in composing sex, and how do we decide which to group together as crucial elements? Medical doctors routinely perform surgeries on so-called intersexual infants whose chromosomes do not link up to their anatomies in standard ways, whose anatomies are ambiguous, or whose bodies include the organs for both a male and a female account of their sex. These surgeries are designed to remodel infants' bodies so that they more closely conform to standard models for male and female bodies. Typically, surgeries done on infants with the capacity to bear children seek to preserve this reproductive function and adhere to chromosomal criteria, while surgeries on others focus on the sex assignment that will lead to the best cosmetic outcome, as the surgeons see it, irrespective of chromosomes (Kessler 2000, chap. 3).

Surgeries are also performed on consenting adults who desire sex-change operations. In these cases, doctors typically conceive of the operation as a cure for gender dysphoria: if one believes that one is a gender not usually associated with the type of body one has, one can be cured of the mismatch by reshaping the body to fit one's conception of who

one is. Yet while the medical profession for the most part respects such operations as cures, courts in Kansas and Texas have recently denied their significance by denying male-to-female transsexuals the right to inherit from their deceased spouses.[5] Both courts have insisted that marriages between men and male-to-female transsexuals violate the states' prohibitions against same-sex marriage, that sex here is a matter of chromosomes, and that no change in anatomy amounts to a change in sex.

Is sex then chromosomal or anatomical? Doctors seem to look at pairs of chromosomes differently: depending on the reproductive situation, anatomy can be transformed in accordance with or against the chromosomal evidence. Courts, in contrast, have looked to chromosomes at least in the case of transsexuals, although it is not clear what their rulings might be in the case of intersexuals. Indeed, in the latter instance, if the case of Maria Patiño is indicative, authorities can differ. Patiño was a hurdler who competed on the Spanish women's Olympic team. Yet when Olympic officials found an XY pair of chromosomes during routine sex testing and in further testing discovered testes as well as the absence of either a uterus or ovaries, they declared her a man. Patiño was barred from future Olympic competition and stripped of her past titles. When Patiño fought her new sex designation in Spanish court, however, she was recertified as a woman, according to court papers, because of her pelvic structure and shoulders (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 1–2).

How we understand sex is thus open to possible differences. How we classify individuals according to sex is a matter of interpretation, so that doctors confronted with an intersexual infant take it upon themselves to interpret the infant according to a male or female sex. Moreover, what we take sex itself to be, whether we understand it as a matter of chromosomes or anatomy, and, if anatomy, which parts of the anatomy, is also a question of interpretations. The same double interpretation attaches to matters of race and gender. When we understand ourselves as particular races, we possess an understanding of ourselves as a race and an understanding of what the crucial criteria for belonging to that race are. Is race a matter of culture or color? Color or genetic frequencies? Both what race we are and what race is are matters of interpretation. Similarly, when we understand ourselves as a particular gender, we possess both an understanding of ourselves as a gender and an understanding of what it crucially means to be that gender. Is gender nurturing style or an interest in careers? A preference for certain toys or a way of dressing? Again, both what gender we are and what gender is are matters of interpretation. As interpretations,

[5] 29 Kan. App.2d 92, 22 P.3d 1086 (2001).

answers to both sorts of questions are open to different possibilities depending on the interests and purposes of interpreters. We can no more possess a definitive understanding of who we are or what race, sex, and gender are than we can possess a definitive understanding of *King Lear*.

Where does this analysis leave us? It seems to me that it leaves us in a discursive situation in which we need to justify to one another the interests and purposes conditioning our interpretations of identity. If social identity is interpretive, then we need to discuss the horizons, contexts, purposes, and assumptions that contribute to our interpretations. Because of the ongoing effects of past discrimination, blacks may have good reasons to continue to understand themselves as blacks for the purposes and in the context of demanding an end to social and economic discrimination. Similarly, women may justifiably hold on to their identities as women in certain contexts, and it might be important sometimes, with regard to nutritional needs, menopause, or pregnancy, to understand individuals as females. Yet if interpretive discussions agree to the plausibility of interpretations in terms of race, sex, or gender, we must nonetheless continue to insist that this understanding is limited and partial, no different from understanding someone as a cancer patient or chess player. In both cases the interpretation delimits a range of contextually appropriate remedies and entitlements. In neither case does it exhaust one's identity or serve as its basis.

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From Nimble Fingers to Raised Fists: Women and Labor Activism in Globalizing Thailand

I n Bangkok, Thailand, women constitute the primary workforce for most of the labor-intensive industries—textiles, electronics, food products, and more—that have fueled that country's recent rapid economic growth. Most of these women are young and unmarried, and most are migrants from Thailand's cash-strapped agricultural regions. Similar patterns of feminized labor recruitment are common around the world, a by-product of globalizing capital's unending search for ever cheaper and more flexible labor. Indeed, this feminization of labor is so widespread, especially in sites of new industrialization, that it has given rise to (and is in part sustained by) a new form of global iconography: the third-world woman worker, a figure ideally suited to the demands of contemporary industrial discipline. This international imagery portrays female factory workers as having the "nimble-fingered" dexterity and patience required for labor-intensive assembly work; likewise, these women are considered fundamentally obedient and respectful toward authority. An implicit corollary to this iconic image is the belief that such novice female wage earners are largely unsusceptible to the appeals of labor organizing.[1]

In Bangkok, however, strikes and other organized forms of labor protest are recurring, if intermittent, features of the urban landscape. Specific grievances vary but typically involve serious complaints about harsh and unfair treatment, poor or hazardous working conditions, low or unpaid wages, and related workplace injustices. Furthermore, some of the most

[1] The iconographic and structural processes associated with the feminization of global labor are well documented. See, among others, Enloe 1989; Ong 1991; Sassen 1998; Marchand and Runyan 2000; Mills 2003.

militant and vocal protesters are young women and rural migrants employed in Bangkok's textile and other export-oriented industries. In fact, I first arrived in Thailand to begin research on women's migrant labor in 1987 in the aftermath of one particularly bitter and well-publicized strike by women employed at a textile factory on the city outskirts. The strikers had garnered front-page headlines when, after moving their protest site to the city center, several of their leaders shaved their heads in a public show of moral outrage.[2] In addition, they threatened to write a letter to the Thai prime minister in their own blood. The confrontation ended after several days of tense and well-attended demonstrations when state officials ordered protesters to disperse and promised a mediated agreement. While resolving some of the workers' demands, the strike ultimately achieved only limited success. Not long afterward, the company closed down its operations, putting all remaining employees out of work.[3]

Despite such (frequently) disappointing outcomes, Thai women's steady participation in similar incidents of labor unrest throughout the 1980s and 1990s belies stereotypical images of the docile and deferential third-world female worker. Both in Thailand and elsewhere the fact that some women can and do organize to pursue collective goals quickly problematizes essentialized notions of feminine passivity and compliance. As scholars of labor and other social movements worldwide can attest, the question is not whether women can organize but rather what conditions enable them to mobilize despite daunting obstacles.[4] In Thailand, working women who challenge images of nimble-fingered passivity by embracing the raised fists of militant labor confront complex and difficult choices. Few rural migrants arrive in Bangkok with a knowledge of labor laws or their rights to organize. Many if not most private industrial laborers work in enterprises where no union organization exists. Indeed, only 3 to 6 percent of the private sector industrial workforce is union-

[2] Within Thailand's Theravada Buddhist society the shaved head signifies a rejection of worldly desires and attachments; strikers used this symbol in their public protests to emphasize that their demands were moral and fair, in contrast to employers' assertions that strikers were acting out of greed or selfishness

[3] Several years later workers in the area who were familiar with the strike and its aftermath told me that the same company was, in fact, still in business. However, it had changed its name and had hired a completely new labor force; it remained adamantly opposed to unionization efforts.

[4] My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for help in clarifying this point. See also Delgado 1993 for a parallel argument regarding immigrant labor in California.

ized.[5] Those unions that exist are typically weak and rarely have more than a few hundred members. Moreover, for many workers the risks of participation in such organizations can be considerable. Although union organizing is legal in Thailand, few wageworkers have the expertise or financial resources to challenge employers who overstep the law. When workers do try to organize, employers often respond with varied forms of harassment, ranging from heightened surveillance and punishment for shop floor infractions to outright dismissal and blacklisting as well as threats and occasionally even acts of violence. Faced with such obstacles, a workforce that may appear docile and complacent is more appropriately understood as constrained by multiple and heavy-handed forms of discipline.

Given the difficult circumstances they face, what does it mean for women in Bangkok's low-wage migrant labor force to assert a vocal and committed activist stance? In this article I take up this question by exploring activist women's subjectivities and the discursive strategies they employ to build ties of commitment and solidarity among themselves and with their coworkers. The women I discuss here are not figures of unusual prominence; they are often little known beyond their own factories or outside the industrial zones in which they live and work. They include women elected to their union executive councils or occupying informal leadership positions in these small enterprise-based unions. Some are participants in worker study groups; others are (sometimes former) wageworkers who have become local organizers and grassroots educators in alliance with or as paid staff for one of the few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that fund labor rights, women's rights, or related assistance programs in Bangkok.

While I focus here on Thai women's labor activism, their experiences have much in common with other workers' struggles in similar settings of new industrialization.[6] Around the world women enter into globalized

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[5] Exact figures vary by source; see Brown and Frenkel 1993, 90, Hewison and Brown 1994, 504, Piriyarangsan and Piriyarangsan 1996, 22 These authors also provide useful overviews of the conditions, both legal and extralegal, that constrain labor organizing in Thailand. For more specific discussion of Thai women's labor organizing, see Ungpakorn 1999, 58–75; Brown 2001; Theobald 2002 Unionization rates are considerably higher for public sector employees, but the power of these organizations was seriously undermined by legislation in the early 1990s.

[6] These similarities extend both to the conditions facing workers in contemporary sites of globalized production and to industrial conflicts of earlier eras Although a full review of the historical and comparative literature is beyond the scope of this article, readers can trace

labor relations that are fraught with what Lisa Lowe has called "contradictions of racism, patriarchy, and capitalism" (1997, 362); consequently, women's labor struggles occupy a political location that "cannot be determined along a single axis of power or . . . contained within a single narrative of oppositional political formation" (Lowe 1997, 362). Wherever labor conflicts arise, they are necessarily entangled in multiple strands of oppression. Nevertheless, the relationship of these complex structures of power to women's participation in and contributions to particular instances of contemporary labor protest remains poorly understood. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues, "analysis of the location of Third-World women in the new international division of labor must draw upon the histories of colonialism and race, class and capitalism, gender and patriarchy, and sexual and familial figurations" (1997, 28) while also tracing how these histories and cultural configurations vary and converge. Only with such a clear appreciation for the "specificities of their/our common *and* different histories" can women (and men) around the world envision and sustain truly transnational challenges to the inequities of globalizing capital (Mohanty 1997, 28).

Mohanty's and Lowe's observations about women's struggles in contexts of globalization reflect a growing recognition among scholars that few popular social movements are reducible to a single or homogenous set of interests. Drawing on the insights of feminism and other areas of critical theory, a growing body of research documents the complex (including gendered) identities and contested meanings that shape grassroots struggles, even those that appear to mobilize the concerns of one specific community—women, peasants, urban squatters, or others.[7] In a related vein, feminist scholars have begun to pose comparable questions about organized labor movements and working-class conflicts, asking how workers' variously gendered experiences and other sources of self-identity in-

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significant parallels between, e g , women's labor activism in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States (e.g., Glenn 1990; Orleck 1995; Enstad 1999) and more recent struggles by women in newly industrializing nations (e.g., Kim 1997; Margold 1999; Rock 2001), as well as with organizing efforts among immigrant and minority workers in the United States (e g , Sacks 1988; Delgado 1993; Bao 2001)

[7] Recent ethnographies that explore these dynamics in grassroots activisms in different parts of the world include Abelmann 1996; Edelman 1999; Paley 2001. See Edelman 2001 for a broad overview of the current literature on social movements. For a more specific discussion of links between unions and broader social movements (also known as social movement unionism), see, e.g., Scipes 1992; Seidman 1994.

teract with and complicate their oppositional class politics.[8] In concert with these broader trends in the literature, my discussion here aims to trace the specific ways that Thai women's labor activism negotiates multiple dimensions of experience and meaning. Specifically, I explore how these Bangkok activists understand themselves—as workers, as women, as migrants—and ask how activists make use of the discursive resources available to them from within these social locations to mobilize and legitimize their oppositional practice. In the process, I argue, Thai women's labor activism engages a distinctly gendered politics of place.

Here I follow recent calls to situate women's activisms around the world as politics of place, a concept based on the "recognition that politics is largely made up of contests over meaning: the interplay between culture and power" (Harcourt and Escobar 2002, 11). Significantly, approaching politics as culturally situated or place-based acknowledges that women's political (including labor movement) activities are rarely limited to public or official arenas of debate and contest. Rather, the relevant political terrain encompasses the broad contexts of women's lives, linking intimate settings of family, household, and the body with wider community and social environments as important sites of contest and struggle. This mode of analysis seeks to assess women's challenges to dominant meanings and structures of power in relation to the multiple dimensions of their subordination. At the same time, it recognizes that women's oppositional subjectivities are formed and transformed within culturally and historically specific settings. Consequently, to understand and evaluate women's activisms as place based is to acknowledge the diversities and contradictions of women's lives (both within and between societies) while at the same time seeking points of intersection that connect and sustain their struggles for dignity and justice, for secure and fulfilling lives.[9] Toward this end, my analysis here aims first to illuminate the culturally specific and locally significant dimensions of Thai women's labor activism; yet, in so doing, the argument that I develop seeks to contribute to the larger project of

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[8] For example, Susan A. Glenn (1990), Melinda Chateauvert (1998), and Nan Enstad (1999) explore gender dynamics in U.S. labor history, while Seung-Kyung Kim (1997), Jane Margold (1999), and Leslie Salzinger (2003) examine how gender hierarchies influence working-class struggles in contemporary sites of globalized production. Although much of this work continues to focus on women's gendered experiences, the gendering of men's labor politics is beginning to attract long overdue scholarly attention. see contributions to Baron 1991; also, Finn 1998.

[9] I am indebted here to a number of recent studies exploring diverse contexts of women's activisms and subjectivities, including Stephen 1997; Babb 2001; Oza 2001; Menon-Sen 2002.

understanding how a diverse and dynamic politics of place can enable or constrain women's struggles across a heavily feminized global labor force.

However, before discussing Thai women's labor activism in more detail, I must first situate my own engagement with this material and its analysis. The data presented here are the product of long-term ethnographic research concerning rural-urban labor migration in Thailand, particularly by women in the 1980s and 1990s. Initially, I conducted anthropological fieldwork (1987–88, 1989–90) in Bangkok and in rural northeastern Thailand, tracing young women's entry into new forms of urban (primarily industrial) employment (see Mills 1997, 1999b, 2001). I later returned for several short periods of intensive fieldwork focusing on labor activists in Bangkok-area industrial zones in 1993, 1996–97, and 1999. Thus the bulk of my data reflects workers' experiences during the peak years of Thailand's economic boom but extends also into the period of economic crisis that began in mid-1997. Throughout my time in Thailand I worked closely with several Bangkok women's and human rights NGOs whose staff introduced me to workers in different parts of the city, some of whom were also active in labor unions and related organizations. In the course of this research, using the method of participant observation, I attended a variety of labor movement events such as May Day celebrations, union meetings, and public seminars on labor policy concerns as well as events focused on other topics—such as marches against domestic violence or rallies for International Women's Day—in which women workers and union activists also participated. These experiences brought me into contact with many dozens of labor movement participants and unionists, as well as staff and volunteers at several local NGOs. Over time I developed closer ties with a smaller number of activist women ranging in age from their late teens to early forties, most of whom worked in one of two different industrial zones on the outskirts of greater Bangkok. Some of these women (now in their forties) I first met in the late 1980s when they were in their late twenties or early thirties. Others I did not meet until the mid-1990s. The data presented here derive from my interviews and interactions with this core group of more than a dozen women, particularly during the mid- and late 1990s. Our discussions took place in varied settings, from public rallies to dormitories, union halls, NGO offices, or while taking trips around the city and, occasionally, on visits to their home communities.[10]

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[10] The public visibility of labor activism exposes many individuals to significant personal risks. Moreover, Bangkok's labor movement is a relatively small world. I do not wish to add

I do not pretend that my relationship to this research is neutral. Throughout the period of study and since I have sought to support Thai women's and workers' struggles in a variety of ways— by contributing to fund drives, providing ad hoc English translation and interpreting services, assisting the grant-writing efforts of local NGOs, and offering encouragement during public rallies and union meetings. On return visits over the years I have shared my thoughts and observations with workers, NGO staff, and Thai academic programs through both formal research presentations and informal discussions. I recognize that these small and all too sporadic efforts do not constitute anything like a fair exchange; as a white, North American woman with access to resources far beyond those available to most of the people who have so generously shared their time and stories with me, I occupy a position of undeniable privilege. The patience and even enthusiasm with which they greeted my persistent questions continue to astound and humble me. Their courage and strength of spirit in the face of daunting odds remain profound sources of inspiration.

Below I present some of what I have learned from these interactions with Thai labor activists. I focus particularly on how activist women confront a political culture that devalues their actions as women, as workers, and as migrants from rural communities. Oppositional labor politics involve claims to public space—for example, by strikers and protestors— that tangibly and physically assert working women's sense of self as political agents. These embodied expressions of resistance can be quite dramatic (as in shaved heads), but they grow out of the ordinary, day-to-day contradictions of activists' lived experiences and self-understandings, both in and beyond the workplace.

I begin my discussion of these processes in the next section by noting some of the ways in which women's labor activism in Thailand builds on the organizational and conceptual resources of wider activist networks. Through such alliances women acquire new tools for thinking about and challenging their marginalization as low-wage migrant laborers. Yet as women use these new skills and ideas to contest the inequitable practices of globalizing capital, authoritarian employers, and the Thai state, they

in any way to the difficulties that activists confront; thus I have chosen not to identify specific organizations, and I use pseudonyms for all individuals discussed. I have also altered some personal details to protect identities as much as possible All interviews were conducted in Thai and recorded in field notes, either at the time of or immediately following the meeting (relevant interview dates are noted parenthetically throughout the text); translations from the Thai are my own.

must also negotiate local gender hierarchies and their own desires and self-understandings as rural-urban migrants. In the process they mobilize a cultural politics (a politics of place) that variously refigures hierarchical norms and role expectations, often in creative ways. At the same time, however, the persistent power of dominant norms limits working women's oppositional practices and identities, framing how Thai activists and those around them understand and evaluate their contributions.

Claiming activist voices, challenging multiple authorities

In Thailand, as in many parts of the world, women's labor activism forms part of a broad web of local and transnational progressive movements that include Thai student groups, feminist organizations, human rights advocates, and popular democracy advocates. These alliances represent important resources for working women, many of whom have only a few years of formal education and whose social networks in Bangkok are often limited by their recent migration from rural homes. Among other benefits, these contacts between labor groups and other activist organizations enabled a number of the women I met to attend NGO-sponsored workshops and seminars, where they met other activists from around the city, from different parts of Thailand, and on occasion from overseas. Similarly, NGO alliances help mobilize union members and other workers to support both labor-related goals (e.g., raising the minimum wage or calling for paid maternity leave) and other social movement issues such as campaigns against domestic violence, prodemocracy rallies, or environmental and antipoverty demonstrations. These experiences of cooperation and mutual support serve to broaden workers' perspectives and to sustain activist energies in ways that most women I met valued highly.[11]

Of particular importance, alliances with Thai feminist and human rights groups help familiarize newcomers to labor activism with the empowering vocabulary of "rights" (*sitthi*) and "justice" (*yutitham*). Such concepts are central to the egalitarian discourse of labor activism, and they enable workers to articulate a clear challenge to dominant cultural constructions of wage employment as a patron-client relationship. In this hierarchical model wageworkers are expected to conform to the same pattern of loyalty and deference that any client owes to a beneficent patron. Even the vocabulary of wage employment replicates these familiar relations of dom-

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[11] Similar national and international webs (or "meshworks") linking NGOs and other groups are often critical sources of empowerment and inspiration for women's activism in different settings; see, e.g., Stephen 1997; Harcourt, Rabinovich, and Alloo 2002.

inance and dependence: in Thai, the common terms for employer, *naay caang*, and employee, *luuk caang*, equate the first with the authority of a master (*naay*) and position workers in the subordinate role of child (*luuk*).[12] An oppositional labor politics requires, therefore, that workers learn new modes of self-imagining that can explain personal hardships as the product not of individual failures but of widespread patterns of injustice. At the same time they must adopt new modes of embodied practice and vocal expression in order to speak out publicly for their own and others' rights. Yet this task is widely viewed (both by workers and others) as more difficult for women than for men. It requires a degree of confidence or boldness (*klaa*) and a physical assertiveness that are more appropriately masculine behaviors.

Cultivating these skills of self-expression, particularly among women workers, is therefore a critical goal for grassroots labor organizing. Such aims are often a key component in the activities of the small study groups (*klum sueksaa*) that a number of independent unions and allied NGOs sponsor in several Bangkok-area industrial zones. Meeting weekly or monthly in small conversational gatherings, participants learn the basics of their legal rights and how to analyze their experiences in relation to these rights as well as in relation to broader structures of inequity within Thai society as a whole. In most study group meetings that I observed, experienced workers and activists served as the primary leaders; however, student volunteers from Bangkok universities, professional NGO staff, labor lawyers, and other outside experts often provided ongoing advice or occasional guest lectures. In addition to lessons in labor law and other rights, study groups also tackle practical problems of building workers' self-confidence and negotiating skills so that they will be confident to speak out (*klaa sadaeng ok*) as potential labor leaders.[13]

Mon, a textile factory worker in her early twenties, had been participating in one such study group for more than three years when I met her in 1996. She credited this experience with enabling her to assert her rights on and off the job: "I've really learned that you have to stand up for yourself." For example, she said, she was no longer willing to accept unfair punishment or criticism from her (female) supervisor: "When I've done nothing wrong, I can argue with the supervisor. If I've made a mistake I will accept the blame, but if not I'll stand up to her. Many of my friends

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[12] For further discussion of the patron-client model in Bangkok employment, see Mills 1999b, 122–24.

[13] See Mills 1999a for discussion of an innovative labor education model that grew out of these study groups

are afraid (*klua*); they don't dare (*may klaa*). But I say if I have not done anything wrong then the supervisor has no right [to punish me]. So now she doesn't try anything with me. Now she *asks* me if I will work overtime instead of ordering me!" (interview, November 1996).

Many women with whom I spoke similarly credited the assertiveness and confidence training of study groups with enhancing their ability to stand up to unjust treatment by employers or state officials. Nevertheless, most women also agreed that they encountered more trouble than men do when seeking respect and recognition as capable leaders, both from coworkers, male or female, and from higher-level leaders within the labor movement. National labor leaders in Thailand have historically come from unions representing larger and male-dominated industries, especially from state-owned enterprises (e.g., post, railways, telephone, and other public utilities); the interests of these workers—relatively well-educated, urbanized, and higher paid—do not always match the needs of the predominantly female and migrant workforces in low-wage industrial sectors. Daeng, an NGO advisor with many years' experience in labor issues, described the difficult power dynamics that characterize these higher levels of labor leadership: "The national labor congresses [*saphaa raengngan*] don't work well with the lower levels of the labor movement. They are top-down, and most leaders are caught up in issues of face and status, building their careers and establishing their own names and influence in wider political circles. Also they concentrate primarily on economic issues, such as raising the minimum wage. [National leaders] call unions together to campaign for these single, economic issues, but then when they achieve that particular goal [they stop and] all the organization, the cooperation dissolves" (interview, October 1996).

Occasionally the top-down and patriarchal dynamics of national labor politics can prompt overt critiques by activist women. In 1996, Sahn—an NGO staff person and former wageworker—and several of her friends recounted for me their pleasure with one such exchange.[14] Some weeks before, the group had attended a public labor rights seminar at which one of the speakers, a senior officer from a national labor organization, discussed what he saw as women's limited contributions to labor leadership: he just didn't see women taking a significant role. "We were furious," Sahn recalled. She went on to describe how one of their group stood up to address the speaker directly. In a bold departure from the normal deference and decorum that characterizes such public meetings,

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[14] Sahn had begun working for a small NGO only a year or so before, having been fired from her previous job at a textile factory because of her union activities

the young woman demanded to know: "Who make up the bulk of dem-
onstrators when you call workers out to march and protest? How often
have you made opportunities in your organization for women to speak
or to take on responsibility? How much have you allowed women in your
own home to go out, to study and learn, to get the experience to take
on leadership roles?" (interview, December 1996). "What did he answer?"
I asked. Sahn replied, "Nobody said a word! He was silent. There was
nothing he could say. He'd completely lost face [*sia naa loey*]!" As Sahn
retold the incident, she and her friends laughed, enjoying the memory of
their challenge to the overt sexism of the older male leadership.

As this incident shows, women labor activists are well aware of the
gender and status divisions within the labor movement. Nevertheless, this
sort of direct public questioning of national-level leaders by female un-
ionists is rare. A number of organizers at the grassroots level that I met—
both workers and NGO staff—expressed frustration with the hierarchical
structures and power jockeying of national labor congresses and related
institutions in Thailand, but they also felt that direct confrontations were
unproductive. As members of small, often fragile labor unions, grassroots
activists have few resources with which to challenge inequitable structures
and practices; furthermore, they are unlikely to rise into significant lead-
ership roles above the local level. Consequently, disparities of gender,
status, and material resources within the labor movement remain impor-
tant but rarely discussed dividing lines.

Moreover, for some women activists these divisions represent painful
sources of self-doubt regarding their own capacity for leadership and au-
thority. For example, Khem, a dedicated union leader with nearly twenty
years of experience, quietly disparaged her lack of "authentic" credentials,
specifically her limited education. Like many migrant wageworkers, es-
pecially those who entered urban factory employment in the 1970s and
1980s, Khem had completed only four years of schooling. A key leader
in her own union and a respected advisor to workers and other small
unions in the surrounding area, she still claimed there was much she had
trouble understanding. Although she dealt with official union documents
almost daily, she felt that her reading skills were inadequate and, in par-
ticular, she found it difficult to negotiate the formal language employed
by lawyers, scholars, and state officials: "I don't have the knowledge that
others do. Many times I don't think quickly on important issues because
I don't know enough" (interview, November 1996).

Despite such qualms, Khem and other female labor activists I met
demonstrated a clear capacity for leadership. Indeed, as Daeng observed,
"The more effective [organizing] work is being done [by women] at the

grass roots. These groups are interested in more than just simple, concrete economic demands. They work to build solidarity, unity, friendship . . . to build greater understanding and mutual aid [among workers] in all areas of life" (interview, October 1996). Women's grassroots organizing is certainly less visible than the political maneuvering of national labor politics and thus can more easily remain unseen by figures like the seminar speaker who outraged Sahn and her companions.[16] Still, by focusing on worker confidence and on building ties of "solidarity, unity, friendship," small unions, study groups, and allied NGOs embolden some women to rethink their subordination both in the workplace and within a labor movement that discounts their efforts as women and as low-status rural migrants. Moreover, grassroots activists themselves recognize the continuing power of conventional gender norms as well as kin-based and rural-identified values in their own lives; however, they also invoke meanings rooted in these familiar spaces of kin and community in order to support their engagement in labor politics. The next two sections explore how these discursive strategies frame the place-based dynamics of Thai women's labor activism and their efforts to generate greater commitment and solidarity among coworkers.

Reframing activist identities: Discourses of gender and migration

Legal restrictions, employer harassment, and ideologies of deference and gender hierarchy are serious obstacles, but they are by no means the sole barriers to labor organizing among Bangkok's migrant workforce. Workers' own commitments and desires can also prevent them from viewing collective protest or labor organizing as viable options. Most notably, the time and energy involved in labor activism is likely to compete with some of the primary goals that motivate young rural women and men to seek urban employment. As I have discussed elsewhere (Mills 1997, 1999b), two central goals prompt most youthful decisions to leave home for urban wage work: first, filial obligations to aid rural families through wage remittances; and second—and just as compelling—the desire to be up-to-date (*thansamay*), that is, to participate in the consumerist pleasures of urban Thai modernity and to experiment with the new forms of personal autonomy that these promise. Nevertheless, earning enough to meet rural financial obligations almost inevitably conflicts with spending time and money on urban outings and commodity purchases. Consequently, the realities of low wages, long

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[16] LeeRay Costa (1999) makes a similar point regarding the invisibility of Thai women's NGO activism.

hours, and poor living conditions mean that most migrants face sharply competing demands on their limited time and income.

In this context, the labor movement's rights-based claims can appeal to workers not only as a practical avenue of redress but also as an attractively up-to-date expression of their desires for equality as modern Thai citizens. Activities such as protest marches, study groups, and union-sponsored excursions also offer pleasurably *thansamay* forms of excitement and fun. However, labor activism can also seriously diminish wageworkers' income, most drastically if they lose their jobs or—even if they remain employed—by reducing their chances for overtime work. (Employers often exclude activist workers from extra shift work, knowing that overtime wages are a major source of savings for many factory workers.) Such income losses can quickly undermine migrant workers' ability to fulfill the desires that brought them into urban wage work in the first place. Both men and women activists face these constraints, but their consequences can weigh more heavily on young women, who are usually expected to make substantial wage contributions to rural households.[16]

Not surprisingly, perhaps, women who become labor activists are often reluctant to tell parents and other family members about their activities. Their hesitation is a measure not only of concerns parents might have about loss of earnings but also of their parents' fears for the safety of children whose actions as union members or labor organizers can brand them as troublemakers or, even worse, communists, a charge that has carried grave consequences in Thailand's recent political history (see Bowie 1997). Expecting that parents would not approve, many women I spoke with felt it better simply to avoid the issue. Nevertheless, I was struck by the multiple and creative ways in which women made use of kinship-based metaphors to sustain their participation in labor struggles and to encourage the contributions of others. In particular, women activists invoked notions of responsibility (*rapbitchop*) and sacrifice (*sia sala'*), ideals closely associated with women's household roles and kinship ties but linked in this case to the support of labor movement goals.

Kinship and gendered norms feature prominently in the self-descriptions of many labor activists, especially in the comments of more experienced union women. By the late 1990s Khem, at age 40, along with

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[16] In contrast, rural families tend to consider migrant sons less reliable contributors, e.g., young men have significant personal expenses (for alcohol, cigarettes, etc.) that limit their ability to save urban wages. Parents may be satisfied if sons can support themselves; daughters, however, are more likely to be criticized if they cannot make significant wage remittances (see Mills 1999b, 87).

several older women like her, exercised a significant advisory role within her small textile union. Khem's long involvement in labor politics placed her in a position of near maternal authority over younger workers and newer union participants. Members of her own union as well as many workers from nearby factories consulted her about their problems, addressing Khem by the familiar but respectful title of "aunt." In our discussions she emphasized repeatedly both the sacrifices she had made and the continuing responsibility she felt, often in ways that clearly compared her union work to the roles and obligations of kinship ties:

> I have worked so hard for so long. I hardly ever do things for myself, all my energy goes to others. . . . My family has problems too, my sisters complain that I spend all my time and resources helping others and have nothing left for my family. . . . But what would happen if I stopped [my union activities]? Who else is there with the knowledge and experience I have to help? I've been thinking about telling people at the next annual meeting of the regional union group [*klum yaan*] that I want to rest next year and just work on issues related to my own union, and there will be plenty of that [next year] with our contracts up for renewal. But there would be an outcry. "Who is there to do the work?" people would say. (Interview, November 1996)

Obligations of sacrifice and mutual care are key components of Thai kinship ties, particularly those between parents and children and among siblings (*phii nong*: older/younger siblings). In the context of labor organizing, NGO advisors, union leaders, and study group participants most often invoke the model of siblings—"we are older and younger siblings together" (*pen phii nong kan*)—as a concrete image of movement solidarity. While similar references to brotherhood and family have a long history in union struggles worldwide, it is important to assess such kinship metaphors in relation to the localized meanings they encode. In Thailand the use of *phii-nong* to describe or encourage close, solidary relations among relative peers is widespread—and includes contexts that assert membership in powerful forms of modern Thai citizenship and status, such as university class cohorts or the nationalist Village Scouts (see Bowie 1997). Images of unionists as siblings therefore evoke both intimate contexts of familial support as well as attractive forms of national citizenship and modern social identity. Most important, the emphasis on kinlike ties refigures social relations in the workplace, suggesting that the obligations workers have as rural migrants to assist distant kin are compatible with

the sacrifices they can make for one another as coworkers in order to protect their collective interests against those of employers.

I encountered a particularly creative invocation of these themes in the performances of an all-women amateur music band formed by several factory workers. The musicians, migrants in their late teens and early twenties, began playing together in the early 1990s as participants in a union-sponsored study group. When I met them in 1996, they were performing publicly several times a year, generally at Bangkok labor rights events, union assemblies, or rallies organized by a variety of progressive NGOs. The band's repertoire included covers of politically charged songs by well-known Thai musicians. However, one of the group's most popular numbers was a song composed by one of its own members. Modeled on the northeastern Thai folk music style *mob lam*, the song begins with a vivid picture of rural parents awaiting their daughters' return from employment in urban "weaving and noodle" factories and reminding listeners that "when you leave home, your parents worry." As the song continues, it recounts the difficulties and dangers that the naive and hopeful migrant to Bangkok soon confronts: "Listen, listen, listen sisters (*phii nong*). Don't go off to clubs and bars, take drugs or drink, take drugs or drink. . . . In your factory, do you have this? It's dangerous, think carefully young girl. Beware, don't try things that you don't know. Ask first to be sure, [even] the air has poisons. Protect yourself a little so your life will be safe. . . . If you're wary of danger, your life will be long."[17] The lyrics end with a warning to young women to avoid disappointing rural parents and to think through their options carefully in order to go home with "money in your pocket."

The contrast the song makes between urban and rural settings is a common (and often conservative) theme in contemporary Thai popular culture. However, given the identities of the performers and the contexts in which the song is typically heard—at union events and other activist rallies and amid the band's larger repertoire of progressive songs—the effect is considerably more radical.[18] The song seeks to bind listeners

[17] The song is titled "*Lam phloen huang haa*" (roughly, "A song of concern"). These excerpts are my own translation worked out in conversations with the woman who composed the music and lyrics I translate the phrase *phii nong* as "sisters," reflecting the predominantly female workforce of most Bangkok "weaving and noodle" factories, including the one where the singer-composer worked at the time.

[18] Ji Ungpakorn argues that songs are key organizing tools used by Bangkok laborers to promote solidarity and resistance (1999, 78–80) He cites the influence of popular Thai activist songs ("songs for life") as well as songs like the one discussed above that recount the plight of rural migrants. In a separate context Sally Sargeson has argued that similar songs about migrant workers' struggles were powerful mobilizing tools in a Chinese export-processing factory (2001, 62).

together in a recognition of shared personal desires and political goals. The lyrics pose a subtle parallel between, on the one hand, the sacrifices young migrants make to help their parents in the countryside and, on the other, the sacrifices needed to protect their own interests on the shop floor and to achieve the benefits and "long life" that will result. Implicitly linking labor struggles to the moral strength of migrants' ties to kin and rural community, the song offers listeners a familiar standpoint from which to judge and evaluate experiences of exploitation as urban wage earners. Meanwhile, these meanings are conveyed in the attractively up-to-date (*thansamay*) style of a rock band. Listeners therefore can engage the song as an emblem of desirably modern and urban-identified style that is simultaneously an invitation to activist politics. Furthermore, the audience can easily identify band members not just as union activists but also as fellow wage laborers and migrant daughters. As migrants, the song avows, workers are *phiinong* (sisters/siblings) who share ties to rural kin as well as a commitment to new experiences of modernity and urban adventure. Yet to realize their goals (and return home "with money in your pocket"), workers must strive collectively to protect one another from the dangers they all face.

In other ways activists invoked gendered norms of kin- and household-based behavior to describe their roles in labor conflicts. Like women within the family, they claimed, women workers are often more responsible and reliable than men at moments of greatest stress. In particular, many activists argued that women make better demonstrators. During a 1999 interview three union women in their mid-twenties expressed their sense of gendered solidarity as they recalled their actions during a strike three years earlier. Their experiences had given them a strong sense of mutual support not only as coworkers but as women: "We women were really the ones who kept [the strike] going. When the police came and threatened us, we stayed and kept the struggle going. Some of the men [mostly machinists at this predominately female factory] were afraid and left or didn't come back the next day" (interview, June 1999).

In late 1996 Som expressed similar feelings as she and I headed toward a rally. Som was a former factory worker now employed as a community organizer for a women's rights NGO. We were on our way to join members from several different unions who were gathering to show their support for contract negotiations underway at a factory in the area. The company in question, a metal tools manufacturer, employed a predominantly male workforce in marked contrast to the textile factories that dominated this industrial zone on the city outskirts. Concerned about the possibility of police interference or other violence at the rally, Som warned,

"If this were a company [employing] women I wouldn't worry at all, but with a lot of men gathered they will be drinking, and if they start to get into fights or arguments, then there could be trouble." Sure enough, when we arrived at the gathering a number of visibly drunken men were already present in the small crowd. Fortunately, the demonstration concluded several hours later without serious mishap.

Som was not alone in her feelings about women's superior qualities at moments of direct confrontation. Sahn, though living in a different part of Bangkok, made a similar claim: "Women are often more successful in making demands [to employers] and in holding demonstrations because women stay together, women are serious. When men get together in groups even for an important matter like a labor rally or demonstration, someone always has a bottle of alcohol. Men get drunk and cause problems, making it easier for employers to say that it is the workers who are acting wrongly" (interview, December 1996).[19]

At the same time, many women I met acknowledged that their activism could also conflict with gender- and kin-based obligations. In the next section I examine activists' perceptions that women's gendered roles as wives were especially likely to limit their participation in labor politics. But marriage was not the only obstacle for labor activists. Rather, women activists, married or single, all had to contend with concerns that their behavior challenged Thai notions of appropriate feminine sexuality. As I discuss below, many activist women experienced public attention to their sexuality as a destabilizing factor for their reputations and authority as labor leaders.

Activism, marriage, and sexuality: Negotiating authority and respectability

Although activists readily evoked women's gendered capacity for responsibility and sacrifice to support their labor movement participation, they had more difficulty reconciling the demands of public activism with the gendered expectations that women faced as wives and mothers. Almost without exception the women I met in Bangkok who had long-standing commitments to labor activism were both unmarried and childless. Most

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[19] Just two days after this conversation, Sahn's remarks were dramatically confirmed in the local press reports (*Nation* 1996). Disgruntled Sanyo Corporation employees had gathered at the company's Bangkok warehouse to protest cuts in their expected end-of-year bonus when a fire broke out, burning the factory to the ground. Blame quickly fell upon several drunken men who, according to the paper, had set the fire in anger.

claimed that they had chosen to remain single. For example, Phim, an activist in her late thirties, argued that the autonomy she enjoyed as a wage earner and experienced union leader would make it impossible for her to tolerate the demands of a husband. Like many other labor activists, Phim expected that most women would withdraw from union activities upon marriage. In some cases this is because couples leave the city to set up housekeeping in the wife's or husband's home village. But even when a woman establishes a conjugal household in the city, few of her coworkers expect that she will be able to sustain an activist commitment. Unmarried activists contemplating the effects of marriage on women's union activities readily complained: "Her *faen* [husband/partner] won't allow [her to continue]." "He doesn't like her going out at night on her own to meetings." "Men are afraid their friends will talk if they are left at home to take care of things while their wife goes out to do union work." In a few cases where a married woman continued her involvement in union or other organizational activities, other women were quick to praise the husband while at the same time commenting on the rarity of his actions.

In 1999 I attended the monthly meeting of an all-women union executive committee. All were garment workers in their mid-twenties to early thirties, and all but one were single. When I asked the group if marriage and union work were compatible, the women responded with an uncomfortable silence. Unlike the older Phim, who expressed no interest in taking up the burdens of a husband and family, a number of these women still considered marriage an important goal. However, they admitted that they knew very few married women union leaders. The sole woman on the committee who was married said she was able to continue her union activities because her husband was also involved in the labor movement. A few argued that men's participation could also be restricted after marriage "because their wives want them to spend more time with their families." Still, everyone agreed that wives had more domestic responsibilities than husbands and that these were difficult to combine with union activities, especially leadership roles. "Yes," the one married woman joked wryly, "I'll have to rush home after the meeting, or my husband (*faen*) will be angry and yell [at me]: I forgot to tell him I'd be out late at this meeting tonight" (interview, June 1999).

On a different occasion, Kaew—a textile worker in her early forties who, like Khem and Phim, had remained single during her many years of union activism—offered a more explicit analysis of these tensions, linking the constraints on women's labor activism to broader patterns of gender socialization: "Thai men are raised to think of themselves, to be selfish [*hen kae tua*]. They are not raised to help their wives in the home.

So women have to work extra hard; when they go home [after work], they still can't stop. There's always more to do, but men expect to relax or to go out with their friends. . . . But this is not a problem of men alone; really the problem begins with society. Of course there are 'good men' [*phuu chaay thii dii*]; it's not all of them [who are bad], just the majority [*pen suan yay*]" (interview, December 1996). Few women I met were so harsh in their opinions, but most concurred with Kaew's belief that men would not share equally in the domestic burdens of married life, acknowledging that these gendered responsibilities were likely to be a source of conflict in women's labor activism.

Still, the private demands of conjugal ties are not the only features of gender roles that constrain women's activist commitments. As noted previously, labor activism requires both women and men to struggle against ideological constructions of workers as the deferential dependents of employers. However, workers not only have to build their own confidence to speak out, they must also convince others to listen. According to Thip, a former wageworker turned NGO staff person, this is particularly hard for women, because "women are seen first as sex objects [*sing thang phet*]. If a man stands up for leadership, no one questions his ability. If a woman does, then she has to prove herself." Furthermore, Thip continued, "It's not just men who are the problem, women also don't help themselves. If there's a choice between a man and a woman, the women may say— 'it's better to let the man do it'" (interview, June 1999).

Thip's remarks reflect the particular difficulties that women face when they take on public roles; activist leaders must demonstrate forms of verbal and bodily assertiveness that are decidedly masculine in tone. In particular, the kind of physical boldness and outspoken confidence that are required for negotiating with employers, addressing massed crowds at a strike rally, or leading chants and protest marches are culturally linked to masculine patterns of sexual aggression and pursuit. But unlike those of male labor activists, women's claims to effective leadership are more vulnerable to questions about their public (i.e., sexual) respectability (see also Costa 1999).

Of course, all rural women working in Bangkok must negotiate concerns about their sexual propriety to some degree. In part these tensions reflect the fears of rural parents and kin that they cannot supervise the sexual behavior of unmarried women who have left home for urban wage work. Indeed, many young women employed in Bangkok use the anonymity and freedom of urban spaces to experiment with informal dating and sexual relationships in ways that would be impossible in their home communities (Mills 2001). They must, however, tread warily; as they and their families

are well aware, the presence of Thailand's large sex industry strongly influences popular constructions of urban women's sexuality. Migrants who enter industrial employment tend to view themselves as occupying a different, more respectable social location than sex workers; indeed, many women who enter the sex industry are recruited directly from rural communities rather than from the ranks of workers in urban factories (see Muecke 1992; Skrobanek, Boonpakdee, and Jantateero 1997).[20] Nevertheless, the prominence of the Thai sex trade generates broad suspicions about the sources and respectability of any migrant woman's urban income. Compounding these broadly sexualized connotations of urban employment, women who embrace activist roles enter into masculinized arenas of political contest in which their sexual behaviors (purported or actual) are especially likely to come under intense public scrutiny.

As a consequence some labor activists fear that questions about their sexual propriety may be used to undermine their authority as effective and respectable leaders. For example, the women wageworkers who volunteered at the small labor-rights NGO where Sahn worked complained that male workers occasionally joined in their activities with the wrong ideas. As Sahn explained, "Sometimes men come to meetings thinking they'll just flirt and not contribute to the work. But that's not what we are all about. . . . They learn pretty quickly that's not what goes on here. You've got to have a serious attitude, and we aren't interested in men coming around who think that women are their servants. Everyone has to contribute, man or woman equally" (interview, December 1996).

Similarly, Kaew told me that as an older, unmarried woman, she had adopted a standard phrase in response to queries about her marital (and sexual) status: "Love hasn't found me yet" (*khwaam rak yang maa may thueng*), she would say to anyone who asked. "This is a wonderful phrase," she said, "because it stops [the discussion] immediately. They can't say anything more. End of story. It is very useful because an older woman like me, if you're not married, sometimes people think badly [of you], that maybe you're not a good person if no one has loved you [enough to want to marry]." While Kaew remained single out of choice, she felt that her marital status could raise questions about her moral character.

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[20] The sexualized context of women's urban employment complicates ties among activist groups dealing with women in sex work, on the one hand, and groups representing industrial laborers, on the other. The ambivalence of some industrial labor activists toward sex workers parallels broader conflicts among Thai feminists and social reformers. Some sex workers' advocates favor the more radical goals of greater control over working conditions, while others prefer more conventional approaches portraying sex workers as victims in need of reform and rescue (see Jeffrey 2002).

Another likely concern for Kaew, though she never explicitly mentioned it, relates to common rumors that female-dominated factory settings encourage lesbian sexuality. In Kaew's case her unusually outspoken "antimale" opinions, noted above, as well as a somewhat masculine self-presentation in dress and hairstyle may have increased suspicions about her sexual preferences.[21]

In a different example, Khem expressed a similar concern about rumored associations with inappropriate sexuality. As a senior member of her union, Khem resided—along with a dozen or so younger union members and activists—in a small row house that doubled as their union head-quarters. This small four-room building was also an important center where workers and leaders of other unions in the area frequently came to seek advice from Khem and other experienced activists. One day she described, with some humor, her efforts to enforce proper standards of public behavior among the union hall residents (a group that at the time included several of the musicians in the women's amateur music band mentioned above). Khem insisted that house residents conduct themselves appro-priately in order to retain the respect that people in the area had for the union and its leadership. For example, Khem was concerned about fre-quent telephone calls that Lan, one of the band members, received from music fans. Khem objected primarily to calls from fans whom Khem con-sidered tomboy-lesbians (*phuak thom*) and effeminate males (*tut*). "I don't like it," Khem said. "Lan is someone who can't say no to friends; she'll talk to them for a long time. She doesn't mean anything, [but it encourages them] and I don't like it. It doesn't look right. Now most know that when I answer the phone they won't get a warm reception!"

Khem was also not averse to taking more direct action to protect the (sexual) reputation of the union hall and its residents: "A while back a woman who was temporarily thrown out of the factory dorm had to stay here at the house for a bit, and that's fine. As a union member it's her place as much as anyone's, but her boyfriend would come by every day and they would sit out in front by the gate and talk. It didn't look good.

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[21] Only one of the labor activists I met publicly self-identified as lesbian (actually as *thom*, a masculine-gendered female whose partners are feminine women; see Sinnott 2004). Al-though not subject to the rigid homophobic sanctions common in some other societies, same-sex eroticism in Thailand is not considered a respectable or desirable social practice, particularly if it becomes an acknowledged component of an individual's public identity. In a comparable example, Annelise Orleck notes the extreme reluctance among women leaders of the early twentieth-century labor movement in United States to discuss or document their private (and possibly nonhetero)sexual identities even toward the end of their lives (1995, 298–310).

. . . So I told her that it wasn't appropriate for the two of them to sit out there; if they wanted to talk they should find someplace else. She didn't stay here much longer after that" (interview, December 1996).

At one level, Khem's words and actions reveal her own considerable investment in the labor movement as a parallel family; she exercises a near parental sense of authority over the younger residents and union members. However, Khem's concerns also reflect a wider awareness of the potential damage that she and other activists can sustain through even rumored indiscretions. Women workers may justify their political activism in relation to valued feminine-identified qualities (responsibility and sacrifice), yet these claims do not significantly transform other gender norms that de-value Thai women, particularly in relation to their sexuality. This contra-diction situates Thai women's activism in opposition to gendered expec-tations that equate public leadership and authority with masculine forms of practice, including active sexuality. As a result, individual women must be prepared to defend their presence and authority within the labor move-ment against even potential accusations of improper behavior, particularly sexual impropriety.[22] These anxieties highlight the degree to which sus-picions of inappropriate sexual behavior or identities can erode the overall legitimacy of women's labor activism, hampering efforts to mobilize broad support and to empower more women workers as respected organizers and effective leaders.

Conclusion

The energy and dedication of activists in Thailand's low-wage migrant workforce demonstrate that such women, far from being unorganizable, are already engaged in dynamic modes of oppositional practice and col-lective action. Labor activism empowers Thai migrant women to take on unfamiliar positions of leadership and to assert their rights to fair treatment in the workplace. However, persistent cultural expectations (their own and others') concerning household roles and normative sexuality also con-strain the extent of women's participation and limit their moral authority within the labor movement. As wage laborers and labor activists, migrant women confront inequities rooted not only in their marginalized class status (as low-wage, insecure labor) but also in their subordinate locations

[22] Costa (1999) makes a similar claim for women's NGO activism. Damaging rumors of this sort are also a hazard for women in Thai electoral politics. See Fishel 2001 for an ethnographic analysis of gendered tensions (including women's experiences) in Thai electoral politics.

within the gendered and geographic hierarchies of the wider Thai society. Activists contest these multiple dimensions of oppression—at once local and global in scope—by asserting a complex, place-based politics rooted in the everyday frustrations and imagined possibilities that shape their lives as women, as migrants, and as workers.

Although located in a specific place and time, the struggles of women in industrializing Thailand parallel women's activisms in many other parts of the world, past and present. For example, small study groups and gender-based confidence training offer crucial resources for many women in grassroots labor movements—from Bangladesh (Rock 2001) to South Korea (Kim 1997), the Philippines (Margold 1999), and Chile (Stephen 1997, 257–66). In the United States comparable education programs have played a key role in women's union politics throughout the twentieth century (see Kornbluh and Frederickson 1984; Fonow 2003). Likewise, newly industrialized workers can draw a sense of collective empowerment from their engagement with popular media and related cultural symbols of modernity. Here Thai women's mobilization of coworkers' desires for urban modernity (as in the activist rock band) echoes the experiences of striking shirtwaist workers in early 1900s New York City, whose claims for greater dignity and equality as workers took inspiration from their consumption of sophisticated fashions, popular novels, and films (Enstad 1999). At the same time, women in varied settings deploy conventional gender norms and kin-based morality to justify claims to public activism and leadership (see, e.g., Sacks 1988; Radcliffe 1990; Chateauvert 1998). Nevertheless, as many of these studies attest, even as activism can challenge and transform the imaginable possibilities of women's daily lives, women's options often remain entangled in the persistent demands of dominant gender roles and other patterns of normative behavior, especially sexual behavior. A related dilemma for many women activists is their vulnerability, in diverse contexts and conditions, not only to charges of inappropriate sexuality but also to physical attack, including sexual violence (see Stephen 1997; Wright 1999; Weix 2002). One consequence of such tensions, as Lynn Stephen has argued with respect to Latin America, is that women's activisms tend simultaneously to "accommodate and resist the dominant ideologies of gender hierarchy" (1997, 23).

Moreover, as a recent Indonesian study suggests, activist possibilities may differ sharply between women who occupy only slightly different social locations. In two separate but very similar industrialized zones on the outskirts of Jakarta, Indonesia, Rachel Silvey (2003) found nearly opposing sentiments about women's labor activism. In one community women (much like their Thai counterparts discussed here) argued that

feminine qualities of politeness and disciplined behavior made them especially appropriate participants in strike actions; workers in the second site asserted that these same qualities meant that women should not get involved in public strikes or demonstrations. Significantly, like the Thai activists discussed above, women in the first community were mostly migrants living far from their communities of origin, whereas a much greater proportion of women workers at the second site were local residents still living with or near close kin.

As this example makes clear, whether in Indonesia, Latin America, or elsewhere, tracing the diverse ideological effects, structural constraints, and contested identities within women's labor struggles requires close attention to participants' own gendered and place-based politics. In multiple ways and places, these grassroots struggles witness the profound ways that gender hierarchies intersect with structures of political and economic inequality worldwide, even as they attest to the creativity and resilience of women's responses to experiences of subordination. As I argue here with regard to Thailand, and as others have found elsewhere, women's labor activism engages multiple (and often contradictory) discourses of struggle and identity, often bridging ideologically distinct arenas of practice in new and creative ways (e.g., Stephen 1997, 7–12).

In addition, by examining the gendered politics of place that informs Thai women's labor activism I have also tried to model an approach that can illuminate these place-based dynamics of women's resistance to globalized forms of oppression without discounting their efforts as place bound. In effect, this analysis suggests the need to reimagine the multiple identities and social locations of a feminized global labor force. Rather than focusing on the barriers these pose to women's activism, we need to do more to investigate how women's lived experiences of contradiction and constraint constitute a foundational terrain for emerging oppositional consciousness and solidarity. These difficult intersections—between different identities, divergent goals and interests, and conflicting structures of power—represent precisely those spaces that are most likely to generate critical avenues of grassroots mobilization and struggle within a global labor force. Assessing these dynamics within and across their diverse local contexts remains an essential task if we wish to understand both the specific challenges labor activists confront on the ground and the resources they can mobilize.

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Women in Between: Globalization and the New Enlightenment

Women's perspectives have attained the significance of a new enlight-
enment, overtaking the seventeenth-century Enlightenment. In the
Cartesian view of nature as something to be controlled and domi-
nated, women were relegated to immanent positions in a world of tran-
scendent male philosophers, scientists, and conquerors who defined, cate-
gorized, and ruled a society made rational by their civilizing mission.
Women's everyday work in reproducing society was invisible until recent
decades, when feminist scholars and activists began to explore women's
contribution to society and the survival of the human species. Women's
mediating positions linking families to communities, and communities to
larger political, economic, and social circuits, become crucial to survival
where global development processes have undermined social reproduction.

I shall argue that the multilateral and resilient approach that women
and other marginalized populations manifest enables them to assess more
clearly their personal situation in relation to global issues. Whether their
marginality stems from social, ethnic, gender, or class positions, their
consciousness of injustice provides a baseline for understanding global
trends in embodied terms. This kind of knowledge, cultivated in the im-
manent roles assigned to subordinates in the world system, promotes a
new enlightenment based on gender-balanced and multicultural under-
standings. Once collectively mobilized, it could become strategic in pro-
viding an alternative to domination by global corporations. The danger
lies in the erosion of such a collective perspective when women gain
individual success as actors equivalent to men in an individualized and
privatized global society.

Those of us who have survived the transformative decades since the

1970s, during which women's perspectives were introduced into scientific discourse, can now evaluate critically the contested discourses of early feminism. Some feminists drew on the rational, scientific paradigm exemplified by René Descartes, including his identification of women with nature and men with culture—and, by extension, civilization—and the assumptions that women were everywhere subordinated to men.[1] Simone de Beauvoir (1957) targeted the problem, but her desire to join the ranks of transcendent males occluded the importance of female roles. She despaired that the "second sex" was biologically doomed to immanent roles. By that she—and her transcendent mentor Immanuel Kant—meant biologically determined reproductive roles. Her escape was to deny maternal functions and the nurturant roles imposed by "nature" on women.

Contesting this conclusion, a feminist critique of Enlightenment rationalism began to expose the fallacy of universal gender roles based on dichotomized oppositions and unilineal evolution that endowed men, particularly European men, with the roles of philosophers and kings. Pointing to evidence from missionaries, conquerors, and travelers, ethnographers began to construct historicized accounts of how women's roles in the Western hemisphere changed with the advent of colonization (Etienne and Leacock 1980). Others analyzed the transformations in women's roles from egalitarian or complementary roles to female subordination within New World empires (Nash 1978; Silverblatt 1987). The breakdown of gender hierarchy based on naturalized differences opened up research into women's domains of knowledge and methods of discovery. Today the Kantian pole of immanence in the world of lived experience is no longer the Cinderella hearth of a society dominated by transcendent males. Everyday experience is being examined, extrapolated, and extolled as the fount of social science insights and the touchstone of reality.[2] The task remains to incorporate these understandings in collective action.

[1] So pervasive were these assumptions that early feminists (see Ortner 1974 and Rosaldo 1974) accepted Descartes' assumption of the universal subordination of women, along with Beauvoir (1957), who was further burdened with Kantian categories of the immanent and transcendent. Eleanor Leacock and I (1977), as well as Mona Etienne and Leacock (1980), drew on ethnohistorical and ethnographic accounts to question the spurious basis for such universalizing categories.

[2] By reclaiming cognition from the transcendent cerebral sphere and inserting it into the daily interactions of people through communication systems, Jurgen Habermas (1984) opened the door to admitting reflexivity and cognitive thought in the lived world. Michael Billig et al. (1988) expanded the study of interactive communication, which allowed both practical and reflective responses that enable people to act in common. This gave greater impetus to the analyses of narratives as ways of exploring people's consciousness in spontaneous and uncensored discourse.

It is in this immanent field of consciousness that Dorothy Smith (1987, 1990) produced a feminist methodology in which the everyday world became problematic. As a second-generation feminist who learned to understand the subordination of women from Beauvoir but rejected Beauvoir's election of the transcendent sphere, Smith accepted her own immanence in the world of practicality. This allowed her to explore a range of experience ignored by theoreticians of her day. Speaking of her contemporaries, women who came of age in the 1950s, she found that they excelled in communicative interactions. She herself acquired her fundamental notions of what constituted women's work as a wife and secretary, but instead of rejecting these premises out of hand, she recognized their value in social reproduction. In the social sciences, women's culturally constituted perspectives direct our attention to an embodied subject located in a particular historical setting (1987, 110). Smith says of the feminist methodology she was forging with other women in the 1980s: "Instead of constructing theories that will explain, I am concerned in how to contextualize or how to constitute the textuality of social phenomena where conceptual practices remain salient . . . preserving the presence of subjects in our accounts" (1987, 106).

This brief digression into feminist ways of knowing serves as a bridge to address what has become visible in the ethnological field as women become both the chroniclers and subjects of social science discourse. This new enlightenment rivals that which occurred in the seventeenth century when Descartes and his colleagues exercised their prerogatives as transcendent males to consign peoples of the world to appropriate places in a hierarchical order of men over women, managers of labor over workers, and the civilized (presumably European) nations over the primitive and/ or feudal orders. The seventeenth-century Enlightenment opened up universal visions of liberation, but these could be realized only by elite males. The rest could aspire to join the enlightened only by rejecting their incarnation as women or as primitive others. In mid-twentieth-century Europe, Beauvoir criticized the intellectual elites of a rational Enlightenment but could not accept an alternate life. Smith also engaged the intellectual life but embraced the embodiment of knowledge.

The new enlightenment promoted by the opening up of civil society to women, indigenous groups, and others excluded from the chambers of the elect was not immediately realized. The distance between third-world feminists and those who were socialized in the first world grew from distinct premises that were fomenting in the mid-twentieth century. I became aware of this when Helen Safa and I co-organized the first conference on feminine perspectives for the Social Science Research Coun-

cil in 1974. After traveling for a month throughout Latin America, visiting universities and research centers to find people doing research on gender, we felt we had succeeded in getting a representative group. But when we arrived at the conference site in Buenos Aires, we found ourselves confronted with a picket line of women charging us with yet another imperialist takeover, this time by U.S. feminists. When we were able to enter into a dialogue with the picketers, all of whom were dedicated activist researchers, we recognized the basis for the difference: whereas we had been challenging the gated entrance to academia and the limited vision this portends, these women were fighting for control over reproductive practices, for family welfare issues at the grass roots, and against the militarization of society. Former Argentinean president Juan Perón had just returned from exile in Spain with his new consort, Isabella, and the contest for power in the nation exacerbated the tensions that Argentinean women were challenging us to address. We invited the picketers to participate in our sessions and to raise these issues in the plenary meetings.

Although I was personally transformed by the experience, the tension between theoretical and activist social science remains, and the distinct commitments of first- and third-world feminisms persist. The feminist movement has given prominence to women and to those who share their concerns as mediators between theoretical concerns and activist applications in their nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations. In a global society where the threat of nuclear warfare looms closer than ever since the end of the cold war, it is important to assess how specific commitments to living in the world that are characteristic of women, and particularly third-world women, can mediate ideological differences.

The new era of enlightenment is a product of social movements calling for greater participation by those who were marginalized from the civil society constituted by elites of the earlier Enlightenment. The feminist and civil rights movements cultivated the cultural diversity that was suppressed in nations constructed on the model of eighteenth-century Jeffersonian or French revolutions.[3] Feminists who inspire or join such movements are saying that they were never a part of the empires or democracies that were constructed in the five hundred years of conquest and empire building. They point out that the revolutions inspired by the earlier Enlightenment were fought in the name of liberty, equality, and justice for all men and that women (like slaves) were not included.

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[3] Ponna Wignaraja spells out the vision of a democratic polity in the introduction to her anthology, *New Social Movements in the South* (1993, 7–8).

Yet women's complicity as reproducers of life—socially as well as bio-logically—often meant a commitment to the status quo in which they were subordinated. The distinctive knowledge gained by balancing these commitments to life with commitments to progress and advancement in the world is what gives focus to the new enlightenment that I propose to identify and to nurture.

What changes are wrought in the new enlightenment? The division of labor that sustained the Kantian dichotomy between the immanent world of nonreflective subjectivities and the transcendent world of thinking and postulating actors is breaking down. Sharing in what had been roles strictly limited by gender and ethnicity such as child care and housework tends to undermine some of the hierarchical structures based on the separation of such roles. More important, women and other subordinated people are beginning to redefine the division of labor and how that should change. At the same time, women in working families are losing the security of stable households and the income of a male provider along with the dependency that entailed. The imposition of flexible regimes of accu-mulation translates into job instability as production is shifted to overseas sites and as technological innovation makes people obsolete along with the machines they serve.[4] Gender antagonism develops and explodes in these settings, as I shall describe below. Yet at the same time alternatives to role dichotomy are opening the possibility of a mutual engagement in the project of living. The awakening of consciousness among indigenous women in the third world expands the horizons of feminist and humanistic thought regarding the potential of humankind.

I shall discuss three instances of rapidly changing gender roles in glob-alization and how feminist activist researchers perceived and analyzed them. The first is in Nicaragua, where women were part of the armed rebellion of the Sandinistas; the second is at the U.S.-Mexican border, where export-oriented assembly plants, or maquiladoras, introduced the neoliberal regime of flexible production; and the third is on Mexico's southern border, where Zapatistas and their supporters are confronting the neoliberal Plan Puebla Panamá proposed by Mexico's president Vicente Fox. By juxtaposing issues raised by feminists with issues affecting both ethnic groups mobilizing for

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[4] "Flexible" production regimes followed the demise of Fordist production regimes, which were predicated on a stable workforce and protected by government regulations and union contracts. In global markets the emphasis on swift responses to consumer demands requires that firms respond quickly in order to maintain their competitive edge. This requires flexibility in production schedules, which ultimately means that workers must bear the social cost of movement in and out of the workforce and that they have little control over their jobs.

their rights and workers who are losing their rights of citizenship in global enterprises, we can assess the advances in theory and practice developing among populations who were not part of the social discourse in the early age of Enlightenment. I shall argue that the contribution of these groups is the key to the new enlightenment addressing changes in global society.

Nicaraguan feminists and indigenous rights

Feminist and indigenous rights movements are central to what are called new social movements based on issues of identity. Theorists are correct in recognizing these alternative sites of social activism (Alvarez 1998), but in their analyses two qualifying conditions must be kept in mind. First, multiple social positions complicate social interpretations, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) maintain: a woman is not only a woman but may also be an underpaid maquiladora worker and/or an Indian. Second, in the multiple social positions that they occupy, people are also responding to historical changes in the conditions that affect their lives, as Alaine Touraine (1988) argues.

With these qualifications in mind, I shall try to show how structurally based inequalities motivated movements identified as feminist and indigenous in Nicaragua during the Sandinista and neoliberal periods of the 1980s and 1990s. But because both feminists and indigenes shared an identity as poor people and as citizens in the Sandinista revolutionary government, they were also responding to exogenous changes that affected the country in ways that did not correspond to exclusively feminist or indigenous interests. Nicaraguan women who had been engaged in the neighborhood committees to care for victims of the 1972 earthquake and who were angered by the misappropriation of relief funds began to participate in the armed struggle against Anastasio Somoza (Molyneux 1985, 228). This "combative motherhood" role promoted by Sandinistas began to wane as casualties rose in the U.S.-backed action that engaged the country in a fratricidal war. Maxine Molyneux recognizes the government's success in promoting social welfare throughout 1982 and much of 1983 but shows that, as the war made demands on the impoverished nation, the emancipation of women was sidelined (1985). For women, who constitute 60 percent of the poorest Nicaraguans, state welfare assistance could not replace the social insurance provided by husbands or sons who might be killed in the war. Diane Molinari (1988), who carried out fieldwork in Nicaragua during the early years of the Sandinista victory and returned when the Contra rebellion was well underway, noted that, just as the women of Managua's poor barrios had mobilized against So-

moza in 1979, so did they turn against the Sandinistas by voting for Violeta Chamorro in 1990. Molinari contends that in both instances the women's inability to fulfill their domestic roles defined their political commitment.

I witnessed some of the contradictions based on conflicting identities of gender, class, and ethnicity when I joined a group of academics organized by the Committee in Solidarity with the Peoples of El Salvador (CISPES) to investigate the Contra war in Nicaragua in 1982. While we were in Nicaragua, educated women of the middle class were engaged in their attempts to write a new constitution that would include the rights of women. The women's organization, the Nicaraguan Women's Association, or Asociación de Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa Amanda Espinosa, was calling for greater control over their lives and their bodies, the right to divorce, to have the number of children they wanted, and to manage their own wealth, whether inherited or earned.[5] Women of the barrios, in contrast, shared a growing apprehension about the deaths of their husbands and sons in the war against the Contras, an apprehension that made some question their loyalty to the revolution.

The degree to which the Sandinistas forged the construction of women as nonpolitical subjects—ceremoniously making them official members of the nonactivist group Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs—perpetuated the dependency of women's groups on the Sandinista party. But after the Sandinista defeat in 1990 the state could no longer contain a radicalized feminist movement that resisted the neoliberal changes ushered in by Chamorro in 1990 (Babb 2002, 206). The Nicaraguan women who became an essential part of the government's maquila industrial program as cheap, expendable labor sustained one of the longest strikes since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in 1994. In this struggle they defied state authority, the apathy of trade unions representing the male workforce, and the threats of foreign-based firms as they asserted the rights of workers to organize. This new independence in the gender struggle must be theorized along with women's rejection of the demagoguery that confined the parameters of their struggle to a single facet of maternity.

At the same time that feminist issues were beginning to surface in the early 1980s, the Sandinistas had just begun to relocate indigenous Misquito communities inland from their coastal habitat, where they had developed a semisubsistence economy based on fishing and commercial exchanges. This had allowed them to be independent of the central Nicaraguan government from the colonial period through independence. The Sandinistas

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[5] Luisa Amanda Espinosa was the first woman killed in the Sandinista rebellion.

justified the relocation on the basis of "security reasons," since some of these communities had joined the rebel forces or assisted the counterinsurgency effort. With the mediation of a research institute established by Charles Hale, an anthropologist working in the southeastern Nicaraguan region of Bluefields, the Sandinista government was able to reestablish contacts with Misquito of Sandy Bay. The resulting dialogue between the Contra and Sandinista positions allowed both sides to come to a resolution recognizing autonomy and allocating a territorial reserve in 1984. As Hale points out in his book, *Resistance and Contradiction* (1994, 13–15), this compromise was achieved when Sandinistas rejected the economism—or class reductionism—endemic to Marxism, on the one hand, while the Misquito opened their ranks to more radical trends, on the other.

Comparing these two dissimilar but parallel instances of actors responding to identity interests—women threatened with the loss of their sons and husbands, and natives threatened with the loss of their subsistence base and way of life—we can perceive the importance of identity politics but also its inadequacy as a holistic explanation. Cartesian dichotomies are not predictive of beliefs and behavior. Larger structural issues are at stake than those made explicit in the discourse about the demands of women or of indigenes as actors in defense of their identity. Women, especially those in the barrios who were asked to sacrifice their men and children to the revolution, were questioning the course of militarism and what some considered to be an intransigent position in Nicaraguan relations with the United States. If gender interests are to be realized within the larger context, as Molyneux (1985, 251) hypothesizes, then the political institutions charged with them must eventually respond to the women's specific interests as well as to class demands.[6] In the case of the ethnic revolt, strategic intervention and the cultivation of a dialogue that resulted in autonomy legislation resolved the larger issue that had threatened the allegiance of the Misquito. Responses to these specific demands of women and of indigenes prove to be transformative for society as a whole.

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[6] Activist groups in the United States, including CISPES, were trying to get the U S. Congress to stop appropriations for the Contra war. Yet on the eve of the vote Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega made an inadvisable trip to Russia, where he was photographed in a meeting with Soviet leaders. When this photograph appeared on the front pages of newspapers throughout the United States, it diminished the hopes of activists who were trying to get Congress to stop the funding for the war against Nicaragua.

Flexible production and the maquiladoras

Turning to another site of global capital advance, this one on the northern border of Mexico, Patricia Fernández-Kelly's (1983) study provided a landmark case of the expansion of export-oriented production in Mexico as foreign direct investments increased exponentially in low-wage areas in the Americas. With unusual clarity and foresight Fernández-Kelly shows how foreign capitalists were able to gain entry into the low-wage Mexican labor markets at a time when restrictions on Mexican migration to the United States were imposed. Because of the desperate economic situation, investors were able to gain tax-free production sites with few environmental restrictions, where they could avoid costs related to social reproduction. They also gained assurances from the Mexican government that labor unions would not be permitted. At the same time the owners of the maquilas gained access to the huge U.S. market with a U.S. congressional act allowing for tariffs to be calculated on the basis of value added (i.e., the low wages of the women themselves) rather than the total value of the product.

Women were drawn to the border by illusory promises of secure jobs and access to consumer goods beyond their dreams. Fernández-Kelly shows the growing contradictions in a distorted labor market where women, as the major wage earners, challenged the culturally constructed image of men as breadwinners.[7] The promises were illusory since the women were subjected to uncertainty because of high turnover and the lack of benefits that could provide security to them or their families. Gender antagonism was present from the early years. Men who were turned back in their attempt to cross the border into the United States still had better access to organized labor unions, and they, along with state and national politicians, pressured the maquilas to open some positions to male workers. Since it was assumed that the men would be "permanent" workers, in contrast to the necessarily "temporary" female workers, they were able to enter training programs for the few supervisory and managerial positions available in the maquilas. In these positions they could impose control over the sexuality as well as the work performance of the workers. Fernández-Kelly reported the required use of birth control pills and the firing of women who got pregnant. Gender antagonism

[7] Comparative studies of export-processing labor carried out two decades ago can be found in Nash and Fernández-Kelly 1983. Safa's recent (1996) study shows how the preferential hiring of women and the loss of the male breadwinner role affect gender roles in Caribbean society.

combined with class antagonism flourished in a sexist and racist environment that cultivated misogyny (Fernández-Kelly 1983).

If we fast-forward to the late 1990s, we gain another perspective on the tangled story of women on the northern frontier. As of this writing more than 4,476 women and girls have disappeared since 1993, and 303 were murdered in the vicinity of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. They had in common the characteristics of being poor, young—between teenage and thirty years of age—and dark-skinned, and many were workers in the maquilas. The owners of the maquilas refused to take even the minimum precautions advocated by women's rights groups during the decade of phenomenal growth in maquilas. The cases, which were ignored or treated in a desultory fashion by Mexican border police, attracted the attention of the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights and women's groups. These groups put pressure on the police, especially at the time around International Women's Day, to carry out more extensive investigations (Villamil 2003).[5]

The maquilas are a classic example of an institution structured on Cartesian principles of gender. First, there is consistent pressure from the start against political organization of and by female workers in the maquilas. Second, the conjunction of male-dominated trade unions with male-dominated government agencies, which provide the institutional basis for the hiring and training procedures of maquilas, ensured male prerogatives in the Mexican borderlands. Trade unions on both sides of the Mexican-U.S. border have historically neglected women workers because they have been considered temporary or, even worse, competitively destructive of the higher wages men could command. Lacking the support of government representatives who might respond to the trade unions, women are further cut off from wage-earning opportunities. Until recently the women's only alternative was to turn to human rights commissions in international courts less responsive to the patriarchal system that operates in the local settings.

The other key to women's vulnerability in the rapidly expanding industrialization of the border area is the fragmentation of society and the precarious household economy. Here we can learn more from activists

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[5] Melissa Wright (2001) uses an extended metaphor of women's precarious employment to connect women's stilled lives to the reproduction of value in maquilas However, she fails to come to grips either with the power issues that promote the managers' negligence in introducing security precautions or their lack of commitment to pursuing justice when violations occur. These wider conditions reinforce the lack of job security and the lack of mobility that women experience in flexible production regimes.

than from a postmodernist deconstruction of discourses. Esther Chávez
Cano, founder of the Casa Amiga (House of a Friend), a group whose
members are mothers of disappeared or murdered daughters, points to
the fragmentation of society that erupts into mass psychosis. The sexist
tradition allows misogynist practices such as violence against women in
the home to be carried out with impunity. Records of interventions made
by Casa Amiga in 2002 indicate a rising incidence of such violence in
Ciudad Juarez, with 973 cases of domestic abuse, fifty-five of incest, and
forty-nine of rape of adult women. In 85 percent of these cases women
relate a family history of incest. Chávez Cano indicates that "here the
social fabric is so damaged that the danger is as great *inside* the house as
outside" (Villamil 2003).

The women who are found murdered share not only the fact that they
are young, that they work principally in the maquilas, that they are dark-
skinned, and that they are of poor, working families but also the fact that
they were systematically raped before their death by strangulation. Fo-
rensic examination shows clear signs of torture, cigarette burns to their
bodies and genitals, the twin-pointed injuries made by electrodes used by
police, and in one case, wrist injuries suggesting that the victim was hand-
cuffed and forced into submission. Police called this case a "crime of
passion" and attributed other cases to drug overdose. Although there is
no specific link between the maquilas and the murders, the practices of
the managers—their delay in introducing safety measures and their pre-
rogatives in disciplining workers—add to the vulnerability of the women.
For example, some managers reserve the right to lock out any worker
who is late in reporting to work. One seventeen-year-old who was later
abducted, tortured, and murdered was not admitted to work because she
was three minutes late.

Law enforcement authorities blame members of bands calling them-
selves *los Rebeldes* (the Rebels), *los Choferes* (the Drivers), *la Foca* (the
Seal), and *el Cerrillo* (the Untamed) or suggest that a serial murderer
committed the killings. Activist groups such as Casa Amiga and Nuestras
Hijas de Regreso a Casa (Our Daughters Must Return Home) charge
authorities in the investigation with negligence and false arrests. They also
charge the authorities with aggravated assault against lawyers defending
those falsely accused and on forensic detectives who undermine the cases
police construct to protect those in powerful positions.[9]

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[9] The data on cases of murder and abuse are provided by Chávez Cano in an interview
published by *La Jornada* (Villamil 2003). I am indebted to Sarah Hill for Ed Vulliamy's
article, "Murder in Mexico" (2003).

Can we develop a new enlightenment theory linking local misogyny to the disintegration of social structures, a theory that will contribute insights to liberation struggles of peoples in a globalizing world? We can start with the insights of those striving to overcome the disadvantages of working women. Rosario Acosta, director of Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa, states: "The maquiladoras are a big part of the problem. Here the transnational corporations have all the rights and no obligations. Up to now they do not ensure the safe return of their employees to their homes. Local companies are also responsible; they are the first to experience the crisis like a boomerang" (Villamil 2003). The systematic lack of responsibility on the part of the maquila managers and the instability forced on the workers account for a great deal of the fragmentation of society. Women's labor is the principal component of the new "flexible" regime of capital. These workers' very vulnerability as women alienated from patriarchal homes and as workers with scant government regulation or union representation makes them especially desired in the flexible organization of production. The general invisibility of women's work in the domestic sphere is perpetuated even as these women became wage workers, further distancing them from benefits that male workers can win. This is due in part to their government's concessions to the investors in the maquilas that did not allow any access to trade union organizations. It is also due to the shame associated with married women who work. Since these women lack institutional and emotional support for their position in the workforce, the owners of the maquiladoras can operate with impunity in laying them off peremptorily, thus destabilizing the household schedules of thousands of women who support families in the frontier zone.

The instability inherent in the export-led development programs is not coincidental; it is a programmed part of flexible production introduced in the 1970s and modified in the 1980s.[10] At the height of the debt crisis from 1983 to 1986, when Mexico was forced to devalue its currency, managers perfected the system of flexible labor employment that responded to changes in production schedules and increasingly gave priority

[10] Orlandina de Olivera (1987) assesses the cycles of expansion and recession attendant on the employment of women in twelve areas of Mexico, showing that the stable growth that began in the 1970s decreased in the 1980s and was followed by a crisis of unemployment for male wage earners with increased employment of women in services and commerce as well as self-employment. In the nineteenth century, Charles Babbage elaborated the principle named after him, which called for the segregation of lower-paid, "unskilled" labor in categories that were often socially discriminated against because of the workers' gender or status as recent immigrants (Nash 1989).

in hiring to women in lower-level jobs. Since the women lacked both trade unions and government regulations, they were forced to accept home assembly work at lower rates when there was a downswing in production. This subcontracting furthered their invisibility and exclusion from trade unions and public agencies. The so-called flexible regime of production characteristic of neoliberal development is based on the forced acceptance of uncertainty by women in increasingly precarious household situations.

The context in which this situation develops lethal consequences is one in which men and women are held at the border subject to the whims of U.S. immigration officials. Some accept work for the drug trade operations, and others, particularly women, are forced into prostitution. These illegal operations are also tied into big business interests. In Ciudad Juarez this means maquila operations, landowners, construction barons, and energy suppliers—all of which are connected within a group of families (Vulliamy 2003). It is suspected that the investigation teams subvert the investigations, possibly with instructions from above.

The very processes that promote globalization also give hope for a resolution of the discrimination women face in border communities. Human rights organizations working with grassroots coalitions are promoting transnational cooperation between police and courts in addressing the deaths and disappearances. The 1997 *Human Rights Watch World Report* included a report of the Women's Rights Project on sex discrimination against female workers in the free trade zone of northern Mexico indicating that some maquilas fired pregnant workers. This resulted in charges against North American maquilas, charges that can now be directed to the National Administrative Office of the United States, which oversees regulations in the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. However, the practice of firing pregnant workers continued among Mexican maquilas, resulting in a charge by the National Administrative Office of the United States in 1998 that doing so constituted an extensive violation of human rights (Nathan 2003, 5). Other charges of violating workers' freedom of association are being adjudicated at a multinational-owned auto parts plant in Ciudad de los Reyes (Stevenson 2003). These networks now operating among the three countries involved in NAFTA promise to give women a greater voice in their workplace and community.

As Saskia Sassen (2003, 260) reminds us, there are two distinct dynamics emerging in the lives of migrant women workers. Though their invisibility and disempowerment as a class of workers remains, they still have access to wages and salaries, however low. Even more important, the growing outcry against the crimes has resulted in a proliferation of human

rights groups that are putting in place the institutional networks to address these problems. They too are a product of globalization processes and cannot be forgotten in assessing changes.

Plan Puebla Panamá: Indigenous resistance and feminist voices

My final case is drawn from indigenous people of Chiapas, where many pueblos support the Zapatista movement. For semisubsistence farmers and housewives who are forced to compete with subsidized agricultural products in the world market, the future is clear. Without protection from foreign exports, they must expect ever-diminishing returns for their subsistence crops or join the streams of migration to urban centers in Mexico or the United States. On January 1, 1994, when NAFTA was to go in to effect, the Zapatista National Liberation Army said ¡basta! (enough) to neoliberal development and took up arms against a government that had ignored its members' claims to land titles in the colonized area of the Lacandón rain forest and their need for protection against the dumping of subsidized U.S. crops.

The alternatives offered by the neoliberal regimes of Mexico and Central America stress exogenous development of export-oriented production. In 2001, during his first year in office, Fox's administration launched a major hemispheric development scheme, Plan Puebla Panamá, designed to promote modernity in the southern sector of Mexico. It projects a new vision of Mexico's place in the hemisphere by directing attention to the southern border with its Central American neighbors and away from the northern border where maquilas abound (Fazio 2001, 3). The scheme promises the integration of sectors in the basic infrastructure of the state through education, the growth of productive enterprises, and protection of the environment. Promoters claim assets that include the abundant labor supply available at competitive costs at the global level (i.e., below most wages in the world labor market), a privileged geographic position, political democracy, and commercial agreements already in place.

The plan, which is now being discussed in Zapatista circles, denies the central concerns of this new revolutionary movement. Zapatistas have called for endogenous development for the advance of human subjects who are agents of their own enterprises. They seek expansion of traditional industries such as organic foods, including coffee and honey (already being marketed by indigenous cooperatives). In order to accomplish this, they need credit and access to domestic and foreign markets.

In contrast, the plan promotes direct foreign investment in enterprises exploiting the rich resources of the region, including oil, hydroelectric

power, the biodiversity of fauna and flora, and the tourist attractions provided by the indigenous populations. In their statement (Presidential Office 2001), the government planners devote pages to the improvement of roads, communication, and port facilities and to the further development of highway, rail, and canal facilities that will parallel the Panama Canal through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Yet nothing is said of the institutional means to draw indigenous people into the planning process. Even more ominous for small-plot cultivators who seek sustainable development (Fazio 2001) is the fact that there will be no restriction on remissions of profits to foreign capital. Based on the history of foreign capital investments on the northern border, we can expect that similar commitments will extend to labor practices, fiscal regulations, and environmental considerations in Chiapas.

Women are suspicious of a plan that talks about invigorating the local economy but intends to send the men to distant areas where they work on constructing the infrastructure for bigger and more costly enterprises. They have heard bulletins about the existing maquilas in Central America and are not enthusiastic about having their own "underutilized labor" allocated to working ten to twelve hours a day with no time left to tend their families (Earle and Simonelli 2005). Faced with similar projects in Oaxaca, campesinos are concerned that their lands will be seized by eminent domain and that the region's archeological zone will be affected. The highway between Mitla and Oaxaca runs through the sacred Zapotec valley that may have generated the religious discourse that was the founding nucleus of Mesoamerican civilization. As one spokesperson saw it, these new enterprises threaten the fabric of society: "We want to continue being administrators of our resources, we want a social corridor that supports our pueblos, we do not want projects that make our culture yield, we want to be actors in and not spectators of the CBM [*Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano*, or Mesoamerican Biological Corridor], we want a corridor of campesina enterprisers, not a maquila corridor" (Gomez Mena 2003).[11]

In the colonized areas of the Lacandón rain forest and in the Christian Base Communities of the highlands of Chiapas, women in the Zapatista movement are seeking a new way of relating to their families and communities. In their cooperatives and collective work groups they try to promote egalitarian relations that deny the hierarchical orders based on

[11] "Queremos seguir siendo administradores de nuestros recursos, queremos un corredor social que apoye a nuestros pueblos, no queremos una suma de proyectos que hagan sucumbir nuestra cultura, queremos ser actores y no espectadores del CBM, queremos un corredor de empresas campesinas, no un corredor de maquiladoras."

gender and wealth that were their destiny in the plantations or highland pueblos from which they come. In my limited stays in the rain forest I could sense remarkable transformations in gender relations, as Duncan Earle and Jeanne Simonelli (2005) discuss. Men often engage in child care and cooking, just as women participate in public arenas. These are the conditions that both men and women want to replicate in any development enterprises, just as they are putting them into practice in their daily lives.

The growing uncertainty in a changing world shows a gender and class bias. Men find themselves displaced in the wider society by other competing workers and even by technological innovations more than do women. This is due to the nature of the work in which they are customarily engaged as well as to the place in which it is carried out. When women's work in the home becomes commoditized, their service jobs play on skills that are part of deeply ingrained socialization. They cannot easily be replaced by machines in the fields of building interpersonal communication networks, nursing, child care, education, and other gendered activities. The innovative work of rural women migrants in creating income-generating jobs processing and selling food in the markets and streets of Latin American cities ensured the survival of their families throughout the political and economic crisis of the 1980s.[12] Women's acceptance of these necessary adjustments is, I would strongly emphasize, a correlate of their living in the world.

In contrast, men's vulnerability in economic crises stems from the very transcendence of their roles in normal periods. By training and acculturation, men are not expected to respond to daily needs; rather, they expect to be waited on by family members or servants. Young men are finding it increasingly difficult to find and hold a wife. When they lose the services of wives and daughters, they lose a sense of themselves in the world, and when they abandon their families, they rarely send remittances to support their children (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003).

This vulnerability is also characteristic of indigenous male campesinos insofar as they have capitulated to the dominant patriarchal models of the household. Jacinto Arias Pérez, a Tzotzil-speaking scholar who has a master's degree from Princeton in anthropology, gives us an insider's view of the disorientation he and other Indians experience when confronted with many alternative choices in life. He writes: "We have doubts about how

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[12] Florence Babb (1989) describes the ingenuity with which Peruvian women managed complex processing and selling operations in the sale of food items, maintaining low costs and carrying out child-care operations that ensured the survival of low-income families during the 1980s

to live. . . . In the early part of the twentieth century, the objectives were clear. This may be my limited vision, from experiences in my life. What Indians considered to be domination by ladinos was outside of their world but now it is within their world. The boundaries of Indian-ness have widened and are less definable in themselves now that many of those who were considered Indian have much of the same outlook as the conquerors or invaders" (1994, 379).

The conflicts that once separated Indians from ladinos now operate within indigenous communities. "Traditionalists" (made up of the *caciques*, or native leaders who were co-opted in seventy-one years of Institutional Revolutionary Party [Partido Revolucionario Institucional] hegemony) oppose those who introduce change through religious conversion and political party competition.

Gender hostility, cultivated in a setting where young men with little chance to gain land and without wage-earning opportunities are unable to find a wife or keep her, aggravates the usual competitive hostilities faced by people in a situation of limited opportunities (Aubry and Inda 1998; Garza Caligaris and Hernández Castillo 1998). Gender hostility is rising as well because women no longer accept as natural their subordination, abuse, and confinement in the home. Women are marrying later, and some choose not to get married when they have alternative economic opportunities (Collier 1990; Nash 1993). When women of indigenous communities in the Lacandón rain forest and highlands of Chiapas break their isolation in the domestic unit and demand a voice in change, they emphasize their roles in the transformations they can make in their lives and in their society. They have one strong factor in their favor: they are not as implicated in the co-optive strategies of the state and political organizations as are men because fewer women have voted or entered public office.

Women who were engaged with men in the armed takeover of four cities, the military barracks, and the state prison on January 1, 1993, voiced their demands from the first week of the rebellion. Their attempt to change the subordination of women in the home as well as that of indigenous people in the nation highlights the broadening of social movements with the participation of what were subaltern voices. The statement of purpose drafted at the First Chiapas State Convention of Indigenous Women reveals the strength of their conviction about women's participation in changing the world:

Take up the word of women, what we have been saying, demanding, reclaiming in our communities, *ejidos* [lands held communally by

indigenous townships], assemblies, and houses to our husbands, brothers, fathers, authorities and to the government that does not listen to our voices, so that the words do not remain within the four walls of our houses. They speak not only of their oppression and discrimination but of the participation of rural women in the seizing of land and the struggles of the Zapatistas that give an example of struggle and rebellion. The voices include the women of civil society, the NGOs, the teachers, the students involved in this process of search for utopias toward a more just and equal society.[13]

Indigenous women and men in the autonomous communities of Chiapas are joining together with mestizos and transnational NGOs to help bring about the changes needed for a democratic society. Women are now calling on men to shoulder some of the child rearing and other domestic responsibilities in the autonomous communities. In turn, women seek greater public participation in the decisions that affect their lives. By sharing these everyday tasks, they may promote a consciousness that gives priority to life. If this consciousness were to prevail in national and global centers of power, we might hope for peaceful resolutions of internecine and international hostilities.

The Zapatistas' attempt to gain a multilateral engagement of all members of the society on many fronts exemplifies the resilient approach to social change. The concept of resiliency is taken from environmentalists who demonstrate the survival value of nonlinear dynamics by which ecosystems maintain themselves in the face of changed circumstances. Susan Walsh demonstrates the effectiveness of such policies in her study showing the success of multilateral coordination among subsistence-based communities in the Bolivian highlands (2003, 49). Their self-sustained economy based on the genetic diversity of their potato crops and on reciprocal exchanges reinforced by ritual and kinship ties contrasts with the unilineal, hierarchical control advocated by modernization theory, which has dominated development circles for the past half century.

Conclusion

In the beginning of the third millennium we find ourselves in the midst of a new enlightenment yet still trapped in the limitations of outmoded structures of intellectual and social life. Women in the social movements that

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[13] Flier distributed at the meeting of the First Chiapas State Convention of Indigenous Women, March 1995; my translation.

have expanded their horizons through the inclusion of feminist, civil rights, and indigenous goals emphasize that they do not seek power but rather a free space where a democratic society can emerge. The emerging paradigm that Ponna Wignaraja (1993), editor of *New Social Movements in the South*, highlights is that of a positive synthesis of ideas and sentiments with social praxes, promoting sustainable development that embraces all life.

These goals and the approach to realizing them are emblematic of the new enlightenment, emphasizing an all-inclusive civil society that embraces the social welfare of all humans. The goals seem elusive in a world where an emerging empire threatens nascent democracies and where those who claim ownership of the technological progress created in the age of enlightenment use it for destructive ends. In the neoliberal world in which the precarious existence of more than one-third of the people hangs in the balance, bodies, as Florence Babb states, "function as a battleground in discussions that center on how quickly adjustment measures may be introduced and how much the population can withstand before irreversible damage is done—or before political protest grows stronger" (2002, 197). Nicaragua, the maquila zone, and Chiapas serve as testing grounds as these propositions are hotly contested by women working in maquilas and as indigenous peoples pose alternative development programs in their autonomous territory.

The global assembly plants have increased the intensity of labor exploitation using predominantly female labor. While indigenous people at Mexico's southern frontier are seeking a cultural renaissance and liberation from the racist subordination to which they were subjugated, what some have called a hybrid society at the northern border is enmeshed in a nightmare of neoliberal development. Women trying to maintain their families with low-paid jobs in a flexible labor force are subject to the violence brought by narcotic and sex traffickers at the same time that men are held back from labor streams to the north by U.S. immigration policies. The development program known as Plan Puebla Panamá for the southern border threatens to introduce the combination of flexible production for low-wage women workers with men forced to migrate, join the military, or engage in narcotic trafficking that is found at the northern border of Mexico and in Nicaragua. Indigenous people and the NGOs that support their claims for sustainable development offer an alternative that springs from immanent sources against the destructive path of universalizing free-market initiatives.

Despite the dismal prospects faced by workers in global assembly plants, women are joining in union organizations, as Jane Collins (2003) documents in her study of garment workers in the United States and Mexico.

The efforts of workers organizing unions to counter world trends toward low-wage labor are paralleled by the efforts of indigenous people striving for a sustainable autonomous development that includes all people. As they gain a sense of their right to exist in the world, indigenous and poor working women and men, joined by middle-class professionals, religious activists, and other grassroots activists, are changing the way that revolutions are mobilized and the ends for which they struggle. Just as they have done during crisis periods throughout history, women are bringing the knowledge and skills they have acquired in building mutual assistance networks into a political arena. There they call for dignity and increasingly for peace as entrenched interests turn to war in a last-ditch effort to ensure their dominant positions. Working collectively with men, they might overcome the gender and class hostility that shred the fabric of society.

The conjunction of class, gender, and ethnicity in today's social movements can be analyzed only in holistic terms. Whereas Cartesian oppositions classify social actors in unique categories, only some of which are expected to exercise power, the dynamics of global processes must take the multiple visions of all social actors into account in order to analyze and propose changes that embrace all social sectors. Thanks to our developing feminist heritage, we can now envision that goal with clarity and pursue it with enthusiasm.

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Deviant Classics: Pulps and the Making of Lesbian Print Culture

In Ann Bannon's now-classic pulp *Beebo Brinker*, the eponymous heroine and ur-butch arrives in New York and comes out as a lesbian by referencing a pulp she read back on the farm where she grew up. "I read a book once . . . under my covers at night—when I was fifteen. It was about two girls who loved each other. One of them committed suicide. It hit me so hard I wanted to die, too. That's about as close as I've come to reality in my life until now" ([1962] 1983, 50–51). On the one hand, this is a self-conscious, even playful metafictional reference to the pulps that Bannon herself helped to make famous and that were, by the time of *Beebo Brinker*'s publication, already richly interwoven with lesbian history. On the other hand, the quotation is a recognition of the seriousness with which pulps were read by some of the lesbian readers who combed the drugstore book racks for them. Bannon's heroine is not the only lesbian—fictional or otherwise—who has consulted the print archive. Beebo, like so many others, read pulps, and Radclyffe Hall's protagonist Stephen Gordon, also like so many others, read sexological books. Significantly, in each case the characters react not only to the text, to what the books are saying to them and to others about them, they also respond to the book itself, to the artifact whose presence in the world as an embodied fact allegorizes and solidifies their own desires.[1]

[1] Stephen Gordon, in her late father's study, "wandered about the room, touching its kind and familiar objects," finally turning to the shelf of sexological books her father has marked with his own "small scholarly hand" ([1928] 1990, 204). This scene is especially important, for it closes the two sections of *The Well of Loneliness* dealing with her early life. Turn the page, and the third section opens on Stephen writing fiction. The scene is also important in that it posits the sexological books as an alternate familial genealogy.

Taking my cue from the number of scenes of reading in self-consciously lesbian novels, I want to look at books as well as texts to think about how pulps in particular have helped to create a lesbian print culture. Taking seriously the whole life of a printed artifact—its production, its circulation, and its various mundane uses—as factors in its textuality, I hope my analysis will provide insight into that most mysterious of social processes: how a historical artifact becomes a foundational text for a culture's sense of itself. Isolating an instance of the complex process of how a book becomes a text for a specific culture can show us, as cultural studies has long promised, what books and texts do in various cultures; how they imagine cultural traditions; how, in this case, they imagine and negotiate conflicting definitions of what counts as lesbian culture and history; and how lesbian cultures and traditions are linked to more mainstream cultural forms. Pulps represent a small but rich site of investigation for such a project. Part of a much larger paperbacking revolution during the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, pulps changed the accessibility and affordability of fiction. Perhaps more important, paperbacking broadened the number as well as the kinds of readers who might buy fiction and in turn recalibrated the ways that presses imagined the relationships among "literary quality," readership, and profitability.

While it is doubtless true that even in an age of purported "lesbian chic" lesbian print artifacts are by no means mainstream, neither are they always oppositional in their narrative content, strategies, or addresses to readers. Indeed, as I shall show, the world of lesbian print culture is gregarious, always in close conversation with the exigencies of a larger print sphere as well as with its various lesbian constituents. The long and peripatetic life of Bannon's Beebo Brinker series, which I shall analyze closely in this essay, is an especially good example. First issued as pulps, the books have been regularly republished over the years, and each appearance of the series in the market reveals surprising overlaps of "alternative" and "mainstream" lesbian readers and literary markets as well as critical shifts in how print has helped to construct historically situated lesbian communities.

In order to think through these larger questions, my methodology relies on insights from queer theory as well as lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender (LGBT) studies, but it does not strictly adhere to either.[2] Rather than asking, following queer theory, how sexual difference organizes narrative, and rather than asking, following LGBT history, how lesbians read and wrote and how they represented sexual difference in nar-

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[2] See, e g , Farwell 1996; Hoogland 1997; and Roby 2000 for excellent examples of queer theory–driven analyses of sexuality and textuality

ratives, I ask of books how their appearance in the market itself incorporates signs of a lesbian readership and makes distinctions within that readership about various historical incarnations of lesbianism and, later, queerness. The magical process by which books become texts is generally understood as a process of reification, of the erasure of concrete social conditions of production.[3] But I shall show that how books become texts is intimately tied to a reverse process in which abstract readers become special, or historical, kinds of readers. They become lesbian readers, able to recognize and historicize "lesbian texts" and "lesbian authors" and able to participate in a historical lesbian community in the very act of buying a book and reading a text "as" a lesbian.

The world of print culture is expansive, comprising novels, zines, post-cards, broadsheets, and glossies, but I focus primarily on the novel. Following the work of Pierre Bourdieu, I approach novels as participants in a field of symbolic struggle defined not only by market conditions but by the struggle of social actors to invest a given book with cultural value. "Few works," Bourdieu writes, "do not bear within them the imprint of the system of positions in relation to which their originality is defined; few works do not contain indications of the manner in which the author conceived the novelty of his undertaking or of what, in his own eyes, distinguished it from his contemporaries and precursors" (1993, 118). In the case of lesbian texts Bourdieu's argument sustains its force (indeed, the novels I examine seem to me to redouble his insight), but its implications are perhaps even more interesting, though no less accurate, than they would be with, say, an already consecrated novel by someone like Henry James.

Lesbian novels do not simply bear within themselves the imprint of the field in which they struggle to participate, they wear that desire on their sleeves. Indeed, lesbian texts indicate—within themselves and by their very existence—a certain instability, a certain unsuspected elasticity within the field of cultural production. This instability is not simply temporal, as Bourdieu so compellingly argues, organized to uphold a closed field of cultural production that functions by maintaining a more or less per-

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[3] The distinctions as well as the relationships between books and texts are the subject of studies of the history of the book. Historians of the book theorize the social life of a book using different terms. For example, Jerome McGann (2002) defines text most broadly as linguistic signification, a definition that seems to divorce texts from their corporeal manifestations in books, which are objects that can be held and physically manipulated. But McGann rejects, as do I, that commonsensical division and argues that texts are known through bibliographic codes as well as linguistic codes. Bibliographic codes pertain to the actual object of the book and range from the typeface used in it to the venues in which it is stocked (2002, 43).

manent tension between established producers and maverick newcomers at each moment of production and consumption. Lesbian print culture provokes a more wide-ranging and more fundamental challenge to the idea that the field of cultural production tends, like Isaac Newton's third law, to conserve energy by setting into motion a finite amount of reputation, fame, and cultural effects. Lesbian print culture challenges the idea that the kinds of fame and reputation generated by the sphere of cultural production are distributed across a generally accepted and known sphere of readers. It helps us to see that although the world of book production operates more or less efficiently, directing itself to readers it helps to create, book production cannot account for the various ways that readers will critique their own positions, use books and texts at different moments, or circulate books among like-minded readers.

One way of saying this is that lesbian print culture does not occupy an oppositional or avant-garde position within a more general print culture. Rather, it is a separate but not isolated cultural field; it refers to and is part of a field that does not always refer to it. In this smaller field—sometimes described as alternative by more comfortably positioned commentators—authors are not always motivated by competition with one another but by affiliation with otherwise unaddressed readers or unread writers. All acts of reading—even, by way of example, the culturally degraded reading for plot or reading for pleasure—have social value. For the readers who choose books from lesbian presses or by lesbian authors, reading for pleasure or reading for escape necessitates choosing books that do not make them feel their otherness in a prescripted way. In this case, the world of print—writing, publishing, and marketing—represents a tradition that both precedes and anticipates lesbian readers, asking them to remember themselves by choosing a particular kind of book before they forget themselves by choosing a particular kind of text.

Theorizing how lesbian print culture works is jumping the gun a bit, for it neglects how we might define that vexed category "lesbian literature." Indeed, looking at lesbian print culture within Bourdieu's basic contention about the operations of the field of cultural production seems to depend on an idea of lesbian culture as a literate culture. This does not mean that all or most lesbians read certain kinds of books, that if lesbians do not read lesbian novels they are not lesbians, or even that if lesbians do not immediately recognize themselves in lesbian novels they are not lesbians. Neither does it mean that any book is not available for a queered reading; as Dorothy Allison has provocatively argued, the authorship of lesbian novels might rest as much on the reader as on the

writer. All books, she maintains, are lesbian books (Allison 1999).[4] Not all lesbians spend their free time reading novels, not all lesbian novels are read only by lesbians, and not all lesbians read the same novels in the same way. Despite rumors to the contrary, there is no handbook for becoming a lesbian, and there certainly is no handbook for reading the handbook. It is doubtless utopian to believe that lesbian culture is not only textual but that it is configured around and through texts.

The list of "lesbian books" is nonetheless large. There are of course novels, like Hall's 1928 *The Well of Loneliness*, that have become classics, canonized by general culture, university culture, and an institutionally sophisticated lesbian culture, on whose behalf the novel has been kept more or less constantly in print. There are, too, lesbian classics within other canons—novels, poems, plays, and stories that are perceived to have lesbian content even though they are understood first and foremost as part of another literary tradition, the whole of which is presumed to be opened up by the observation that it contains such queer material. One thinks here of Gertrude Stein's position in the modernist canon or Sarah Orne Jewett's major position in the "minor" genre of American regional writing. In these instances the writers' literary reputations, already assured by conventional mechanisms of evaluation, are not substantially changed when critics analyze their texts under the rubric of lesbian writing. Stein and Jewett can still typify the best elements of the genres in which they write, the periods in which they lived, and the communities that shaped their authorial positions, even though they have been recategorized as lesbians. Introducing sexuality as an element of analysis complicates without displacing aesthetic or historical modes of interpreting these authors and assigning them value.

Here I will narrow the field of lesbian literature to those artifacts produced (or reproduced) by lesbian or LGBT presses. Such books include those produced for lesbian readers as well as books that have been reprinted, and therefore selected, for their perceived relevance to a large segment of a lesbian readership. This focus challenges ideas about literature that poststructuralist thinking has seemingly dispatched—ideas like authorship, intent, and audience.[5] For there are indeed lesbian authors,

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[4] Allison writes, "Looking for self-defined lesbian books was never how I approached the subject. I always reinterpreted books to give me what I needed. All books were lesbian books—if they were believable about women at all, and particularly if they were true to my own experience" (1999).

[5] It is not of course lesbian or gay literature alone that challenges the "death of the author." Feminists and critics of color have long argued that poststructuralism dematerialized key social actors just at the moment when those actors were finally appearing and speaking in the public sphere.

and although they may have no authority over the meaning of their own texts, they certainly had some authority, shared with a host of other producers of cultural artifacts, over their books. Because they understood themselves as lesbian authors, they occupied a position in some field of literary production. That position is not outside of the world of the text and its readers or of the world of the book and its producers, but neither is it identical to them. Similarly, once the literary field allows a reinvigorated author to emerge, questions of intent—an idea that died at about the same moment as self-conscious identitarian print cultures emerged—follow. We may argue, as we do to our students, that Hall may or may not have meant this or that, that it does not matter in any case since there is no way to recover intent or to surmise whether one intention was a displaced intention of some other kind. Authors of texts may not have intent, but writers of books do. Their intent may be limited and compromised, directed toward a specific and now lost cultural market.[6] Writerly intent has economic restrictions as well as the usual restrictions of a subject's understanding of the tradition in which she is writing, but it is nonetheless intent of a vulgar, and therefore important, kind.

Authorship's relationship to the lived identity of the writer has a special intensity for almost all writing by minority subjects who recognize themselves in a marginal relationship to major literary traditions. This is not simply because they are who they are but because for them the literary sphere is not a disinterested sphere of communication. Rather, it is a sphere in which interested social actors make claims against and for normativity, and it is a sphere that works according to laws that are dictated by the needs of a market. When culturally or socially marginalized actors enter that sphere of print, they expose its contingencies as well as their investments in it, but they also reveal, as I shall show, its ability to incorporate them at the very point of their marginality.

Middlebrow deviants

In the United States the first examples of lesbian print culture were periodicals, and although I do not analyze them here, I begin with them because they were among the first self-conscious commentators on as well as participants in a self-conscious and growing lesbian literary tradition.

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[6] For this insight I am indebted to Bourdieu's work in *The Field of Cultural Production* (1993) but also to Barbara Herrnstein Smith's work in *Contingencies of Value* (1988), in which Smith argues that the audience exists within the process of writing, for writers make judgments about what might interest or speak to readers.

Homophile periodicals devoted page after page to evaluating other print artifacts with lesbian subtexts and, later, gave a great deal of space to reviewing lesbian novels. Periodicals like *The Ladder*, produced by the national lesbian organization the Daughters of Bilitis from 1956 to 1972, published not only news articles but original stories and poetry as well as book reviews.[7] The commitment of political periodicals to book reviewing tells us that the representation of lesbians, however limited, however deviant, and however disappointing, was critical for the ways that one segment of print culture imagined the development of another. Lisa Ben (a pseudonym created as an anagram of "lesbian"), who in 1947 created *Vice Versa*, the first lesbian periodical, told interviewer Kate Brandt that her magazine, reproduced on carbons on her office typewriter, contained "just fiction and poetry and book reviews" (Ben 1993, 134). One of Ben's editorials supplicated readers for material by providing a list of books, saying, "Why not read and review one of these listed stories . . . for the benefit of those who have not the time to read the book, or perhaps can not obtain it" (134–35). Her insistence on the importance of the text and the artifact converge in the periodical itself. *Vice Versa* proved hard to obtain, and because each issue was produced by hand on time borrowed from her job, Lisa Ben enjoined the readers of each issue to "pass it on to another lesbian. Don't just throw it in the wastepaper basket" (134).[8] Although *Vice Versa* did not last long—the labor of producing it and the lack of contributors shortened its life—it imagined that part of its service to its readers was to alert them to the fact that there were books for and about them, and that they were the right interpreters for those books. Indeed, these early periodicals are some of the first places in which we can see the scenes of reading with which I began this article.

The Ladder, which sought to politicize and inform the members of the first mainstream lesbian organization, had a much more long-term impact on the lesbian community. It too ran book reviews in its issues. The reviews were not objective; from the start they developed a critical vocabulary about lesbian literature, focusing on aesthetic elements as well as historical value. Barbara Grier, the last editor of *The Ladder* and cofounder of Naiad Press, the first press run by and dedicated to publishing work by lesbians, partially understands her position as the editor of *The Ladder* and as cofounder of Naiad through a world of books. As a collector of lesbian

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[7] I do not discuss in this essay the many radical periodicals and manifestos circulating in the 1960s and 1970s, although they too have much to tell us about how the lesbian print sphere was constructed. For more on such periodicals, see Adams 1998 and Soares 1998.

[8] See Streitmatter 1995

books, she says, "I started haunting, in a serious way, secondhand book-stores," finding "a badly stained copy of the first edition of *We Too Are Drifting* by Gale Wilhelm. I still own it; it's lovely. I love its little two-dollar-and-twenty-five-cent hardcover body with its nasty coffee stain on the front. It delighted me years after to be able to bring that book back into print" (Brandt 1993, 101).

Grier's delight in the artifactual qualities of Wilhelm's novel is insep-arable from her pleasure in Wilhelm's text; discovering its existence is as meaningful as discovering its content, and making sure that it finds its way into other hands is inseparable from making new lesbian readers. Grier's sense of discovery, her belief in the meaning of the book as well as of the text, has echoes everywhere in the archive of lesbian autobi-ography. Let me give some examples, which are typical but by no means exhaustive, of scenes of discovering and reading "lesbian" texts. In auto-biographical pieces in Joan Nestle's collection *The Persistent Desire* (1992), speakers reference running across novels that "tell them who they really are" (Bulkin 1992, 110). Doris Lunden, for example, in a 1980 interview, says that she heard the word *lesbian* and went to the library to look up relevant material. Moved by the discovery of novels, Lunden is even more moved by the sense that such novels had already been purchased and read by other lesbians. Her scene of reading is also a scene of initiation: "It was just after that that I found *The Well of Loneliness* at the drugstore bookracks—of course, I went back to that bookrack, I haunted it, and I found other books, perhaps half a dozen. Before that time I had no inkling how many lesbians there might be. Then I did at least get the idea that there were probably some more in my city" (Bulkin 1992, 110).

In *Zami* Audre Lorde writes of her search to find printed material: "One read *The Ladder* and the Daughters of Bilitis newsletter and won-dered where all the other gay girls were" (1982, 150). Similarly, Kate Adams writes that Carol Seajay, who went on to found the *Feminist Book-store News*, a major publication for lesbian and feminist writing, "hunted down secondhand lesbian pulps as a Michigan high school student in the late 1960s, train[ing] herself to read them only up to the last twenty pages, to avoid sharing the lesbian protagonist's inevitable tragic end" (1998, 122). Adams details how Judy Grahn describes finding the standard work on homosexuality sequestered behind a cage—a phenomenon still in existence now, though at the time it was more likely practiced to protect the general public from contamination than it was to protect the books from potential defacement by unsympathetic readers (1998, 122). In this case, the artifacts themselves are being protected. It is impossible to un-

couple the book from the text, and harm to one will be expressed through harm to the other.[9]

The referencing of books and texts in the same breath imagines the search for books as similar to a search for other lesbians. The memorialization of these texts in a lesbian literary tradition is also a memorialization of artifacts. In each of the prior examples it is important that the material artifact can be held in one's hands, can arrive in one's house. It has a body; it can be touched; and, more important, it has been touched. The story of the lesbian novel as text and as book is about the discovery and circulation of people as well as objects, but as I shall show in the next part of this essay, it is also the story of republication and rediscovery of a lesbian literary history.

Republication and lesbian publics

Lesbian pulps are now undergoing something of a revival. They have been the source of a great deal of fascinating literary and cultural criticism, but my interest in them focuses on their historical ability to initiate readers into a sense of the historicity of lesbianism, for the pulps are now beloved texts about which readers maintain a sense of irony and affection. Often cited, often parodied, lesbian pulps exist now as a touchstone for popular lesbian writing in a pre-Stonewall past.[10] There are lesbian pulp address books and day planners, there are coffee table collections of lesbian pulp cover art, and there is an extensive, often visited Web site of pulp cover art maintained by Duke University. Lesbian pulps, especially Bannon's Beebo Brinker series, have been the site of some of the most interesting work on text and artifact, publishing history and sexual identity, and history and readership. This is partially because lesbian pulps reveal how a genre that was directed at one kind of readership was appropriated by another, for they show us a kind of reading that has become central to the ways that LGBT communities have survived and flourished as subcultures within a larger community by appropriating and resignifying signs.

Pulps, published as genre fiction by publishing houses that marketed inexpensive paperbacks, followed tight narrative guidelines and featured

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[9] Leslie Feinberg's *Stone Butch Blues* (1993) is one of the best examples of how a novel references other lesbian texts. Protagonist Jess Goldberg goes from anxiety over her lover's open display of *The Ladder* in their living room to a passionate hunger for print material. Becoming a typesetter, she spends most of her paycheck and her spare time in bookstores.

[10] See, e g , Walters 1989; Nealon 2001; Walker 2001.

lurid covers and titillating subject matter. The heyday of pulps, in the 1950s and 1960s, coincided with larger changes in the publishing industry as a whole, and lesbian pulps especially led a double life. Although pulp novels about lesbians were sometimes written by men and marketed to them as well, they were discovered by lesbians, and they became some of the earliest mass-market texts in which lesbians could see representations of themselves. Although the pulps drew different readers, publishers and writers were quick to see the potential of pulps to expand readership and therefore customers, and many of these books were written by lesbians and about lesbians with lesbian readers in mind.

There are reasons that lesbian pulps have proven resilient, none of them intrinsic. Pulps have been understood as signs of a secret history of readers, and they have been valued because they have been read. The more they are read, the more they are valued, and the more they are read, the closer the relationship between the very act of circulation and reading and the construction of a lesbian community becomes. As I have shown, even within some of the pulps themselves, characters use the reading of novels as a way to understand that they are not alone. Isolated, with no one to talk to, they turn to that most private of pleasures, novel reading, and find instead a public expression of their innermost selves, the secret of who they are. Reading, for some of the pulp heroines and even for some of the essayists and activists whom I have mentioned, is dramatic, even revelatory. And it is precisely that feeling of revelatory identification that has driven the republication of some of the lesbian pulps. The pulps have been a crucial part of LGBT history because feminist and lesbian presses have been quick to recognize their role in the construction of a lesbian print tradition and have reissued many of the titles under their imprimaturs. The republication of pulps is a critical factor in the construction of a lesbian community that values not just texts but books themselves as elements in the construction of history.

Bannon's Beebo Brinker series is perhaps the most famous series in the lesbian pulp tradition, and this is doubtless because Bannon's work has had a long life. The Beebo Brinker series was first published by the Gold Medal series of Fawcett books, but the novels have gone from being pulps to being examples of pulps. The series has been republished and therefore reconsecrated by other presses.[11] After its publication by

[11] I focus on Bannon's Beebo Brinker series not because it represents the "best" of the lesbian pulp novels but because it has been so critical in the rediscovery of pulps. I should also say here that I am by no means certain that Bannon's work should be used as a synecdoche for all lesbian pulps. It is worth further investigation to see how other pulp writers used the

Gold Medal, one of the most successful pulp publishing houses in any genre, the Beebo series appeared in the Arno Press series on homosexuality, then in the now-venerable Naiad Press list, and then in the Cleis publisher's catalog, and the series was recently featured as a selection of the Quality Paperback Bookclub (QPB). In each instance the novels were packaged and marketed differently, making them especially good examples of how the history of production and the circulation of an artifact become factors in its textuality.

Odd Girl Out (Bannon [1957] 1983), which inaugurated the series, focused on the thwarted love between two sorority sisters, Laura Landon and Beth Cullison. The novel was not initially meant to be a pulp, a distinction important to make if only because part of the terms of the rediscovery of pulps involved accommodating their perceived lack of "literary quality" along with their social qualities. Bannon, a young housewife, was writing a magnum opus, a tiny part of which focused on the torrid if doomed love affair between Laura and Beth. Her publisher took the book on the condition that she get rid of the rest of the narrative and focus on the lesbian relationship. Bannon's novels were at once like and unlike many of the pulps. As Susan Stryker has shown in her fascinating and beautifully researched collection *Queer Pulp* (2001), many of the writers of the pulps were men, but a significant number were lesbians publishing under pseudonyms (such as Vin Packer), or people writing what they imagined to be important novels of high literary quality. Yet writers write to a market, and Bannon, like so many of her later readers, recalls the personal importance of discovering lesbian pulps. In an interview with Brandt, she says that "I had begun to discover the early blooming of lesbian novels on the paperback kiosks at the drugstores and the train stations. I had read a couple, and they moved me" (Bannon 1993, 75). Vin Packer, to whom Bannon wrote a fan letter after having read the pulp *Spring Fire* (1952 [2004]), became her mentor, introducing her to the editor of the Gold Medal series. Bannon's first novel differed in one significant way from the conventional pulp, for the heroines of the novel do not die. Rather, both of them move (at different times) to New York City, where they later meet and fall in love with Beebo, the ur-butch of pulp fiction. In her interview with Brandt, Bannon says that she did not realize until much later how important it was that her novel had an at least qualified happy ending. "These two women did not have to self-

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form to fashion fictions about lesbians. I should also note that in yet another crossover between forms of print culture, Bannon contributed the forward to Jaye Zimet's excellent collection (1999) of lesbian pulp covers.

destruct; they didn't have to destroy one another emotionally; nobody had to step in and murder them . . . in order for me to say, somewhere in the book, that they were happy when they loved each other" (Bannon 1993, 77).

Bannon did not mean to continue the series, but because of the fan mail she received, she did, producing five books in all in the Beebo Brinker series. In the midseventies the Arno Press, the publishing division of the *New York Times*, reissued all five as part of its series of classic books on medical and sexual deviance. Whereas Gold Medal had released Bannon's work with trademark pulp art covers, featuring girls in some stage of sexual vulnerability, the Arno Press immediately reclassified the literary and social status of Bannon's work by releasing it in a hardcover library edition with somber clothbound covers. The question of what made the Arno Press distinguish Bannon's work rather than the work of other pulp writers is one I cannot answer here, but the choice itself signifies the press's power to reassign cultural capital, for the imprimatur of the *Times* is sufficiently different from the imprimatur of Gold Medal in its ability to change the status of a pulp and therefore its historical, and textual, value.

Canonized with hegemonic culture's left hand, Bannon's series became critical for three further publishing ventures. In 1983, Grier and Donna McBride reissued the novels from their newly founded Naiad Press. Grier, providing a clue to her reasons for republishing the series, says of her backlist generally, "a single work of fiction from a relevant era tells you more about what the people were really doing and thinking in that era than five hundred works of nonfiction" (1993, 106). And yet what is most interesting about what Grier says is not its accuracy—what the Beebo Brinker series tells us about an era is surely as dense and conflicted as that era itself—but its sense of history as a defining element of value. Grier's argument is relevant to the history of publishing; our own era's version of the past, its decisions about what and how to memorialize it, tells us who we think we are because it tells us where we think we became a "we." Bannon's series is not just classic for deviants, it is a deviant classic, a series of books and texts canonized by the newly established lesbian print culture. Unlike the original pulp cover and unlike the library binding, the Naiad paperback version features tasteful (if now dated) line drawings showing the outlines of women in the period clothes of the early eighties. Also included in the Naiad reissue is a photo of Bannon and a short introduction by her in which she comments on the historical power readers have reposed in her books. This is a fascinating turn, for it not only recovers the historical value of the texts, it recovers an idea of authorship not especially valued by the pulps. In making Bannon an individual, the reissue

of the pulps values the act of authorship and the value of interpretation; it imagines book and artifact in the same horizon, and its foregrounding of the books' importance for lesbian readers in particular imagines these pulps as part of the lesbian literary tradition.[12]

The Beebo Brinker series has recently been reissued by the Cleis Press. Cleis, like Naiad, is not a mainstream press, but it shows us how a lesbian press like Naiad occupies a position somewhere between alternative and mainstream. Cleis is not specifically for gay and lesbian readers but for alternative readers (alternative in the sense that they are able to value what is not mainstream in itself). The press's Web page directs itself to "smart readers," and the artifacts' covers are close-ups of the original pulp covers, thereby securing their sense of historicity but also their sense of irony.[13] Some of the first readers of lesbian pulps used them to open a door, as Nestle said (1993); to be "moved," as Bannon said (1993, 75); or to imagine the possibility of "a lesbian literature," as Lee Lynch said (1993, 62). The artifacts released by Cleis do not scorn these "naive" readings of pulps; rather, they allude to them, transforming a knowing naïveté into an element of the texts. One reads, in this scenario, because one has been read already, because the sense of revelation and discovery are valuable even if they are self-conscious and ironic. Indeed, the blurbs on the Cleis reissues of the Beebo Brinker series call the books "lesbian classics" and on the back cover cite a number of well-known lesbian writers' and critics' responses to the novels. The release of the Cleis versions of Bannon's novels—especially their emphasis on the style of the covers, on style itself—might be seen as part of a larger cultural trend some critics have called lesbian chic. But it is a market-driven chic, and it is one that has led to an increase in the visibility of all kinds of alternative publishers by and in the mainstream press. Indeed, the availability of three volumes of the Beebo Brinker series in one volume from the QPB speaks to the interest of one self-styled "high middlebrow" segment of the population and the publishing industry in what might be seen as alternative culture.[14]

The republication of the novels helps to unfold what Christopher Nealon (2001) has termed the sense of historicity that the tradition of LGBT

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[12] The adventures of Beebo Brinker continue on the Web, where she has been reimagined as Feebo Stinker by Sasha Foo, the creator of "The Ann Bannon Shame Machine" (see Foo n.d.).

[13] The Cleis Web site can be found at http://www.cleispress.com. Last accessed April 25, 2005.

[14] See Radway 1999 on the distinction enjoyed by the QPB in relationship to the Book-of-the-Month Club.

writing inaugurates through its very yearning for history. But it also alerts us to something interesting in the ways in which people read, the kinds of things that they want. For if, as I am arguing, part of the value of these texts is their artifactuality, the location of authorship and lesbianism lies not in the texts and not in the people who have written them but in the people, real or otherwise, who might read them. That is to say, the idea of authorship lies in the belief that someone else might read the book in a specifically lesbian way.

By transposing the meaning of *lesbian author* or *lesbian literature* to the field of reception, I do not mean to perform a sleight of hand. I do not, for example, mean to say that the sexuality of the writer is somehow unimportant to the production of texts. I do, however, mean to say that the ways in which authors are constructed in a literary field—the choices they make about what to write, whom to address, where to publish, and how to imagine their books in a tradition of other books—constitute a process that has as much to do with the way in which they understand their sexuality in the field of writing as do other more conventional factors like sexual object choice. Certainly, understanding the lesbian author as a lesbian who is authorized as such by a group of readers means that we can think about the kinds of interpretation that are solicited by such literary artifacts. As Reina Lewis has pointed out, critics need to "deal with the emphasis on author which often results from the reclamation or identification of lesbian texts as the product of a lesbian author" and need, as well, to recognize that questions of reader-response theory cover everything from "ivory tower ponderings on the generation of meaning to grass-roots demands for positive images" (1992, 21). Struggling with the value of recovery projects that let us see authors long dead as lesbians who can now be seen to have written lesbian books, Lewis rightly argues that the real meaning of lesbian texts lies in their interactions with readers. In other words, authorship must be, as I argue, partially relocated to an arena of market authority, an authority that authorizes readers and critics to decide what makes a lesbian text important for lesbians.[15] In the critical work that has already been done on the pulps, it is hard not to overestimate pulps' value to readers precisely because pulps are no longer a viable form of representation but a more innocent form of lesbianism whose value lies not in the streets they depict but in the notional avenues of circulation they now embody.

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[15] In her excellent essay, Amy Villarejo (1999) has made a more pointed argument about the broken historical promises the pulps hold out to contemporary readers, cautioning us to understand the pulps as indifferent to the uses to which readers seek to put them.

Reading as reviewing

Whatever else it may now be, pulp fiction is degraded fiction because it is genre fiction. While it is easy to talk about the meaning that various readers have reposed in Bannon's work, it is not obvious how we can use this example to talk about other kinds of lesbian literature. It is not easy to "rediscover" other kinds of culturally degraded fiction that, for example, seem less historically rich, that seem, in consequence, to be less valuable historically or aesthetically than iconic pulps. But the logical outcome of my analysis is to suggest that we approach even the most degraded lesbian genre fiction in this way. In this section I shall turn to one of the questions that pulps pose and that has dogged the most successful lesbian and LGBT presses: the question of genre fiction—which dominates most of the lists of lesbian presses just as it dominates the lists of most major publishers— and the related question of literary rather than historical value.

Janice Radway first argued about the kinds of expectations readers had for the romance genre in 1982, and she has recently extended her inquiry into the ways in which the literary market was able to account for different kinds of reading, for different kinds of books. In the interviews she conducted for *Reading the Romance* ([1982] 1991), romance readers argued that stylistic devices were less important to them than the novel's capacity to sweep them away, to transport them to a different place, and to let them imagine themselves as different kinds of readers. In her recent analysis of the Book-of-the-Month Club (1999), Radway demonstrates that although what we think of as middlebrow literature seems to demand a similarly naive process of reading, publishers have realized that even "amateur" readers recognize that there is a difference between reading for pleasure and reading for edification. That is, readers recognize that some kinds of books call for one kind of reading and not for another, and they calibrate the intensity of their reading accordingly. But publishers also calibrate the marketing of books to elicit some kinds of reading, making the distinction between stylistically difficult books and "good stories" in ways designed to appeal to and reinforce the ways that readers read. Academic inquiry tends to devalue amateur methods of reading, insisting that the pleasures of the text must be sought in other registers—linguistic difficulty, for example.

While focusing on the development of lesbian print culture through the example of pulps lets us look at the way that the production of an artifact is related to changes in the very meaning of the text—Bannon's authorship, for example, becoming more important when her texts are republished for lesbians—it also suggests that the meaning of texts relies on informal as well as formal mechanisms of evaluation. Like most presses,

the most successful lesbian presses specialize in genre fiction. Indeed, the biggest and most successful lesbian and gay presses—Naiad and Alyson among them—have built their reputations by sticking to very basic genres: mystery, coming out, romance, or some combination of the three. There are a number of lesbian detective series, for example, as well as lesbian romance series. While there are LGBT reviewing periodicals, I would like to consider the main, and most unrecognized, way that lesbian books are "reviewed" for lesbian readers—their placement in gay bookstores.

How gay bookstores stock books and what they stock are critical to their success; undercapitalized, threatened by big chains, and dependent on a known community of readers, these bookstores make choices that will keep them in business. They end up, therefore, making distinctions about literary and historical value in their very choice of stock. I should also say that most gay bookstores do not limit themselves to books from gay presses. They include books from major presses that have crossover appeal. Many of the books sold in the lesbian section of my local LGBT bookstore are mass-market paperbacks featuring lesbian protagonists or even minor lesbian characters—the work of mystery writer Laurie King and thriller queen Patricia Cornwell command a lot of shelf space, as do more recherché books that reference well-known straight publications, like Mabel Maney's lively rewriting of the Nancy Drew mysteries. Similarly, bookstores both straight and gay give a lot of space to "serious" and acclaimed lesbian novels like those of British author Sarah Waters. Perhaps the best-selling lesbian novels—the graphic novels of Allison Bechdel's *Dykes to Watch Out For* series—are not genre fiction.[16] It is not often easy to tell which of these books will have crossover appeal of the kind enjoyed by such nominally lesbian texts as Dorothy Allison's *Bastard Out of Carolina* (1993) or Rita Mae Brown's *Rubyfruit Jungle* ([1973] 1983). Brown's series of cat-centered mystery books are also staples of the "lesbian literature" section of my local LGBT bookstore.[17]

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[16] Bechdel's work is deeply involved in the very idea of lesbian community and print culture. For example, for many years (until it "closed" in 2002) the fictional Madwimmin Books, a local, independent LGBT bookstore, has been central. The struggle to keep Madwimmin's alive in a world of giant chain bookstores figures in many of the strips and might be seen to parallel the incorporation of Bechdel's own publisher, Nancy Bereano's Firebrand Press, into a larger publishing house.

[17] Brown is a good example of the crossover phenomenon, especially because her literary productivity cannot be read in any mechanical way as either alternative or mainstream. Long a literary activist and political writer affiliated with radical women's journals with low circulation, Brown published *Rubyfruit Jungle* in 1973 with the small Daughters Press. Its success in the feminist community as well as in the lesbian community (groups whose con-

Crossover books are more appealing as objects of study than are literary novels published by alternative presses, for they invite sophisticated readings of print culture (straight and gay) as well as interpretations that queer the texts in question. Indeed, series fiction—what we might think of as the equivalent of the pulps—seems designed to stymie those impulses. The Naiad Press Web page is fairly up front about its reliance on series fiction, directing new authors to write within the word limit and to avoid unhappy endings. Indeed, Grier makes the case quite strongly for Naiad's genre fiction: "I myself find [romances] dreadfully boring, but I publish them because there are a lot of women out there who really like them. And they have a right to" (1993, 107). This is a significant change from her earlier venture in publishing and reviewing, when, using the pseudonym Gene Damon, she and Lee Stuart in 1967, and then she, Jan Watson, and Robin Jordan in 1975, compiled *The Ladder*'s bibliography of lesbians in literature (Grier and Stuart 1967; Grier, Watson, and Jordan 1975). In the introduction to the 1975 second edition, the editors write that although they are dedicated to having a complete bibliography, they have made several changes in their selection process. "We have acknowledged the changing consciousness of the world to agree with the deletion of almost all 'Trash' entries, thus removing over three thousand books from the bibliography" (Grier, Watson, and Jordan 1975, 4). The coexistence of inclusion and evaluation are highlighted both in the editors' decision to include more scholarly books and in their decision to retain their ratings system, with three asterisks indicating "those few titles that stand out above all the rest and must properly belong in any collection of Lesbian literature" (Grier, Watson, and Jordan 1975, 4).

Following Radway, we can easily see that making literary judgments on the great majority of texts in the lesbian corpus is a way to dismiss not just some books, but some readers. Yet we should not assume that high-culture readings of series books have anything like a coherent strategy for approaching and defining them. On the one hand, poststructuralism's basic insights suffuse the study of literature. The death of the author, the contingency of meaning, the instability of the sign, and the diffuse operations of power now seem so common as to be banal, even in their most aggressively deployed formulations. Yet such ideas, whether or not we always apply them, coexist uneasily with other working assumptions behind literary value: a high regard for the intrinsic value of social difference

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gruence cannot be assumed politically or socially) led to its reissue by a mainstream press. Brown has published mainstream mysteries but has not stopped publishing essays or books of essays in smaller venues.

of all kinds, a fascination with identity as a category, and an endless appetite for literature by and about socially marginalized persons. The difficulty for critics who want to come to terms with the preponderance of series or genre fiction at lesbian presses is that socially marginalized people may indeed be political subjects who understand the workings of power. They may be deeply political. And they may also want to read for plot.

How might we incorporate that kind of reading into a history of lesbian print culture? Suzanne Juhasz (1998) has recently argued that the readers of lesbian romances are doubly disqualified from a certain kind of consecrated reading. On the one hand, she argues, romances are an always degraded cultural form. On the other hand, the very idea of plot as a narrative device has been critiqued by feminist critics as a structure that mimics patriarchal epistemologies. Arguing that critics need to take mainstream-inflected lesbian writing seriously, Juhasz writes that "there exist hundreds of lesbian romance novels, written by lesbians who do not seem to know they are fooling themselves when they think they are writing love stories about two women, even as there exist readers who apparently derive pleasure and satisfaction from reading stories about two women falling in love" (1998, 67). Saying that the needs of the lesbian community to read as lesbians is critically important, two lesbian critics concur very specifically: Katherine Forrest, who writes the popular Kate Delafield mystery series, and Grier, who has made a commitment to modeling the everyday rituals of the gay community for her readers (Forrest 1993, 88; Grier 1993, 107). Lynch sees her place as a lesbian *popular* writer: "If we had supermarket shelves that sold lesbian books, it would be fine for me to be there. Those reach the most people" (1993, 69).

Conclusion: Marketing (to) lesbians

The development of a complete lesbian print sphere of authors, publishers, and bookstores does not have an inevitably happy ending, for it does not have an inevitable ending. The story I have told about the ways in which books and texts functioned in the lesbian community is not a progressive story about the construction and triumph of either a lesbian culture or a lesbian print culture; it is not the story of the imagined nations of lesbian print in which print universalizes its readers. Lesbian print culture, like any print culture, makes its own distinctions and divisions, and it assigns books literary merit based on aesthetic standards often borrowed from more general culture. Although the development of a market for lesbian novels, for example, takes place in a narrative in which the lesbian book as artifact was of crucial importance, there are a number of pressing issues

that confront the world of lesbian print culture. Perhaps the most important of these issues involves the success of the gay book market. While the first reviews and evaluations of lesbian texts took place in lesbian periodicals, and while the first presses and bookstores were founded by print activists who could not or did not want to place their work in more mainstream venues, gay and lesbian literature has now found a niche in the major presses and in the giant bookstore chains like Barnes & Noble and Borders. The success has been double-edged, for with the inclusion of LGBT texts in mainstream bookstores, the future of alternative presses has been threatened. Indeed, between the time I wrote this essay and the time I revised it, Naiad Press, bulwark of lesbian publishing, had shut down operations.[18]

Cleis's release of the Beebo Brinker series occasioned a flurry of book reviews in the *Advocate* as well as the *Library Journal*, and indeed the idea of LGBT literature now figures into the evaluatory mechanisms of journals like *Publisher's Weekly*, *Choice*, *Booklist*, and the *Library Journal*. The *Lambda Book Report* and *Women's Review of Books*, along with glossies like the *Advocate* and *Out*, have long reviewed lesbian literature, but the (re)appearance of lesbian literature in nonlesbian venues has occasioned a recognition of its readers as a market. While mainstream trade publications tend to write articles about how major press houses like St. Martins are establishing LGBT essay and fiction series (although this series was recently cancelled), or about how and where to shelve and sell LGBT literature, LGBT periodicals tend to ask questions about the state of LGBT publishing houses.[19] For example, in the 1990s, mainstream trade journals published articles with titles like "Where Do You Shelve Books That Are out of the Closet?" (Bryant 1993), "Part of the Family: Gay and Lesbian Literature in the Mainstream" (Bram 1993), or "Out of the Closet and into the Forum" (Olson 1992). Alternative venues tended to publish essays with different kinds of titles, such as "Is Lesbian Literature Going Mainstream?" (Jay 1993), "The Backlash and the Backlist" (Seajay 1994), or "The 10 Most Hated Books" (Weir 1997). The differences in the ways in which different periodicals approach LGBT literature are in some ways a product of the shifting book market.

Such reviews and the new prominence of LGBT titles in mainstream

[18] This is an occasion of great sorrow, but one bright spot is that Bella Books will be publishing a substantial portion of Naiad's backlist.

[19] For example, in 1993 Feinberg's *Stone Butch Blues* was reviewed in the *Lambda Book Report*, *Belles Lettres: A Review of Books by Women*, and *Women's Review of Books*, as well as in *Publisher's Weekly* and *Booklist*.

venues are important, for, as I have argued, we must pay attention to the social life of a book as a factor in its textuality. Printed artifacts, at once books and texts, have a double life, making them critical sites for understanding how emerging literatures and historical identities intersect. The commonsensical distinctions between books and texts encourage us to forget the world of the market and of readers. Books have weight and heft; they take up space on bookshelves; and they have dog-eared pages, broken spines, and coffee stains. They are marked in all kinds of idiosyncratic ways by their users. Texts, on the other hand, have the dubious privilege of disembodiment. Texts, the common wisdom assures us, merit rereading; they have enough internal complexity to interest a range of readers who might all occupy otherwise dissimilar subject positions. Texts therefore endure, while books perish.

Yet however naturalized this disembodiment of texts has become, however gracefully readers learn to interact with it, disembodied texts, having stood the test of time and history, exact a certain kind of readerly disembodiment. Lesbian books and print artifacts help us to rematerialize the lesbian reader. The political efficacy of consumer choice is limited, and the kind of community that consumption implies is ephemeral at best. Yet in terms of lesbian print culture the very act of buying a book—no matter how formulaic that book might be—involves finding and getting one's hands on it and therefore appearing in public as *that* kind of woman before one disappears from view into its pages. Radical texts and political journals have helped to shape a social history of lesbianism, but so too have more conventional lesbian readers and lesbian texts. Readers of Sarah Waters or Ann Bannon, of highbrow literature, and of romances have made critical choices about how they will approach the field of literary representation, but their choices are never simply personal. Indeed, if the publication history of the pulps I have analyzed shows us anything, it is that all of a reader's choices—ranging from what and where to buy a book to how to make sense of a text—are factors in the social life of an artifact and therefore are critical factors in how—or if—a book will become an important text for a given community. The pulps also show us that the scenes of reading that appear in so many autobiographical accounts and in so much lesbian fiction are as vital to understanding an individual lesbian reader as they are to understanding the books that she reads, for such individual scenes of reading are not just historical, they are history making.

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Queer Theory for Everyone: A Review Essay

Library shelves tell interesting stories. Thirty or forty years ago, it took almost no time to get from feminism to homosexuality—in the stacks. Neither category took up much space, and few books stood between them, since the Library of Congress system classifies feminism and homosexuality together in Subclass HQ, "The Family. Marriage. Women." That subclass has filled out rapidly in the past forty years, and in the past two decades much of the growth has been in HQ 74-77—"Bisexuality. Homosexuality. Lesbianism. Transvestism. Transexualism." Books that once huddled together for warmth on a few shelves now proudly occupy many linear feet in most major research collections. Paralleling the growth of gay studies has been the even more substantial increase within HQ 1101-2030.7: "Women. Feminism."[1]

One ironic result of the surge in lesbian-gay studies and feminist studies is that the distance between these sections in the library has grown even as sexuality and gender have coalesced in feminist and queer scholarship. The more books there are in HQ 74 and HQ 1101, the longer it takes to get through each section, and the longer it takes to get from one to the other. That homosexuality and feminism are neighbors at all is an artifact of a classification system that absorbs both "sexual life" and "women" into "family" and "marriage," the first two words in the overarching HQ subclass heading. Although "family" and "marriage" unite "homosexuality" and "women," they also separate them. Between HQ74-77 and HQ 1101-2030 we find HQ503-1064: "The family. Marriage. Home." Stuffed into those call numbers are "parents," "single people," "man-woman relationships," "adultery," "divorce," "widows," "gerontology," and—as if when marriage ends, so does life—"Thanatology. Death. Dying."

[1] For more information on the Library of Congress's subclasses in the social sciences, see http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/lcco/lcco_h.pdf (last accessed April 5, 2005).

It is not surprising that those who devised the Library of Congress headings in the late nineteenth century defined homosexuality as a sexual deviation to be sandwiched between bestiality and incest, on one side, and prostitution, sadism, fetishism, masturbation, and emasculation, on the other.[2] Nor is it astonishing that the system's inventors asserted, well before Monique Wittig, that lesbians (HQ 74.2) are not women (HQ1101; Wittig 1993, 108). Scholars may try to overturn these divisions, but classification systems designed for bookshelves transform intersections into sequences that then become hierarchies. The first term in any Library of Congress data entry is the most visible because it governs where and therefore how we see a book. A scholar may argue that at the turn of the century race, gender, and homosexuality were all mutually constitutive categories, but the book in which Siobhan B. Somerville (2000) makes this assertion is classified as first and foremost about gender identity (HQ1075.5.U6S6S: 1. Gender identity—United States—History).

Like the sexological categories Somerville analyzes, Library of Congress descriptions often reveal more about the values of the classifiers than about the books they categorize. For example, Esther Newton's *Margaret Mead Made Me Gay* (HQ76.3.U5 N49) includes several essays on the relationship between feminism and lesbianism, but the library's third subject listing for the book is "Lesbian feminism—United States." *Lesbian feminism* is a term associated much more with separatism than with the sexually mixed consciousness-raising groups Newton describes in her essays on feminism. But either out of ignorance of such nuances or in accordance with a one-drop rule of sexual deviance, the library rubric reduces Newton's account of knotty encounters between women to a single political movement and filters lesbians out of feminism: books on "lesbian feminism" are shelved with "homosexuality," not "feminism."

Those who write, read, and teach books that strain the limits of classification systems can pride themselves on how poorly those schemes reflect new ways of thinking about gender and sexuality. The library is filled with works that dissolve the dictates governing their placement. We now have the tools to pry off the labels that segregate homosexuality from the family, queer studies from feminism, and lesbians from women. This essay begins with an overview of how we acquired those tools and then inventories the equipment provided in some recent queer scholarship, most of it focused on nineteenth- and twentieth-century England, France, and the United States, for understanding not only sexuality and gender but also

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[2] See Chan 1986 for the history and usage of the Library of Congress system

modernity and its offshoots—science, liberalism, democracy, and con-
sumer culture.

Genealogies of sexuality and gender

Feminism in the United States has, since the 1960s, understood sexuality
as both an arena for women's liberation and as a crucial vector of women's
oppression. Manifestos such as Anne Koedt's "The Myth of the Vaginal
Orgasm" ([1970] 1971) and encyclopedic works such as *Our Bodies,
Ourselves* (Boston Women's Health Book Collective [1970] 2005) claimed
women's rights to sexual pleasure, autonomy, and knowledge. The de-
mand for female sexual autonomy also required understanding the forces
arrayed against it: hence the focus on rape, sexual harassment, and male
domination in early writings by Kate Millett, Susan Brownmiller, and
Catharine MacKinnon. Lesbians played an important role in those early
feminist formulations, as we see in two recent collections whose essays
chart the intertwined history of lesbianism and feminism since the 1960s:
Newton's *Margaret Mead Made Me Gay: Personal Essays, Public Ideas*
(2000) and Amber Hollibaugh's *My Dangerous Desires: A Queer Girl
Dreaming Her Way Home* (2000). Both books express frustration with
1960s and 1970s feminist tenets—that heterosexuality embodies men's
oppression of women, that male domination suppresses lesbian love and
bonds between women, and that lesbianism liberates women from male
oppression by refusing men and all things masculine. One classic for-
mulation of those tenets was Adrienne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosex-
uality and Lesbian Existence," first published in *Signs* in 1980, which
summoned feminist theory to go beyond "token allusion to lesbians"
(Rich [1980] 1983, 140). To do so, Rich argued, would require under-
standing "the institution of heterosexuality itself as a beachhead of male
dominance" (141) and lesbianism as women's resistance to "male tyranny"
(160). But prescribing lesbianism as an antidote to everything toxic about
heterosexuality excessively sanitized lesbianism, purifying it of power, gen-
der, and desire.[3] Butch women were censured for being male-identified,
and femme women were criticized for cleaving to patriarchal codes of
femininity (Hollibaugh 2000, 63, 123; Newton 2000, 161, 172).

Feminist arguments about sexuality as the site of women's oppression
depend on an interesting circularity: they define gender as the sexual

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[3] On lesbianism as a desexualized fantasy of feminism, see also de Lauretis 1994, 185,
and Dever 2004.

conflict between men and women, and sexuality as the gender conflict between men and women. As a result, early feminist manifestos for lesbianism either had little to say about gay men or saw gay men as having much more in common with male oppressors than with lesbians. Rich cited "the prevalence of anonymous sex, . . . the justification of pederasty among male homosexuals," and the "pronounced ageism" of gay men's "standards of sexual attractiveness" as examples of the "differences" between lesbians and gay men, expressing the sense of strict sexual difference now associated with radical feminism ([1980] 1983, 157). But Rich, MacKinnon, and Brownmiller also articulated a fundamentally liberal politics, since they assumed that to deprive women of autonomy, equality, individuality, and happiness is to commit unacceptable violence on rights-bearing human beings. Feminists in the United States diagnosed sexual difference as the cause of the heterosexual conflict they aimed to eradicate, but even as they made sexual difference paramount, they also located its disappearance as the horizon of equality.

The continental versions of feminism that circulated in the United States in the 1980s through the work of Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva also took up a sexualized opposition between femininity and masculinity. Irigaray's writings described male homosexuality in ways uncannily similar to Rich's work. But French feminist theory was interested in neither individual liberty nor the eventual eclipse of sexual difference. For thinkers influenced by Jacques Lacan's ideas about subjectivity, freedom was a necessary casualty and sexual difference an inescapable condition of being human. Feminists in the United States understood lesbianism as the rejection of the masculinity embedded in heterosexuality. French feminists theorized female homoeroticism as the embodiment of the feminine difference on which true heterosexuality depended but which phallocentrism suppressed. In the late 1990s, that embrace of heterosexual difference led a different set of French feminists to denounce lesbians and gay men who demanded political and social recognition. French opponents of gay marriage included conservative womanists, such as Françoise Héritier and Sylviane Agacinski, who warned that sexual difference is the universal basis of culture and that psychic health, sound parenting, and mature sexuality flourish only when a couple unites the complementary opposites Man and Woman (see Eribon 2000; Butler 2002).

The French model of sexual difference once exerted a strong influence on U.S. feminist scholarship. In the past two decades, however, that influence has waned as psychoanalysis and deconstruction have become increasingly specialized, as students have lost interest in France, and as the fall of communism and increasing U.S. conservatism have combined to

make liberalism more appealing to progressives.[4] Liberalism has become a prominent ingredient in arguments for the rights of women and sexual minorities. In both instances the grounds are similar: respect for difference and interest in promoting equality and autonomy. Newton, for example, includes "the right to be different without being persecuted" and "the right to a greater measure of sexual freedom and choice" among the causes gays embody (2000, 237). Claims for equality, such as the demand to legalize gay marriage, are not uncontroversial, and many queer theorists warn that equality will be the death of difference because it will force minorities to adapt themselves to a norm that was formulated to exclude them (Warner 1999). But even warnings about its homogenizing consequences affirm liberal values: nonconformity and individual dissent. Where French feminists valorize gender difference as a universal difference (Schor 1995), liberals in the tradition of John Stuart Mill value the idiosyncratic difference of the sexual minority.

The influence of liberalism provides one genealogy of how feminism, instead of dividing homosexuality into a positive feminine version and a negative masculine one, can make common cause with gay rights in the name of freedom of sexual choice. Other important factors in the rapprochement of feminism and queer theory have been the increased visibility of women in gay movements, increased contact between feminist lesbians and gay men, and the academic dialogue between queer and feminist theorists that became possible when queer scholars claimed an academic presence. In the 1980s, scholars objected to the ways that feminists like Rich and Irigaray characterized male homosexuality (Sedgwick 1985, 26; Owens 1987), and in recent years many men doing queer studies give equal weight to feminist research agendas.[5] Parallel lines can sometimes converge. Feminist theory shifted from studying women to studying gender as a set of relations, and lesbian and gay studies analogously moved from tracing historically stable identities based on object choice to defining queerness in relation to sexual norms. Those parallel shifts have created intersections between queer and feminist scholars who now share gender and sexuality as objects of analysis.

The queer turn began as a gambit to reclaim a slur whose lack of

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[4] Henry Abelove offers a more optimistic genealogy when he argues that authors who laid the ground for gay liberation in the United States were influenced by a liberal ideology whose strength derived not from U.S. global domination but from decolonization struggles that challenged Western powers to live up to their liberal principles (2003, 70–88).

[5] Examples include Bagemihl 1999; Goldberg 2001; Nealon 2001; and Lucey 2003.

specificity unified outlaws and outcasts of all stripes.[6] *Queer* has become a compact alternative to *lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender*, but it also emphasizes affinity and solidarity over identity. In this essay I use *queer* to refer to this deliberately loose, inclusive association. Like the postmodern turn in feminism, the adoption of *queer* issued a reminder that complex identifications and differences undermine identity. But despite the fanfare that heralded queer theory as an advance over lesbian and gay studies, usage has not affirmed any firm distinction between *queer* and *lesbian and gay*. While *queer* foregrounds the belief that sexual identity is flexible and unstable, *gay* and *lesbian* do not assert the contrary. *Queer* is more capacious than *lesbian and gay*, but it always includes gays and lesbians and often functions as a metonymy for *lesbian and gay*. And while queerness is supposed to signify the instability of all sexual identities, scholars who define queerness as the lability of sexual identity in general almost always do so with reference to gay identity in particular; there is little extant work on the queerness of those conventionally considered heterosexual.[7]

Despite its political advantages, *queer* has been the victim of its own popularity, proliferating to the point of uselessness as a neologism for the transgression of any norm (queering history, or queering the sonnet). Used in this sense, the term becomes confusing, since it always connotes a homosexuality that may not be at stake when the term is used so broadly. *Queerness* also refers to the multiple ways that sexual practice, sexual fantasy, and sexual identity fail to line up consistently. That definition expresses an important insight about the complexity of sexuality, but it also describes a state experienced by everyone. If everyone is queer, then no one is—and while this is exactly the point queer theorists want to make, reducing the term's pejorative sting by universalizing the meaning of *queer* also depletes its explanatory power. Used to refer to any departure from the norm, the term *queer* obscures why Matthew Shepard, Brandon Teena,

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[6] For a particularly cogent discussion of the shift from *gay and lesbian* to *queer*, see Abelove 2003. Within the gay community today, *queer* has become perfectly anodyne, although not all dictionaries register this shift in usage, and government agencies unsympathetic to gay causes have denied funding to groups that use the word *queer* on the grounds that it is a pejorative term. For gay community organizers, the suggestion that *queer* is an offensive term is perceived as an effort to suppress overt references to homosexuality by deeming them obscene; see, e.g., Meenan 2004.

[7] For example, Leila J. Rupp (1999) asserts a belief in the indeterminacy of all sexual identity but focuses only on same-sex examples of that indeterminacy. Michael DeAngelis (2001) offers an exceptionally sustained study of the mutual influences of straight and gay culture.

and Sakia Gunn were murdered for being queer, while people who excluded gay groups from city parades applauded New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani in drag.

Despite these limitations, one of queer theory's most valuable contributions, and one that establishes an important link to feminist work on sexuality, is to demonstrate how homosexuality and heterosexuality mutually define each other. Two of the most significant works to do this were Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble* (1990) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's *Between Men* (1985), both of which develop their arguments through readings of Gayle Rubin's classic essay "The Traffic in Women" (1975). Rubin's essay made two claims that have been crucial to theorizing sexuality and gender: that patriarchal culture depends on men's exchange of women and that the incest taboo (which generates exogamy, hence exchange) presupposes a prior, unspoken taboo on homosexuality. In *Gender Trouble*, Butler argued that gender is performance in the sense of a copy for which there is no original. Since gender must be continually reproduced, its structure is always vulnerable to mutation and subversion (1990, 30); as Butler puts it in a later work, "the norm has a temporality that opens it to a subversion from within and to a future that cannot be fully anticipated" (2000, 21). Expanding Rubin's insight that the incest taboo assumed a taboo on homosexuality, Butler analyzed definitions of gender that emerge from a "heterosexual matrix" that defines femininity as a desire for men, masculinity as the desire for women (1990, 37–38). The heterosexual matrix of gender also mandates that same-sex identification accompany cross-sex desire. It represses heterosexuality's painful renunciation of homosexuality, which prohibits straight people from mourning the homosexuality they must repudiate (1990, 48–49, 53). Fusing that argument with a reading of Joan Riviere's essay on womanliness as masquerade, Butler reconceived heterosexuality as the melancholic mimicry of a lost but unmourned homosexuality: a heterosexual woman becomes the woman she cannot have, a heterosexual man seeks to embody the man he is barred from desiring. In the process of showing how feminist models of gender continued to depend on heterosexual definitions of identity and desire, Butler rewrote psychoanalytic theory to show the difficulty of maintaining any strict separation between homo- and heterosexuality.

Gender Trouble helped set an agenda for queer studies that included items only now receiving full attention. For example, the book's "Concluding Unscientific Postscript" on Michel Foucault's study of Herculine Barbin presciently argued that there is no clear genetic distinction between male and female sexes, a claim that is developed in recent books by Bruce

Bagemihl and Anne Fausto-Sterling. Bagemihl's *Biological Exuberance* (1999, 37) collates evidence that many animals do not have two distinct genders. Biologist Fausto-Sterling notes in *Sexing the Body* (2000) that although binary gender norms would suggest that intersex births are rare, in fact such births are only rarely *visible*: there are approximately 340 times as many intersex babies born as albino ones (51, 53). Taking her cues from work like Butler's, Fausto-Sterling charts how scientists' assumptions about the forms that gender should take have distorted their accounts of the forms it does take. In *Bodies That Matter*, Butler argued that bodies take shape in response to norms, and that the process of materializing and reproducing norms can also change norms (1993, 64–65, 95). Similarly, Fausto-Sterling defines sexuality as "a somatic fact created by a cultural effect" (2000, 21). If culture can create somatic facts, she asks, can culture also change them?

Butler showed that definitions of gender assume definitions of sexuality; she challenged the power of sex and gender norms by defining norms as vulnerable to subversion and by showing that norms depend on what they exclude, since heterosexuality at its most normative is organized around homosexuality. In an equally influential study that also took Rubin's "The Traffic in Women" as a point of departure, Sedgwick's *Between Men* (1985) redefined male heterosexuality as an exchange of women that forges homosocial bonds between men. In an important counter to earlier feminist work that assimilated the sexual connections between gay men into the social associations of straight men, Sedgwick argued that the boundary between homosocial and homosexual has been a heavily policed site of paranoid, violent contests for power in modern Western culture. For decades, literary analysis of forbidden desire had focused on adultery. *Between Men* revised that tradition by focusing on what should have been obvious but for so long not only went without saying but was treated as unspeakable: what is forbidden to heterosexual desire is first and foremost homosexual desire. Sedgwick redefined heterosexuality as a fear of male homosexuality that motivates men to route their desire for one another through women. In Sedgwick's argument, heterosexuality is not simply about the relations between men and women but also about the relations between men; sexuality defines gender, but sexuality is not reducible to heterosexuality as a simple confrontation of male and female. By arguing that men define women as their binary opposites because so little distinguishes male homosociality from male homosexuality (1985, 118–19), Sedgwick formulated gender difference as a function of the homosocial/homosexual divide. Like Butler, Sedgwick showed that homosexual desire

was not the exclusive property of a minority and that homosexual and heterosexual desire mutually defined each other.

One of the crucial innovations of both *Between Men* and *Gender Trouble* was that they took the encounter between gender and sexuality, previously staged more or less exclusively within feminism, and reoriented it as an encounter between feminism and gay studies. Sedgwick did this by synthesizing feminist theory with scholarship on male homosexuality. Butler confronted feminism with a homosexuality represented primarily by lesbianism, but a lesbianism that included the butch-femme configurations dismissed by earlier thinkers like Rich. Women's studies scholars may be inclined to dismiss queer studies as only about men, but to do so neglects women's foundational work in the field and assumes a polarization between men and women that queer studies itself disproves. Much queer work now focuses on men and women together, and even queer work that concentrates on men draws on feminist insights and models, attesting to feminism's powerful influence beyond women's studies.

Nor is research on men irrelevant to women. One of the most powerful points made by women in the vanguard of sexual politics since the 1980s has been that female and male sexuality are not simply opposed. In a 1985 talk given at the groundbreaking Barnard Conference on Sexuality, Hollibaugh posed questions that in some sense set the agenda for work like Sedgwick's and Butler's: "Who are all the women who don't come gently and don't want to; . . . are the lovers of butch or femme women; who like fucking with men; practice consensual S/M; feel more like faggots than dykes; love dildos, penetration, costumes; . . . think gay male porn is hot?" ([1985] 2000, 96). Nor is it always women who cross over into territory deemed masculine; Hollibaugh notes how feminism changed gay men and allied them more closely with lesbians (2000, 113, 151, 159).[8] Far from representing the displacement of feminism with a version of men's studies, queer studies documents a genuine exchange between men and women that could provide a model for studies of heterosexuality.

Tempting as it might be for feminist scholars to limit their reading in queer studies to work on lesbians, and as much as recent historical scholarship suggests long-standing links between feminist and lesbian political causes, bringing queer theory into women's studies only through work

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[8] It should be noted that Newton, by contrast, highlights the tensions that persist between lesbians and gay men and indeed flare up in mixed lesbian-gay communities like Cherry Grove, Fire Island. Since power in our society depends on proximity to men, lesbians remain invisible. Newton sees the move to queerness as one in which lesbians move closer to gay men but the reverse does not take place (2000, 67, 85).

on lesbians misses the point. Queer studies offers more than a resource
to diversify the study of women by providing information on lesbians as
a distinct group. In her magisterial *An American Obsession* (1999), Jen-
nifer Terry gives substance to the claim that homosexuality in the twen-
tieth-century United States has been the central prohibition defining all
norms, especially gender norms. Those who challenge the conventions
that limit women can learn a great deal from the women *and* men who
challenge sexual norms, even when those men and women are not overtly
feminist. If sexuality is one of the elements making up the sign *woman*,
and if the goal of feminist theory is to challenge what we mean by *woman*,
then queer studies is a crucial tool for feminist theory.[9] By expanding the
range of visible, plausible, and livable sexualities, queer studies expands
the meanings of *woman* and *man*. We can see this at work in the ways
that public discourse about sexual practices in print, in conversation, on
the Internet, and on television has changed in the past two decades.
Thanks in large part to a number of openly lesbian and bisexual women,
women of all tastes can find erotica and sex toys with relative ease. Women
from sexual minorities and straight sex radicals helped create a feminist
ars erotica in which women and men of all sexual orientations have, so
to speak, come together.[10] It is a clear and not so straight line from *Our
Bodies, Ourselves* to *On Our Backs* to *Sex and the City*, as it is from *The
Joy of Sex* to *Sex Tips for Straight Women from a Gay Man* and *Lesbian
Sex Secrets for Men*.

[9] It could be argued that by undermining gender as a stable category, queer theory
undermines feminism, which depends on the concept of women. However, this fear is ground-
less, for two reasons. First, queer theory does not completely abandon the concept of gender,
since homosexuality depends on assigning a gender to oneself and to the people to whom
one is sexually attracted. Queer theory simply refuses the strict limits that heterosexism sets
on the possible configurations of genders, bodies, and desires. Second, since feminism is by
definition invested in changing women's social and political positions, the concept of woman
on which feminism rests is mobile, not static, and thus not at risk from the kinds of plasticity
that queer theory ascribes to gender.

[10] For the ways in which the lesbian-feminist movement, often maligned as asexual, also
constituted an *ars erotica*, see Newton (with Walton), "The Misunderstanding" ([1984]
2000, 174), which details the sexual etiquette developed by lesbian feminists. Although the
sex-positive lesbianism of the 1980s is often understood as an absolute rejection of a repressive
lesbian feminism, hindsight suggests a dialectical relationship between the two in which
lesbian feminism articulated a principle and a method that remained vital for the sexual
culture that displaced it. The principle was the value of women's sexual pleasure, and the
method was organizing to provide communal and consumer support for that pleasure. The
key contradiction of lesbian-feminist ideology was its refusal of anything associated with
masculinity, which conflicted with the principle of sexual pleasure for women, since almost
every aspect of sexual pleasure has nominally been defined as masculine.

Overlap is not equivalence

Much as queer studies and feminist studies owe to each other, and much as queer studies is an important component of gender studies, queer studies is neither equivalent nor analogous to gender studies. Not every question that feminist scholarship needs to investigate can or should be referred to sexuality. Nor do feminist and queer studies face the same challenges today. The significance of *woman* is historically variable, but in English the word itself has been in place for centuries. By contrast, terms for homosexuality rapidly proliferate and disappear, and they often remain confined to codes, slang, and scientific jargon. As a result, gay history confronts different obstacles than women's history does. Nor are the patterns of discrimination the same. Those who most contest women's value, achievements, and rights do not contest that women exist; indeed, they insist all too strenuously on what women must be. By contrast, those who dismiss homosexuality often do so by claiming that no solid evidence proves that there really are, or ever have been, gay people.

Queer studies offers two responses to such erasures. The first is to produce gay history, a response complicated by the privacy, secrecy, shame, and fear that inhibit people from leaving detailed records of their sexual lives. Some gay subcultures thrive on flamboyance and scandal, but in many different regions and classes reticence has been the lifeblood of queer communities. Even more challenging for any history of modern homosexuality is the extent to which sexuality, as Jonathan Goldberg asserts, is experienced as that which is unconscious, unknowable, and cannot be named with any specificity (2001, xi). Historians of more conventional topics can consult official archives or find material in collections of private papers. Those writing queer histories of the past and present often need to construct their own archives through oral history, personal testimony, and participant observation. This method has gained ground in recent queer work. In *Female Masculinity* (1998), Judith Halberstam works her way through a series of published documents and a wealth of film material, but she also compiles a record of contemporary drag king culture using photographs, interviews, and ephemera she collected as a participant observer. In *An Archive of Feelings* (2003), Ann Cvetkovich draws on ethnography and oral history to document lesbian involvement in the New York ACT UP movement. The interviews, dialogues, journal entries, and collaborative pieces included in Newton's and Hollibaugh's anthologies identify other genres that allow queer women to make their lives the stuff of history. Newton explains that "the reasons I write anything . . . are the same as those for any human action: to be found in culture, history, personality and chance" (2000, 4). Newton means that one can use history

and culture to explain why she writes, but her sentence also suggests that she writes in order "to be found" in a history and culture that has excluded her. Through auto-archiving, those hidden from history take history into their own hands.

The project of recovering the past may seem to replace a complex, ineffable sexuality with simplistic empirical evidence. But in her introduction to Hollibaugh's essays, Dorothy Allison articulates the importance of archiving precisely in terms of the unknowable: "The world is changed through story, each of us giving over what we know for what we do not yet know" (2000, xviii). The delicate balance between knowing and not knowing also surfaces in recent queer theories of memory. David Eng, for example, shows how the memories embedded in personal memoirs can counter master narratives (2001, 55). Eng makes this point in relation to Maxine Hong Kingston's *The Woman Warrior*, but it applies equally to the material gathered by Newton, Hollibaugh, and Cvetkovich. Eng argues that recollection displaces what it recollects; in memory and in memoirs, the unconscious attaches censored images to permissible ones, and memory thus allows what has been prohibited to resurface in the preconscious (2001, 56, 78). If history is the scholarly process of assembling a memory of the past, Eng's definition helps us to see how that process can restore what has been suppressed without claiming finality and totality.

Scholars also counter queer erasure by exposing its rhetorical strategies and its irrational assumptions. In his monumental book on sexual diversity in animals (1999), Bagemihl demonstrates how the denial of sexual diversity extends even to the birds and the bees. Scientists steeped in the ideological premise that heterosexual gender is natural have relentlessly denied their own observations of animal behavior or neglected their own protocols for collecting scientific evidence. Bagemihl wittily documents how animals are presumed "heterosexual until proven guilty" (93) when scientists assign gender on the basis of sexual and reproductive behavior, so that animals observed having sex or offspring are assumed to be male or female without any verification of their genitalia (94). Observers define heterosexuality broadly and homosexuality narrowly. Any affectionate behavior between male and female animals suffices to identify their relationship as sexual, but genital sex, as difficult to observe directly among animals as it is among humans, is the only evidence considered sufficient for identifying same-sex animal pairs (107, 117, 160). Even when sex between animals with the same genitalia seems undeniable—for example, a bonobo monkey inserting her erect clitoris in another's vagina—scientists

dismiss animal homosexuality by labeling it a mistaken or pathological imitation of heterosexuality (89, 123).

Bagemihl has a clear agenda: he wants to prove that homosexuality occurs in nature and therefore cannot simply be dismissed as a cultural deformation or biological error. To this end he provides examples that conform to a familiar rhetoric of gay rights. Every kind of sex is natural, if animals are the measure of nature. *Biological Exuberance* provides copious evidence of animals having homosexual sex, group sex, anal sex, oral sex, clitoral sex, and masturbating with digits and with tools (1999, 19). The only sexual attitude unique to humans, Bagemihl underscores, is homophobia (54). Bagemihl cautions against anthropomorphizing animals by showing how erroneous ideas about human sexuality have been mistakenly applied to animals, and his book incites useful skepticism about how scientists have defined nature. At the same time, Bagemihl draws provocative connections between animals and humans. Animals, like humans, have social behaviors about sex that vary from species to species, and animal homosexuality, sexual plasticity, and nonreproductive sex all have roles to play in human evolution (45, 64, 69). Homosexuality is everywhere in the animal kingdom, including in more than sixty species of mammals and birds (47), and Bagemihl amasses evidence scattered in hundreds of scientific articles to compile a fuller picture of animal sexual behavior. We learn that among some birds female pairs raise offspring together, receiving sperm from male birds who have no other involvement in child rearing (23), and that species such as musk oxen, white-tailed deer, cheetahs, and red squirrels form same-sex pairs but never opposite-sex ones. Among black swans only males form long-term same-sex couples and raise offspring, while among sage grouse, only females engage in homosexual group sex (30). Animals also engage in temporary imitations of cross-gender behavior, loosely analogous to human transvestism though not necessarily to homosexuality. For example, homosexual mounting is common among male bighorn sheep, but females do not allow themselves to be mounted except during estrus, so that male sheep who imitate female sheep avoid being mounted by other males (39).

Queer models
In the process of developing a more refined vocabulary for sexual diversity in animals, Bagemihl also provides readers with a more complex framework for understanding sexual behavior in humans—just one of many reasons his book should be required reading in sexuality courses. Most human

beings are not exclusively straight or gay; nor does bisexuality, which connotes an even split between two orientations, adequately describe most people's experience. The famous Kinsey scale offers a slightly more nuanced approach by placing homosexuality and heterosexuality on a continuum, but its terms fail to capture the nuances of lived sexuality. In *Sexing the Body* (2000) Fausto-Sterling cites a multidimensional model that graphs sexual attraction, behavior, fantasies, emotional preference, social preference, self-identification, and lifestyle on a temporal scale. In a similar move, Bagemihl's focus on animals in *Biological Exuberance* frees him to develop a terminology that usefully distinguishes components of sexuality that most human labels collapse. *Courtship* is his term for stylized behaviors prior to mating. *Affection* comprises forms of touch such as grooming, caressing, or play fighting that Bagemihl considers sexual if they lead to arousal or take place within a pair bond. He defines *sex* as genital contact and stimulation. When sex is present in pair bonding, the pair consists of *partners*, while Bagemihl uses the term *companions* to describe pair bonds without sex. Another distinct sexual behavior is parenting, which among animals often takes place between companions rather than between partners.

Biological Exuberance challenges ideas about nature in its massive presentation of the many ways that animal sexuality departs from our sex and kinship norms, and its distinctions among sex, pair bonding, and parenting are suggestive for humans as well, allowing better definition of what already exists and of what could come into being. To place greater empirical accuracy in the service of utopian change is not unique to queer theory; this strategy has also been characteristic of feminist discourse about sex, often in the form of confrontations between lesbians and straight women. Bagemihl's new vocabulary has precursors in Rubin's "Thinking Sex" (1984) and in Esther Newton and Shirley Walton's 1984 essay "The Misunderstanding," which proposed a new sexual vocabulary that distinguished sexual preference, erotic persona, erotic role, and erotic acts ([1984] 2000, 171).

Stephen O. Murray's *Homosexualities* (2000) synthesizes scholarship on diverse cultures and historical periods in order to generate a new taxonomy of types of homosexuality that span place and time. *Juvenile homosexuality* describes activities permitted, even encouraged, until adulthood. *Age-structured homosexuality* legitimates cross-generational same-sex contact but forbids any other kind. *Transgendered homosexuality* describes situations in which both partners are the same sex but only one maintains that sex's gender assignment; for example, the man who penetrates is a man, but the man penetrated by a man is a woman. In *egal-*

did indeed define queerness in opposition to the holy trinity of heterosexuality, biological reproduction, and the nuclear family. As Carolyn Dean has shown, French discourse between the world wars dismissed homosexuality as sterile (2000, 12–13). Hollibaugh recalls the fight against the California Briggs initiative that defined homosexuals as the ultimate threat to families and children (2000, 63). Newton writes in her book on Cherry Grove that gays are "outside the realm of kinship" and thus perpetually defined as children (1993, 290). Terry shows how popular social theories identified homosexuals as threats to the family and defined good parenting as the prevention of homosexuality in children (1999, 24, 61, 215). Scholars in other fields have extended Weston's observation that gay people have found ways to affiliate and reproduce themselves outside of biological reproduction, whether through queer mimesis (Moon 1998) or historical feeling (Nealon 2001).

In the epilogue to her 1991 book, Weston noted that a queer baby boom, then most notable among lesbians and now also visible among gay men, was beginning to break down the orthodoxy of nonprocreative homosexuality (193). The increasing profile of queer families and the quickening pace of debates about gay marriage are abrading what was once a stark distinction between straights ensconced in families and queers exiled from them. Reinventing the family rather than replacing it has become a prevalent way of theorizing queerness, a task that links lesbians and gays to straight men and women reinventing kinship (Hollibaugh 2000, 136). In the legal realm, the connection between feminist claims for reproductive rights and queer battles for sexual rights materialized when the Supreme Court declared sodomy laws unconstitutional by citing both *Roe v. Wade* and an amicus curiae brief on sodomy laws filed by historians of sexuality.

New theoretical work continues to develop the consequences of decoupling family, kinship, and sex from heterosexual intercourse. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has displaced queerness as the disruption of the nuclear family with her concept of "originary queerness" (2003, 32, 33). In *Antigone's Claim*, Butler proposes that nonsocial or presocial kinship, though marked as outside the law, bears "the trace of an alternate legality" (2000, 40). In *The Misfit of the Family: Balzac and the Social Forms of Sexuality* (2003), Michael Lucey uses the "alternative families" spawned by Napoleon's Civil Code to go beyond queerness as an outlaw sexual identity. Instead, Lucey proposes that same-sex relations, like other forms of sexuality, result from struggles between interests that become particularly acute at times of economic, social, and legislative upheaval. Sexuality, for example, can be "a ruse of inheritance structures" (150) rather than an expression of desire. In a legal code that does not depend on natural

law but is responsive to political action, even families not explicitly en-
visaged by that code can scrabble for a place within it. Instead of con-
struing homosexuality and heterosexuality as opposed identities, Lucey
subsumes both within a model of sexuality as "a set of social forms, of
institutions, differentially distributed across a social field, subject to mod-
ifications both by external social forces and by the cumulative effect of
individual actions" (xxx).

Social theorists and historians of modernity have charted how capitalism
relegates feeling to the private sphere of family life and assigns affective
labor to women, particularly mothers. Some of the most recent work in
queer theory argues, however, that affect bridges the private and public.
Pride, hate, shame, love, anger, desire, trauma, loss, and melancholy are
crucial terms for a host of queer critics.[11] In *An Archive of Feelings* (2003,
7, 17) Cvetkovich makes a thorough case for the ways that affect, far from
shrouding its subjects in isolation and privacy, can become the basis for
creating new and very public cultures. Arguing that the resolution of
trauma does not have to be a return to normalcy, Cvetkovich explores
how sexual abuse and AIDS have been platforms for creating new sexual
cultures (121–22).

In the course of making arguments about sexuality and affect, queer
theorists must negotiate with psychoanalysis. Yet another family resem-
blance among feminists and queer theorists is a complicated relationship
to the work of Sigmund Freud and Lacan. One thinker's good Freud
(femininity as social construction, homosexuality as normal) is challenged
by another's bad Freud (femininity as passivity, homosexuality as primi-
tive).[12] Some theorists turn to psychoanalysis to understand how homo-
sexuality, like heterosexuality, is structured around sexual difference and
castration (de Lauretis 1994), while others define queerness as the refusal
of castration anxiety (Lucey 1995, 47). The queer proposition that iden-
tification is a form of desire emerges from a critical reading of Freud's
notorious opposition between them (Fuss 1995, 11–12). Where some
use psychoanalysis to understand how dominant ideology gets reproduced
(Mitchell 1974), others argue that psychoanalysis explains how desire and
the unconscious disrupt dominant ideology (Eng 2001, 77). As a theory
of gender, desire, and subjectivity, psychoanalysis has appealed to some
queer theorists even as others have refused the heterosexual presumptions

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[11] See Berlant 1997; Dinshaw 1999; Eng 2001, Love 2001; Nealon 2001; Sedgwick and
Frank 2003

[12] For bad Freud, see Terry 1999 and Eng 2001 For good Freud, see Abelove 2003,
1–20.

embedded in concepts such as castration, sexual difference, and the Oedipus complex. For example, Lucey explains that he turned away from psychoanalytic readings of Honoré de Balzac that focused on timeless, individual psychic structures in order to pursue sociological readings that explore the effects of legal and economic change on kinship structures (2003, xv). But Lucey is careful to note that only certain psychoanalytic readings occlude history (xv), and his qualification reminds us that psychoanalysis is not going away. Psychoanalysis lives on in what we might call our cultural and scholarly unconscious. Even as we reject Freud, we continue to talk about anxiety, projection, displacement, symptoms, trauma, Freudian slips, and the unconscious, and psychoanalysis has a new lease on life in the hands of the feminist and antihomophobic theorists reinventing it as a theory of change.

As sexuality has come to be defined more broadly as a vector of social reproduction that includes kinship and affect, it has also been analyzed as a ubiquitous component of racial definition. Eng, Somerville, Terry, and Lisa Duggan are among those who have recently demonstrated how fully U.S. ideologies have intertwined sexuality, gender, and race since the late nineteenth century. Somerville and Eng also explore how the African Americans and Asian Americans targeted by anthropology and sexology used literature to disrupt the racial and sexual differences imposed on them. The several authors cited trace how late nineteenth-century thinkers intent on classifying and evaluating races and sexual types produced analogies between homosexuality and primitivism. Eng focuses on Freud (Eng 2001, 13), Terry and Somerville on sexologists and early anthropologists (Terry 1999, 33, 36; Somerville 2000, 37), and Duggan argues that the white national imagination perceived both the white lesbian and the black man as threats to white domesticity (2000, 27). Moving from Alice Mitchell's trial for murdering her female lover to a wider study of Memphis in the 1890s, Duggan links the fear of lesbians registered by that trial's sensationalist press coverage to the fear of African American men's sexuality that led white people to form lynch mobs.

Convincing as all these arguments are, several of them conflate analogy with equivalence in ways that make the exact relationship between sexuality and race difficult to understand. Somerville shows that race and homosexuality were both effects of hierarchical classification and a politics of body surveillance. Both homosexuals and blacks were marked as abnormal and unnatural, but being stigmatized in similar ways does not demonstrate, as the book's jacket copy claims, "that race has historically been central to the cultural production of homosexuality" (2000, back cover). Somerville proves that classification was central to discourses of sexology and

race, but the fact that similar terms and methods were used to describe race and homosexuality does not prove that one concept produced the other or that all classifications are also racializations. Similarly, Terry argues for an analogy between homosexuality and primitivism, but while analogies are reversible, Terry mostly demonstrates that sexologists called homosexuals primitive, not that anthropologists ever called primitives homosexual (1999, 33, 36, 97). Like Somerville, Terry takes anthropological references to *hypersexuality* as allusions to *homosexuality* (33, 36), but there is no direct evidence that the first implied the second. These are not mere quibbles; in proving the interdependence of sexuality and race, these books alert us to the importance of understanding their relationship as precisely as possible, exactly because they demonstrate beyond a doubt their more general claim that the scientific, educational, and judicial establishment of the United States conflated inversion with racial primitivism.

Queer modernity

Recent scholarship on race and sexuality shows that both concepts emerged as effects of modernity's epistemological commitment to classification. Modernity is as difficult to date in the history of sexuality as in any other field (see Dinshaw 1999), and there is no consensus about how to periodize queer history. While some argue that Oscar Wilde's 1895 trial was pivotal for the emergence of lesbian and gay identity, others insist that gay and lesbian cultures flourished well before the rise of sexology or the publicity of scandal. Laura Doan, in her excellent book *Fashioning Sappbism*, shows that Radclyffe Hall's 1929 trial brought lesbianism into the public sphere but also points out that earlier ignorance about lesbianism allowed relationships to flourish that would wilt under later policing (2001, xv, 124). Nor is there agreement about the exact timing of the homo/hetero opposition, although most agree it was well in place by the middle of the twentieth century. Jonathan Ned Katz asserts that intimate male friendships were more common in the nineteenth century because homosexuality and heterosexuality did not yet exist as concepts (1995, 2001, x, 17–18). Alice Domurat Dreger (1998), by contrast, shows that by the mid-nineteenth century doctors were using heterosexuality as a standard for assigning gender to hermaphrodites.

Recent work also complicates our understanding of how homo/hetero divisions relate to gender crossing. By equating homosexuality and gender inversion, sexology converted homosexuality into heterosexuality: the man who desired another man was really a woman. In alerting us to the relatively late appearance of a homosexual role for British women, Doan also

contends that sexology had a limited impact on popular culture. *Fashioning Sapphism* offers convincing evidence that in the 1920s women in masculine clothing were not perceived as lesbians—or even as masculine; instead, trousers and the right short haircut were the ultimate in modern, youthful, feminine chic (2001, 102, 107, 110, 113). What now looks like gender inversion and has therefore been interpreted as lesbian style was in fact a new type of femininity that signified trendiness, not deviance. Halberstam (1998) offers a similar caveat against collapsing gender and sexuality when she argues against reading all instances of female masculinity as lesbianism.

Claims about the recent invention of heterosexuality suggest that for most of the nineteenth century heterosexuality was too absolute to be perceived as a category distinct from other types of sexuality. It follows that before heterosexuality and homosexuality came into focus, marriage, family, gender, desire, and sex were not explicitly defined in ways that excluded same-sex relations. Indeed, a rigid two-gender system may have fostered same-sex intimacy and conferred immunity on same-sex partnerships by viewing them as anodyne variations on heterosexual ones. This is in some sense what Carroll Smith-Rosenberg claimed in "The Female World of Love and Ritual" (1975), published in the inaugural issue of *Signs*. Smith-Rosenberg argued that separate male and female spheres encouraged women who were emotionally distant from men to have passionate relationships with one another and that such relationships were never perceived as deviant, by which she meant in part that they were never perceived as sexual. Yet any return to that claim needs to contend with the evidence amassed since then. Such friendships also existed among men (Katz 2001), and people in all classes knew about homosexuality as a practice if not as a concept and often considered its practitioners unnatural and perverse (Marcus 2002). While some people who engaged in homosex suffered no negative consequences, others were censured, exiled, arrested, and imprisoned. The new theory that could account for all we now know has yet to be produced; the weight of new data has smashed earlier paradigms, and new ones have yet to emerge from the rubble.

Yet amid the welter of data one consensus has emerged: defining homosexuality as we now do—as sameness of sex, rather than in terms of age or gender difference—is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Doan's *Fashioning Sapphism* (2001) equates lesbianism with both modernity and modernism, Terry's *An American Obsession* calls the lesbian one of the "bad seeds of modernity" (1999, 97), and Newton writes that lesbians and gays are "at the leading edge of modernism" (2000, 240). Like gays

and lesbians, modernity and modernism are everywhere, and their meanings proliferate accordingly. Epistemological modernity produces scientific positivism and classification (Terry 1999), which enabled queer social scientists like Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead to replace cultural hierarchy with cultural relativism (Banner 2003). Economic modernity yields consumer capitalism, which subjects gender to relentless innovations (Doan); political modernity is equated with liberalism and its contradictions (Terry, Newton); and aesthetic modernism celebrates difference, subversion, and innovation (Newton, Terry, and Doan).

As an epistemology, modernity values evidence and investigation, equates facts with nature, and grounds knowledge in the body. As both a concept of nature and a protocol for observing nature, modern science esteems restraint and control. Nature, the body, and the scientific method become synonyms for mapping reality's limits and disciplining the imagination, as Thomas Laqueur argues in his painstaking study of how modern science apprehended the sexual practice of masturbation (2003, 280–82). Yet even as modern positivism understands experiments as mustering empirical evidence to curb imaginative hypotheses, the scientific method also strives to master and hence overcome nature, to exceed the limits of the known. It is in this sense that Doan writes that modernity has always been "a space for experimentation" (2001, 194), sexual as well as scientific. By ceaselessly shifting nature's familiar borders, scientific modernity contributes to a historical process in which sexualities once branded deviant, such as nonprocreative heterosexuality, are now widely accepted as a new norm (see Rupp 1999, 40; Newton 2000, 210; Laqueur 2003, 22, 51, 358).

Just as an epistemological commitment to experiment exerts pressure on definitions of nature, economic modernity has undermined the family units often defined as natural and in the process has created mobile, autonomous individuals defined by consumer and sexual desires. As John D'Emilio argued in "Capitalism and Gay Identity" (1993), capitalism diminished the importance of the heterosexual family and freed individuals to form gay communities in cities. Subsequent studies have confirmed the close connection between urbanization and gay culture.[13] Nor are capitalism's effects confined to cities; as Newton shows in her book on the Fire Island resort town Cherry Grove, the limited egalitarianism built into the consumer economy also benefited gay people with money to spend

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[13] See Howard 2000 for a study of how gay culture has also thrived far from urban centers

outside urban centers (1993, 143).[14] From economies of scarcity that imagined nature as constraint we have moved to economies of abundance that promote the indulgence of unlimited desire (see Bagemihl 1999, 215, 252, 255; Terry 1999, 119; Laqueur 2003). Consumer culture has fostered gay life (Newton 1993, 143; DeAngelis 2001, 122, 127) just as modernity's fantasy of a liberated female consumer has its counterpart in new demands for women's autonomous sexual pleasure (Terry 1999, 135; Newton 2000, 180–82; Laqueur 2003, 82). But as Foucault ([1976] 1980) reminds us, incitements to pleasure install new modes of discipline; as Butler (2002) warns, to replace old norms with new ones reinforces the formal distinction between the normal and the deviant; and as Laqueur (2003) argues, celebrations of limitless pleasure lead to more urgent demands for self-control. Those whom religion targets as bearers of sinful desires come to typify a new freedom from natural limits. Queers thus easily symbolize modern tendencies toward hedonism, secrecy, and excessive individuality, and the very pervasiveness of these tendencies fosters a drive to contain them by imagining them to be the unique properties of a few fringe groups (see Terry 1999, 9–10; Dean 2000, 141, 157; Laqueur 2003, 210).

Politically, modernity is a double-edged sword. Modernity's epistemological proclivity for classification inscribes sexual and racial hierarchies onto laws, policies, and movements (Eng 2001, 9). The democracy associated with modernity undoes hierarchies, but modern panic about the erosion of old differences leads to the invention of new ones. In the twentieth century homosexuality has often both embodied democratization and registered the point at which tensions within democracy boil over (Terry 1999, 21, 27–29; Dean 2000, 35). As Terry argues, U.S. liberalism associates democracy with diversity, progress, equality, and self-restraint—and with a decadent freedom in need of regulation (1999, 9–10). The sanctity liberalism accords the private sphere can protect homosexuality, but the emphasis on private rights can also relegate gays and lesbians to silence and invisibility and exclude those deemed sexually deviant from public space, political participation, and the social body (Newton 1993, 238; Dean 2000).

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[14] Newton (2000, 36) contrasts two currents in Western gay history: an anti-Puritan theatricality that thrives in the underworld, demimonde, and aristocracy, and an egalitarian, democratic queerness characteristic of bourgeois liberalism. It may be more helpful, however, to view both theatricality and egalitarianism as offshoots of modern capitalism. Capitalism thrives on promoting individual whimsy and uniqueness, but its profit-making imperative demands extending the privilege of self-definition to as many people as possible, on terms as homogeneous as possible.

Conclusion

The books under review represent only a fraction of extant scholarship on sexuality, but even this limited selection conveys how much we have learned and how much more research there still is to do. What directions do these books suggest for the immediate future?

We now have a critical mass of scholarship on homosexuality based on legal and criminal records, medical writing, popular journalism, and novels. Those sources best illustrate how lesbians and gay men negotiate with institutions and individuals more or less hostile, neutral, or external to them. We also have a smaller body of research that draws on sources shaped by a presumption of shared location within a sexual culture: participant observation, oral history, letters exchanged among lovers and queer allies, and documents crafted for a specific rather than a general public. The two kinds of sources have generated very different histories of sexuality. The United States in the 1950s is a period of repression for Terry (1999), who focuses on law, science, and mainstream journalism; of ambiguity for Michael DeAngelis (2001), who explores popular teen culture; and of transition for Newton (1993), who interviews residents of a long-standing gay community. The time is ripe for a queer history that synthesizes extant scholarship and draws on the fullest possible range of sources.

Outside the realm of queer theory, very little current scholarship takes seriously the claims that sexual orientations defined as different actually have much in common, or that the sexualities we consider normal and think we know best are consequently those we understand the least. Most work on sexuality continues to focus on those who deviate from the male heterosexual norm—queers, women, and masturbators—and on masculinist society's anxious, phobic responses to deviance. Straight men in queer theory are straw men, with the ironic result that male heterosexuality maintains its status as universal, normal, homogeneous, predictable, and hence immune from investigation. There could be no more powerful extension of queer theory than detailed research into straight men's desires, fantasies, attractions, and gender identifications—research unafraid to probe the differences between sexual ideology and sexual practices.

To apply the lessons of queer studies to many kinds of sexuality and to ask what different sexual orientations have in common both require a more broadly based readership for queer studies. I began with call numbers; let me end with blurbs. Laqueur's *Solitary Sex* (2003) has been designated HQ447—"masturbation." Like its call number, the book lies between homosexuality and feminism and forms a bridge between them. Although at times Laqueur treats masturbation as yet another discrete

sexuality, the book's bibliography works against that approach. Laqueur's scrupulous attention to feminist and queer scholarship makes *Solitary Sex* a truly comprehensive study of modern sexuality's relation to religion, politics, economics, and science. Perhaps because of its proximity to homosexuality, *Solitary Sex* has been subjected to some of the censorship and trivialization suffered by many works in queer studies. But its blurbs give it an intellectual credit extended to few works in queer studies, not least because both emphasize that although Laqueur's book has sex in the title, it is about more than sex. Psychoanalyst Adam Phillips underscores that Laqueur shows that "the history of masturbation has . . . much to tell us about the history of freedom and individualism" (Laqueur 2003, dust jacket). Stephen Greenblatt writes, "This book tells a remarkable story, at once ghastly and risible, about the professional fashioning of a universal human practice into a dread disease. . . . Laqueur's scholarly courage—for it took courage to write this book—has reaped ample rewards" (Laqueur 2003, dust jacket). As a scholar of Shakespeare sensitive to the ways that cultures split into high and low, sacred and profane, Greenblatt understands the courage required to write about a subject that, he reminds us, still triggers anxiety and embarrassment even in sophisticated readers.

Laqueur deserves these astute words of praise, which recognize that his book is not simply about sexuality and that he took risks by writing it. It is encouraging that he was able to find scholars who do not specialize in sexuality per se to recognize and endorse his achievement. It is also striking to compare the jacket copy of *Solitary Sex* to the back matter of most queer studies books. Almost no blurbs for queer studies books mention their authors' courage, although Greenblatt's point about braving an uncomfortable topic applies equally well to those who work on homosexuality.[16] Laqueur's blurbs are also by thinkers as different from him as they are from each other. By contrast, the four blurbs gracing Terry's *An American Obsession* (1999) are all by scholars in queer and feminist studies (rather than in American studies most broadly defined), while the quartet commenting on Duggan's *Sapphic Slashers* (2000) are all known for work in lesbian and gay theory and history.

Editorial and bibliographic conventions may continue to create subtle distinctions within queer studies, feminist theory, and the history of sexuality, but it is clear that scholars who want to understand modernity must

[16] Those who doubt that any academic today could find queer studies disconcerting can test that disbelief against a recent report on the career paths of PhDs with dissertations on queer history (Stein 2001).

study gender and sexuality in all their manifestations. The day is soon at hand when the Library of Congress will rethink its classifications, when all forms of sexuality will be considered important subjects of general knowledge, and when the connections between queer theory and feminism will seem too obvious to require explanation.

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Book Reviews

Homosexuality in Early Modern France: A Documentary Collection. By Jeffrey Merrick and Bryant T. Ragan Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Queering the Middle Ages. Edited by Glenn Burger and Steven F. Kruger. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

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The two books under review belong to different disciplines, address different historical periods, and use different theoretical and methodological approaches. Yet together and separately they make an important contribution to our (still too limited) knowledge of same-sex behavior and representations in premodern Europe.

Jeffrey Merrick and Bryant T. Ragan Jr.'s book is a sample of primary French sources that discuss same-sex behavior and representations in the early modern period (1533–1795) and is a companion volume to their important collection of articles on homosexuality in modern France.[1] As a collection of sources it circumvents theory and lets the documents speak for themselves. The authors' choice of documents and the variety of approaches they present challenge existing preconceptions in the growing field of gay and lesbian history—and should force scholars in the field to rethink some of their major assumptions.

The collection is divided into four parts. The first part, "Traditions," gathers references to same-sex behavior from theological, legal, and medical discourses. The second section, "Repressions," presents a rich sample from police archives of arrests and executions of homosexuals. The third part, "Representations," presents a few of the many pornographic writings on same-sex behavior (much of it deals with lesbianism) and documents

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[1] Jeffrey Merrick and Bryant T. Ragan Jr., eds., *Homosexuality in Modern France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

the intolerant approach of the French Enlightenment's philosophes to-
ward homosexual behavior. The final section, "Revolution," demonstrates
the continuity of homophobic attitudes during the years following the
French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Sodomy
was decriminalized in 1791, but effeminate homosexuals and active tri-
bades continued to represent a danger to the health of the nation, and
the alleged indulgence of Queen Marie Antoinette in same-sex relations
marked her aristocratic corruption and moral bankruptcy.

    While the authors present themselves humbly as merely providing em-
pirical evidence about same-sex relations in early modern France, their
selection forces us to rethink the major questions about identities and
desire that are at the center of current debates in the history of sexuality
and queer theory. Thus, for example, Merrick and Ragan point out that
while men who were engaged in sexual activities with other men in fif-
teenth-century Florence did so "without having any sense that they con-
stituted a different category of people" (xi), some people in eighteenth-
century Paris and London clearly defined themselves and were defined
according to their exclusive sexual interest in people of their own sex.[2]
Homosexuality in Early Modern France enables us to trace this transition.
Not less important, the collection makes it clear that early modern Parisian
men and women who were engaged in same-sex activities were identified
as different due to a sexual inclination. While they were not homosexuals
or lesbians in the modern psychopathological medical understanding of
these terms, they clearly had a subjectivity that incorporated much more
than just sexual acts.[3] One of the most important contributions of Merrick
and Ragan's collection is the overwhelming presence of desire in the texts
they consider. Love and desire have been excluded from much recent
homosexual and lesbian history, which emphasizes acts rather than sub-
jectivity. Merrick and Ragan resurrect Henriette de Castelnau, countess
de Murat (1670–1716), whose love of and affection for her female lovers
led to her house arrest in a remote castle. *Love*, *propensity*, *taste*, *incli-
nation*, and *character* are just a few of the many terms that appear time
and again in the documents, and these indicate that more than just sexual
acts were taking place among French men and women who engaged in

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    [2] See Michael Rocke, *Forbidden Friendships. Homosexuality and Male Culture in Re-
naissance Florence* (New York· Oxford University Press, 1996); Randolph Trumbach, *Sex
and the Gender Revolution*, vol. 1, *Heterosexuality and the Third Gender in Enlightenment
London* (Chicago· University of Chicago Press, 1998).
    [3] See also David Halperin, "Forgetting Foucault. Acts, Identities, and the History of
Sexuality," *Representations* 63 (1998):93–120.

same-sex activities. Finally, while the collection includes more sources that document the lives of homosexual men, the authors collected many documents about the lives and representations of early modern French lesbians, adding to the timely death of the myth of lesbian immunity and invisibility in premodern times.

If Merrick and Ragan are too modest in their self-presentations, the editors of the second collection under review, Glenn Burger and Steven F. Kruger, present their collection as no less than a disturbance of normative sexuality and of temporality itself, an interruption of the teleological bias of historical thinking, as a deconstruction and destabilization of the medieval as we have come to know it. They do it by means of sophisticated and clever queer readings of a few canonical medieval texts and images.

Susan Schibanoff offers a fascinating reading of Alan of Lille and Jean de Meun's failed attempts to condemn sodomy as unnatural and ungrammatical. In his chapter, "The Sodomitic Moor," Gregory S. Hutcheson follows the development of the figure of the sodomitic Moor and the sexual otherness of the ethnically other. His careful reading demonstrates that prior to the fourteenth century the Moor was often presented as "the long arm of divine law" (103) and justice, as a paradigm of virtue compared to the sinful and sodomitic Iberian Christians. "There is little 'orientalism' in medieval Spain's posturing toward the Moors," he states (104), and he then goes on to explain the political context that led, in the period 1330–80, to the creation of the sodomitic Moor. Equally impressive is Claire Sponsler's discussion of the tension between sodomy and male friendship in the court of Edward II of England.

Other essays in the collection are less convincing. In the only article in the collection that addresses women and female desire (!), Marilynn Desmond and Pamela Sheingorn analyze images of bestiality and desire in one manuscript of Christine de Pizan's *Epistre Othea* (produced during Christine's lifetime and presented by her to Queen Isabeau of France).[4] The authors argue, convincingly, that unlike previous representations of mythological female figures in Ovidian and vernacular Ovidian texts, the miniatures in this manuscript present desiring women, whose acts eroticize their agency and construct them as subjects of their desire. It is less clear how this manuscript, which was produced by a woman to be presented to a woman, directs the implied male reader or viewer to look differently and to challenge heteronormative constructions of female desire, nor is it clear that Queen Isabeau and her contemporaries constructed or deconstructed

[4] British Library MS Harley 4431.

the images the same way twenty-first century readers or viewers do. Equally frustrating in its narrow scope is Michael Camille's reading of one miniature in one commentary on Dante's *Inferno*.[5] Camille argues that the miniature reveals the complex relations between Dante and his teacher Brunetto Latini. While previous readings of the *Inferno* emphasized Dante's condemnation of his teacher for the latter's homosexuality, the miniature shows Dante's ambivalence regarding sodomy, while Brunetto's pose in the miniature presents him as the first "queen" and queer, whose gesture is evocative of his urge toward self-statuary and whose identity is nothing but performative. Like Desmond and Sheingorn, Camille does not address the manuscript's representativeness. Garrett P. J. Epp's discussion of Christ's nakedness and its erotic potential adds very little to Leo Steinberg's and Richard Trexler's previous discussions of this issue, and it ignores Caroline Bynum's warning not to project our own obsession with sexuality onto medieval spirituality. Steven F. Kruger's discussion of HIV/AIDS and what he calls "the Temporality of Crisis," namely, modernity's own struggle with its self-constitution, adds nothing to previous discussions of images of disease and plague as medieval, and like Kathleen Biddick's discussion of the Middle Ages in Amitav Gosh's study *In an Antique Land*, it belongs more in a collection on postcolonialism and medieval studies than in this one.[6]

In her contribution to *Queering the Middle Ages*, Karma Lochrie asks us to investigate the queerness of heteronormativity itself and to ask whether heteronormativity existed in the Middle Ages. She points out the instability of sexual categories and the epistemological naturalness of perversion, and she reminds us that "the Middle Ages had a much more broad, diverse, and pluralized notion of sexual activity than we do" (92). It is a pity that many of the authors in this collection too often ignore this otherness ("queerness," if you like) of the Middle Ages.   ⊪

[5] Chantilly, Musée Condé MS 1424, fols. 113v and 114r.
[6] See the recent *The Postcolonial Middle Ages*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (New York: St Martin's, 2000)

Gay Cuban Nation. By Emilio Bejel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Pink, Purple, Green: Women's, Religious, Environmental, and Gay/Lesbian Movements in Central Europe Today. Edited by Helena Flam. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2001.

James N. Green, Brown University

Most works on the lesbian and gay movement have focused on the northern Atlantic countries. These wealthy, industrialized, advanced capitalist nations with solid middle classes, modern urban centers, and relatively strong democratic traditions have offered the economic possibilities and the social spaces for the formation of lesbian and gay enclaves—bars, saunas, clubs, public parks, and cultural milieus—in which semipublic homosexual networks have flourished in the post–World War II period, if not before. In the aftermath of the profound youth and student political protests and cultural transformations that shook Western Europe, the United States, and places beyond in the 1960s (which in turn were part and parcel of broader worldwide revolutionary upheavals during the same time period), civil rights, feminist, and gay and lesbian movements emerged to challenge hegemonic racial and gender hierarchies and the marginal social position of those who experienced same-sex sexual desires.

In recent years a few scholars have focused their gaze away from northern Europe and the United States to examine the development of politicized movements of lesbians, gay men, and transgendered people in other parts of the world. Barry Adam, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and André Krouwel's edited anthology, *The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics: National Imprints of a Worldwide Movement*, and Peter Drucker's edited collection, *Different Rainbow: Same-Sex Sexuality and Popular Struggles in the Third World*, are two important works that present case studies with the intention of offering broader global analyses of the dynamics of this international social movement.[1] While many authors can point to the U.S.-based influences on the lesbian and gay movements in given countries within the context of a U.S.-driven globalization process, there remains

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[1] Barry Adam, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and André Krouwel, eds., *The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics: National Imprints of a Worldwide Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), and Peter Drucker, *Different Rainbow: Same-Sex Sexuality and Popular Struggles in the Third World* (London: Gay Men's Press, 2000).

a significant void of in-depth studies of national processes that examine network and community formation, sexual cultures, and their interaction with local political contexts. In that regard, Emilio Bejel's *Gay Cuban Nation* and Helena Flam's *Pink, Purple, Green* make an important contribution to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the complexities of national realities and their relationship to the construction of politicized lesbian and gay identities and the formation of social movements in countries that have been outside the capitalist fold. Neither work focuses exclusively on lesbian and gay sites of political resistance and social movement formation. However, the two volumes taken as a whole offer an intriguing look at the challenges of forging political articulations in the aftermath of socialist regimes, in the case of Eastern Europe, and in the midst of a society clinging to a socialist dream, in the case of Cuba.

In *Gay Cuban Nation*, Bejel frames his examination of homosexuality in the context of the construction of a national identity. Cuba was the last Spanish colony in the so-called New World to cast off formal colonial domination on the eve of the twentieth century, and Bejel argues that Cuban nationalist sentiments have been closely interwoven with homophobic discourses since the late nineteenth century. Beginning with the literary work of José Martí, the founding father of Cuban nationalism, Bejel points to his rejection of effeminate men and manly women as disruptive of the ideal family (the metaphor for the nation), in which women are expected to conform to appropriate feminine behavior and possess muted passions except for those of maternity and a devotion to the nation. For Martí, gender transgressions, among them homosexuality, represented a modernity that disrupted national sentiments.

While Martí feared endogenous masculine effeminacy and feminine masculinity as behaviors that contaminated the national body, contemporaneous Cuban social scientists influenced by social hygienic theories feared the foreign homosexual embodied in the Spanish enemy as a threat to Cuba's health. Dr. Benjamín de Céspedes's 1888 study of prostitution in the city of Havana offered an examination of an emergent urban homosexual subculture and pointed to young Spanish clerks as the conveyors of contagious same-sex sexual practices to the island. According to Bejel, anxiety about the external and the internal sexual transgressors combined to solidify a notion of nationhood that sought to purge the homosexual from any legitimate place within the family/nation. The two chapters on Martí and de Céspedes suggest the possibilities of further research to construct a more comprehensive social history of homosexuality in early twentieth-century Cuba. The reader is left wanting to know much more about the attitudes of Martí and other early Cuban nationalists regarding

same-sex sexual transgressions, as well as more details of the contours of the networks, spaces, and survival strategies of men and women who subverted nascent constructions of the Cuban nation.

As a new wave of anti-imperialist nationalism emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, in this case directed against the influence of the United States on the island, feminism offered a theoretical construct to challenge the conflation of *la patria* with patriarchy. Feminists fought for the right to vote and to reform marriage, family, and property laws. Interestingly, within the movement a debate unfolded regarding *garzonas*, as lesbians were popularly called in the media and literature. Thus, in a public letter, Dr. Flora Díaz Parrado wrote that lesbianism is a behavior "more acceptable than that of the servile woman" and that the *"garzona* is a sort of transition from the woman of 1914 to the woman of the future" (Bejel, 45). Bejel illustrates the shift among some feminist thinkers regarding homosexuality through the writings of Ofelia Rodríguez Acosta. Although Rodríguez Acosta's viewpoint represented a somewhat isolated perspective, it reflected the glimmers of cultural toleration toward women who loved women, as well as toward homosexuality among men, that would expand in the post–World War II period.

The third section of *Gay Cuban Nation* examines the Cuban Revolution of the past forty years and the place of homosexuality within that process. Bejel traces the early repressive practices of the Castro regime, which included sending homosexual men and women to Military Units to Aid Production and placing restrictions on gay writers critical of the government's revolutionary praxis, from José Lezama Lima to Reinaldo Arenas. Bejel ends with a study of cultural production that has repositioned homosexuality as a subject debated within Cuba, examining the documentary film *Mariposas en el andamio* (Butterflies on the scaffold, 1996), the feature film *Fresa e chocolate* (Strawberry and chocolate, 1993), and the new generation of Cuban writers, including Sonia Rivera-Valdés, the openly lesbian Cuban-American winner of the prestigious 1997 Casa de las Americas literary award for her short stories, many of which contain lesbian themes.

Notably absent from the book (and by no fault of the author) is any discussion of an overtly lesbian or gay movement in Cuba, precisely because the regime has yet to permit the political space for one to fully develop. Yet reading between the lines of this book, which is primarily concerned with the relationship of literary production to nation-building and homophobia, one can perceive multiple strategies that Cuban intellectuals have employed to create an imagined and real space where alternative sexualities can flourish on paper and in practice. Instead of looking

to find a movement that shapes its form, content, and vision on a model born in advanced capitalist societies where possibilities of overt political protests can leverage social transformations, Bejel has documented a subtler shift in how homosexuality is perceived, manifested, debated, and reluctantly tolerated.

On the other hand, Flam's collection *Pink, Purple, Green: Women's, Religious, Environmental, and Gay/Lesbian Movements in Central Europe Today* deals with social movements in Eastern Europe since 1989, when these countries were experiencing the profound pain of the transition from socialism to capitalism. Although only a few of the book's chapters address gay and lesbian issues, the anthology points out some of the difficulties that the newly formed movement encountered even after a transition to democracy, shorn of repressive measures reminiscent of Cuba. In all three countries under discussion (East Germany, Poland, and Hungary), very small gay and lesbian subcultures and movements existed prior to 1989. In all three countries gay and lesbian life took place in small circles of friends, and in East Germany one group operated under the umbrella of the Protestant church. Attempts to create national movements failed because of police harassment and intimidation and the conservative nature of the societies in which the early gay and lesbian groups tried to organize. The few activists who surfaced had to devise ways to organize a social movement without collective mobilization and without the possibility of protest and to develop strategies of political recognition and collective identity in societies in which such notions were complete novelties.

Following 1989, a handful of activists had a triple challenge: to forge their own collective identity, to gain entry into and expand their place within civil society, and to secure legal recognition from the state. But needed first and foremost were activists willing to be "out," as well as economic resources to build a movement. All three countries have gone through the same developments since 1989. In the early 1990s, a gay and lesbian movement burst onto the scene—with organizations, support groups, self-help groups, HIV/AIDS groups, magazines, bars, cafés, and, in eastern Germany, even a radio program. According to Jochen Kleres, one of the contributing authors to the collection, the eastern German movement pursued changes in school curriculum, organized antiviolence campaigns, and in Leipzig even established a strong representation in city hall. All of this was achieved by a few activists and without mass mobilization. The failure to mobilize gays and lesbians should be contrasted with the success of commercial gay life. Kleres speculates that the numerical weakness of the movement was due to the huge migration of lesbians and gay men to western Germany and Berlin soon after reuni-

fication and suggests that liberalization led directly to depoliticalization. Both the lesbian and gay subcultures and the movement constructed identities, but gay men and lesbians found a cultural identity more attractive than a politicized one.

The situation in Hungary was, in many respects, similar. According to the contributing scholar Mihály Riszovannij, an explosion in gay institutions and initiatives in the early 1990s was short lived, and by 2000 only a few very small gay groups existed in the county. Lesbians find themselves doubly invisible. Their relations with the feminist movement are strained, and they are a small minority within the small gay male–dominated groups, while their own group has only about fifty members. In Poland, too, according to the contributor Krzysztof Kliszczynski, the magazines, bars, discos, and small groups and centers of the early 1990s were short lived. The lack of activists—"there are only five to ten active people" in the gay movement in Poland (166)—prevents the movement in both countries from creating visibility or political presence. The prominent role of religion in Poland and Hungry also discourages politicians from addressing gay and lesbian issues.

Flam's collection points out that a democratization of the political sphere does not in and of itself guarantee gay and lesbian liberation. More freedom and commercialization of gay life led to less mobilization in Eastern Europe. With no activists to pursue movement-related demands, issues such as domestic partnership, marriage, anti–gay and lesbian violence, and health concerns are not being addressed. In considering these concluding observations about how the commercial dominates the political in emerging capitalist Eastern Europe, and in comparing that experience to socialist Cuba, where cultural resistance leverages debate and relative toleration, one wonders how helpful the model of a politicized lesbian and gay movement may be for achieving social freedom, toleration, and respect in non–Northern Atlantic nations. Casting a gaze to other parts of Latin America may offer alternative models for how to balance the tension between the sense of personal freedom through commercial consumption and a broader political agenda. Small clusters of activists in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil have managed to act as catalysts to change government policies, media coverage, and social attitudes. The Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgendered Pride Marches of São Paulo, Brazil, in which participation jumped from two thousand people in 1997 to one and a half million in 2004, rely on the support of commercial bars, Internet services, and publications for support yet continue to seek out political alliances with left-wing politicians of the Workers Party who are disposed to defend pro–lesbian and gay legislation in state legislatures and the

Congress. If social change can be seen as the sum total of the efforts of activists, organized movements, visibility brought by commercialism, and everyday molecular changes in attitudes, ideas, and their representations (at times brought about by cultural resistance, as exemplified in the literary works described by Bejel), then one can appreciate the broader impact of a powerful, oftentimes muted social revolution that has taken place, even in countries without strong political movements, where notions about homosexuality are slowly becoming detached from an association with disease, pathology, and immorality. ı

The Stranger Next Door: The Story of a Small Community's Battle over Sex, Faith, and Civil Rights. By Arlene Stein. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.

Voted Out: The Psychological Consequences of Anti-Gay Politics. By Glenda M. Russell. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

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The study of antigay politics in the United States emerged over a decade ago. Almost all of this work has focused on either discourses of elite individuals and organizations on the Christian Right, opinion poll data on attitudes toward homosexuality, or, in the legal field, judicial pronouncements in cases dealing with antigay lawmaking. Arlene Stein's *The Stranger Next Door* and Glenda M. Russell's *Voted Out* both offer distinctly new, welcome, and complementary analyses of lesbian and gay political struggles.

The Stranger Next Door poses the question, What happens when a gay rights battle erupts in a small town? Stein places her pseudonymous Timbertown in its Oregonian context, tracing the collapse of the lumber industry, shifts in local populations, the influx of a new middle class, and the growing impoverishment of a largely uneducated white working class. In illustrating the buildup of class resentment, using interviews and other local material, this study goes a long way toward explaining how and why the Christian Right's "no special rights" rhetoric appeals to "decent people" in small communities.

This is also a story about organizing—both pro- and antigay—and *The Stranger Next Door* illuminates at a microlevel how issues erupt (in this case, as in so many local gay rights battles, books in schools were the

immediate catalyst) and how such struggles can alienate and empower both sides. Unlike authors who focus on urban activists, Stein also paints a portrait of the town's lesbian small business owners, and she has some interesting things to say about antigay politics in the relative absence of gay men. I would have liked to see Stein develop these elements further.

My substantive difficulty with *The Stranger Next Door* comes from an uneasiness with Stein's conclusions about what motivates conservative Christian activists. She would have us believe that Timbertown's antigay politics arose out of people's sense of shame, denial, and alienation (35, 105–9, 215). Stein calls their moral vision "impoverished and mean-spirited" (224). Yet she also notes her surprise that these conservative Christians believed so strongly in "God's authority" (216). It seems to me that progressive theory needs to move beyond ascribing psychological ill health to our opponents and toward an understanding of the rich (not impoverished) normative world of orthodox believers.

Russell's *Voted Out* focuses on the psychological harm suffered by Colorado's lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in the wake of the antigay Amendment 2 campaign in the early 1990s. Russell and her colleagues undertook a large-scale quantitative and qualitative study of lesbian, gay, and bisexual questionnaire respondents, and this book presents research findings that seek to demonstrate the trauma suffered by victims of Christian Right antigay initiatives. Perhaps the less obvious and more challenging aspect of Russell's work is the data that show the positive role played by Amendment 2 in the lives of Colorado's lesbians, gays, and bisexuals. *Voted Out* illustrates how a deeply hurtful political process can also result in mobilization, empowerment, self-realization, and transformation for "victims." While the idea that antigay politics causes psychological harm will not surprise anyone who has been involved in gay rights battles, Russell's data is moving and powerful, and I would expect this book to become an essential referent for gay rights activists in the future.

As a nonpsychologist, I was puzzled by Russell's uncritical adoption of theory that, in part, explains her respondents' trauma as arising out of their "assumptions that the world in general was benevolent" (55). When this assumption is shattered—as was the case when Amendment 2 was passed by a majority of the state's voters—trauma ensues. Leaving the effects of 9/11 on the American psyche to one side, this analysis seems rather simplistic and even appears to contradict Russell's own evidence from lesbians, gays, and bisexuals who were clearly not so naive and trusting (83–85). I am also aware of, although no expert in, the debate around the (over)use of the concept of "trauma." For example, Russell provides little guidance for distinguishing between the harm caused to a lesbian,

gay man, or bisexual by witnessing the passing of antigay law and the harm caused by witnessing the genocidal destruction of one's community.

Both authors share an interest in methodological issues. Indeed, *Voted Out* is as much about the researchers' personal biographies and methodological choices as it is about the psychological consequences of antigay politics. Russell's preoccupation with ethical research is laudable, but it does not make for a good read unless one is specifically interested in these issues. Stein deals with similar questions in a more anecdotal way; we learn how she identifies herself—particularly as a Jewish lesbian—and how these identifications affected her role as a researcher in Timbertown. At the same time, some of Stein's more personal asides are jarring and appeared to me to undermine the concern for research ethics. For example, she seems surprised that conservative Christians were warm and welcoming (76)—why?—and she tells one of her conservative interviewees that she is married (231). Stein tells us that she feels married to her partner, but this seems rather disingenuous. Would it be acceptable for a Christian Right researcher to tell a lesbian interviewee that he is gay (meaning, to him, that he feels happy)?

More generally, while both these books are ostensibly gay rights stories, I found myself struck by broader themes of "place" and methodology. Scholarship on "insiders and outsiders" is often abstract and acontextual; Stein's book usefully places these questions in an actual location—a small town in the Pacific Northwest. Who is a stranger to Timbertown? *The Stranger Next Door* illustrates the process through which a sense of town ownership shifts over time and also how state and national organizations—in this case the Christian Right Oregon Citizens Alliance—can themselves become seen as outside agitators, not just to the town's progay forces but also to local conservative churches. Several of the respondents in *Voted Out* also express ideas about home and place in relation to Colorado (88, 192), and Russell's approach would have been strengthened by some of Stein's sociological analysis.

One of the most interesting bits of evidence from *Voted Out*, for me, was the lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents' overwhelming faith in law and U.S. justice (168–71). Given how many conservative Christians feel abandoned by U.S. legal institutions, both Russell and Stein, in different ways and not always explicitly, ask us to think about who is—or feels—estranged from the American polity today. ▪

Longing to Tell: Black Women Talk about Sexuality and Intimacy. By Tricia Rose. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2003.

Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism. By Patricia Hill Collins. New York: Routledge, 2004.

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The phrase "waiting to exhale" references the idea of a black woman who is holding her breath waiting for the right man to come along. These inherent assumptions too narrowly attempt to encompass black women's sexual and intimate lives. Those of us interested in black women's experiences beyond simple heterosexual constructs are left holding our breath. When two books are released with new and compelling insights into black women's sexuality and black sexuality more broadly, there is an exhalation of relief from those working in history, feminist studies, sociology, psychology, and cultural studies. For scholars, students, and laypeople alike, the result is the opening of a new chapter in understanding black women's sexuality.

Tricia Rose's *Longing to Tell: Black Women Talk about Sexuality and Intimacy* and Patricia Hill Collins's *Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism*, which were published within a year of each other, are fortuitously companion texts. Rose's shares with us twenty oral histories from what was initially a larger project exploring the very pertinent question, "How has the history of race, class, and gender inequality in this country [the United States] affected the way that black women talk about their sexual lives?" (ix). Collins's mission with *Black Sexual Politics*, as with her other works, is to offer critical social theory leading toward transformation. Her point here is a no-holds-barred linking of what she calls the past in present. Both books do theory, whether through testimony or more traditional forms of evidence.

Rose does not answer the question she poses outright. Instead she offers raw data for those seeking to find patterns or historical links in contemporary black women's sexual experiences. For lay readers the interviews are gripping in their honesty across a wide array of experiences, age, color, class, and gender. The testimonies address similar themes: upbringing, lessons about sex, formative sexual experiences, personal definitions of intimacy, race as it interacts with sexuality, body image, and hopes for future growth. Importantly, Rose connects intimacy and sex-

uality, a connection often missed in discussions of black female sexuality, which often center crucially, but narrowly, on violence or reproduction.

It is difficult to criticize the content of *Longing to Tell*, as these are women's words and reflections on the reality of their sexual and intimate lives. The sole critique I can offer would be for more input from Rose as to what these testimonies mean in the larger realm of black sexuality and black women's lives. Rose is clear, though, in explaining her rationale for not overlaying her own contextualizations on the narratives. She offers a critique of the pitfalls she saw in either extracting useful parts of the testimonies to support her thesis or putting the interviews into what she calls "story containers" that create barriers to perceiving the complexity in the narratives. What might one overlook in Rhonda's testimony, for example, which includes sexual abuse, an abortion, drug addiction, recovery, coming out as a lesbian, skin color dynamics, sexual liberation through sadomasochistic play, and a budding career as a lawyer? To contain that narrative in, say, her early sex abuse would drastically limit readers' choices in which aspects stand out and in what conclusions to draw.

Collins's analysis synthesizes the raw data of black sexual politics (e.g., history, stereotypes, and public policy) into a cogent genealogy of what she terms *the new racism* and offers creative strategies for combating it. Both Collins and Rose allow us to hear from "ordinary" black women without obfuscating jargon. Rose provides verbatim transcripts of her interviews, and Collins adds a glossary noting the interdisciplinary threads in her theorizing and the imperative of accessibility. Indeed, the glossary itself provides a unique opportunity to discuss the construction and evolution of terms such as *identity politics* as they are imbued with much of the social, political, and economic meaning Collins attributes to the construction of ideas about black sexuality.

Collins's book is in part a response to teaching an undergraduate course in black gender studies and ensuring that students understand the historical ramifications of black sexual objectification and exploitation. Those conditions are reflected in contemporary film, television, music, social policy, and black intracommunity politics. Keeping this undergraduate readership in mind, only the second chapter of the book, "The Past Is Ever Present: The New Racism," might be redundant for some already conversant in the derivation of antebellum portrayals of black sexuality. Beneficial for all readers is a range of textual analyses and situations, including the film *Booty Call*, Beyoncé Knowles and Jennifer Lopez's celebrity bodies, the ever-expanding prison industrial complex, Anita Hill's testimony at Clarence Thomas's Senate Judiciary hearings, and Missy Elliott's omnipresent hip-hop hit "Get Ur Freak On." These easily accessible texts have a currency

that should prove a useful starting point for sociopolitical debates in a number of settings in and outside the academy.

A crucial addition to the dialogue on black sexuality that this book brings is an assessment of black masculinity. Collins tackles black male and female relationships in a progressive framework that demands accountability for oppressive masculine constructs as they harm black women but also as they are detriments to black men. She offers, for example, discussion of sexual violence perpetrated by black men against one another while breaking down the media notion of "black-on-black" crime. She also begins the Herculean task of placing present hysteria over black men who are on the "down low," or who are nominally straight but engage in clandestine gay sex, in a framework that moves us beyond medicalized homosexual or political queer categories into a more complicated picture of power, race, and sexuality. Collins also brings to the table a considered reckoning with media constructs of rappers and basketball players and insights on young black men who have figured out how to manipulate stereotypes of black masculinity. Whether those manipulations are in the end beneficial for blacks collectively or only individually is a conclusion dependent on readers keeping in focus the past as Collins has presented it for consideration.

It will be an easy decision for instructors to teach these two volumes together. The greater dilemma will be, in which order? For students without background knowledge in the historical exploitation of black bodies, it would be a worthwhile experience to work out the meaning of *Longing to Tell*'s narratives. Yet it could be just as fruitful to have students first read *Black Sexual Politics* and then apply the range of historical and contemporary situations Collins offers to the oral history narratives that Rose presents. Both ways of teaching and reading these texts highlight the nature of sexuality—already manifold in contradictions—as it involves external attributes and internal perceptions of self. *Longing to Tell* and *Black Sexual Politics* bring to bear the weight of history and what that might mean for black women constructing a contemporary vision of black women's sexuality independent of corruptions of the erotic but full of potential.   I

Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. By Susan J. Brison. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Between Women and Generations: Legacies of Dignity. By Drucilla Cornell. New York: Palgrave, 2003.

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Early in her book, Drucilla Cornell recalls the emphasis of second-wave feminism on the ways in which women have historically and socially been silenced, noting that silencing is not simply remedied by the increased presence of women's voices in the public sphere, for sometimes "we either do not know there is something to talk about, or we feel our experience recedes before the lack of language" (13). As professors, neither Cornell nor Susan Brison finds herself in a traditionally silenced position. But both have written books that, by combining philosophical and theoretical analyses with the autobiographical, seek to challenge deeper, more complex forms of silencing, especially those that characterize extreme forms of experience.

Part memoir, part philosophical study of the effects of violence, Brison's *Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self* tells of the brutal sexual assault that transformed her world and her sense of herself as a woman and a thinker. Cornell's *Between Women and Generations: Legacies of Dignity*, an exploration of family history that gives way to theoretical explorations of female subjectivity, political analyses, and ethnography, is a sort of eulogy, written in response to a request from her mother, who committed suicide in 1998, that she write a book "bear[ing] witness to the dignity of [her mother's] death" (xvii). Different as these two books are, they both recall for us in vivid terms the ways in which the silencing of women's experience, while often borne as suffering of individual women, cannot be located within the individual in any simple way but is integral to social, political, economic, and family structures.

Certainly these issues are not new to women's historians and scholars of women's autobiographical writing. Cornell and Brison, however, draw attention to gender's relation to the representation of traumatic experience. Both are committed to bearing witness, writing not simply autobiographically but testimonially. They would no doubt concur with Cathy Caruth's insight that the traumatic cannot be understood simply as an event but rather as "a structure of experience" in which temporality and

language are dislocated, demanding new ways of speaking, writing, being.[1] "The challenge of finding language that is true to traumatic experience . . . is a daunting one," Brison writes. "How can we speak about the unspeakable without attempting to render it intelligible and sayable?" (xi). Her own book is testimony to her struggle to find such language and to the success of that struggle. Cornell's book in turn traces in its very shape, organization, and language a similar endeavor to find language for unspeakable losses. The analytically trained philosopher Brison suggests, quoting Ursula K. LeGuin, that her strategy of resisting some scholarly conventions in her discipline might be "rather in the feminist mode" (xii).[2] In fact, these two volumes suggest that, for women, representing the extreme or the traumatic requires feminist modes that address the disparities and relations between the philosophical and the theoretical and the autobiographical and the testimonial—and most crucially, modes that enable engagement with cultural representations of gender and sexuality.

Before the trial of Brison's rapist, the French prosecutor cautioned her that "when the trial is all over, you must forget that this ever happened" (86). Recalling this injunction, Brison remarks, "Perhaps *he* could have forgotten, but given the stories of rape I'd grown up with and the ones I'd heard about and read again and again in adulthood, one might say I remembered the rape before it happened, as a kind of postmemory . . . informing the way I lived in my body and moved about in the world" (86). While she has neither desire nor capacity to forget the assault that nearly took her life, she finds that many of those around her do; her own recovery is affected by the expectations of others that she will go on as before, that nothing has really changed. Her narrative tells of the isolation the experience of violence brings. She reaches out to her community, takes self-defense classes, and joins a survivors' group but finds that the assault has left her, as she says at one point, "as though I'd somehow outlived myself" (9). As is the case for many survivors of traumatic experience, Brison finds that the assault created a break in her sense of identity as continuous and integral: "The trauma has changed me forever, and if I insist too often that my friends and family acknowledge it, that's because I am afraid they don't know who I am" (21). Her book simultaneously enacts and explores the relation of narrative to selfhood as she examines how violence disrupts the stories we tell ourselves of who we are in the

[1] Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

[2] Ursula K. Le Guin, *Dancing at the Edge of the World: Thoughts on Words, Women, and Places*. New York: Grove, 1989. Cited in Brison, xii.

world. Brison wants to understand how violence, in her words, unmakes the self and how the practice of memory, in her case literally re-membering, can remake it.

If this book is testimony to the structure of violent experience, it also stands as an intellectual autobiography, for Brison's project of reassembling a self unmade by trauma involves a reexamination of the philosophical tradition in which she was trained. She writes as both a woman who has undergone sexual assault and as an analytic philosopher; much of her book can be understood as an attempt to bring these two parts of her life together, and her writing limns the difficulty of doing so. "We are trained," she writes, "to write in an abstract, universal voice and to shun first-person narratives as biased and inappropriate for academic discourse" (8). Yet she finds the methods and assumptions of the analytic tradition, particularly those pertaining to selfhood, language, and what constitutes an appropriate object of philosophical attention, inadequate to an exploration of her own experience and to the impact of violence on the self more broadly. Struggling with a philosophical discourse whose methods and assumptions silence her, she embarks on a journey that is intellectual and personal into recent writings on the traumatic, Holocaust testimony, and the work of feminist theorists and activists.

Toward the end of her book the survivor and the philosopher come together in an astute if painful irony: "Recovery," she writes, "no longer seems to consist of picking up the pieces of a shattered self (or fractured narrative). It is facing the fact that there never was a coherent self (or story) there to begin with" (118). Surviving violence lays bare the artificiality of the coherent stories we tell ourselves about who we are and where we are going. But Brison also suggests that surviving makes an ethical demand. This is what motivates her telling of her own story in such a direct and honest way.

The ethical demand of survivorship shapes Cornell's *Between Women and Generations* as well. Cornell's survivorship is of a different sort; the ethical demand is that specifically articulated by her mother. Like Brison, Cornell is engaged in a quest to speak the unspeakable. Her book is shaped not simply by her mother's death, however, but by the fact that her mother chose to die. Cornell asks what it means to bear witness to another's death, a question taken up by philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, who have been central to her prior work. Here she wants to explore how the shape of that question changes when the other is one's mother, who, in the face of inexorable illness, chose to take her own life. But, as Cornell notes, "this is not a book about the right to die. . . . I leave those . . . to be written by people whose mother did not

choose to exercise that right" (xviii). Instead, Cornell acknowledges that the elder woman made a choice that she felt was her own, perhaps for the only time in her life.

Between Women and Generations springs from this deeply disturbing acknowledgment. A strange and at times confusing book, it performs a work of mourning by questioning what this recognition of another woman's life—and death—choices might entail. Mourning becomes a quest for redemption, as the task of bearing witness to her mother's dignity in death leads Cornell to argue for the importance of feminism as a broad concept of dignity, developed through autobiographical reflections, an engagement with feminist readings of psychoanalysis and Kantian philosophy, and ethnographical-style interviews with members of a housecleaner's collective.

The first chapter of the book is autobiographical; the second takes up psychoanalytic theory, specifically guided by the work of the Lacanian analyst Judith Gurewich. The third chapter moves on to a complex reading of the Kantian sublime, and the fourth and fifth chapters discuss and present interviews with the women of the Unity housekeeping collective. The sixth chapter returns to the autobiographical and movingly tells of Cornell's mother's last days. The shifts between autobiography, theory, and ethnography mark a tension in the text; it can seem as if this is actually two interrelated books inhabiting the same cover. In a sense, *Between Women and Generations* is a coauthored work, shaped by the distinctly different claims of Mrs. Cornell, who wanted her daughter to write a book "that members of her bridge class could read" (xvii), and her daughter, who seeks through her work as a feminist theorist to understand the legacy of the older woman's life and death.

One way to read this book might be to think of it as metonymically organized; each chapter leads to the next, not through any traditional narrative or scholarly form of organization but through a network of associations, hinged on the importance to feminist theory and practice of respecting and valuing the differences between and among women. Cornell seeks not so much to say what has been left unsaid but rather to attend to the ways in which "traces can remain for us as what is missing as we begin to measure silence and pay heed to [its] significance" (72). The engagement with psychoanalysis is therefore central. Cornell's concept of dignity involves both a reworking of female development as understood by classical psychoanalysis, in which the girl achieves womanhood via a rejection of the mother and a turn to the father, and more recent feminist theories that emphasize a close and intricate mother-daughter bond. Cornell theorizes an alternative in which mother and daughter could see the other as a separate and in some sense unknowable human being.

Thinking of the mother-daughter relation as the cornerstone of women's relations across class, race, and geographical boundaries, she seeks to think through how connections between women might be elaborated in terms of this alternative.

Testimony to the dignity of a mother's suicide is made through exploring the ways we might live with, respect, and value others even as we might not fully understand their actions, feelings, and experiences. Cornell shares with Brison a hope that somehow, in finding a language for extreme and traumatic experiences, we might reimagine bonds of community. ▪

Surviving Poverty in Medieval Paris: Gender, Ideology, and the Daily Lives of the Poor. By Sharon Farmer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

Women in a Medieval Heretical Sect: Agnes and Huguette the Waldensians. By Shulamith Shahar, translated by Yael Lotan. Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell Press, 2001.

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Two medieval French institutional documents are the main sources for these studies that attempt to uncover the lives of nonelite people in the Middle Ages. Sharon Farmer uses the miracle stories collected at St.-Denis outside Paris, in 1282–83, for a canonization inquest into the sanctity of the deceased king of France, Louis IX, while Shulamith Shahar studies two heretical women from Bishop Jacques Fournier's inquisitorial register compiled in the south of France in 1319–20. Both authors seek to understand women's experience, but their analytic strategies differ. Shahar writes compensatory women's history to show the position of women within the poor of Lyons (the persecuted Waldensian heretical sect), a task that would not be necessary, she notes tartly, if women "had been included in the leading narratives" (xiv) about the group. Farmer uses her documents to analyze the grid within which gender functioned in the later Middle Ages; her aim is to avoid "constructing simplistic gender categories" (70). Both studies are well researched and written, but Farmer goes further to tease theoretical implications from her sources although, with her small number of cases, those sources sometimes seem too slim to support her statistical arguments.

Shahar's first chapter is a thumbnail sketch of Waldensian history, a

compact summary useful to anyone seeking to understand this persecuted minority that wanted to preach the Gospel, read the scriptures in the vernacular, and live in poverty and simplicity. Both women and men could be believers, the rank-and-file poor of Lyons, and although there were both sisters and brothers among the spiritual elite, only the brothers functioned as leaders. The church condemned the Waldensians as heretics in 1215, driving underground the movement that had spread across Europe.

In chapter 2, Shahar examines whether the Waldensians offered women equality. She concludes that, unlike the sects that considered the godhead to be both female and male, the Waldensians worshipped God the Father and did not—contrary to the oft-cited scholarly contention—offer women equality in the early days of the sect.

The next chapters use the inquisitorial records to consider the relative position of women and men within the sect, finding an interesting split. Male and female believers shared in most ways the practices of their clandestine faith; women's roles were vital probably because this was a home-based sect without church buildings. However, the elite spiritual women, the sisters, were tightly cloistered in hospices run by brothers, and they neither worked outside the hospice nor attended religious conferences. Shahar argues that such sisters "found a greater spiritual satisfaction than did many of the Catholic nuns" (64) because they became sisters by choice. Since she cites no evidence to support the voluntary entry of women into the hospices, this is not a compelling argument. However, when she turns to the ordinary female believers, looking at the testimonies of Agnes and Huguette, the evidence does support a shared community in which women's and men's distinctions are somewhat blurred, and Huguette emerges heroically strong and committed to her beliefs unto death. Intriguingly, Shahar notes, just as the usual gender and class distinctions tend to be less rigid in minority groups, so too the Inquisition questioned the men and women it examined with ungendered expectations and types of questions. This equal treatment even has the dubious distinction of extending to the form of execution: men and women were burned for heresy, unlike other executions that were gendered in medieval Europe, with women being put to death by burning and live burial while men were generally hanged. Shahar offers no concluding argument from her study but does append translations of the two female heretics' interrogations.

Farmer examines nonelite working people who were recipients of thirty-six of the sixty-five miracles of Saint Louis. Putting these stories together with data from sermons, wills, guild statutes, and tax records, Farmer attempts to describe the underclass in late medieval Paris. She then uses this data to argue that gender in the Middle Ages was more fluid than

has been generally believed. Paris in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries was populous and adorned by great wealth and beautiful buildings at its center, yet more than one-half of its inhabitants were poor. Many of the underclass were migrants seeking work in the city, commonly as domestic servants. A model of domestic service as performed by single, young migrants who later left service to marry has been described as the "northwest European household pattern" (25). Farmer's sources suggest that this model needs nuancing, since celibate domestic service often became a permanent arrangement rather than terminating in marriage. Women seeking work migrated into the cities as older widows, as well as when they were young girls, because, among the laboring poor, widows did not have the property to maintain themselves when elderly. Farmer's work suggests women most commonly migrated in their twenties and thirties, while males did so as younger boys of fourteen to eighteen. Once the migrants entered Paris, they could descend precipitously from the working poor into the ranks of the nonworking poor due to a disability, disease, or pregnancy that rendered them unemployable.

The bulk of the book presents evidence to demonstrate that gender was hardly a fixed concept in late medieval Paris. Rather than female always being inferior to male, status and degree of wealth complicated gender. For example, miracles tended to cure elite men at home after a short illness, while poor men had to travel to the tomb of Saint Louis for help, generally after a long illness. Those clerics taking down the testimony checked the bodies of poor men to see the healed ulcer or the limb now straightened, a viewing of physical evidence not recorded in the cures of elite men. Similarly, sermon literature stressed the sexual faults of nonelite women, a subject ignored when discussing propertied women. Intriguing further evidence of the complication of gender is that male beggars who did not work lost gender status, being seen as unmanned by their lack of work and as womanlike due to suspicion that disabilities were feigned for sympathy.

The support systems for poor people were more complicated than most scholars have recognized and reveal subtly gendered assumptions. Bourgeois charity tended to assist young boys who needed training, elderly widowed women, and poor girls who needed dowries—groups within what Farmer calls "the marriage prism" (150). Artisans and the working poor gave greatest support to the disabled, particularly to poor, single women bypassed in the charitable giving of well-to-do city folk. Such women also might band together in mutual support, and the tax lists suggest that spinsters may have been clustered in sections of the city.

Shahar's study plugs a hole in our study of the Waldensian heretics,

while Farmer's work both expands our understanding of medieval poverty and reinforces the broad caution within gender history against essentializing gender stereotypes. Both are welcome additions to the study of premodern European women and gender. ı

Women's Human Rights and Islam: A Study of Three Attempts at Accommodation. By Jonas Svensson. Lund, Sweden: Studies in the History of Religion, Lund University, 2002.

Women in Islam: The Western Experience. By Anne Sofie Roald. London: Routlege, 2001.

Medicines of the Soul: Female Bodies and Sacred Geographies in a Transnational Islam. By Fedwa Malti-Douglas. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

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Today the "woman question" is a battleground both inside and outside the Muslim world. That is, the woman question raises the sharpest criticism of Islam and Muslim societies from the outside and is at the same time one of the most hotly debated areas within Islamic and Islamist circles. This situation is reflected in the three books under review here, each of which looks at how Muslim voices engage with a secular, globalized "Western" world as seen through the lens of women's rights and women's proper role in society.

Women's Human Rights and Islam: A Study of Three Attempts at Accommodation is fascinating and is the most successful of the three works. Jonas Svensson assesses how three very different public intellectuals attempt to reinterpret Islam in ways that make it compatible with women's human rights as expressed in various international instruments, most notably the 1979 United Nations Women's Convention. Svensson's subjects have in common that they are Muslims who hail from predominately Muslim societies, have received extensive Western-style academic training, have published widely on the topics in question, and actively participate in international academic and human rights forums. In their work all three emphasize approaching religious questions on the basis of the earliest, most fundamental sources of Islam, mainly the Qur'an, at the expense of the established schools of Islamic law, the *madhahib*. They all champion

a broader ethical understanding of the Qur'an, and they insist on the essential message of equality in Islam. There are also important differences, however. Fatima Mernissi, the renowned Moroccan feminist and academic, accepts as a given that secularism is the social ideal to strive for. Her reinterpretations of Islamic scripture and history are overtly aimed at facilitating a gradual move in Muslim societies toward that goal, whereas the other two authors are committed to the idea of working for fully Islamic societies that subscribe to and enforce Islamic law, albeit Islamic law interpreted according to each author's lights. Riffat Hassan, a U.S.-based Pakistani woman and self-described feminist theologian, approaches the interpretation of the Qur'an by insisting on its internal coherence. This leads her to defend women's equality in Islam through the idea of complementarity between the sexes, positing an essential and biologically determined difference in social function between men and women. Thus she accounts for the different rights accorded to men and women in Islam while still maintaining that there is a principle of equality. By contrast, Sudanese exile and specialist in comparative law Abdullahi Ahmed an-Naim follows the teaching of his spiritual mentor Mahmud Muhammad Taha in asserting that the Qur'an has two messages: one, a timeless ethical message of equality embodied in the Meccan revelations, the other, a temporally located message embodied in the Medinan revelation and containing regulations that helped the first Muslim community flourish in specific circumstances. Therefore an-Naim rejects all of the specific regulations and legal restrictions directed at woman on matters such as leadership, divorce, marriage, and so forth, as pertaining to the Medinan period, and he argues that in modern times the "larger" Meccan message of total equality should prevail.

Svensson analyzes quite incisively the authors' use of various rhetorical and argumentative strategies to achieve accommodation and to garner authority, and he makes a clear exposition of the implications of those approaches for women's human rights. About Hassan's framing of gender equality in Islam, he notes, for example, "There is no notion of a right for women to freely express their sexuality. . . . The institution of marriage, and intercourse within the framework of marriage is given a *telos* in relation to a view of society that is organic" (107).

The book contains a useful discussion of how international human rights documents are formulated and then locally contested, drawing attention to how the intellectuals under study straddle two worlds and speak to two audiences. What Svensson terms the "positive emotive charge" (19) carried by the term *human rights*, together with the ever-increasing globalization that makes such ideas widely available around the world,

render it difficult for governments and even religious groups to completely reject these discourses. At the same time, claims of self-determination and cultural relativism make it hard for the international human rights community to ignore local voices. Thus these globe-trotting intellectuals, whose origins give their voices "authenticity" and whose training allows them access to the political capital of human rights discourse, wield influence in both camps and cannot be ignored even by their critics. What Svensson explicitly does not do in this work is make any evaluation of the "Islamicness" of his authors or their arguments, because, as he says, "that would amount to participating in the debate" (11).

By contrast, Anne Sofie Roald's *Women in Islam: The Western Experience* is a mixture of sociological study and cultural intervention. Roald attempts to examine "change and changing processes in the interpretation of social issues in the Islamic sources" (79). This she seeks to understand through interviewing and distributing questionnaires to Muslims living in Western Europe in order to see "how attitudes to women and gender relations change in the cultural encounter between 'Islam' and the 'West'" (79).

The voices heard in this book, of educated, devout Muslims living in the West and striving to make accommodations between their best understanding of the faith and the realities of their daily lives, are fascinating. Roald's discussion of their understanding of questions such as the nature and adaptability to historical circumstances of the Sharia, or the proper meaning of Qur'anic passages referring to men's stewardship over women, allows those voices to come through clearly while also giving a good sense of the larger international and historical discourse to which these individuals are responding. Often Roald also offers her own interpretation on such issues, as she does with the Sharia (103–4).

However, in explaining the choice of target group for her study, in outlining her criteria for selecting her respondents and interviewees, and in identifying intellectual trends she deems important, Roald makes many problematic assertions and allows her own commitments to structure her work. The parameters she establishes amount to a religious or theological judgment about who a real Muslim is, and they reveal a certain arabocentric prejudice. For instance, she identifies four movements or trends among Islamists as the most important and therefore the focus of her study: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Party, the *salafi* movement (the movement to return to the sources—the Qur'an and the Sunna—and to interpret them directly without deferring to tradition), and what she terms the "post-*ikhwan* trend" (37–57). The post-*ikhwan* trend and the Muslim Brotherhood are further singled out because she

claims they have "more potential for change" (97). But she offers no evidence for these claims. What is true is that the four movements she chooses are based in the Arab world and advocate a return to the "pure" and "original" sources of Islam—the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet—at the expense of the *madhahib* or of other trends that give importance to leaders, such as the sheykhs of Sufi orders or the ayatollahs of Shi'i Islam. In terms of her respondents and interviewees, the study is limited to Arab-speaking Sunni Islamist intellectuals living in the West. In justifying her focus on Arab speakers to the exclusion of the non-Arab Muslim majority, Roald makes the argument that due to having the Arabic language as their mother tongue, Arabs feel greater confidence and have greater facility in consulting the original sources. She claims that the movement to return to the original sources is most prominent in the Arab world and that this shows that Arabs continue to exercise an important leadership role in the Islamic world. She further asserts that she has observed that non-Arab Muslims rely more on religious leaders and traditional legal schools than do Arabs. She attributes this to their not knowing Arabic and deduces that these communities will be less likely to produce innovative and influential approaches to social issues (31–32, 59). But is this true? Her attitude ignores the centuries of rich contributions made by non-Arabs to Islamic thought and civilization, on the one hand, and, on the other, it overlooks the fact that, by her own account, there are both *ulama* (religious scholars) from the traditional legal schools and Sufi sheykhs taking a reformist or hermeneutic approach to Islamic law and theology. Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, one of the originators of the progressive-minded return-to-the-sources trend Roald praises, was neither an Arab nor a Sunni.

Similarly, when Roald stipulates that her women respondents must wear some form of head covering and that respondents in general must obey the Islamic commandments, she is making a religious judgment about who can rightly be considered, if not a Muslim, then an Islamist (21, 61–62). But is it true that all women who view Islam as a comprehensive approach to life wear some form of head covering? Indeed, one might further ask why, if she wants to study change in interpretation, Roald limits herself to "Islamists"? In all religions, many people who consider themselves believers and pious nevertheless have a secular way of life and outlook. Roald claims that those who fall within her stipulations are those likely to have the greatest impact on the reformist debate currently taking place within the Muslim world, but again, is this true? Or is it true that such people are likely to have the greatest impact on others like themselves? Implicit in all of this is the notion that secular Muslims are not really

Muslims, and therefore their opinions cannot or should not have an impact on the interpretation of Islam. The book focuses on Arabic-speaking Islamists in the West and in the Arab world in a way that creates the illusion of a two-dimensional debate between a secular West and an Islamist Arab world, and it tends to flatten the range of views toward religion common in the West, as well as the truly cosmopolitan nature of Muslim and Islamist social discourse.

Very different in tone and style from the above works is Fedwa Malti-Douglas's study of three autobiographies by Muslim women relating their spiritual transformation from a secular life as nominal Muslims to a religious awakening and life as practicing Muslims. Malti-Douglas employs the tools of literary criticism effectively in showing how these stories, though ostensibly women's stories, are permeated with male authority. The women's texts are framed by validating introductions, conclusions, or both by male authority figures. The title page of Belgian-born Sultana Kouhmane's book actually lists her husband as coauthor, even though the book is her memoir and purports in places to consist of extracts from her diary. Leila Lahlou's account of her struggle with breast cancer and miraculous cure following her journey to Mecca is sandwiched between introductions by a medical doctor and by the king of Morocco and an appendix containing medical documents. Karîmân Hamza's description of her evolution from Egyptian bourgeoise to Islamically garbed media personality incorporates extensive passages from the works of her spiritual guide and also carries a male-authored introduction and conclusion.[1] Malti-Douglas notes (in interesting counterpoise to Roald's work) the stories' Sufi or mystical overtones—all three protagonists are deeply affected by "true" dreams that either set them on their spiritual quests or signal the fulfillment of those quests. Hamza's story, in fact, follows the basic structure of a Sufi journey toward enlightenment, with each phase in the progressive covering of her body standing for a stage on her mystical journey. Similarly, Kouhmane's trip to the Atlas with her husband and her gradual acceptance of sex segregation as a natural social order where men occupy the public sphere and women the private, follows in some ways the pattern of a Sufi journey in which the external, material, and false are

[1] The works discussed by Malti-Douglas are Karîmân Hamza, *Riḥlatî min al-Sufûr ilâ al-Hijâb* (Cairo: Dâr al-I'tiṣâm, 1981); Laylâ al-Hulw, *Falâ Tansa Allâh* (Casablanca: Matba'at al-Najâh al-Jadîda, 1984), and the French language ed., Leila Lahlou, *N'oublie pas Dieu* (Casablanca. Imprimerie Najah El Jadîda, 1987); and Cheikh Mohammed Saghir and Kouhmane Sultana, *L'Islam, la femme, et l'intégrisme: Journal d'une jeune femme européenne* (Brussels: Edition Al-Imen, 1991). (The authors' names are transliterated from the Arabic differently in these publications than in *Medicines of the Soul.*)

renounced in favor of inner truths. Missing from all these women's accounts, however, is any mention of female mystics or prominent contemporary Islamist women who might have served as inspiration. Each woman's voyage to enlightenment is entirely inspired and guided by men.

As Malti-Douglas emphasizes, the degree to which women's bodies constitute the terrain on which piety and religious practice, especially social religious practice, are defined is striking in these accounts. A greater interpretative effort at thinking about why this should be the case would have enriched this work, however. These women, through their awakenings and the subsequent publication of their conversion stories, have entered into a heated public debate in Islam and Islamic revivalism about the proper role of women in society. Malti-Douglas's exposition clearly demonstrates this, and she casts her authors as examples of a new kind of Islamist intellectual engagé, but her failure to situate any of these women precisely in terms of the Islamic and Islamist movements active in the contemporary world or to address the question of who the audience for these works is and how the works have been received and answered in other quarters leaves the reader unable to evaluate them as cultural interventions or to see their transnational character in any meaningful analytical sense.

A common feature among many of the thinkers treated in these books, one that is present also in some of the authors of the books themselves (Hassan, Kouhmane, Roald, among others) is the tendency to essentialize women based on "natural" biological function, to view the family rather than the individual as the basic unit of society, and to emphasize that there is equality within the harmonious acceptance of natural or divinely ordained gender roles. This is a set of attitudes familiar from other contexts, such as organic nationalism, and the corporativist movements that arose between the World Wars, in particular. It is an outlook that employs the language of love, not rights, and asserts that in fulfilling his or her proper function, each member of society finds happiness and contributes to social harmony—ends that cannot be achieved through a model of rights and adversarial or competitive interaction. Like corporativism, this form of Islamism should be understood as a radical modernizing movement that rejects tradition, on the one hand, and seeks to offer an alternative to classical liberal models based on formal equality and individual self-interest, on the other. The woman question is one piece of terrain where this alternative vision of modernity is articulated particularly, and it may serve as one explanation for why the topic is so fraught. It is to be hoped that authors writing on questions relating to women and Islam will dedicate more time to considering not only the articulation of the

woman question in various contexts but the reasons for its centrality and hotly contested nature. ı

Promise of a Dream: Remembering the Sixties. By Sheila Rowbotham. London: Verso, 2001.

Shaky Ground: The Sixties and Its Aftershocks. By Alice Echols. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

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T**he time of reflection** has arrived. The 1960s as a period of personal as well as social transformation has now entered into the category of "the past," which many believe makes it merit individual and collective stocktaking. These two feminist historians now offer an intriguing combination of professional scrutiny of their own individual history and an attempt to make some sense of the changes of the period in some larger way. Each book is quite different, yet only in part because of the authors' social locations. Sheila Rowbotham is older, experiences the sixties in Paris and London, and is deeply involved in socialist politics long before she ever begins to think of feminism; Alice Echols experiences already active women's studies communities on the fringes of American politics in Minnesota and New Mexico and studies the 1950s and 1960s in order to make sense of what she lives through in the 1970s. Rowbotham is engaged in an explicitly autobiographical project in which she deploys historical tools to try to make sense of the context of her own life, hoping to convert its raw experience into a more self-conscious and critically evaluated life from which she and others can learn. Echols aims instead to write historical assessments of the period, some of its personae, and its politics, while reflecting on the life context in which she wrote the various essays that are collected here and bringing her own life story to bear on the events.

The authors can, therefore, hardly avoid questions of to what extent the personal is political and vice versa. Rowbotham's memoir is deeply personal, discussing in depth such events as her schooling, her parents' deaths, and her various affairs and trying to evaluate just what they meant to her. Like a good session of psychoanalysis, her stories about her past are frank and thoughtful. Writing them must have been tremendously useful to her as she worked through what meaning she wished to give to

her past actions and involvements. And as a source of personal anecdote informed by a lively and critical historical imagination, they are rich pictures of the era through which she lived. But for all the name-dropping of the various other individuals whose lives intersected her own at various points, such as E. P. and Dorothy Thompson or the members of Pink Floyd, none of the other people in the stories emerge as fully developed characters with their own interests or agendas. Organizations as well as individuals appear and disappear as they come into contact with Rowbotham, and the struggles of the time are curiously warped into the shape in which they have meaning for her development as a person, as a historian, and as a feminist. Rowbotham gives her conflicts with her tenants or her students the same reflective treatment as factional struggles among socialist splinter groups and the emergent critiques of male dominance in the left that eventually produced a new feminist movement. She evaluates social developments in terms of what they meant for her. Thus, while reflecting that beats and hippies shared some of the same attitudes, Rowbotham views both through the narrow lens of her personal experience: "I'd been a very junior beatnik; now at twenty-four, I was a bit old for the hippies. . . . Throughout 1967 I wavered. I enjoyed the prettiness, the display, the release, the conviviality of the hippies and their gatherings. . . . But I could see the tribe-like underground possessed its own snobberies and conceits like any other social world" (133). As this quote illustrates, Rowbotham typically places less emphasis on what it all meant for society than she does on what it all meant for her.

Echols takes the other tack and stresses the big picture. Although she writes as a journalist—many of these essays are lightly revised versions of articles published in such venues as the *Village Voice* and the *L.A. Weekly*—her departure from academia appears to have affected her choice of subjects (Janis Joplin, music, and popular culture) more than her perspective on what she writes about. Her professional sense of herself as a historian appears to rest on getting right what the developments of the time mean for later social changes. Her interpretations stress how different the 1950s were from the 1960s, how much changed (for the better) as beats, hippies, rock music, feminism, and sexual freedom shook the complacencies of what she characterizes as the "Ike Age."

Echols groups her essays into three major clusters—one of general reflections on the social transformations that she argues significantly changed the U.S. social landscape, one of her own interventions into feminist debates over pornography and sexual freedom, and one of interviews with and interpretations of musicians and their music. Each section gets a substantial introductory essay in which Echols situates herself

today and when the essay was written in relation to the subjects about which she writes. This organizational decision gives her ample opportunity to reflect on how both the social situation and her understanding of it have changed in the intervening period, and she uses it well to provide both social context and a self-deprecating but unapologetic reassessment of her own experiences. Her essays on social change in the first section are tightly argued and well researched but are also strong pleas for her point of view. Echols has no patience with those who doubt that the sexual revolution was revolutionary and that it offered a tremendous boon to women, who were now able to experience their own sexuality in a far less constrained and repressed fashion. She is confident that the cultural changes of the 1960s changed more people's lives for the better than any amount of social policy, and her analysis of social change largely follows the contours of her own interests in popular culture and its icons, be they Joni Mitchell or Janis Joplin. She makes a convincing case for looking at such cultural figures in terms of what they are made to stand for, what they actually say and do, and what they take for granted even in their rebellions.

Both Echols and Rowbotham are lively writers with a talent for placing their own concerns, even obsessions, in a social context. Both books offer personalized lenses on a period of great social change. Each book is necessarily narrow, and feminism figures in each but does not by any means take center stage. Music, sex, politics, urban culture, and the historian's craft emerge as significant themes in both books. Rowbotham's politics provide a tour through the (largely male) personalities of the British Left, Echols's politics offer a lens on gender in popular culture, and both of their stories are idiosyncratic but intriguing. Neither book would be of much use in the classroom, but it is refreshing to read books that are not trying to be textbooks so much as to give the authors' own takes on the times to those who might be interested in sharing a moment of reflection with them.   ∎

Sexual Chemistry: A History of the Contraceptive Pill. By Lara V. Marks. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.

The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in America. By Linda Gordon. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002.

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Two new books provide readers with an opportunity to reexamine key issues in reproductive politics. One, Lara Marks's *Sexual Chemistry*, is an interdisciplinary study of the contraceptive pill that looks at the pill's pharmacological history within a transnational and gender-conscious interpretive framework. The other, Linda Gordon's *The Moral Property of Women*, is an important new revision of her classic *Women's Body, Women's Right.*[1]

Based on extensive archival research and interviews, Marks's book provides a fresh account of the laboratory work and clinical testing that produced the pill and of its reception by women, physicians, politicians, and priests. The book covers some of the same material as Andrea Tone's *Devices and Desires* and Elizabeth Watkins's *On the Pill,* but Marks situates her account within the global networks through which the pill was developed and distributed.[2] The book includes wonderful new shop-floor views of the processes by which refugee European and Mexican scientists first produced synthetic progesterone from wild yams and by which women technicians and physicians actually tested early versions of the pill. She connects this history to the long-standing efforts of European pharmaceutical companies to develop a commercially viable source of sex hormones. Marks juxtaposes this account of laboratory and clinical practice with a very readable discussion of the chemical processes underlying sex hormones, which makes quite clear how little difference there is between the molecular structure of male and female hormones.

The greatest strength of the book may be Marks's ability to describe the broad social, political, and cultural currents in which this modern pharmacological feat occurred. The book draws very effectively on insights from feminist scholars about gender, race, and class politics in its discussion of international reproductive-control markets and policies. These insights

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[1] Linda Gordon, *Women's Body, Women's Right* (New York: Grossman, 1976).

[2] Andrea Tone, *Devices and Desires: A History of Contraceptives in America* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2001), and Elizabeth Watkins, *On the Pill: A Social History of Oral Contraceptives, 1950–1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

are not taken up uncritically, however. In fact, Marks argues against the claim that women were used as guinea pigs. To the contrary, she makes a strong case that the testing of the pill met the scientific standards of the times. At the same time, the book incorporates a very useful chapter on the Roman Catholic Church's opposition to the pill, which focuses on how internal conflicts over modernization shaped the church's eventual disapproval. This opposition is framed in a transnational perspective through juxtaposition with a careful discussion of the very different concerns about the relationship of science and nature by which Indian and Japanese authorities refused to approve the pill.

There are some weaknesses in the book. Marks rather facilely attributes the strong initial reception of the pill in North America to "skillful manipulation of fears about population growth" (36). This may explain mass purchases of the pill by U.S. development agencies, but it underestimates U.S. women's independent desire for more effective contraception than the douches, diaphragms, rhythm method, and condoms they otherwise relied on. In addition, the scope of her undertaking is so broad that in later sections of the book the argument sometimes devolves into a list of issues. Yet the rich detail she provides strongly supports her conclusion that location, both political and geographic, still largely delimits women's reproductive-control practices. Likewise, although her assessment of the impact of the pill still relies a bit too heavily on the U.K. and U.S. experiences, it also looks beyond that to provide readers with a concrete sense of the complex factors involved in women's reproductive-control practices in the global South.

The Moral Property of Women is the third edition of Gordon's 1976 history of U.S. birth control politics. The first edition of *Women's Body, Women's Right* became a foundational text in women's history. It and the 1990 second edition are standard references for U.S. historians and are standard texts in women's studies courses. The book also became a resource for a wide range of perspectives in contemporary birth control debates. As the change in title signals, this edition contains both updated sections and some revision of "previous interpretations" (viii). Noting that she has moved on to other topics since 1976, Gordon explains that the new edition uses "new scholarship only sparingly" (viii), saying she "did not wish to give the appearance of trying to improve my imperfect book on the basis of other people's work" (viii). The outcome, a sometimes uneven mix of old and new, will likely reinvigorate debate about the book.

Gordon's central argument, as well as the major portion of the text, is substantially the same. She still argues that birth control is a matter of politics more than technology. Her assessment of the trajectory of reproductive

politics from a grassroots to a professional movement remains. Her view of the role that race-suicide fears, eugenics, and racism played in the movement's development remains unchanged. But the overall tone of the analysis is less harsh with regard to key twentieth-century actors. For instance, chapter 8, "Birth Control and Social Revolution," which Gordon "rethought and rewrote" (x), still attributes birth control's professionalization in the 1920s to Margaret Sanger's leadership. However, Gordon now offers some praise of Sanger's leadership and leans toward the view that the decline of an organized left and of feminism prevented a grassroots movement from flourishing in the twenties. Gordon offers a kinder appraisal of Planned Parenthood and the population-control establishment as well. Planned Parenthood's policy and practices are, in her assessment, still emblematic of the population establishment as a whole. But where she had strongly criticized both the organization and the establishment—saying they supported oppressive controls over women's reproductive lives—she now also praises them, saying they became solid allies of feminist reproductive-rights organizations in the 1990s. The pro-life movement also receives some positive assessment as a social movement, especially for its strength in mobilizing broad grassroots support. Additional changes appear in the first chapters, which provide a reorganized and shortened discussion of ancient birth control practices and their prohibition. The revised final three chapters, which were added in the 1990 edition, discuss contemporary politics of abortion, contraception, HIV/AIDS, and teen pregnancy. These chapters take particular notice of welfare reform, abstinence-only sex education, and the success of feminist activism at the 1994 U.N. population conference. There is also a new section about the pill, which, like Marks's discussion, relies on Tone's and Watkins's works.

The most important change, though, is that the analytic framework and interpretive language no longer rely on a socialist feminist perspective. Class politics inherent in capitalism are no longer a prominent explanatory factor. In fact, the whole language of modes of production, class struggle, and revolutionary change has been replaced. Sexual politics are still the central focus of the analysis, which was a real strength of the earlier editions. But the language with which those politics are described replaces the women's liberation discourse of second-wave feminism with the newer academic language of gender systems.

While the original socialist feminist perspective may be outdated, the new analytic language raises other questions. For some readers who felt that the earlier analysis seemed to give too much weight to class politics, the new perspective may be welcomed. Others may find that the new

perspective, by identifying a generalized notion of modernization and economic development as the key factors underlying both the emergence of feminism and modern reproductive control motivations, embraces an overly conventional view of social change. Still other readers may question whether updating the analytic framework and interpretive language without incorporating much recent scholarship can really provide a better alternative to the original work.

Although a "highly selective" (x) rewriting of her classic work, Gordon's most recent revision reaffirms the value of "gender-conscious" history (x): the sexual politics that have shaped both historical and contemporary reproductive policy would not be intelligible without a critical focus on gender. Likewise, Marks's use of a gender-conscious framework illuminates previously overlooked aspects of women's contributions to contraceptive politics and science, as well as the complex global impact of those politics on women's reproductive practices.   ı

Women in Developing Countries: Assessing Strategies for Empowerment. Edited by Rheka Datta and Judith Kornberg. Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner, 2002.

Women Development Workers: Implementing Rural Credit Programmes in Bangladesh. By Anne Marie Goetz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001.

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Gender and development literature in general and empowerment studies in particular have been enriched by several new works from an ever-expanding team of development scholars and gender specialists. Among such texts is that of Rekha Datta and Judith Kornberg, *Women in Developing Countries: Assessing Strategies for Empowerment.* Equally illuminating is Anne Marie Goetz's *Women Development Workers: Implementing Rural Credit Programmes in Bangladesh,* which provides an in-depth analysis of rural credit programs in Bangladesh. The strength of Goetz's work is the analysis and insights it provides on methodology—in this case the collective principles, values, prejudices, and management strategies that influence and guide development workers in the field. Datta and Kornberg's introductory chapter sets the stage for in-depth analyses

of the conceptual issues associated with processes of empowerment and disempowerment; they view empowerment as a multilevel process that involves individuals, groups, and agencies.

The world's largest nongovernmental organization (NGO) may well be the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). Goetz focuses on the ideology at play in BRAC and allied organizations such as the Rural Development Program of Bangladesh, an NGO struggling to achieve gender equity and rights. Her analysis exposes these organizations as being patriarchal at the level of policy implementation. Unfriendly and insensitive to female empowerment in their organizational culture, these NGOs seem primarily to be concerned with the disbursement and recovery of loans. Few of the female development agents in the two organizations believe they have a mission to empower women, and Goetz concludes what some of us have felt all along: that the hiring of large numbers of women is not an automatic pathway to gender equity. More has to be done at the institutional level. Getting development institutions right entails women's participation and women's control of the development policies designed for their benefit at the level of policy making and institutional implementation, a view that Goetz puts forward and that Datta and Kornberg clearly endorse. According to Goetz, it is still essential to have a dominant female presence since success in gender equity will ultimately depend on "the efforts of individual women waging battles for changes in personal relations in their own lives and on the success of women working collectively to bring institutional changes in civil society" (328).

Goetz's conclusions correlate with those of Datta and Kornberg, who argue that empowerment is both a process and an outcome. While Goetz deals with specific institutional case studies such as BRAC, Datta and Kornberg focus primarily on regional cases for the most part. Conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women come under scrutiny, as do the numerous conferences held during the UN Decade for Women—from Mexico City to Nairobi—in illuminating chapters by Charlotte Patton and Kathleen Suleja. That conditions for women worsened in some areas because of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment policies is a major premise of Patton, Kiki Anastasakos, Marian Miller, and several other contributors, whose case studies include the Caribbean, Mexico, Costa Rica, India, China, and the Gaza Strip.

Joan Creevey's analysis, which focuses on the informal economies of the West African states of Niger and Senegal, is well researched and informative. Women are engaged in pottery making, cloth dyeing, and the manufacture of cosmetics, jewelry, and baskets. As agricultural workers,

they produce peanuts, fruits, rice, millet, and vegetables. They are cooks, hairdressers, and midwives as well. In Senegal women sell dried fish, vegetable oils, yogurt, butter, and varieties of fabric and cosmetics in small-scale enterprises. Creevey concludes that as women struggle to overcome greater odds, they are empowered because they take charge of their own situations. But should the IMF and the World Bank be given credit for the coping mechanisms that have emerged to counter their draconian policies? What of the many girls who have been denied access to education because of the exorbitant school fees mandated by the IMF? What of the many women who have died untimely deaths in the struggle to cope with desubsidized health care?

Anastasakos raises an interesting theoretical issue on the concept of empowerment in her focus on Mexico and Costa Rica, proposing that one of the underlying prerequisites of the empowerment process is control: an empowered individual should have control over decisions affecting his or her life as well as access to decent wages, education, and health care. By implication, one may conclude that since IMF policies are literally thrown at governments and undemocratically imposed on unwilling states, the perceived gains or benefits they generate can hardly be empowering in the true sense of the word. The fact is that not only are institutions such as the IMF violators of human rights and of the right to health care and education—they are ultimately agencies of disempowerment, not only of nation-states but also of individuals, be they in Senegal, Niger, or Mexico.

Miller's analysis of the Caribbean gives insight into organizations such as the Barbados-based Women and Development Unit, the Trinidad-based Caribbean Association for Feminist Research, Jamaica's Sistren, and Guyana's Red Thread. The basic theme of her chapter is empowerment through organized struggle in the context of people-centered development models. She points to the growing solidarity of Caribbean women despite a history of class, caste, and racial divisiveness, as well as severe economic difficulties.

The adaptability of patriarchy is the major theoretical issue confronting activists, scholars, and even feminist theory in relation to the world's most populous country, China, according to contributor Kelley Tsai. She argues that gender inequalities have persisted over the last half century, in defiance of Marxist ideology, on the one hand, and free market liberalism, on the other. Chairman Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party, and the All-China Women's Federation could not deinstitutionalize patriarchy, despite mixed successes in land reform and notable successes with regard to foot binding, concubinage, child brides, and dowry payments. At the

political level the participation of women has remained impressive. Tsai points out that patriarchy got a new lease of life in the post-1979 era with the adoption of the neo-Malthusian policy of One Family, One Child. Not only was this an infringement of women's reproductive rights, but it would lead to skewed sex ratios and increased crimes against women, including infanticide, an issue also raised by Datta in her focus on the processes of empowerment and disempowerment in India.

The greatest challenges confronting women in China, India, and the developing world—in organizations ostensibly founded to promote women's well-being, for that matter—is the need to dismantle institutional patriarchy, which has manifested itself in different forms over time and space. In the final analysis these two texts are essential reading not only for the numerous male and female development workers who work in gender-related organizations but for scholars, policy makers, and development planners who seek genuine pathways to female empowerment.   ∎

Holding On to the Promise: Women's Human Rights and the Beijing + 5 Review. Edited by Cynthia Meillon in collaboration with Charlotte Bunch. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Center for Women's Global Leadership, 2001.

Women's Rights: A Global View. Edited by Lynn Walter. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001.

Women, Gender, and Human Rights: A Global Perspective. Edited by Marjorie Agosin. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001.

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The three books under review at once celebrate the recognition of women's rights as human rights and critique the poverty of formulaic prescriptions for gender balancing. Several themes coalesce from powerful depictions of women's agency and from illuminations of structural barriers in the books. These include women's adept transformations of crises into redeeming opportunities, the collision of emergent rights with

culture and religion, manipulations of gender issues by vested interests, and the repeated embrace by divergent actors of gender participation as an instrumental objective or as a means instead of as intrinsically valuable.

Cynthia Meillon's *Holding On to the Promise* highlights the Center for Women's Global Leadership's monumental role in reinterpreting existing human rights standards to incorporate women's experiences. The book emanated from the proceedings of a forum organized by the center in anticipation of a special session scheduled by the UN General Assembly to review the implementation of the Platform for Action adopted at the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference. *Holding On to the Promise* is a lyrical compilation of thoughts, which Meillon aptly describes as "a series of snapshots" (4). It foregrounds women's tireless, resourceful, and innovative deployment of strategies to advocate for and assert their rights as well as to counter the retreat of state parties from hard-won concessions achieved through international feminist struggles. Resonant indictments of states for exploitations that hold gender equity hostage to the vicissitudes of politics and to cultural and religious politicizations are vividly reinforced by Meillon's invocation of Khalil Gibran's reminder: "Just as a single leaf does not turn yellow without the silent knowledge of the rest of the whole tree / So the wrong doer cannot do wrong without the hidden will of you all" (68).

Interestingly, the equivocation of states is somewhat paralleled by the selective advocacy for aspects of women's human rights among champions of the gender equity agenda. Particularly telling in this respect is the fact that, even in his response to commentaries devoted to women's economic rights and the challenges of structural injustice, Pierre Sané, the secretary general of Amnesty International, prioritizes political mobilization and eschews meaningful affirmation of economic rights. Meillon's collection presents sobering evidence, indicating that inertia in implementing women's human rights cannot always be attributed to the absence of political will but rather demonstrates a host of challenges, including the paucity of resources at the disposal of the state.

Contributors to this collection rely on core human rights documents to paradigmatically reconceptualize gender-based violence by linking it to macroeconomic policies. Delineating key benchmarks to further the Beijing + 5 agenda in her opening remarks, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson underscores the increasing obligation of developed countries to transfer resources to those living in poverty. In a similar vein, Colombian senator and women's rights activist Piedad Cordoba laments the burden the international debt crises and concomitant asymmetries in the international political economy pose for the substantive

implementation of women's human rights. Pointedly addressing the indivisibility, interdependence, and interconnectedness of the totality of human rights, Cordoba enunciates the relevance of "globalization with ethics and equity" (28) to the consolidation of political democracy.

By saliently illustrating grassroots interventions and the growing sophistication of nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities, networking, and exchanges, this collection articulates the importance of listening to voices from below. However, its discussion of practical constraints, which makes no reference to the shortfalls of NGO practices, could have been enriched by applying some of the standards NGOs use to scrutinize governments to the NGOs themselves. In the final analysis, the book shows that whatever the deficits of women's conferences, they have provided enormous opportunities for women to network across boundaries and have stimulated the emergence of a formidable global women's movement.

Lynn Walter's collection, *Women's Rights: A Global View*, posits the commonality of gender predicaments across time and space to locate current feminist struggles and complicate problematic assumptions. Drawing on synoptic country profiles and cursory life-review anecdotes, contributors describe structural factors that impede or facilitate women's mobilization. The materials show a strong correlation between women's descent into poverty and their vulnerability to various forms of violence, including sexual predation. Surprisingly, however, some authors focus almost exclusively on physical violence without problematizing the underlying structure or enabling environment for its prevalence. Explorations of explanatory variables for gender abuse and responses thereof in the publication reveal additional burdens shouldered by rural, indigenous, and minority women. The disproportionate disadvantage of these constituencies is all the more tragic when their issues are manipulated to legitimate so-called grassroots NGOs that functionally remain city based and that define agendas devoid of meaningful input from the stakeholders they were founded to serve.

The book captures the complexity of culture (broadly construed to encompass religion), illustrating both its susceptibility to oppressive distortion by conservative elements within indigenous or statist power structures and its capacity to reinforce the empowerment of women in some contexts. Islamization and gender segregation policies can in fact catalyze women's increased participation in society as well as the indigenization of feminist critiques, and women can maneuver cultural artifacts like the *hijab* (veil) as symbols of resistance to dominant male privilege and as a means to negotiate tensions between orthodoxy and modernity. The dis-

cussions in *Women's Rights* are enhanced by several other instructive jux-
tapositions. Women's enactment of femininity is reconciled with women's
assumption of nontraditional roles (83). Age-old presumptions about the
diminished capacity of, and ascription of civil death to, women are ana-
lyzed alongside vivid depictions of the extraordinary agency that women
exhibit in their daily lives.

Walter's collection presents evidence that states rely on women to stim-
ulate their economies, even if women's input is not officially acknowl-
edged. This evidence belies the validity of the grounds for women's his-
torical exclusion from the professions and the public sphere. Women's
unremunerated and unenumerated tasks are venerated by incantations of
an ideal womanhood, sacrificial and predisposed to an ethic of care. The
revealing chronologies presented in *Women's Rights* trace reform dis-
courses to unlikely periods, champions, and domains such as harems.
Particularly compelling are Marysa Navarro's accounts of the mobilization,
agency, and activism of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, who risked their
lives to protest the disappearance of their children and who were a major
force in the democratization of Argentina. However, as Navarro dem-
onstrates, women's sacrifices for and contributions to the disintegration
of repressive regimes do not necessarily translate into political capital or
concrete advantages in supposedly participatory regimes.

Similarly noteworthy in this vein is Sharon K. Hom's discussion of the
prospects and constraints of state feminism. Her acknowledgment of law's
potential is tempered by sensitivity to the limitations of formal legal guar-
antees and to the backlash triggered by seemingly progressive interven-
tions. Along the same lines, several other contributions suggest that the
institutionalization of women's rights and the prioritization of civil aspects
of enfranchisement become proxy for inertia, symbolic gestures, or highly
selective implementation. Pertinent on this note is Araceli Alonso's anal-
ysis, which offers grounds to question the consensus about human re-
source development, especially education and its multigenerational re-
turns, as a critical mechanism for gender balancing. Her insights are
incisive about the Cuban experience, in which social opportunities for
women resulted in neither openness to women's political representation
nor in the erosion of self-reinforcing patriarchal power structures. The
issues and strategies prioritized by the groups of women discussed in the
book are telling about their common grounds and points of departures.
The book is further instructive about skillful initiatives engineered by
women to collaborate across their differences and to bridge their pertinent
interests. Remarkably, the book's consistent caveats regarding the heter-
ogeneity of women do not preclude overly broad, essentialized, and con-

tradictory claims. By the same token, some contributions, such as Victoria B. Tashijan's chapter on Nigeria, could have been more rigorously reasoned, nuanced, documented, and informed by methodologically sound data.

Marie Agosin's *Women, Gender, and Human Rights* is an eclectic collection of essays by a broad spectrum of scholars. Arvonne Fraser's refreshing historicization of feminist consciousness demonstrates that gender inclusion gains are not merely patriarchal acts of benevolence but fiercely contested and sometimes Pyrrhic. Outlining the genealogy of a coherent women's human rights discourse and activism, Fraser contends that, despite the long ancestry of women's human rights debates, the abrogations exemplified by the Taliban's atrocities clearly establish the urgency of vigilant and substantive implementation of those rights today.

The bulk of materials in *Women, Gender, and Human Rights* highlight the importance of gender-based violence as a concern—and as a prism for analyzing women's predicaments. Although global attention to gender violence is novel and rapidly evolving, the issue became the pivot for successful campaigns that culminated in the recognition of women's rights as human rights. The strategic value of privileging this concrete issue as a microcosm of gender oppression brings home the folk wisdom that the "only way to eat an elephant is bite-by-bite." Nonetheless, there are material risks to monolithism. Some of the writings only go as far as the salutory invocation of quantitative data, such as the World Health Organization report that domestic violence accounts for more deaths and disabling injuries among women ages fifteen to forty-four than cancer, malaria, traffic injuries, and war put together (74). However, the staggering statistics about the casualties and fatalities from violence make all the more curious the failure to push the analysis to uncover systemic and systematic dimensions of violence. The analytical and empirical investigations of a range of gender mainstreaming interventions convey the cogency of a comprehensive gender equity framework. The significance of violence as a paradigm for corrective initiatives is reinforced when the phenonmenon is used to delineate the complex political economy of gender oppression and its interconnections with issues such as health care, employment, and political participation.

Various insights in Agosin's collection betray the artificiality of binaries and suggest that the usefulness of assuming a dichotomy between public and private actor violence may be considerably undermined by redefinitions of state complicity implicit in the emergent recognition of women's rights as human rights. The shift from an era in which the realm of domesticity was occluded from state scrutiny to a period in which activists

insist on state accountability for gender violence regardless of its source may be a mixed blessing. State scrutiny is not cost free, especially when seen in light of the state's concerted effort to control the definition of feminist agendas. Furthermore, the feminist imbrication of productive and reproductive roles is paradoxical amid the retrenchment of social policies, opportunities, and services in the wake of economic dislocations and globalization. It is a striking irony that structural adjustment mandates such as privatization are in effect the reprivatization of public responsibilities and result in increased obligations for women, who are forced to redouble their efforts in order to ameliorate the burdens occasioned by social service cutbacks.

Problematic legal measures derive from caricatured readings of culture. For example, according to Sheila Dauer, Amnesty International traces honor killings to the commodification of women and unequivocally prescribes the criminalization of "the sale or giving of girls in marriage against financial consideration" (75, 78). This conclusion is somewhat akin to arguing for the eradication of the market economy on account of gross wealth disparities. The centrality attributed to culture by Amnesty International's finding demonstrates the dangers of discounting the dividends of culture and suggests the constructive role of culture for gender equity purposes. It behooves us to consider the logical implications of Amnesty International's stance in light of whatever values a bride price may express for a woman about her personhood—and whatever corollary functions it may serve for the community. Ample evidence suggests that simplistic approaches that pit individuals against collective self-determination raise the stakes unduly, play into the hands of conservative elements, and tend to compound the risks, at least in the short term, for women. Ultimately, gender and cultural or religious rights are not inherently opposed; human rights represent a discourse available to local actors to define their problems in their own terms. Encouraging reinterpretations of sacred texts undertaken by Muslim feminists offer empirical proof of the reconcilability and intersectionality of these rights.

Antifeminism and Family Terrorism. By Rhonda Hammer. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.

The Surrendered Wife: A Practical Guide to Finding Intimacy, Passion, and Peace with a Man. By Laura Doyle. New York: Fireside, 2001.

Linda Kintz, University of Oregon

R honda Hammer has written an important book that brings together feminist analyses of violence against women in a broad context, including the effects and activities of globalization, and readings of conservative antifeminist texts that shed light on the ways in which that violence is made to appear invisible, even though, in reality, it is right before our eyes. Hammer also takes the opportunity to argue for interdisciplinary approaches that theorize feminism as the colonization of female subjects by a patriarchal order and that employ a fluid, multivalent, dialectical framework that seems to have been influenced by Frankfurt School critical theory. Such a dialectical approach, she argues, could avoid a particular historical flaw that often appears in the U.S. context, a tendency to fall into identitarian, binary, or realist concepts in which meaning is made static and its terms reified. Such an outcome, which often results from a lack of dialectical interrogation of U.S. traditions of textuality, risks losing the shifting valences of social positioning and locking the objects of study into one-dimensional power relations.

Although much poststructuralist or Continental theory has been criticized as relativist and as abandoning its empirical foundations when attempting such fluidity, Hammer argues that a rigorous study can remain historically grounded while accounting for the layered shifts and relations of social positioning. Her organizing concepts of fluidity and marginality also make the work of theorists of borderland, or marginalized, social positions central to the study of violence.

Hammer traces the arguments of several antifeminist writers, or pseudofeminist antifeminists: Camille Paglia, Naomi Wolf, and Christina Hoff Sommers. Feminist analysts have too rarely taken this work as seriously as it deserves, given the formidable cultural work it performs in popular culture. Hammer's readings provide a nuanced analysis of the power available to women who exploit feminism's social achievements in order to make a career out of antifeminism. In describing the receptive audience produced by a corporate-controlled media, she also shows the ways in which each of these antifeminists has either an untheorized, naive notion of American individ-

ualism or an exploitative view of mass-mediated popular culture. Wolf, for example, presumes a pure individual "voice" unaffected by the context within which she is heard, while Sommers knows full well, given the right-wing financial support and recognition she has received, the weight of the antifeminist backlash in which popular culture is eager for catty critiques of feminists by other women, especially women who call themselves feminists. Hammer also shows how difficult it is for feminists to engage in public dialogue, given the traps that popular culture sets for critical thinking in general.

The book also includes chapters on structures that enable domestic violence both in the United States and globally, usefully broadening the concept of terrorism to include the intimate violence that increasingly escapes notice, its invisibility ironically all the more powerfully produced the more the globe becomes militarized. In this regard, the Bush administration has co-opted the concept of terrorism in its most cosmic, global sense to refer to acts that victimize not women but the strongest country in the history of the world. It would have been helpful had Hammer devoted more time to this issue, given its key importance to contemporary politics. One would also have liked to see the analysis of a case of domestic violence in circumstances of difficult economic conditions in juxtaposition to the high-profile, high-income case of Hedda Nussbaum, who was recognized as a victim of domestic violence but pilloried for her failure to save the life of her daughter, whom her husband murdered in 1988.

Laura Doyle's self-help marriage guide, *The Surrendered Wife: A Practical Guide to Finding Intimacy, Passion, and Peace with a Man*, provides guidance for that ordinary woman. At first glance Doyle promises to deal with surrender as the act of opening oneself up to another in love rather than trying to control him. The group process of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is the filter for her method, its format historically amenable to nonreligious concepts of spirituality, though pressures to Christianize AA are intense. Describing herself as a feminist, Doyle decided to write the book when her marriage of eleven years was coming apart, and she saw surrender as a way to escape the need to do everything at home. To be fair, she does warn her readers that this advice is not for women who are married to abusive, unfaithful, or substance-abusing husbands, and she insists that surrender is not the same thing as physical submission. However, this superficial caveat to domestic violence is one of the most troubling and irresponsible aspects of *The Surrendered Wife*, which repackages absolutist assumptions about gender differences into a popular and accessible format.

Different interpretations of surrender, such as that of Eastern philosophy or other spiritual traditions, might see surrender as giving oneself

to another, a very different form of spirituality than the ego-obsessed American version. Doyle, however, shuts down that possibility by constructing surrender as giving oneself *up* to. This kind of training is perhaps the most important element in contemporary conservative politics, which takes women's domestic work with the seriousness it deserves. In convincing women to stay home and educate the next generation in traditional values, the Right takes full advantage of the powerful linkage between intimacy and power. Doyle's book may be even more dangerous than straightforward religious texts because of its popularized, secular form. She also advises her readers to get out of politics and let men handle public matters, which, we assume, will be to make policies based on traditional values. Ironically, while Christopher Lasch was lamenting, in 1977, feminism's destruction of the "haven in a heartless world," the conservative backlash and women like Doyle have brought the mandate for traditional values and the home directly into the realm of politics.[1]

Doyle's secular book sports a blurb by John Gray, author of *Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus*, and on Amazon.com it was twinned with Stuart Scott's *The Exemplary Husband: A Biblical Perspective*, which features this blurb: "The strength of this book is its high view of God and theological foundation. Husbands are to be the spiritual leaders in their homes and to love their wives as Christ loved the church."[2] And just as Hammer's book suggested, conservative women have understood marketing very well: Doyle's credentials as marriage therapist consist only of a degree in journalism from San Jose State University and experience as a copywriter for a marketing firm; her exploitation of the antifeminist backlash led to appearances on *Oprah, Dateline NBC, The Today Show, The View, Politically Incorrect, The O'Reilly Factor*, the CBS Evening News, and the radio shows of Laura Schlesinger, among many others; she now offers seminars on the principles of surrender across the country.

These two books, one a cautionary study, the other an example of the genre, point to the centrality of the need to discipline women, both by ideology and by force, in these reactionary times. Although one might have wished that Hammer had more fully historicized her use of the concept of dialectics in relation to the changing definitions of that term over time, her book is a model of the kind of work that must be done if we are to understand family terrorism and the mundane ways in which it is perpetrated.

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[1] Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World. The Family Besieged* (New York: Basic, 1977).

[2] Stuart Scott, *The Exemplary Husband. A Biblical Perspective* (Bemidji, MN: Focus, 2000).

United States and International Notes

Calls for papers

The editors of *Atlantis* invite submissions for a special issue titled "Sexy Feminisms? Transformations in Feminist Sexuality Studies," to be edited by Susanne Luhmann and Rachel Warburton. Papers should contribute to an inquiry into the current relationship between "feminist" and "sexuality." Such inquiry circulates around two central questions: How have the above-mentioned theoretical and political movements transformed how we do and understand feminist sexuality studies today? What kinds of changes can we observe in feminist theory's long-standing conversation about the status of sexuality? Please send submissions to *Atlantis: A Women's Studies Journal*, Institute for the Study of Women, Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax NS B3M 2J6, Canada; phone 902-457-6319, fax 902-443-1352; e-mail atlantis_at_msvu.ca. Deadline is February 1, 2006.

Intersections: Gender, History, and Culture in the Asian Context seeks submissions for a forthcoming issue on "Queer Japan" to be published in June 2006. *Intersections* emphasizes the paramount importance of research into the region's multiple historical and cultural gender patterns—patterns that are crucial for the understanding of contemporary globalized societies, where identities and social relations are constantly being negotiated against the background of dominant narratives. Submissions should be e-mailed to intrsect@central.murdoch.edu.au or mailed to the Editors, *Intersections*, SSHE, Murdoch University, South Street, WA 6150, Australia. Deadline for submissions is February 15, 2006.

For a special issue on religion and politics, *Radical History Review* solicits article proposals from scholars across the disciplines, in fields including history, anthropology, religious studies, sociology, philosophy, political science, gender studies, and cultural studies. The journal encourages potential contributors to explore the following issues, among other possibilities: religion and state violence; religious identity within transnational migrations and diasporic communities; links between religion/secularism and political and/or social radicalism; gender, sexuality, and

religious belief, missionaries and imperialism; the politics of religious iconography; and "religion" as a category of analysis in history, anthropology, and sociology. The journal also encourages submissions from scholars who teach religious history for the special section titled "Teaching Radical History" (TRH). In TRH pieces, scholars discuss their methodological, theoretical, and pedagogical frameworks, along with course syllabi and reflections on the classroom experience. Please submit an abstract of up to two pages to rhr@igc.org. Deadline is March 15, 2006.

Women's Studies Journal invites submissions for a special issue on women and spirituality to be edited by Kathryn Rountree and Mary Nash. The journal welcomes submissions from all academic disciplines and from those working in the area of women and spirituality in the community. The journal has a primary but not exclusive focus on New Zealand and the Pacific region. Each submission will be peer-reviewed by two reviewers. Contributions should be between 5,000–8,000 words, including tables, notes, and references, and should use either APA reference format or endnotes. Contact Kathryn Rountree at K.E.Rountree@massey.ac.nz and Mary Nash at M.Nash@massey.ac.nz. Send submissions to Jenny Coleman, J.D.Coleman@massey.ac.nz, Women's Studies Programme, School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, Massey University, Private Bag 11 222, Palmerston North, Aotearoa/New Zealand. Deadline is April 15, 2006.

The Swedish Secretariat for Gender Research is seeking papers on the topic of "Debating a Gender Encompassing Economic Citizenship" as part of the XIV International Economic History Congress, to take place in Helsinki, Finland, August 21–25, 2006. For more information, contact Kirsti Niskanen at kirsti.niskanen@tema.liu.se. Final deadline for papers is May 1, 2006.

The Journal of Women's History is inaugurating a new special section to be devoted to the practice of women's history. This section will consist of short individual pieces (1,000–2,000 words) as well as full roundtable forums of four to five contributors (5,000–10,000 words total) that explore cutting-edge questions in history practice—from the archive to personal narrative work, from grant writing and publishing to teaching, from activism and community service to campus and department politics. To contribute to a forum or to propose future history practice sections (either individual or roundtable), contact the editors at Editors, *Journal of Women's History*, University of Illinois, 810 South Wright, Urbana, IL 61801, or at womenshistory@uiuc.edu. Deadline is ongoing.

thirdspace_: Feminist Journal for Emerging Scholars is committed to the promotion of new feminist work in all areas of study. The mandate of this e-journal is to produce a top-quality, refereed journal that demonstrates the broad range of applications for feminist theory and methodology and that gives emerging feminist scholars a venue for their work. The editors also seek to make *thirdspace_* a portal for connection with the wider feminist academic community. Submissions should

be original work done by an emerging scholar—graduate student, postdoctoral fellow, new independent scholar, junior professional, or someone of similar status. *thirdspace_* welcomes submissions in English, French, German, Spanish, and Arabic; submissions in other languages may be considered as well. Submissions should be sent electronically in Word, WordPerfect, or Rich Text (rtf) format to submissions@thirdspace.ca and jessica@thirdspace.ca. Send one paper copy of your submission to *thirdspace*, c/o K. Snowden, #6-2526 West 4th Avenue, Vancouver BC V6K 1P6, Canada. For more information, contact info@thirdspace.ca or go to http://www.thirdspace.ca. Deadline is ongoing.

Chicana/Latina Studies, an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed, biannual publication of the national collective Mujeres Activas en Letras y Cambio Social (Women Active in Research and Social Change), seeks review essays, research articles, literary criticism, and creative writing that explore the Chicana/Latina experience. For all matters of style, especially for notes and references, consult the fifteenth edition of *The Chicago Manual of Style*. The journal uses the author-date documentation style. *Chicana/Latina Studies* has no manuscript page minimum or maximum but prefers scholarly articles of 5,000 words or 25 pages (not including tables, notes, or references), commentary articles of fewer than 2,500 words, and review articles of approximately 1,000 words. Submissions may be sent to Karen Mary Davalos, Chicana/o Studies Department, Loyola Marymount University–UNH 4419, One LMU Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90045. Deadline is ongoing.

Praeger Publishers announces a new series, Sexual Diversity and the Law, which will focus on legal issues involving sexual orientation or sexual/gender identity. This series will examine a host of issues affecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered individuals, including discussions of the law on marriage, family, employment, immigration, human rights, and so on, in both the national and international context. The series will include works that focus on the law of a particular country as well as works on comparative or international law. Proposals for book-length manuscripts should be sent to Mark Strasser, Series Editor, Capital University Law School, 303 East Broad St., Columbus, OH 43215; e-mail mstrasser@law.capital.edu. Deadline is ongoing.

Three notable gender and technology scholars, Sue V. Rosser, Mary Frank Fox, and Deborah Johnson, invite proposals for volumes for a new book series, Women, Gender, and Technology, to be published by the University of Illinois Press. This series will bring together women's studies and technology studies focusing on women and technology, feminist perspectives on technology, and the gendering of technology and its impact on gender relations in society. Volumes may be written from multiple perspectives and approaches, reflecting and aimed toward audiences that include scholars in women's studies, science and technology studies, studies of occupations and organizations, ethics and technology, cultural studies of science and technology, the history of technology,

and public policy. Inquiries and proposals should be sent to Sue V. Rosser, Dean, Ivan Allen College, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA 30332-0525, e-mail sue.rosser@iac .gatech.edu; Mary Frank Fox, School of History, Technology, and Society, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA 30332-0345, e-mail mary.fox@hts.gatech.edu; or Deborah Johnson, School of Public Policy, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA 30332-0345, e-mail deborah.johnson@pubpolicy.gatech.edu. Deadline is ongoing.

Call for artwork

Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society seeks submissions for cover art. Published quarterly by the University of Chicago Press and distributed internationally, *Signs* is an interdisciplinary journal that focuses on issues of gender, race, class, nation, and sexuality. Submissions are not limited by style or medium (photography and film stills are welcome) but should reproduce well in black and white; content should represent a point of view on women's issues. One full-color cover will be published annually. Send up to ten labeled slide duplicates, a brief biography, an artist statement, and SASE to Art Editor, *Signs*, Room 8, Voorhees Chapel, Douglass College, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901. E-mail signs@signs.rutgers.edu. A small honorarium is available. Deadline is ongoing.

About the Contributors

Gloria Emeagwall is professor of history at Central Connecticut State University. She has taught at several universities in Nigeria and the United States and has published over fifty articles and edited six books on various aspects of African development. Among her publications is *Women Pay the Price: Structural Adjustment in Africa and the Caribbean* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1995). She is chief editor of *Africa Update*, a newsletter of African Studies, at Central Connecticut State University. Dr. Emeagwali was the founding director of African Studies at CCSU.

Myra Marx Ferree (mferree@ssc.wisc.edu) is professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. She is a longtime student of the women's movements and coauthor of *Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and *Controversy and Coalition: The New Feminist Movement*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000). Her current work includes a project on transnational feminist networks on the Web and a book on transformations of German feminism. She was a Berlin Prize Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin in Spring 2005.

Stephanie Foote is at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She is the author of *Regional Fictions: Culture and Identity in Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001) and numerous articles on U.S. literature. She is currently finishing a book on class desire in late nineteenth-century U.S. literature and beginning a book on twentieth-century lesbian print cultures in the United States.

James N. Green (James_Green@brown.edu) is associate professor of Brazilian history and culture at Brown University. He is the author of *Beyond Carnival: Male Homosexuality in Twentieth-Century Brazil* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and *"We Cannot Remain Silent": Opposition to the Brazilian Dictatorship in the United States, 1964–85* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming). Green currently serves as chair of the Committee on the Future of Brazilian Studies in the United States. He is currently writing *"More Love and More Desire": A History of the Brazilian Lesbian, Gay, and Transgendered Movement*, which is under contract with the University of Chicago Press.

Didi Herman is professor of law and social change at the University of Kent, United Kingdom. She is the author of *Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Equality* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), *The Antigay Agenda: Orthodox Vision and the Christian Right* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1997), and, with Doris Buss, *Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right and International Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

Penelope D. Johnson is professor emerita of history at New York University, where she taught for twenty-five years. She has published *Prayer, Patronage, and Power: The Abbey of la Trinité, Vendôme (1032–1187)* (New York: New York University Press, 1981) and *Equal in Monastic Profession: Religious Women in Medieval France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Articles include "Suicide and Its Prevention in Later Medieval France," *Proceedings of the Western Society for French Studies* 26 (2000): 184–91, and "The Body of Gerardesca, or Pisa Reclothed and Resexed," to appear in *The Boswell Thesis*, edited by Matthew Kuefler and forthcoming from the University of Chicago Press.

Linda Kintz (lkintz@uoregon.edu) is professor of English at the University of Oregon, with research interests in critical theory, psychoanalytic theory, performance studies, and studies of contemporary conservatism. Her books include *Between Jesus and the Market: The Emotions That Matter in Right-Wing America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), *The Subject's Tragedy: Political Poetics, Feminist Theory, and Drama* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), and, with Julia Lesage, *Media, Culture, and the Religious Right* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

Sharon Marcus teaches at Columbia University. She is the author of "Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention," which appears in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott's *Feminists Theorize the Political* (New York: Routledge, 1992), and *Apartment Stories: City and Home in Nineteenth-Century Paris and London* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). She has recently published several articles drawn from a forthcoming book on relationships between women in Victorian England, including "Reflections on Victorian Fashion Plates," *differences* 12, no. 3 (2003): 4–33, and "The Queerness of Victorian Marriage Reform," which appears in *Exploring Women's Studies: Looking Forward, Looking Back*, edited by Carol Berkin, Carole Appel, and Judith Pinch (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2006).

Robyn Marschke earned a BA from Concordia College in Moorhead, Minnesota (1997) and a PhD in sociology from the University of Colorado at Boulder (2004). She is currently working in the Office of Institutional Research at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs as an institutional research analyst.

Carole R. McCann is director and associate professor of women's studies at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC). She is the author of *Birth Control Politics in the United States, 1916–1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) and coeditor, with Seung Kyung Kim, of *Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2002). She is currently work-

ing on a study of gender, race, and colonial politics in twentieth-century demographic theory and practice.

Nina Menkes synthesizes inner dream worlds with harsh, outer realities. Her six films include *The Bloody Child, Queen of Diamonds, Magdalena Viraga,* and *The Great Sadness of Zohara.* She has worked closely with her sister, Tinka Menkes, who has been both lead performer and creative collaborator. Their films have shown widely in major international film festivals, including Toronto, Rotterdam, Locarno, London, Sundance, and Cairo, as well as at the Cinémathèque Française, the Whitney Museum of American Art Biennial, and the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Menkes's many honors include a Los Angeles Film Critics Association Award, a Guggenheim Fellowship, two fellowships from the National Endowment for the Arts, and an American Film Institute Independent Filmmaker Award. See more of her work at http://www.ninamenkes.com.

Mary Beth Mills (memills@colby.edu) is associate professor of anthropology at Colby College in Waterville, Maine. She is the author of "Gender and Inequality in the Global Labor Force," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32 (2003): 41–62, and *Thai Women in the Global Labor Force: Consuming Desires, Contested Selves* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999), winner of the Anthony Leeds Prize for Urban Anthropology.

Sara Murphy holds a PhD in comparative literature from New York University and teaches literary and cultural theory at NYU's Gallatin School of Individualized Study. She is currently at work on a study of the representation of sexual violence in literature, law, and psychoanalysis.

June Nash is Distinguished Professor Emerita at the City University of New York Graduate Center and City College. Her early fieldwork was in Chiapas, Mexico, where she worked with Mayas, publishing *In the Eyes of the Ancestors: Belief and Behavior in a Maya Community* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970). Her work in tin-mining communities of Bolivia resulted in the monograph *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), which received the C. Wright Mills award honorable mention in 1980. In 1989 she returned to her roots in Chiapas as the safest and least conflicted field area in which to train future anthropologists. She summarizes her decades of fieldwork with Mayas in *Mayan Visions: The Quest for Autonomy in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2001). She received the Conrad Arensburg award for ethnological studies in 1993, the American Anthropological Association's Boas award for lifetime achievement in 1995, and the Kalman Silvert award of the Latin American Studies Association in 2004.

Joyce McCarl Nielsen (joyce.nielsen@colorado.edu) is professor of sociology and associate dean for social sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder. She has

been teaching and researching gender equity issues for over thirty years. Recent publications include "Gendered Heteronormativity: Empirical Illustrations in Everyday Life," *Sociological Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2000): 283–96, with Glenda Walden and Charlotte Kunkel.

Leslye Obiora holds law degrees from the University of Nigeria, Yale, and Stanford. Dr. Obiora has published extensively and received several honors and awards. She is the founder of the Institute for Research on African Women, Children, and Culture (IRAWCC) and currently teaches at the University of Arizona College of Law.

Patricia Rankin (Patricia.Rankin@colorado.edu) is an experimental high energy physicist who traces her interests in gender equity back to her single-sex schooling in England from ages 11–18. She joined the faculty at the University of Colorado, Boulder, in 1988 and is currently the associate dean for natural sciences. After receiving tenure, she took a two-year leave of absence to be a program officer in the physics division at the National Science Foundation. She is the principal investigator for the Leadership Education for Advancement and Promotion (LEAP) project funded by an NSF ADVANCE award.

Malini Johar Schueller is professor of English at the University of Florida. She is the author of *U.S. Orientalisms: Race, Nation, and Gender in Literature, 1790–1890* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998) and coeditor, with Edward Watts, of *Messy Beginnings: Postcoloniality and Early American Studies* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), which includes her essay, "Nation, Missionary Women, and the Race of True Womanhood." Her recent articles include "Claiming Post-colonial America: The Hybrid Asian-American Performances of Tseng Kwong Chi," which appears in *Asian North American Subjectivities: Beyond the Hyphen*, edited by Eleanor Ty and Donald Goellnicht (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); "Articulations of African-Americanism in South Asian Postcolonial Theory: Localism, Globalism, and the Question of Race," *Cultural Critique* 55 (2003): 35–62; and "Postcolonial American Studies," *American Literary History* 16, no. 1 (2004): 162–75.

Elisabeth Sheff is assistant professor at Georgia State University. She researches gender and sexuality, and is particularly interested in examining the margins of social life in order to illuminate the power structures and covert norms endemic to the central social cast. Her recent publications include "Polyamorous Women, Sexual Subjectivity, and Power," *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 34, no. 3 (2005): 251–83.

A. Holly Shissler is assistant professor of modern Middle Eastern history in the department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago. She is also associate director of the university's Center for Middle Eastern

Studies. Her book *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003) deals with the development of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman and early republican periods.

Moshe Sluhovsky is associate professor of history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His new book, "'Believe Not Every Spirit': Possession, Mysticism, and the Discernment of Spirits in Early Modern Catholicism," will be published by the University of Chicago Press in 2006

Kimberly Springer lectures in the American Studies Department at King's College London, where she specializes in social movements, mass media, and feminist theory. She is the author of *Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 1968–1980* (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2005) and editor of *Still Lifting, Still Climbing: African-American Women's Contemporary Activism* (New York: New York University Press, 1999). Her current research examines the censorship of historical and contemporary expressions of black female sexuality in the work of performance poet Sarah Jones and fine arts photographer Renée Cox.

Sarita Srivastava's (sarita@post.queensu.ca) primary research interest is the interdisciplinary, historical, and organizational study of race and gender; her areas of research also include the sociology of social movements and emotions. Her recent work analyzes the discursive shifts and deadlocks of antiracist challenges within social movements, particularly in feminist organizations. She has been active in environmental, labor, and feminist movements, and is a professor of sociology at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. Forthcoming publications include "Tears, Fears and Careers: Anti-racism, Emotion and Social Movement Organizations," *Canadian Journal of Sociology;* "The Problem of 'Authentic Experience': Storytelling in Anti-racist and Anti-homophobic Education," *Critical Sociology;* and "'Let's Talk': The Pedagogy and Politics of Anti-racist Change," in *Radical Experiments in Utopian Pedagogy: Confronting Neoliberalism in the Age of Globalization,* edited by Mark Cote, Richard Day, and Greig de Peuter, forthcoming from the University of Toronto Press.

Georgia Warnke is professor of philosophy at the University of California, Riverside, and the author, most recently, of *Legitimate Differences: Interpretation in the Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). She is currently working on a manuscript developing an interpretive conception of identity.

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Guidelines for Contributors

The editors invite submission of article-length manuscripts that might appropriately be published in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*. We publish articles from a wide range of disciplines in a variety of voices—articles engaging gender and its interaction with race, culture, class, nation, and/or sexuality. We are looking for lively, provocative essays that launch new inquiries or prompt intense debate. We publish essays not only in areas of scholarship familiar to *Signs* readers but in emergent fields relevant to women and gender. Essays may be cross-disciplinary in their theorizing, their methodology, or their sources.

Signs does not consider manuscripts that are under review elsewhere or that have been previously published. *Signs* does not accept unsolicited book reviews.

Each author (or set of coauthors) will receive 10 copies of the issue or a year's subscription (or renewal).

Editorial procedures

All articles published in *Signs* are peer reviewed.

Preparation of copy

1. Articles should not exceed a maximum length of 10,000 words, including references and endnotes. Please indicate the word count on the title page.

2. A separate title page should include the article title and the author's name, postal address, telephone number, e-mail address, and fax number, if available. To protect anonymity, the author's name should not appear in the manuscript, and all references in the body of the text and in endnotes that might identify the author to the reviewer should be removed and cited on a separate page. Articles that do not conform to these specifications will be returned to the authors.

3. A high-quality copy of each illustration should accompany the manuscript. Reproduction-quality prints of illustrations will be required for manuscripts accepted for publication.

4. All articles must include an abstract of no more than 500 words. Abstracts should be included within the body of the manuscript and must also be submitted within the appropriate field on the Web-based Peer Review (WPR) submission form.

5. Authors are strongly encouraged to submit manuscripts online, via WPR. For instructions, please visit http://mss.uchicago.edu/Signs or see Submission Guidelines below.

Citations and references

Submissions should follow the author-date system of documentation, with limited endnotes, as outlined in *The Chicago Manual of Style* (15th ed.). (See chapter 16,

pages 616–24, outlining documentation for the social sciences.) The journal office may request full revision of manuscripts not meeting the *CMS* requirements for documentation.

References to works are given in the text in chronological order by enclosing the author's surname and the year of publication in parentheses (Miller 1978) and are keyed to an alphabetical list of references at the end of the article. Specific page or section references follow the date, preceded by a comma (Miller 1978, 234). Other examples are: (Miller and Jones 1978) for dual authorship; (Miller et al. 1978) for more than three authors; (Miller 1978a, 1978b) for two works by the same author in a single year; (Smith 1982; Chanock 1985; Robertson and Berger 1986) for two or more works by different authors.

Endnotes are used for material commenting on or adding to the text and should be used instead of parenthetical citations for references to more than three works, archival materials, unpublished interviews, and legal cases. Within endnotes, second and later references to a work should refer to the author's last name and date. Do not use *op. cit.* Endnotes should be double-spaced and placed at the end of the article, following the list of references.

Full documentation appears in the references. References must list all works cited in the text, including citations in endnotes. List works alphabetically by author and, under author, by year of publication. References not cited in the text will be removed from the reference list. For additional information, see *The Chicago Manual of Style* (15th ed.).

Examples of references

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
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
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
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
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Gender, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in Pakistan: Willful Daughters or Free Citizens?

Discourses about Muslim women's victimization, which have intensified during the U.S.-led "war on terror," position Muslim women as objects in a debate of Islam versus the West, tradition versus modernity, and threaten to erase accounts of Muslim women's agency and activism within their own societies. We need to examine Muslim women's ambivalent positioning within religion, society and politics, and family and nation and recuperate the ways in which women appropriate contradictory discourses to assert their identities as daughters and citizens. This article seeks to trace the mutability of the gendered identity and status of citizen that is the locale of a persistent tension between Shariah laws and constitutional statutes in Pakistan. I focus on the social construction and control of women's sexual autonomy in Pakistan that is due to the imbrication of law, religion, and politics at a particular historical moment. While I do not mean to suggest that a neat demarcation between legal, political, and social spheres is possible, I am interested in a peculiar collaboration between the imperatives of nation-state formation and the cultural-political project of Islamization in which the courtroom became the site of construction and contestation of ideas about "the nation," "Muslim woman," and "citizen." An important part of my project is to explicate the challenges posed by the assertion of women's sexual agency to the ideology of the heterosexual middle-class nuclear family and thus to the nation-state, even as the demand for autonomy is couched within the language of citizenship. This complicated positioning of women within family, community, nation, and state has shaped the feminist discourse in

Pakistan, which is overwhelmingly couched in the language of women's rights as universal human rights.

Sexual autonomy and citizenship

Contemporary feminist analyses have usefully explicated the dangers that women's assertion of sexuality and sexual agency pose to the ideology of the heterosexual middle-class nuclear family, which is both the cultural and economic unit of capitalist society and hence of the nation-state that assumes such a society. Many of these analyses have also successfully delineated the heterogeneous implications of sexual autonomy for citizenship in different contexts.[1] Feminist scholars have shown how women—whether as lesbians defying the heterosexual ideology of the capitalist state (Alexander 1997) or as daughters refusing to yield control to fathers and brothers over their sexuality in marriage (Hussain 1997)—tend to destabilize the categories of nation, citizen, home, and family. M. Jacqui Alexander has proposed the concept of erotic autonomy to signify the independence of "woman as citizen rather than daughters raised and ladies always defined in relation to men" (Alexander 1997, 64). For her the erotic is a contested site for both state and citizens, and she suggests that the institution of "heteropatriarchy" enables the state to regulate domains other than the sexual and also to represent itself as a savior of the citizens (1997, 99). She argues that erotic autonomy poses a danger to the nation-state since it threatens the nuclear family and points out that, "because loyalty to the nation as citizen is perennially colonized within reproduction and heterosexuality, erotic autonomy brings with it the potential of undoing the nation entirely, a possible charge of irresponsible citizenship or no citizenship at all" (1997, 64). Other feminists have also looked at how various notions of home and family based on the arbitrary, and highly sexualized, constructions of private and public are used to construct different types of women and citizens (e.g., Grewal 1996). Thus contemporary feminist work emphasizes the dangers posed by women's autonomy to the middle-class home and argues that in threatening this social and economic unit of the modern nation-state, women's sexual autonomy threatens the nation as well. Another important outcome of the feminist interpretation of these processes of assertion and challenge is the identification of ways in which certain gendered and raced bodies come to symbolize this eroticism and serve as tropes for normative narrations of

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[1] See Grewal 1996; Joseph 1996; Alexander 1997; Hussain 1997.

nation and citizen. Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin's (1996) work on abducted women powerfully illustrates how ideas about women as cultural and biological reproducers of the nation structured the "rescue" operations undertaken by the newly partitioned nation-states of India and Pakistan in the early 1950s. More recently Alexander has pointed to lesbians in the context of the postcolonial Bahamas as an example of "particular figures [who] have come to embody this eroticism and have historically functioned as the major symbols of threat" (Alexander 1997, 65). Similarly, I would suggest that in contemporary Pakistan the woman who transgresses the boundaries of clan, caste, sect, class, or religion to form sexual relationships is being slotted in this space. This is a sign of "woman" who asserts her sexual autonomy, and her citizenship, either by choosing her own marriage partner or rejecting forced marriages—thereby challenging patriarchal control over a traditional site for the respectable deployment of women's sexuality. The construct of the "willful" daughter/woman that is being recuperated through the discourse of Islamization appears to interact with another one—the enduring concept of the "Westernized woman," a rights-claiming individual—that has traditionally functioned as a trope to enable the narration of the virtuous woman, be she a mother, a sister, a wife, or a daughter, as the privileged national female subject. Therefore, in this article I would like to examine the constructions of these identities and representations at the particular moment at which the idea of the (sexually) willful daughter burst into prominence in the national imagination. Although more extreme cases exist in the history of male violence against women in Pakistan, I will focus on the one instance referred to in the literature as the "Saima case" or the "Saima Love Marriage case" (details follow in later sections). I will show that this particular episode epitomizes the unstable constructions of "woman" and "citizen" that emerge through the interaction between the discourses of Islamization and modern nation-state formation in Pakistan.

While "Islam" and "woman" have always been part of the public discourse around citizenship and nation in Pakistan, this process intensified with the state-sponsored program of Islamization adopted by General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, who controlled the nation from 1977 to 1988. Zia's project of Islamization of law and society introduced oppressive laws, particularly the notorious Hudood Ordinances, and promoted other measures and guidelines that have adversely affected the political, legal, and social position of women and religious minorities in Pakistan.[2] These have

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[2] On February 10, 1979, on the recommendation of the Council of Islamic Ideology,

been recorded in detail by Pakistani activists and scholars.[3] On the whole, this literature provides substantive information and insights into the legal, social, and political implications of Islamization for women and religious minorities. However, since most of these accounts consider Islamization to be an attack on modern nation-state formation, they often reinscribe the dichotomous tradition-versus-modernity construct, which does not allow a nuanced account of the discursive terrain where political subjectivities are constructed and contested. We need analyses of Islamization as a project of modern nation-state formation in which the state is apprehended as a complex of practices, a complex that overlaps, contends, and collaborates with a catachrestic sphere of civil society that includes both religious and secular groups. Such analyses can usefully explicate the significance of the middle-class home both as a bastion of the nationalist project of signification and also as the limit of the state's authority when women creatively invoke discourses of citizenship and human rights in their own interest.

Although the Saima case was not conducted under the legal framework of Hudood laws (with the exception of a related case filed against Saima's husband's lawyer), it was clearly marked with the subtext of politicized culture.[4] Thanks in part to the public debates in the case, judges felt impelled not only to deliberate on questions relating to rights, legality, the individual, and the family but to determine what type of woman was necessary for the kind of society desired by the Islamization project. In particular, widespread speculation about the ineffectiveness of institutions responsible for the domestication of the "pure Muslim girl" enabled the pathologizing of women's autonomy as deviance. This, in turn, facilitated narrations of the willful daughter, the Muslim home as a sanctuary, and the preservation of the family in ways that undermined the legitimacy of both the rights-bearing individual and the sexual woman. In addition the constitutional protection that General Zia provided for the Shariah laws meant that the nature of constitutional rights was changed and with it

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Zia issued five ordinances that would change the existing Pakistan Penal Code. These were called Hudood Ordinances and related to offenses concerning private property, adultery, fornication (*sina*), false accusation of adultery (*qazf*), and consumption of alcohol. The ordinances also defined a series of punishments that were ordained according to the severity of the offense.

[3] See Weiss 1986; Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987; Jahangir and Jilani 1990; Khan 1994; Haq 1996; Gardezi 1997; Hussain 1997, Saeed and Khan 2000.

[4] The Saima case in fact comprises a set of related cases referenced by this name.

the notion of citizenship.[5] In this case the issue of women's citizenship itself appears to be a problem for the judges, who must try to reinterpret the constitution in order to bring it in line with what they consider to be an ideal Islamic society.

The "Saima case"

The "Saima case" refers to the courtroom battle that started in the city of Lahore in early 1996, when Saima Waheed, a twenty-two-year-old business student, married Arshad Ahmad, a teacher of English, in accordance with Islamic law but against the wishes of her family (Khan 1996a). When Saima's father, Hafiz Abdul Waheed Ropri, and other relatives asked her to rescind her decision, she approached the AGHS Legal Aid Center, which arranged accommodation for her at Dastak, a shelter for women in Lahore (Khan 1996a).[6] Saima's father and uncle, who are members of the powerful right-wing religious Ahle-Hadith sect, used their influence to put Arshad in jail, where he was tortured into signing a divorce deed (*Dawn* 1996b). When Saima refused to yield to her family's pressure, her uncle filed a habeas corpus petition for her "recovery," on the basis of which Justice Ihsan-ul-Haq Chaudhry deputized a bailiff to forcibly remove Saima from Dastak. Eventually another judge, Malik Muhammad Qayyum, who was approached by Saima's counsel, Asma Jahangir, ordered the police to take her to Darul Aman, an institution run by a religious organization, Anjuman Hamiyat-I-Islam. Justice Qayyum, while refusing Saima's request to be allowed to return to Dastak, ordered that she should not be forced to see any of her relatives, including her parents, but would be free to meet her counsel (*Dawn* 1996b). Meanwhile, Saima filed a petition for release from illegal detention, in which she stated that she was sui juris (entitled to act for herself) and therefore had the right to decide for herself where she could live. On April 22, the Lahore High Court found Saima to be sui juris but ordered her back to Dastak. Instead of being allowed to join her husband she was placed under the supervision

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[5] In 1985, before he ended martial law and introduced a civilian government with himself as president, General Zia issued President's Order no. 14 of 1985 for the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 (also known as the Eighth Amendment). Constitutional amendments made through this order not only introduced the basis for a theocratic state in Pakistan but also validated all laws passed under Zia's military rule since July 5, 1977, so that they could not be challenged in court

[6] The acronym AGHS stands for the first letters of the names of four women lawyers who founded the organization: Asma Jahangir, Gul Rukh Rahman, Hina Jilani, and Shahla Zia

and control of the Lahore High Court Bar Association president pending further proceedings on a petition filed by her father for her "custody." Thus, what is popularly referred to as the Saima case comprises two main petitions: one by Saima for permission to live with the man to whom she said she was legally married; another by her father, Hafiz Abdul Waheed Ropri, for custody of his daughter on the grounds that her marriage was illegal since it was contracted against his wishes.

The two petitions raised a number of legal, social, and cultural issues, such as whether a sui juris woman is entitled to marry without the consent of her parents, whether she is at liberty to live anywhere she likes, whether the "rights" of a father over his children are judiciable, and whether validity of a *nikah* (marriage) is to be determined by legal precedence or particular interpretations of Islamic Shariah. By June 1996 the judges perceived the issues arising through the arguments presented by the two sides to be so important that they decided to apply to the chief justice for the constitution of a larger bench. The two judges hearing the case, Justice Chaudhry and Justice Qayyum, agreed that the decision about the independence of a sui juris woman in Islam could affect the roots of Family Law, the sole law governing marriage and divorce in Pakistan (*Nation* 1996). In her arguments on behalf of Saima, Jahangir said that Saima was an adult woman and as such entitled to autonomy under the constitution of Pakistan. She said the argument by Saima's father's counsel for the presence of a legal guardian, or *wali*, to mandate all matters relating to women's activities outside the home would violate basic human rights and contravene the country's constitutional guarantees provided for all citizens (*Dawn* 1996a). After almost a year of courtroom debates the judges were unable to render a decision and asked the Supreme Court to place the split decision before a referee judge. Finally, on March 10, 1997, a full bench of the Lahore High Court upheld the validity of Saima's marriage on the grounds that a marriage contracted by a sui juris woman without the consent of her *wali* was validated by the constitution. While two members of the bench upheld the marriage, a senior member of the three-man bench gave a dissenting judgment.[7]

Each of the three judges separately recorded and explained his judgment. Justice Chaudhry, in his forty-page judgment, relied extensively on

[7] Pakistan Legal Decision 1997 Lahore 301 (PLD 1997) before Ihsan-ul-Haq Chaudhry, Malik Muhammad Qayyum, and Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday, JJ, Hafiz Abdul Waheed (petitioner) versus Miss Asma Jehangir [*sic*] and another (respondents), criminal miscellaneous no. 425-H of 1996, decided on March 10, 1997. In *All Pakistan Legal Decisions* (Lahore: PLD Publishers, 1997), 49:301–84.

Quranic verses and *hadith* (recorded statements of the Prophet Muham-
mad) to conclude that marriage was not simply a contract in Islam but
also a religious duty and that obedience to parents could be legally en-
forced.[8] Justice Qayyum, in his two-page order, differed with the opinion
of Justice Chaudhry. While conceding the importance of family and its
sanctity in Islam, he relied on legal precedent to argue for the validity of
the *nikah* of a sui juris Muslim woman even in the absence of the consent
of her *wali*.[9] The third judge, Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday, in thirty-one
pages of remarks, relied on the Quran and the Sunnah (the life and prac-
tices of the Prophet Muhammad) to argue that Saima's action, though
constitutionally sound, was socially and morally precarious.[10] While ac-
cepting that the consent of the man and the woman involved is an in-
dispensable condition for the validity of a marriage and that a *wali* has
no right to grant consent on behalf of the woman without her approval,
the judge declared that he believed "premarital and extra-marital liaisons,
courtships, secret friendships and secret marriages" to be offensive to
Islam.[11] Therefore, in his remarks he strongly recommended that the state
introduce laws that would make such relationships and marriages a penal
offense. Despite the ambiguity in the decision, eminent lawyers and jurists
termed the decision in the Saima case to be "historic" and a "landmark
judgment" (*News* 1997).

An examination of the reports in the media, court debates, and the
texts of the judgments suggests that the case brought up insecurities about
cultural and national identity since arguments about "Islam versus West"
and "tradition versus modernity" were freely mobilized to counter appeals
to constitutional provisions or legal precedents. I will therefore explore
how constructs of Muslim womanhood encountered modernist ideas
about citizenship to authorize particular kinds of subjects to police the
boundaries of subjecthood. This encounter was rehearsed through a va-
riety of discourses that proliferated at different sites during the trial: the
question of women's legal maturity or entitlement to act as autonomous
individuals, the "home" and "family" as ideological units of the "nation,"
the reinscription of ideas about Muslim womanhood in constructing the
normative woman in the Pakistani nation-state, and definitions of national
boundaries through notions of the good society. Feminist discursive strat-
egies in support of Saima's, and women's, autonomy can be understood

[8] Ibid., 312–52.
[9] Ibid., 352–53.
[10] Ibid., 353–84.
[11] Ibid., 383.

as being framed by and against these discourses. Texts that I draw on include newspaper reports in Urdu and English that sensationalized not only the Saima case but also other similar cases; related feature articles, editorials, and newspaper columns; judgments in the Saima case; and published statements by government officials, social activists, human rights groups, and religious political parties.

Muslim daughter or citizen of Pakistan?

Feminist accounts describe the Saima case as significant and argue that it represents a battle between patriarchal control of women's sexuality and a (Pakistani Muslim) woman's assertion of her desire and rights (Sarwar 1996; Hussain 1997). The Saima case, like many similar situations, appeared to constitute a struggle between two opposing social, economic, and cultural groups in Pakistan—one represented by Saima's father, an upwardly mobile middle-class businessman with close ties to an orthodox religious sect, the other represented by Jahangir, a prominent human rights lawyer with elite family connections who is well known for her secularist politics. Thus it invoked representations of a classic struggle that Muslim feminist scholars such as Fatima Mernissi, Farida Shaheed, and Khawar Mumtaz have theorized as the tradition-versus-modernity struggle being fought in Muslim societies between "fundamentalist" men and elite professional women (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987). According to journalist Beena Sarwar, Saima's family and her lawyer symbolized the "two extremes of Pakistani society," since her father was a leader of the extreme right-wing religious sect Ahle Hadith, while her lawyer, Jahangir, was "known for her stand on secularism and progressive thinking" (Sarwar 1996, 6). "This factor contributed in no small way towards propelling the case into prominence," Sarwar writes (1996, 6). Similarly, feminist scholar Neelam Hussain describes the Saima case as a power struggle between "an upwardly mobile fundamentalist orthodoxy and women who represented a mix of the old elite and rising social classes" (Hussain 1997, 206). Hussain's detailed analysis of the narratives of the Saima case attempts to illustrate how state apparatuses, social institutions, and the community "colluded in the interests of maintaining both legal and social control over women's sexuality" (Hussain 1997, 202). Seeing Saima's marriage as the assertion of a woman's autonomy, Hussain suggests that the issue is so fraught with danger that Saima's father's counsel tried to draw attention away from Saima's avowal of her citizenship rights by raising the question of parents' right to be obeyed, the status of marriage in Islam,

and the condition of a *wali*'s permission for a valid *nikah* (Hussain 1997, 226). Therefore, although feminists and progressive groups welcomed the apparent victory of constitutional rights, it is important to explicate how and in what ways the validation of a woman's autonomy was overwritten by discourses of the protection of daughters and the nurturing of girls.

While "woman" carries (admittedly limited) ideas of legal and social personhood, the concept of "girl" is culturally and socially associated with dependency, protectedness, and legal incapability (Smyth 1998). Although Saima had defied her family by acting out her desires and rights as a woman, in the statements of her father and his counsel she remained a "girl" whose "innocence" had been corrupted by the influence of feminists and Westernized women. In one extreme illustration of such defilement, her father's counsel actually tried to convince the court that Saima had not married Arshad of her own accord but that her lawyer, Jahangir, had been involved in misleading her into the situation (Khan 1996a). The desire to protect (and to disempower, by speaking for) was evident in the arguments for "custody" put forward by Saima's father's counsel, Riaz-ul-Hasan, who defined the main issues as parents' right to obedience, the inapplicability to Muslim marriage of the notion of civil contract between individuals, and the permission of a *wali* as a prerequisite for a valid *nikah*.[12] This position was in turn enabled by the ambivalent decision of the judges, early on in the case, when they declared Saima sui juris yet ordered her to be retained under supervision at Dastak instead of freeing her to rejoin her husband (Khan 1996b). Muhammed Malik Nawaz, also an advocate for Saima's father, stressed this point further by asserting that in Islam, the outdoor activities or public life of even a sui juris woman could be regulated by her parents or *wali*, who are also responsible for arranging her marriage. He claimed that prior to marriage, "the girl is the responsibility of her parents" and if she defies their authority or shows them any disobedience, under Islamic tenets she can be put on the "right track" through a judicial order. Nawaz argued that "a virgin girl stepping out of her house without the consent of the parents can be asked to go back."[13]

One of the main questions before the judges was whether a woman whom they considered to be sui juris could be compelled to live at her father's home against her will or, conversely, whether a Muslim woman

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[12] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) has demonstrated how strategies of representation work in the silencing of women in particular locations.

[13] PLD 1997, 313.

could be allowed to live independently.[14] Eventually the judges decided to treat it as an issue of state failure in successfully integrating "Islamic" tradition and culture into constitutional law, a failure through which the relationship between the religious and the legal presented thorny dilemmas for the judiciary. Pakistan's legal system is a corpus of laws established under British colonial rule, the Anglo-Muhammadan Law, intermixed with Shariah law (Mehdi 1994). Centralization and unification of laws by British administrators in India in the interest of efficient colonial rule led to the replacement of local criminal justice systems by British law, although Hindu and Islamic law continued to be applied as the "personal" law in matters relating to inheritance, succession, and religious endowments. This meant that the diverse Muslim legal practices that existed in colonial India were subsumed under a uniform and consistent code—Islamic law— and this universal set of rules was applied to every person who identified with Islam (Mehdi 1994). In territorially independent Pakistan, judges traditionally managed to avoid the inherent contradictions between constitutional and Islamic laws by following in the footsteps of the British Indian courts in applying case law, evoking legal precedent rather than their own interpretation of the Quran. This changed after 1977, with Zia's plan to "Islamize" all aspects of life in Pakistan, including both criminal and status law (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987). Shahnaz Rouse (2001) points out that this marked the first time in Pakistan that the liberal agenda was ideologically challenged at the state level and that this challenge reversed the compromise between secular and religious forces that had been in evidence up to that point. While earlier regimes had tried to appease the religious opposition by delegating them some control over personal law, Zia altered the entire legal structure and created parallel systems of civil, religious, and military courts in which the latter two were accorded supremacy over the former (Rouse 2001). My reading of the Saima case suggests that the judges, who were civil court judges, showed a concern not so much for abidance with the "true" principles of Shariah or consistency with legal precedence but with their perception of their own roles in the Islamization of society—their pedagogical position in nation-building. "We are national judges and as such custodians of the morals of the citizens," declared Justice Chaudhry in his dissenting judgment of March 10, 1997.[15] From this and other statements from a variety of positions, it is clear that the case had acquired a pedagogical importance for the project of national signification and therefore entailed a reassertion

[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 341.

of different interests about the relationship between woman, sexuality, and national interest.

In his minority judgment Justice Chaudhry made it clear that he considered it the duty of Muslim parents to arrange the marriage of their children, particularly daughters, as early as possible to prevent them from coming across male outsiders and sullying the "purity" of the home.[16] Further, he suggested that the government should regulate or ban marriage bureaus and other institutions that were becoming "a menace" to society, presumably by encouraging people to choose their spouses.[17] Of most significance are the thirty-one pages of judgment remarks by Justice Ramday, whose decision turned the case in favor of Saima. Despite allowing Saima her constitutional "liberty," Justice Ramday's remarks show very little difference from those of Justice Chaudhry and, in some instances, seem to be harsher in condemning her actions.[18] Although he declared the marriage of Saima and Arshad to be valid and conceded Saima's right to reside wherever she desired, Justice Ramday emphasized not so much the importance of citizenship or individual rights but the need for measures that would limit these rights in the interest of what he deemed to be Islamic and moral values. He called for preserving the middle-class family as a symbolic national model and as a bastion in the cultural battle against the West. Justice Ramday proposed a "right of preemption" through which families could protect themselves "in the matter of strangers being brought into the household either in the form of a son-in-law or the form of a daughter-in-law."[19] According to this view, in the discursive regime of the middle-class Muslim home, as Hussain rightly points out, the concept of "woman" can only be invoked through the transgressive metaphor: thus crossing the threshold can signify the transformation from daughter to citizen and from "good anonymous woman" to "transgressive woman or *fitna* [agent of social and moral chaos]" (Hussain 1997, 215). Seen thus, domestic chaos can lead to national chaos. While upholding Saima's liberty as a citizen, Justice Ramday hastened to draw attention to the plight of the West, where social chaos had erupted due to the absence of "proper balance between the extent of the individual's freedom and the limits to which the individual's rights extended."[20] The judge blamed the "social chaos" of the West on the inability of its

[16] Ibid., 312–13.
[17] Ibid., 343.
[18] Ibid., 353–84.
[19] Ibid., 380–81.
[20] Ibid., 370.

leaders to control the "common man."[21] He therefore emphasized the need for the nation-state to maintain the balance between home and street through measures designed to protect the purity of the middle-class family. For Justice Ramday, the security of the Muslim family meant purdah— protection of women from the "outside" and from their own sexuality. After emphasizing the respected status of women in Islam, Justice Ramday proposed to guarantee this status by circumscribing the home as a "safe" gendered space and by silencing women within a discourse of seclusion as protection. He suggested that: "(*a*) the females should ordinarily stay indoors; (*b*) if a woman needs to go outdoors then she must extend her veil over her face; must cover her chest and should not indulge in any act which could attract men; and that (*c*) if it becomes inevitable for her to talk to a man then she should *not* talk in a mild and a pliable tone, and further that if someone needs to ask her for something then she should talk to the man from behind a screen or a veil."[22] In this extreme representation of sexuality, Justice Ramday seems to equate the gendered female body, the fact of woman's identity in itself, with the potential for sexual chaos—a face unveiled, the female body outside the home, even a mild tone of voice is considered a dangerous signal of sexuality and, consequently, societal immorality. Hence he proceeds to emphasize marriage not as a relationship between two individuals but as a religious and social duty that parents must discharge so that a daughter will not have to undertake the un-Islamic practice of "husband shopping."[23] Therefore, despite the favorable majority judgment deeming her capable of marrying without a father's consent, Saima remained symbolically the daughter who had been tainted by feminists and outsiders and who needed to be represented because she could not represent herself.

There was thus a profusion of concerns about the "problems" of "girls" and the proper nurturing of daughters in the judges' final statements as well as in other statements and discussions in the courts and the media. What is unremarkable about these discourses is the enabling fiction that a girl's identity is supposed to emerge within the sanctified atmosphere of the middle-class family and home. What makes these discussions significant is that the anxieties about the proper upbringing and education of girls were focused overwhelmingly on the middle classes, who are just

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., 379; emphasis added; some Islamists argue that Muslim women, when speaking to male strangers, should use "straight-forward and customary speech" so as to avoid appearing flirtatious. See Jameelah (1978) 2000.

[23] PLD 1997, 381.

entering the developmental project of the nation-state through access to modern education, employment, and media. This becomes evident in a sampling of the national and local Urdu press, which directs itself mostly to urban and rural lower- and middle-class readers.[24] Feature articles, letters to the editor, discussion forums, interviews, and surveys started appearing in Urdu newspapers about the problems of girls and the failure to provide proper upbringing, education, and nurturing to girls by particular classes of families, by the education system, by teachers, and by the state. There were debates on the pros and cons of arranged versus love marriages, early versus late marriages, relationships between parents and daughters, the generation gap, and so on. Anxiety about the changing patterns of behavior among girls in middle-class families is exemplified in a feature article in a nationally circulated Urdu daily that suggests that late marriages of girls were leading to difficulties for many families (Nazir and Zafar 1996). The article cites parents, psychologists, and the manager of a marriage bureau in arguing that many social problems were resulting from increased opportunities for higher education and careers as well as from the changing aspirations of girls in middle-class families. "Whatever the reason the problem of late marriage of girls is a problem that besets every fourth household," the authors noted (Nazir and Zafar 1996, 12). They quote Syed Azfar Ali Rizvi, head of the Department of Psychology at Government College Lahore, as saying, "Failure to find a suitable [marriage] proposal is a problem, but higher education, the quest for the best, desire for the ideal, discrimination of caste and class and greed are reasons why late marriages are on the increase. And the higher incidence of divorce in our society is an aspect of this trend" (Nazir and Zafar 1996, 12–13). While this article seems to be drawing attention to the social and economic stresses of modernization on middle-class families, another writer laments the failure of national cultural processes in producing the right kind of citizen-subjects in middle- and lower-middle-class families. Referring to the uproar created by the Saima case, columnist Saeed Wasseq asks in the newspaper *Khabrain* why girls run away from home. For the answer, he draws on religion, Western psychology, and modernist notions of family and parent-child relations to explain the "crisis" facing the middle-class Muslim family: "There are many reasons. . . . The basic one is that the girl does not receive from her parents, brothers and other family members, the kind of attention and love that she craves. . . . Another tragedy of

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[24] In contrast, the English-language press is aimed primarily at upper- and middle-class urban readers who are more conversant, and often more comfortable, with English than other local languages.

our society is that there are very few parents who have a mutual under-
standing with their children. Parents consider themselves to be the pro-
viders for their children and therefore their superior and consider it their
fundamental right to assert their will on their children. . . . This is why
there is very little communication between parents and children and there
is a great distance between them" (Wasseq 1996, 6). What the writer
appears to be arguing for is a reorganization of the Muslim home as a
space in which individuals as members of a family are trained in their
"proper" roles as mothers, brothers, daughters, and so on. Wasseq notes
the significance of differential social and economic conditions of different
families and pinpoints as most deserving of national concern "those low
middle-class families" that experience "constant strife" due to economic
and social problems (1996, 6). Although Saima was identified with a
wealthy industrial family, the anxiety generated by her marriage appeared
to be felt most acutely in relation to the section of the population identified
as the lower middle classes of Pakistani society who, presumably, could
not be relied on to act in their own interest or that of the nation. Wasseq
suggests that the concept of girls running away is less common in upper-
class homes, where children are granted much more freedom due to the
influence of Western culture. In lower-middle-class families that, according
to him, are larger and have more domestic problems, he suggests that
parents are not sensitive to the emotions of their children since they are
not "educated in the right sense." He declares that this is evidence of the
failure of national ideology: "Is this what Pakistan stands for?" (1996, 7).
The protection of "girls" from their social environment and the creation
of the right kind of mothers and daughters are thus seen to be the re-
sponsibility of the nation-state. This resonates with Lisa Smyth's (1998)
analysis of discussions that surrounded the issue of abortion for a teenage
girl in Ireland in 1992, which were dominated by appeals for safeguarding
her identity as a Catholic daughter. The positioning of a girl as a daughter
aroused issues of nation, family, and state protection, since daughters
"belong" to families and since "the family" is an important trope for the
narration of the nation.

These comments illustrate anxieties related to the changing situation
of the middle-class family and particularly of daughters within such fam-
ilies, since there is evidence that women from the middle and lower-middle
classes entered urban-based universities and employment sites in record
numbers during Zia's time. This period is also associated with the dis-
lodging of the Western-oriented elite from their almost total control of
state and social power in Pakistan (Weiss 1986; Mumtaz and Shaheed
1987; Jalal 1991). Due to political realignments and changes in the bal-

ance of power among different social groups, Zia's period witnessed the rise of a new section of middle-class traders and petty entrepreneurs who continue to be the strongest supporters of the state's Islamization project. The ascendance of this class is ascribed to a number of factors, including increased access to financial credit for groups hitherto denied it, the use of financial incentives as a measure to neutralize political opponents, and most of all a dramatic boost to Pakistan's economy by trade and labor migration to the oil-rich Arab Gulf states. Saima's father's family, the Ropris, arose from within the petty commercial and trading groups that appear to be both economically prosperous and religiously conservative (*Sabafat* 1996; Hussain 1997). Hussain suggests that they represent the "orthodox world of fundamentalist Islam as it reaches out for the fruits of modernity while holding on to the certitudes of traditional structure inherent in female segregation and authoritarian lifestyles" (Hussain 1997, 205). I would add that the "inner" and "outer" spaces of home and society are constructed not only by fundamentalist or modernist desires but by the dividing practices of gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and status, which produce gendered subjects capable of functioning within the context of both capitalist expansion and state-sponsored religious repression. Thus, newspapers reported that Saima, who appeared in court completely veiled, was allowed at other times to dress in Western clothes, to own a mobile telephone, to go swimming, and to ride in fancy cars (Haider 1996; *Sabafat* 1996). I would argue that this reflects the family's ability, due to their economic prosperity, to straddle the border between what is considered modern behavior for women in Pakistan and that which is seen as traditional. Further, I propose that in Saima's case, transgression of the boundary between family and society can be seen to lie in her reaching out for the modernist rights of the individual as citizen-subject rather than in appropriation of the usual markers of cultural change—for example, unveiling or Western education—that in anticolonial nationalist discourse often symbolized the change from "traditional" to "modern" woman.[25] Saima's internalization of her case as representative of the elusive woman-citizen is significant. Against widespread depiction of her, on the one hand, as lovesick (media) or innocent but duped (her father) and, on the other, as an independent adult (her supporters), or an essential woman (sympathetic writers), Saima describes herself as "the first drop of rain" and as an autonomous, rational individual through statements such as: "My

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[25] Such a conception of women's liberation or modernization is most vividly evident in women's own accounts of their lives and times, such as Shahnawaz 1971 and Ikramullah 2000.

nikah was not an impulsive act" (Qayum 1997). Saima therefore publicly presented her case not as the victory of a "love marriage" or the fruition of a woman's desire as emblazoned by the national and international media but on the register of modernity, as marking a new identity for Muslim women of her class (Qayum 1997). Whatever significance one attaches to the Saima case, the debates that it generated certainly disturbed—even though they did not dislodge—the discursive regime of the middle-class family in Pakistan in which female selfhood is limited to "daughter," "wife," "sister," or "mother."[26] If, as Partha Chatterjee (1993) argues, the middle-class home was the originary site of anticolonial nationalism and the development of middle-class female selfhood, the Saima case also bears out Inderpal Grewal's (1996) contention that notions of selfhood in the home can also be constituted in ways that challenge notions of state and nation. As Hussain points out, Saima's transgression succeeded "in revealing possibilities of breaking the frontier and in revealing the anxieties of the powerful within 'the maps they have drawn'" (1997, 240). The discourse of the home as a sacred harem of privacy and protection was disrupted by Saima's repeated accusations that she feared for her life from her relatives and by her refusal to go with any of them: "I have tested all my relatives—I was betrayed by everyone I trusted" (*Jang* 1996a).

The discourse of women activists supporting the idea of middle-class women's autonomy as "individuals" was also complicated by the need to attend to the differential social class positioning of different women as highlighted by the Saima case. While the project of Islamization begun by Zia affected women from the poorer and working classes most adversely, it was accompanied by a public discourse on women's dress and mobility that alarmed upper-class women and led them to experience social and cultural restrictions from which they had previously been protected by their class position (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987).[27] The leading women activists who challenged Islamization, including Saima's lawyer Jahangir

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[26] Michel Foucault (1982) defines a discursive regime as the circulation of knowledge as truth and the practices of power related to this organization of knowledge.

[27] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988–90, 1993–96), who came to power after Zia, although not a proponent of Islamization, did not take any effective measures to reverse the process. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1990–93, 1997–99), who was a protege of Zia's, revived the Islamization program and introduced new legal and political changes. General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in October 1999 and is Pakistan's president as of this writing, describes his philosophy as enlightened moderation. He has vowed to review, and where necessary modify, unjust laws that were introduced in the name of Islam. However, all the oppressive laws, including Hudood Ordinances, remain in force.

and the women who set up Dastak, are associated with the upper and upper-middle classes of Pakistani society. In demanding constitutional rights for Saima and in her efforts to enlist sympathy for her struggle, Jahangir also appeared to replicate the paternalistic discourses of protection of girls in both middle- and lower-income classes. However, unlike Justice Ramday, she took care to emphasize not only the threats from outsiders and strangers but also from within the "protective" space of the family, from fathers, uncles, and brothers. In challenging the idealized constructions of daughter and family, Jahangir drew attention to the vulnerability of the majority of girls and women in Pakistan who are denied access to social and legal resources due to their social and economic class position (*Jang* 1996b). She also referred to dowry rituals associated with poorer families in which fathers are seen to "sell" their daughters and to other instances where (middle-class) parents subject their daughters to humiliating court cases to punish them for marrying against family wishes. She argued that even though higher courts frequently legislate in favor of daughters, it is usually the parents who take the matter to court—mostly after nonlegal attempts at coercive control fail to achieve the desired results. Jahangir emphasized the increased responsibility of the state and judiciary to compensate for the fragility of a woman's legal personhood and her vulnerability as a daughter by contending that the "treatment of girls in our society is such that no girl would have the courage to move the courts for redress" (*Jang* 1996b). The discourse of women's autonomy in Pakistan therefore became entangled, inextricably and contradictorily, with the class-specific discourses of the construction of girls and their protection.

Conclusion

The Saima case is significant in expanding our understanding of how gender underlies and organizes citizenship—and how women in Pakistan both contest and appropriate the discourses of Islamization and modernity. In the case of Pakistan (as in many other Muslim states), while the modernizing state seeks to build a concept of nationhood by eroding alternate forms of alliance, it has foundered in the area of personal law—particularly in matters relating to women and the family (Kandiyoti 1994). The gendered nature of the discontinuous and contradictory processes of nation-state formation in Pakistan has meant that even as the state has tried to claim more authority for itself in certain areas, it has also relinquished its authority in other areas to tribes, families, and privatized forms of regulation, particularly of women. While Pakistani feminists have tended to

see the modernizing state as liberating, it is important to understand that the processes of state formation, including anticolonial secular nationalism, have strengthened patriarchal control of women by delineating customs, traditions, and culture as a domain of the personal against which the legal and political are then seen to constitute the public sphere. The imposition of "Islamicized" laws such as the Hudood Ordinances, the Law of Evidence, and the Law of *Qisas* (retribution) and *Diyat* (blood money) has made some matters pertaining to women's bodies and sexuality directly accountable to formal laws, yet it has also made certain types of murder and injury, especially violence within families and tribes, "compoundable," that is, crimes against the individual rather than the state.[28] There is thus a peculiar reconfiguration of the private and public by which areas typically designated private such as sexuality, personal relationships and liaisons, modes of dress, and so on are deemed to be matters of public interest while other issues typically designated as public have been subsumed under the private rights of families and communities. The state's attempts to bolster its authority through constitutional amendments and acts that enable it "to prescribe what is right and to forbid what is wrong" (*News* 1998, 9) include the incorporation and endorsement of mechanisms embedded in notions of family, community, and tribe to regulate women's morality. This has resulted in the privileging of informal and customary practices and privatized identities over the national identity of "citizen." As in the Saima case, there are dangerous results for women when subnational identities such as family, *biradri* (community), or tribe emerge as subjects to arbitrate issues of sexuality and identity. Pakistani feminists argue that the Islamizing state has bolstered private control of women by the family and community by further restricting women's access to the public sphere and by regulating morality through strict prescriptions for women's dress and deportment.[29] As the above discussion shows, there was a profusion of uncertainties around whether the Saima case should

[28] I use the term *Islamicized* to emphasize that Islamization in Pakistan must be approached not with reference to Islamic revivalism or fundamentalism but as a historically situated policy that was implemented within specific sociopolitical conditions. The Law of *Qisas* and *Diyat*, which determines all aspects of intentional and unintentional murders, bodily injuries, and abortion, was proposed during Zia's regime but passed later, in 1990. According to this law the compensation for a victim of murder or bodily injury if it is a woman or non-Muslim would be half of that for a Muslim male. In the aspect of evidence too, this law reduces women's testimony to circumstantial evidence in all cases of murder or bodily injury (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987; Mehdi 1994).

[29] This argument has been ably expounded by Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987 and Rouse 1998.

be judged according to legal precedent, prevailing social and cultural behavior, or religious law. Caught between the ideals of national interest as envisaged in the discourse of Islamization or the imperative to uphold rights enshrined in the constitution, the judges evinced ambivalence around the question of whether to treat Saima as a citizen or as a daughter.

Feminist politics in Pakistan are both framed by and have to mobilize the tension between private and public and home and nation to press for women's rights. Although they used the discursive space opened up by Saima's predicament to draw attention to women's oppression within the family and community, Saima's supporters could ignore neither the class-specific nature of women's experiences nor the decisive role of cultural and ethnic affiliations in their lives. They therefore had no option but to resort to an unmarking of women's identity as citizens. While drawing attention to the precarious position of girls, especially in lower- and middle-class families, Jahangir ultimately emphasized women's citizenship rights and human rights as offering the best protection for Pakistani women of all classes. The crux of her arguments was that any law, convention, or customary practice that conflicted with the provisions of the constitution regarding fundamental rights could not be legally sustained. In challenging her opponents' arguments about Islamic tradition and Muslim or Pakistani customs, Jahangir thus relied on the formal guarantees provided in the 1973 constitution through articles 10, 11, 14, 20, and 25 relating to fundamental rights, safeguards against detention in custody, safeguards against traffic in human beings, inviolability of the dignity of man, freedom of religion, and safeguards against discrimination on the basis of sex alone.[30] The Women's Action Forum (WAF), a major alliance formed in Pakistan in 1981 specifically to challenge the Islamization of law and society, was one of the groups that strongly campaigned for Saima's right to be treated as a citizen instead of as a daughter. In a statement issued during the Saima case, WAF stated that the issue was not, as popularly represented, the right of a father over his daughter but one of "an adult woman's rights to freedom in movement, choice in marriage and right to determine her own life, all of which are fundamental rights granted in the Constitution of Pakistan" (*News* 1996). The group said it was "alarmed by the developments taking place in the country as exemplified by the controversies surrounding the Saima Waheed case" (*News* 1996). In its arguments the women's group also highlighted the importance of Pakistan's commitment to universal human rights instruments and treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms

[30] PLD 1997, 321.

of Discrimination Against Women. Such a privileging of universality as the desired condition of national subjectivity resonates with the demands of many progressive and secular democratic groups in Pakistan and other Muslim societies. It certainly testifies to feminists' emphasis on the transcendence of human universality over nationalist particularity in local contexts where notions of politicized culture are mobilized to subvert gender equality. By strategically fusing ideas about Muslim identity and citizenship claims and by subsuming both under women's rights as universal human rights, women activists in Pakistan attempt to reject both notions of women as wards of the family and as dependents of the state. Through demands for state adherence to international conventions on women and human rights and by drawing on transnational support to confront the state, women activists discursively challenge the emotional and physical boundaries of both "home" and "nation" as sanctified spaces for women.

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Josephine Donovan

Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue

n recent years feminists have brought care theory to the philosophical debate over how humans should treat nonhuman animals. Care theory, an important branch of contemporary feminist theory, was originally articulated by Carol Gilligan (1982) and has been elaborated, refined, and criticized extensively since it was first formulated in the late 1970s. Since I and others applied care theory to the animal question in the early 1990s (see esp. Donovan and Adams 1996), it has established itself as a major vein of animal ethics theory (the others being liberal rights doctrine, utilitarianism, and deep ecology theory). It also has received close scrutiny from the philosophical community, which has yielded pertinent criticisms.

This article is an attempt to respond to these criticisms and thereby further refine and strengthen feminist animal care theory. Although focused on the issue of animal treatment, my analysis may have implications for care theory in general. As it is my conclusion that many of the critiques have misapprehended the original message of the feminist animal care theorists, I hope to reposition the discussion to emphasize the dialogical nature of care theory. It is not so much, I will argue, a matter of caring for animals as mothers (human and nonhuman) care for their infants as it is one of listening to animals, paying emotional attention, taking seriously—caring about—what they are telling us. As I state at the conclusion of "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," "We should not kill, eat, torture, and exploit animals because they do not want to be so treated, and we know that" (Donovan 1990, 375). In other words, I am proposing in this article that we shift the epistemological source of theorizing about animals to the animals themselves. Could we not, I ask, extend feminist

standpoint theory to animals, including their standpoint in our ethical deliberations?

Feminist animal care theory

Feminist animal care theory developed in reaction against the animal rights/utilitarian theory that had by the 1980s established itself as the dominant vein in animal ethics (Singer 1975; Regan 1983). Rooted in Enlightenment rationalism, liberal rights theory and utilitarianism, feminist care theorists argue, privilege reason (in the case of rights theory) or mathematical calculation (in the care of utilitarianism) epistemologically. Because of their abstract, universalizing pretenses, both rights theory and utilitarianism elide the particular circumstances of an ethical event, as well as its contextual and political contingencies. In addition, rights theory, following Kantian premises, tends to view individuals as autonomous isolates, thereby neglecting their social relationships. It also presumes a society of rational equals, a perspective that ignores the power differentials that obtain in any society but especially in one that includes both humans and animals. Finally, both rights and utilitarianism dispense with sympathy, empathy, and compassion as relevant ethical and epistemological sources for human treatment of nonhuman animals.

Feminist care theory attempted to restore these emotional responses to the philosophical debate and to validate them as authentic modes of knowledge. It also, following Gilligan, urged a narrative, contextually aware form of reasoning as opposed to the rigid rationalist abstractions of the "one-size-fits-all" rights and utilitarian approach, emphasizing instead that we heed the individual particularities of any given case and acknowledge the qualitative heterogeneity of life-forms.

Finally, implicit in feminist animal care theory—though perhaps not sufficiently theorized as such—is a dialogical mode of ethical reasoning, not unlike the dialectical method proposed in standpoint theory, wherein humans pay attention to—listen to—animal communications and construct a human ethic in conversation with the animals rather than imposing on them a rationalistic, calculative grid of humans' own monological construction.

Feminists—indeed most women—are acutely aware of what it feels like to have one's opinion ignored, trivialized, rendered unimportant. Perhaps this experience has awakened their sensitivity to the fact that other marginalized groups—including animals—have trouble getting their viewpoints heard. One of the main directions in feminist legal theory has insisted that legal codes drawn up based on male circumstances often do

not fit the lives of women, whose differing realities and needs have not been recognized in the formulation of the law (West 1988, 61, 65; 1997; MacKinnon 1989, 224). Just, therefore, as feminism has called for incorporating the voices of women into public policy and ethical discourse, so feminist animal advocates must call for incorporating the voices of animals as well. Dialogical theory, therefore, means learning to see what human ideological constructions elide; to understand and comprehend what is not identified and recognized in these constructions; to, in short, attempt to reach out emotionally as well as intellectually to what is different from oneself rather than reshaping (in the case of animals) that difference to conform to one's own human-based preconceptions.

Response to criticisms and elaborations of feminist animal care theory

Before further developing the dialogical aspect of feminist animal care theory, I would like first to address recently proposed critiques and refinements of that theory. Such discussion will, I believe, help to elaborate the modifications in care theory I am proposing here.

I begin with the criticisms. A continuing criticism of care theory in general is that the individual experiences of caring on which it is based are not universalizable. Robert Garner, for example, labeled care theory "problematic" because, although he acknowledges that "contextualizing animal suffering in particular cases" (2003, 241) is enriching (citing in this regard Marti Kheel's proposal that all meat eaters should visit slaughterhouses to experience emotionally the circumstances that produce their food [Kheel (1985) 1996, 27]), such an individual experience cannot, he claims, be "universalize[d] to appeal to those who have not had that particular experience" (Garner 2003, 241).

Garner's criticism is a variation of Immanuel Kant's objections to care theory's eighteenth-century counterpart, sympathy theory (see Donovan 1996). Kant argued that sympathy is an unstable base for moral decision making because, first, the feeling is volatile; second, the capacity for sympathy is not evenly distributed in the population; and third, sympathy is therefore not universalizable (1957, 276–81). Instead, he proposed that one should act ethically out of a sense of duty and that one's sense of what is ethical be determined by imagining what would happen if one's actions were universalized. For example, if one were to universalize one's own lying as an ethical law, it would mean that everyone could lie, which would effect an adverse result, making one realize that lying is wrong. This is the so-called categorical imperative (302).

Kant therefore rooted the idea of universalizability in the individual decision maker—"the moral agent . . . in lonely cogitans" (Walker [1989] 1995, 143)—who attempts to imaginatively universalize his or her own ethical inclination in order to ascertain a moral imperative. Garner, however, seems to imagine an abstract arbiter (the philosopher perhaps) apart from the decision maker who does or does not universalize from the instance of a person revulsed by a slaughterhouse. While there seems to be some confusion among proponents of universalizability as to who is doing the universalizing (see Adler 1987, 219–20), the question is a crucial one for feminists, who have become suspicious of universalizing theories precisely because of who has traditionally done the universalizing and who has been left out. Indeed, many ethic-of-care theorists have dispensed with the universalizability criterion altogether, seeing it as incompatible with the particularistic focus of care (Benhabib 1987; Walker [1989] 1995). Margaret Urban Walker suggests in fact that a rigid application of universalized norms may result in "a sort of 'moral colonialism' (the 'subjects' of my moral decisions disappear behind uniform 'policies' I must impartially 'apply')" ([1989] 1995, 147).

Nevertheless, if generalizing is done from a feminist point of view, as in Kheel's argument—in other words, if we take seriously the perspective or standpoint of a marginalized individual as opposed to contending that such a perspective is invalid because not universalizable—I would argue that it is not illogical to contend that one might easily generalize from an individual ethical reaction, extending that reaction to others similarly situated, thus positing a general or universal precept. Thus, one might reason: if others could see the horrendous conditions in this slaughterhouse, they too would be revulsed and moved to take an ethical stand against such practices—for example, to condemn the slaughter of animals for food as morally wrong, to become vegetarians. Moreover, one can likewise generalize from the treatment of one cow in the slaughterhouse to contend that no cows should be treated in this way. Thus, through the use of the moral imagination one can easily extend one's care for immediate creatures to others who are not present. These remote others are not, however, the abstract disembodied "others of rational constructs and universal principles" envisaged by Kantian rights theorists but rather "particular flesh and blood . . . actual starving children in Africa," as care theorist Virginia Held pointed out with respect to remote suffering humans (1987, 118).

In other words, the injunction to care can be universalized even if all

the particular details of an individual case cannot be so extrapolated.[1] The real question that is raised in applying care theory to animals then becomes who is to be included in the caring circle? Or, to put it in other terms, who is to be granted moral status? I will argue below, that status should be granted to living creatures with whom one can communicate cognitively and emotionally as to their needs and wishes.[2]

In an article generally sympathetic to feminist animal care theory, David DeGrazia points out correctly that "much feminist [animal theory] work construes moral status . . . in terms of social relations" (1999, 126), unlike more traditional moral theory, which relies on an entity's property (sentience, agency, etc.). He considers that this idea, while proposed some twenty years ago by Mary Midgley, has not been seriously discussed but has "potentially enormous" implications, as it represents a major shift in ethical thinking about moral status (126). DeGrazia, however, misrepresents Midgley in making his point. Midgley does argue that we should give serious moral consideration to those with whom we have emotional or social ties (including animals), acknowledging that as a practical matter one is often limited to caring for those around one, but she doesn't claim that primary concern with one's immediate circle should automatically override all other ethical considerations. In fact, she states quite the opposite (1983, 23).

DeGrazia, however, construing Midgley to favor those near over those remote, warns that "excessive weight [given] to [personal] social bonds" (1999, 126) raises once again the question of universalizability: if one favors one's immediate circle (which may include animals)—an attitude that is sometimes referred to as "kin altruism"—won't this "destabilize the moral status of many humans: unloved loners, people from very different cultures or highly isolated countries" (126), not to mention unlovable animals? This criticism echoes Tom Regan's objection to care

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[1] Regarding Kant's other points, one might question whether a sense of moral duty and the capacity to reason are any more evenly distributed in the population than the capacity for sympathy. Indeed, care theorists, like most feminist theorists, believe that habits and practices are socially constructed, not innate (Kant's point about sympathy being unevenly distributed implies that only or mostly women have the capacity); thus, they are teachable. I would argue then, following Nel Noddings (1984, 153), that if compassion practice were taught systematically as a discipline in the schools, it would become a widely accepted socially sanctioned basis for moral decision making and therefore not dependent on the whim of various individual responses, thus replying to Kant's concern about subjective volatility.

[2] By the term *cognitive* I do not mean restricted to rational discourse but rather including all communicative signs detectable by the human brain.

theory, articulated in *The Thee Generation*: "Most people do not care very much what happens to [nonhuman animals]. . . . Their care seems to be limited to 'pet' animals, or to cuddly or rare specimens of wildlife. What then becomes of the animals toward whom people are indifferent?" (1991, 96).

Pace DeGrazia and Regan, most feminist animal care theorists have not in fact argued for prioritizing one's immediate circle; rather, they have proposed that care and compassion is a practice that can and should be applied universally—a categorical imperative, if you will—to all animals (human and non). As I argue below in furthering this contention, knowledge of one's immediate animal entourage, as well as one's own experience of suffering, provides a point of reference to which the reactions of remote others may be compared and analogized on the principle of homology.

Garner offers a second criticism of care theory, namely, that it fails to provide a specific guide for action. He asks, for example, if it prohibits meat eating (2003, 241). It is hard to believe, given the volume of eco-feminist vegan/vegetarian theory that has emerged in the past decade, that anyone could doubt the answer to this question.[3] Garner wonders, however, if animals raised humanely (with care) and slaughtered humanely (but nevertheless slaughtered) would be acceptable under care theory (241), for the animals would be receiving compassionate treatment during their lives. Garner's question points to a misapprehension of care theory that I believe a dialogical theory will help to correct. From the point of view of a dialogical ethic of care, the answer to Garner's question would clearly be no, for if we care to take seriously in our ethical decision making the communicated desires of the animal, it is apparent that no animal would opt for the slaughterhouse. A Jain proverb states the obvious: "All beings are fond of life; they like pleasure and hate pain, shun destruction and like to live, they long to live. To all life is dear" (*Jaina Sūtras* [1884] 1973, I.2.3).[4] Humans know this, and a dialogical ethic must be constructed on the basis of this knowledge. Caring must therefore be extended to mean not just "caring about their welfare" but "caring about what they are telling us."

But what if, Garner continues, one encounters a situation in which there is a "conflict of caring, whose interests should we choose to uphold?" (2003, 241). In particular, he raises the issue of animal research, which

[3] See, e.g., Adams 1995; Donovan 1995; Gaard and Gruen 1995; Lucas 2005.

[4] As cited in Chapple 1986, 217. Jainism is an ancient Indian religion, a principal feature of whose practice is the vow of ahimsa (to do no harm to other living creatures). All Jains are thus vegetarian.

may benefit humans and thus satisfy a caring ethic for humans if not for animals. Deborah Slicer, a major feminist animal care theorist, explored this issue thoroughly in her nuanced article, "Your Daughter or Your Dog?" (1991). Slicer makes the salient points in the feminist animal care argument: much of the research is, to be blunt, worthless (i.e., redundant and trivial), and, as is becoming increasingly evident (even more so since Slicer's article appeared), "animals often do not serve as reliable models for human beings and . . . it can be dangerous to extrapolate from results obtained from one species to another" (117).

One might argue that stressing the uselessness of the research evades the basic dilemma posed by Garner. I would counter, however, that a feminist animal care ethic insists that the political context of decision making is never irrelevant and that ethical decisions must include an assessment of that context (in this case, the questions of who benefits from the research economically and how reliable are the research results published by thusly interested parties).

One might pose Garner's hypothetical differently to avoid the question of tainted, useless research. What if caring for immediate creatures whom one loves clashes with one's concern about remote others? My response is not intended to be evasive, but I would argue that lifeboat hypotheticals that pose questions of this type—while ostensibly designed to clarify moral thinking and values—abstract so egregiously from the particulars of any given situation as to hopelessly distort it. Indeed, nearly always, the conflicts described can in reality be negotiated in accordance with the particular circumstances of the case and settled as "both/ands" rather than "either/ors." Moreover, it is also apparent, as Slicer, Kheel (1989), Vandana Shiva (1994), and others have pointed out, that truly beneficial human health measures, such as cleaning the air, water, and soil from the poisons injected into them by agribusiness and chemical corporations (including, of course, most centrally, factory farms), are ignored, while animal experiments of dubious value are pursued with vigor (largely by profit-driven corporations and collaborating universities). Here is a case where, once again, seeing the political context aids in clarifying an ethical issue far more than a lifeboat hypothetical does.

In addition to criticisms, there have been in the recent past several refinements of feminist animal care theory, to which I now turn. In his law review article "The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory of Animal Rights" (1999), Thomas G. Kelch, a law professor and the first to apply feminist animal care theory to the law, argues that one should grant rights to those for whom one feels compassion (empathy/sympathy). The determination of who shall be granted rights or moral status (i.e.,

who shall be included in Kant's "kingdom of ends") is seen therefore to depend on humans' emotional assessment of creatures' capacity to suffer. Kelch thus places the emphasis on the emotional reactions of the human subject. This distinguishes him from Regan and Peter Singer, who, as noted, emphasize rational inquiry as a means of determining moral status. In the case of Regan, such determination grants rights to "subjects-of-a-life" or to those who are conscious and self-directive (Regan 1983, 243–48); in the case of Singer, it is to those creatures who have "interests" in not being harmed (Singer 1975, 8, 18).

Relying heavily on feminist animal care theory, especially on the articles collected in *Beyond Animal Rights* (Donovan and Adams 1996), Kelch argues, "On the issue of whether it is fitting to attribute rights to animals in order to protect them from ill treatment, we might ask whether we feel compassion for their suffering. We might ask whether we feel attachment to them, whether we feel a sense of kinship to them, whether we feel awe at their resistance" (1999, 39). Kelch is clearly speaking generically here. In other words, it is a matter not of caring just for an individual animal in an individual situation or of an immediate circle but of caring in general. We know, he argues, that animals "have the kind of suffering and pain that are appropriately objects of this emotion [compassion]" (38). Kelch thus seems to grant moral status to creatures who we know feel pain because we empathize with their suffering.

Although utilitarians have argued that sentience or the capacity to feel pain or pleasure is a *"prerequisite for having interests"* and thus for being granted moral status (Singer 1975, 8), Kelch's position stresses the emotional response of the human determining that status.[5] Instead, therefore, of proceeding to the calculation of interests proposed in utilitarian theory, where suffering is quantified in a balancing of interests ("the greatest good for the greatest number"), Kelch remains closer to the feminist animal rights position, which avoids mathematical calculations in ethical decision making. The weakness of the utilitarian position in this regard was illustrated recently in an article by Singer and Karen Dawn, "When Slaughter Makes Sense" (2004), in which it is argued that the slaughter of 25 million ducks and chickens was ethically justified in order to halt the spread of avian flu (the argument was also applied to cows with respect to "mad

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[5] Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, famously stated that the critical question regarding the moral status of animals is not "Can they *reason?* nor, can they *talk?* but, *Can they suffer?*" ([1789] 1939, 847 n. 21).

cow" disease and cats with respect to SARS).[6] The obvious speciesism of this argument is apparent if one considers that the slaughter of 25 million humans to prevent the spread of some disease would be considered outrageously evil.

A dialogical ethic-of-care approach to this issue, by contrast, would insist that the wishes of the animals not to be slaughtered must be taken seriously in weighing their fate. The Singer-Dawn position apparently regards the wishes of the chickens and ducks in this case as trivial, thus pointing up a major difference between the feminist ethic-of-care approach and other animal defense theories. The feminist position puts the emotional response of caring up front and center and does not dismiss it as irrelevant when big decisions have to be made. A dialogical extension of the ethic-of-care approach would, in addition, put front and center the feelings of the animals in question and not dismiss those desires as irrelevant to the argument. Moreover, as with other lifeboat hypotheticals (here implicitly posed as "would you slaughter 25 million chickens to save one child's life?"), there is likely a "both/and" solution. There are undoubtedly other ways to control the spread of the disease than through mass slaughter.[7] How do we control epidemics among humans? We don't slaughter the infected. We quarantine them; we treat them medically; we take care of them. Granted, such solutions would likely be more costly, a realization of which must lead us to conclude that the ultimate reason for the slaughter of millions of chickens, ducks, cows, and cats was that it was the most profitable alternative for agribusiness. Finally, therefore, I would argue once again that the larger answer to these sorts of questions lies in a consideration of the ultimate political causes for, in this case, the spread of the disease. If these causes were analyzed, it would be clear that the solution lies not, therefore, in more mass slaughter but rather in a cessation of the system that raises animals for slaughter to begin with and moreover in miserably unhealthy conditions. (In fairness, Singer and Dawn also make this point.)

Another recent article that takes an approach similar to Kelch's is one that extends feminist animal care theory to issues of child abuse. In "Protecting Children and Animals from Abuse: A Trans-species Concept of Caring" (1999), James Garbarino argues, citing my "Animal Rights and

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[6] Singer and Dawn also make the amazingly specious argument that the animals in question were going to be slaughtered anyway, so what difference does it make?

[7] Saijai Phetaringharn, a duck egg wholesaler in Thailand, where the avian flu in poultry has reached epidemic status, recently argued, for example, that the way to stop its spread is to vaccinate the birds. Such vaccines do exist. (See Specter 2005, 53.)

Feminist Theory" (1990), that "it is in their capacity to *feel* that the rights of animals derive" (Garbarino 1999, 9). He argues further that "any genuine understanding of the rights of children and animals must arise out of empathy. *We (and they) feel, therefore we are entitled*" (10). (Garbarino notes how in his own experience "there came a point where I could imagine the screaming of a fish—and then ceased to be able to cast that baited hook" [12].) "We should," he urges, "conceptualize a generic empathy for the victimized as part of our core mission" (11).

In an article published in 2004, however, Catharine MacKinnon proposes, in contradistinction to the above opinions, that the ability to feel pain should not be the criterion for moral status; one should not have to experience suffering, she argues, in order to be granted rights: "Why is just existing, being alive, not enough?" (2004, 271). Her point is that demonstrating that animals can feel will not prove any more effective in ending animal abuse than associating women with feeling has helped end women battering. Women have, she points out, in fact been stigmatized as inferior in part because of their association with feeling. In other words, feminizing animals by showing them to be emotional creatures who suffer, she claims, will not effect their inclusion within the compass of who is to be granted moral status.

I have to disagree with MacKinnon here and agree with the previous theorists, in particular Kelch and Garbarino, both of whom, as we have seen, would accord rights or moral status to those who can suffer and feel. In fact, as a strategy, evoking sympathy for an oppressed group has historically been an effective means of arousing moral indignation against oppressive practices. David Brion Davis attributes the abolition of slavery in large part to the "complex change in moral vision" effected by the sympathy movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries initiated by theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment (1996, 54). That movement succeeded in getting whites to see Africans as persons like themselves for whom they could feel sympathy. Indeed, Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote *Uncle Tom's Cabin*—which many (including Abraham Lincoln) credited as a major force in turning public sentiment against slavery—largely for the purpose of convincing the white reader that blacks suffered just as whites did. A recurrent theme in the novel is that blacks should not be considered as property/objects—as was held under existing U.S. law— but as subjects who feel similarly as whites. Little Eva, a central moral authority in the novel, tells her father at one point, "These poor creatures love their children as much as you do me" (Stowe [1852] 1981, 403), thus countering slave traders' arguments that blacks are not sensitive to pain or emotional suffering. "These critters ain't like white folks, you

know," one trader remarks of a black woman's misery over a child of hers being sold at auction, "they gets over things" (47). As Marjorie Spiegel points out, "In the eyes of white slave-holders, black people were 'just animals,' who could soon get over separation from a child or other loved person" (1988, 43). Stowe, incidentally, also wrote a powerful article protesting animal abuse, "Rights of Dumb Animals" (1869).

Thus, a strong argument for granting creatures moral status is to persuade oppressors that those they are oppressing are subjects who have feelings not unlike those of the oppressor. This positing of similarity or homologousness serves to make empathy or sympathy possible. If one sees the other as a creature who suffers in a manner like oneself, then one can imagine oneself in that creature's situation and can thus imaginatively experience his pain. One thereby implicitly grants him moral status comparable to one's own.

But what of those with whom one has little in common and who may not appear to feel as we do (to reprise Regan's critique that humans favor cuddly animals over those less appealing, like snakes and spiders, who may not exhibit recognizably humanlike emotions)? Here I believe we see the limits of theory based strictly on the sympathetic reaction. We need—and the rest of this article will be devoted to developing my case—to reorient or reemphasize that care theory means listening to other life-forms regardless of how alien they may seem to us and incorporating their communications into our moral reaction to them. In other words, even if we don't feel the cuddly warmth we might toward a human infant—presumably the paradigmatic experience in care theory—we nevertheless can read other creatures' language on the principle of homology, for their nonverbal language is very much like ours. In the case of snakes and spiders, for example, we can see by their body language (which is homologous to ours) that they experience terror and anxiety, that they shrink away from sources of pain, that they want to live. We must respect their wishes in any human decision making about their condition.

In addition to Kelch's, a second recent important and thoughtful exploration of care theory that requires a response is Grace Clement's "The Ethic of Care and the Problem of Wild Animals" (2003). Clement explores the question of whether rights theory, which privileges autonomy, independent agency, and freedom from intrusion, might be more applicable to the situation of wild animals than care theory is, even though care theory, traditionally interpreted in maternalistic terms, might seem to be more applicable to domestic animals who are dependent on humans and in a position of lesser power. Clement's nuanced conclusion is that each approach is necessary in both wild and domestic cases. Her discussion

raises a number of interesting points that help to clarify the direction in which I would like to see care theory move.

Clement suggests (probably correctly) that animal care theory evolved by taking domestic animals "as paradigmatic" (2003, 3) and wonders whether sympathy might be a more appropriate emotion for domestic animals than for wild ones. If, she proposes, the world of wild animals is one of "eating *and being eaten*," following the characterization of deep ecologist J. Baird Callicott, "our sympathies would seem to be out of line with this fact" (Clement 2003, 3; see also Callicott 1987, 205).

First, it must be pointed out that the characterization of nature as "red in tooth and claw" is a distortion (on this, see Midgley 1983, 24). In fact, one can argue equally well that the predominant practice in the natural world is one of symbiosis and cooperation. Nevertheless, it is indeed true that one's sympathies for an animal being killed by another animal in the wild would seem to be misplaced, or at least vain. However, the contention itself risks falling into the naturalistic fallacy, misconceiving the purpose of human ethics. Feminist care theorists are not offering an ethic for all animate life on the planet. Rather, they are concerned with an ethic for the human treatment of nonhuman animals. They are not proposing an ethic for lions chasing zebras, but neither do they endorse that humans emulate lions or other animals in establishing their own ethic. What they propose instead is an ethic that ensures that humans do not themselves inflict suffering on creatures who we know can suffer or experience harm.

Environmental ethicists such as Callicott classically fall into the naturalistic fallacy when they attempt to justify practices such as hunting by claiming they "reaffirm [humans'] participation in nature" (Callicott [1980] 1992, 56). While numerous ecofeminist criticisms of environmentalist justifications of hunting have been made (Luke [1992] 1996; Davis 1995; Kheel 1995), here I would like to apply dialogical care theory to the hunting issue. A dialogical ethic for the treatment of animals would argue that our ethic of how to treat the deer should be based on what we know of the deer's wishes. If one reads and pays attention to the body language of the deer who is fleeing from the hunter, taking seriously the communication from the deer that she does not want to be killed or injured, one would have to conclude that the hunter should lay down his gun.

One might object that this position risks itself falling into the naturalistic fallacy, which bases human ethics on alleged natural behaviors of animals in the natural world. But the difference is that in the dialogical approach it is not a matter of behaving like the deer or modeling human ethics on

the deer's behavior; rather, it is a matter of incorporating the deer's position and wishes dialogically in the human ethical-decision-making process.

What, however, if one receives mixed messages from animals: how then does a dialogical care ethic respond? In the case of the lion and the zebra, for example, it is clear that the lion is communicating a desire to eat the zebra, where the zebra is communicating a desire not to be eaten. How is the human to respond? Clement, I think persuasively, argues for a general theory of noninterference in the wild but proposes nevertheless that a human encountering an individual suffering animal in the wild should act to alleviate that suffering (2003, 7). I would further postulate that a human should attempt to protect weaker animals within her immediate entourage; that is, if one's own companion animals are attempting to kill another animal, one should try to prevent it.

A dialogical ethic does not assert that the animal's position should be the only matter taken into consideration or that the human should automatically comply with the animal's wishes. Ethical decision making is in fact made dialogical by the introduction into the conversation of factors the human knows beyond the animals' ken, which may be relevant to the ethical choice. In the case of domestic animals for whom one has assumed responsibility, such factors might include, for example, a decision to give one's companion animal a vaccination, even though one knows the animal doesn't enjoy going to the vet or receiving a shot. One nevertheless decides in this case to override the animal's immediate wishes because one sees that the animal's suffering is likely to be minimal and temporary and that the long-term result is likely to be beneficial to the animal, saving her from worse pain and suffering.

One might object that such a decision-making process reprises the utilitarian ends-and-means logic that justifies lab experimentation on animals: local immediate suffering that leads to a later, greater good. But in fact the analogy doesn't hold up. Lab animals are subjected to much greater and repeated pain, not to mention the stress of confinement, and a long-term, abstract good may well not result and certainly will not result for the individual animal who is likely to be killed as reward for her pains.

The final elaboration of feminist animal care ethics that I wish to comment on is MacKinnon's "Of Mice and Men" (2004). MacKinnon characterizes the liberal animal rights approach as the "like us" or "sameness model" in terms that recall her similar critique of the inadequacies of liberal rights theory with respect to women in her celebrated books *Feminism Unmodified* (1987) and *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (1989). As in these works, she notes in "Of Mice and Men" that the

liberal model of equality for all ignores substantive power differentials among unlike entities.

Most powerfully, MacKinnon attacks champions of free speech, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, who have defended crush videos, for example, in which stiletto-heeled women crush live small animals to death to provide sexual titillation for the viewer. The ACLU argued in opposition to the recent federal law banning such videos (in interstate commerce) that the film itself is speech and therefore permitted under the First Amendment. Although MacKinnon doesn't make this point in reference to the federal law, an implicit question is thereby raised: Whose speech is being overlooked here?

This example graphically illustrates how a dialogical ethic of care would operate differently from traditional liberal constitutional doctrine. A dialogical ethic would argue that the wishes of the animals being crushed must be taken into account in human decision making about their fate. (A similar point might be made with respect to another recent national event, the "mad cow" disease scare of late 2003 in which virtually no one expressed concern about paying emotional attention to the sick and injured "downer" cows' own feelings about being dragged by chains and bulldozed into slaughterhouses, much less about how healthy cows feel about being slaughtered.)

MacKinnon further develops her point by examining a 2000 California anti-snuff-video bill (which didn't pass) that provided a consent provision for humans (i.e., if they consented to the acts being depicted, the bill would not apply) but not for animals. MacKinnon sarcastically comments, "Instructively, the joint crush/snuff bill had a consent provision only for people. Welcome to humanity: While animals presumably either cannot or are presumed not to consent to their videotaped murder, humans beings could have consented to their own intentional and malicious killing if done to make a movie, and the movie would be legal" (2004, 269).

While the issue of human consent in such matters may be questioned (and has been by MacKinnon elsewhere, where she points out that such consent presumes an equal playing field and elides coercive circumstances like economic need, patriarchal brainwashing, etc. [1987, 180–83]), the bill's consent provision inadvertently highlights the fact that no one asked the animals if they consented, which of course they would not. MacKinnon concludes this discussion by asking, "Who asked the animals? . . . Do animals dissent from human hegemony? I think they often do. They vote with their feet by running away. They bite back, scream in pain, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim away" (2004, 270).

A standpoint theory for animals?

Because it offers a more theoretically sophisticated political perspective than care theory, standpoint theory, another significant vein in contemporary feminist theory, may prove a useful supplement to care theory regarding the ethical treatment of animals.[8] Especially in its original articulation by Georg Lukács, standpoint theory would seem to be particularly apt for the dialogical focus I am proposing here. Lukács, a Marxist, developed the idea in his *History and Class Consciousness* (*Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* [1923] 1971), in which he posited that the proletariat evinces a particular and privileged epistemology because of its commodification or reification in the capitalist production process. When a subject is treated as an object, Lukács argues, the experience necessarily evokes a critical consciousness born of the subject's ironic knowledge that he or she is *not* a thing. In capitalist assembly-line production, Lukács notes, the worker "is turned into a commodity and reduced to a mere quantity. But this very fact forces him to surpass the immediacy of his condition" ([1923] 1971, 166). Beneath the "quantifying crust," however, lies a "qualitative living core" (169) from which arises a critical, subversive consciousness. Lukács elaborates: "In the proletariat . . . the process by which a [person's] achievement is split off from his total personality and becomes a commodity leads to a revolutionary consciousness" (171). Moreover, "corresponding to the objective consciousness of the commodity form, there is the subjective element . . . [and] while the process by which the worker is reified and becomes a commodity dehumanizes him . . . it remains true that precisely his humanity and his soul are not changed into commodities" (172).

Feminist standpoint theory has generally—following Nancy Hartsock (1983)—rooted an oppressed group's awakening critical consciousness less in objectification and more in bodily experience and in the practice or memory of nonindustrial craft-based labor (use-value production); however, for the purposes of developing a feminist approach to the animal

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[8] Carol Adams initiated this line of thinking in her 1997 article "'Mad Cow' Disease and the Animal Industrial Complex" (see esp. 29, 41–42, 44). Adams takes a different tack than I do here, seeing cows as "alienated laborers" whose standpoint has been ignored. See also Slicer 1998. While care theory and standpoint theory derive from different philosophical traditions, they connect in their concern about paying heed to others' misery. And in the original formulation of feminist standpoint theory, Nancy Hartsock (1983) identified as the feminist standpoint the female relational ontology that is at the heart of care theory. Where care theory and standpoint theory differ, however, is that the latter is more of a political theory that seeks to locate the causes of the misery and to confront and eliminate it politically; care theory is more of a moral theory aimed at alleviating misery in an immediate way. Both approaches are necessary, I argue below.

question, the Lukácsian emphasis on reification as the primary element constitutive of the critical standpoint would seem more useful.[9]

When the theory is applied to animals, it is abundantly clear that they are commodified and quantified in the production process—even more literally so than the proletariat, whose bodies at least are not turned into dead consumable objects by the process, though they may be treated as mechanical means. Where one immediately senses problems, however, in applying standpoint theory to animals is in the question of how their subjective viewpoint is to be articulated. For obviously, unlike human workers, animals are unable to share their critical views with other animals or to organize resistance to their objectification and (in their case) slaughter. However, the fact that workers rarely expressed a proletarian standpoint spontaneously or rose up en masse against their treatment (a perennial problem in revolutionary theory) suggests that the differences between the two cases may not be as great as they might at first appear. Often, as a practical matter, Marxist theorists have fallen back on the idea of an intellectual vanguard leading and educating the proletariat so as to recognize and act against the injustices that are inflicted on it (the most famous example here being V. I. Lenin's idea of the vanguard party). And indeed a central question in feminist standpoint theory has been that of the relationship between the theorists articulating the standpoint and the women on whose behalf it is being articulated (see Hartsock 1998, 234–38).

In the case of animals, it is clear that human advocates are required to articulate the standpoint of the animals—gleaned, as here argued, in dialogue with them—to wit, that they do not wish to be slaughtered and treated in painful and exploitative ways. And human advocates are necessary as well to defend and organize against the practices that reify and commodify animal subjects.

A dialogical ethic of care for the treatment of animals

Ludwig Wittgenstein once famously remarked that if a lion could speak we couldn't understand him (Wittgenstein 1963, 223e). In fact, as I have been proposing here, lions do speak, and it is not impossible to understand much of what they are saying. Several theorists have already urged that

[9] MacKinnon is the exception here. In "Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: 'Pleasure Under Patriarchy'" ([1990] 1995), she proposes that "sexual objectification" be considered the basis for the emergence of a woman's standpoint (135). For a survey of feminist standpoint theories, see Harding 1986, 141–51.

humans need to learn to read the languages of the natural world. Jonathan Bate has proposed that we learn the syntax of the land, not seeing it through our own "prison-house of language," in order to develop appropriate environmental understandings (1998, 65). Similarly, Patrick Murphy has called for an "ecofeminist dialogics" in which humans learn to read the dialects of animals. "Nonhuman others," he claims, "can be constituted as speaking subjects rather than merely objects of our speaking" (1991, 50).[10] Earlier, phenomenologist Max Scheler spoke similarly about the necessity for learning the "*universal grammar*" of creatural expression ([1926] 1970, 11). Indeed, over a century ago American writer Sarah Orne Jewett speculated about the possibility of learning the language of nonhumans, asking, "Who is going to be the linguist who learns the first word of an old crow's warning to his mate . . . ? How long we shall have to go to school when people are expected to talk to the trees, and birds, and beasts in their own language! . . . It is not necessary to tame [creatures] before they can be familiar and responsive, we can meet them on their own ground" (1881, 4–5).

There are those, to be sure, who still raise the epistemological question of how one can know what an animal is feeling or thinking. The answer would seem to be that we use much the same mental and emotional activities in reading an animal as we do in reading a human.[11] Body language, eye movement, facial expression, tone of voice—all are important signs. It also helps to know about the species' habits and culture. And,

[10] In the past few years a number of other literary theorists have begun exploring the possibility of a dialogical "animal-standpoint criticism." I have just completed an article (not yet published), "Animal Ethics and Literary Criticism," that further develops this concept.

[11] This is to disagree somewhat with Thomas Nagel, who in "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974) argues that we humans cannot apprehend "bat phenomenology" (440); i.e., we can only imagine what it would be like for us to be bats, not what it is like for bats to be bats. To an extent Nagel is correct, of course; it is a truism of epistemology that we are limited by our mental apparatus. However, I believe more effort can be made to decipher animal communications and that while we may never fully understand what it feels like to be a bat, we can understand certain pertinent basics of his or her experience, sufficient for the formulation of an ethical response. For an alternative view to Nagel's, see Kenneth Shapiro's "Understanding Dogs" (1989), which argues that we recognize the validity of interspecies "kinesthetic" communication. Although Val Plumwood proposes a "dialogical interspecies ethic" in her recent *Environmental Culture* (2002, 167–95) that would seem to be consistent with what I am proposing here, she inconsistently argues that it is ethically permissible to kill and eat nonhumans under this ethic: one can "conceive [them] both as communicative others and as food" (157). This would seem to defeat the purpose of a dialogical ethic, which is to respond ethically to what the "communicative other" is telling one, namely, and invariably, that he does not want to be killed and eaten.

as with humans, repeated experiences with one individual help one to understand that individual's unique needs and wishes. By paying attention to, by studying, what is signified, one comes to know, to care about, the signifier.[12] In this way, what Carol J. Adams (1990) famously termed the *absent referents* are restored to discourse, allowing their stories to be part of the narrative, opening, in short, the possibility of dialogue with them.

The underlying premise here is that one of the principal ways we know is by means of analogy based on homology. If that dog is yelping, whining, leaping about, licking an open cut, and since if I had an open wound I know I would similarly be (or feeling like) crying and moving about anxiously because of the pain, I therefore conclude that the animal is experiencing the same kind of pain as I would and is expressing distress about it. One imagines, in short, how the animal is feeling based on how one would feel in a similar situation.[13] In addition, repeated exhibitions of similar reactions in similar situations lead one inductively to a generic conclusion that dogs experience the pain of wounds as we do, that, in short, they feel pain and don't like it. The question, therefore, whether humans can understand animals is, in my opinion, a moot one. That they can has been abundantly proved, as Midgley points out, by their repeated success in doing so (1983, 113, 115, 133, 142).

Of course, as with humans, there is always the danger that one might misread the communication of the animal in question, that one might incorrectly assume homologous behavior when there is none. To be sure, all communication is imperfect, and there remain many mysteries in animal (as well as human) behavior. Feminist ethic-of-care theorists have explored some of the difficulties inherent in attempting to assess the needs of an incommunicative human and/or the risks of imposing one's own views or needs on her. But as Alison Jaggar summarizes, care theorists maintain that in general such "dangers may be avoided [or at least minimized, I would add] through improved practices of attentiveness, portraying attentiveness as a kind of discipline whose prerequisites include attitudes and aptitudes such as openness, receptivity, empathy, sensitivity, and imagination" (1995, 190).

Understanding that an animal is in pain or distress—even empathizing or sympathizing with him—doesn't ensure, however, that the human will

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[12] Here I am modifying classical structuralist terminology.

[13] In the locus classicus on the subject of knowing another's inner states, "Other Minds" ([1946] 1979), J. L. Austin insists that a primary prerequisite for such communication is that one must have had the feeling oneself (104). Austin, however, like Nagel, abjures the possibility of knowing "what it would feel like to be a cat or a cockroach" (105).

act ethically toward the animal. Thus, the originary emotional empathetic response must be supplemented with an ethical and political perspective (acquired through training and education) that enables the human to analyze the situation critically so as to determine who is responsible for the animal suffering and how that suffering may best be alleviated. In her recent book *Regarding the Pain of Others* (2003), Susan Sontag warns that people do not automatically act ethically in response to pictures of other people's pain (she doesn't deal with images of animals). While she characterizes as a "moral monster" the person who through a failure "of imagination, of empathy" (8) does not respond compassionately, she nevertheless argues that various ideologies often interfere with the moral response. Too often, she claims, sympathy connotes superiority and privilege without self-reflection about how one is contributing to the suffering one is lamenting. She therefore urges that a heightened humanist political awareness must accompany the sympathetic response in order for truly ethical action to result. Photos of atrocity "cannot be more than an invitation to pay attention, to reflect" (117) on who is responsible for the suffering and similar questions.

Several of the contributors to the feminist animal care collection *Beyond Animal Rights* (Donovan and Adams 1996) argue in this vein for what Deane Curtin terms a "politicized ethic of caring for" ([1991] 1996, 65), one that recognizes the political context in which caring and sympathy take place. In my discussion of the celebrated Heinz hypothetical (in which Heinz has to decide whether to steal a drug, which he cannot obtain any other way, in order to save the life of his dying wife), I propose that "a political ethic-of-care response would include the larger dimension of looking to the political and economic context. . . . Thus the corporate-controlled health care system becomes the primary villain in the piece, and the incident should serve to motivate action to change the system" (Donovan 1996, 161). And, as Adams points out in "Caring about Suffering" (1996, 174), feminist animal care theory necessarily recognizes the "sex-species system" in which animal (and human) suffering is embedded.

In his much-cited article "Taming Ourselves or Going Feral?" (1995), Brian Luke reveals how a massive deployment of ideological conditioning forestalls what he sees as the natural empathetic response most people feel toward animals. Children have to be educated out of the early sympathy they feel for animals, he contends; ideological denial and justifications for animal exploitation and suffering are indoctrinated from an early age. Luke catalogs the ways in which such suffering is rationalized and legitimized by those who profit from it (303–11). To a great extent, therefore, getting

people to see evil and to care about suffering is a matter of clearing away ideological rationalizations that legitimate animal exploitation and cruelty. Recognizing the egregious use of euphemism employed to disguise such behavior (copiously documented in Joan Dunayer's recent book, *Animal Equality* [2001]) would seem to be an important step in this direction.

But it is not just a matter of supplementing care with a political perspective; the experience of care can itself lead to political analysis, as Joan Tronto points out in her call for a "political ethic of care" (1993, 155): "Care becomes a tool for critical political analysis when we use this concept to reveal relationships of power" (172). In other words, although Tronto doesn't treat the animal question, if one feels sympathy toward a suffering animal, one is moved to ask the question, Why is this animal suffering? The answer can lead into a political analysis of the reasons for the animal's distress. Education in critical thinking, these thinkers emphasize, is therefore imperative if an ethic of care is to work.

We also need education, as Nel Noddings proposed (1984, 153), in the practices of care and empathy.[14] Years ago, in fact, Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson contended that "empathy is a discipline" and therefore teachable (1987, 195). Many religions, they noted, use imaginative exercises in empathetic understanding as a spiritual discipline (195). Such exercises could be adapted for use in secular institutions like schools (including, especially, high school). Certainly a large purpose of such a discipline must be not just emotional identification but also intellectual understanding, learning to hear, to take seriously, to care about what animals are telling us, learning to read and attend to their language. The burgeoning field of animal ethology is providing important new information that will aid in such study.

In conclusion, therefore, a feminist animal care ethic must be political in its perspective and dialogical in its method. Rejecting the imperialist imperative of the scientific method, in which the "scientific subject's voice . . . speaks with general and abstract authority [and] the objects of inquiry 'speak' only in response to what scientists ask them" (as Sandra Harding [1986, 124] characterized the laboratory encounter), humans must cease imposing their voice on that of animals. No longer must our relationship with animals be that of the "conquest of an alien object," Rosemary Radford Ruether notes, but "the conversation of two subjects." We must recognize "that the 'other' has a 'nature' of her own that needs to be respected and with which one must enter into conversation" (1975,

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[14] Noddings (1991) has, however, stipulated reservations about applying care theory to animals. See also my critique of Noddings's position (Donovan 1991).

195–96). On that basis and in reflecting upon the political context, a dialogical ethic for the treatment of animals may be established.[15]

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[15] Other theorists who have advocated and explored dialogical ethical theory include Martin Buber, Simone Weil, Iris Murdoch, and Mikhail Bakhtin. See further discussion in Donovan 1996.

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Planet-Love.com: Cyberbrides in the Americas and the Transnational Routes of U.S. Masculinity

I am an explorer in the undiscovered continent of love, a scientist in the laboratory of masculine longing. Can a middle-aged man, scarred by the sex wars at home, find a new beginning on a tropical island where women are still feminine?
—Makow 2000, back cover

My whole life is abstract. . . . I don't find myself feeling really close to people, I don't feel really close to my family. . . . I've realized I'm just sort of going through the motions, so on some level, going outside the country is an attempt to, you know, get past that cynical, detached expe-nence that I have here.
—Jason, interview, March 2005

When the mail-order bride industry shifted from using a magazine format to operating over the Internet during the 1990s, the number of companies providing matchmaking services exploded and spread from Russia and Asia into Latin America. Scholarship on the mail-order bride industry in Asia and Russia tends to emphasize the exploitation of poor women in developing countries by Western men as part of the sexual trafficking trade, an emphasis that reproduces binary relations of power between developing and first-world countries.[1] The emergence of agencies

[1] Nicole Constable's book, *Romance on a Global Stage* (2003), is the only exception. While I am differentiating my work from traditional studies on the mail-order bride industry, there are many similarities in the ways women from Latin America are cast—as better mothers, as warmer, more sexual, and less outspoken than U S. women—that resonate with how Asian women are popularly constructed within the global economy. See Glenn 1986, Parreñas 2001; Kang 2002.

on the Internet with services in Latin America has resulted in attracting women from a mostly middle-class and/or professional clientele, although male participants come from various regional, economic, ethnic, and class backgrounds. In illuminating the process of finding a Mexican or Colombian bride, I argue that this industry does not merely commodify relationships into binaries of the white male buyer and ethnic female seller, as is often repeated in mail-order bride studies (Villipando 1989; Glodava and Onizuka 1994; Tolentino 1999), but involves a more complex and uneven historical moment of racial formation, nationhood, and understandings of masculinity and subjectivity. The more recent expansion of the industry into Latin America also capitalizes on the language of morality in an attempt to shore up the industry's (and men's) central role in forging a new national family across borders.

In feminist writing on mail-order brides, women's and men's voices remain absent. Instead, this scholarship assumes a one-to-one correspondence between the male gaze on the Web sites and women's exploitation as domestic laborers in the home. While this article focuses on the men, I discuss elsewhere the ways middle-class Mexican women interpret their desire to marry U.S. men (see Schaeffer-Grabiel 2004). Men have few opportunities to understand women's perspectives, especially since Web sites promote stereotypical information about women as more family oriented, accustomed to large age differences, willing to please, and as sexual objects for men's pleasure. Women's self-descriptions and their alluring photos (often requested by companies) as well as media images, popular imaginaries, and language and cultural barriers further perpetuate stereotypical renderings of differences across borders. Many women perceive U.S. men (as opposed to local men) as more equitable companions in marriage, who value women's contributions to the home and family and who offer women opportunities to enjoy a stable, middle-class lifestyle. These contradictory imaginaries produce various outcomes when couples marry and live together in the United States. While I center my critique on discourses generated by the men and through company Web sites, I want to point out that some men and women do form egalitarian and loving relationships. It is with the hope of avoiding a dichotomy between love and power relations that I analyze the ways love is inseparable from labor relations, race, gender, and the global economy.

In recent years, scholarship on the sex tourism trade has positioned men as visible participants (see Truong 1990; Bishop and Robinson 1998, 2002). There are similarities in both marriage and sex tourism, such as the sharing of information via chat rooms and Web sites that lure men in with images of overly sexualized Latin American women. Yet Web com-

panies are careful to "class up" the language of marriage—using labels such as *gentlemen* and *ladies* and using discourses of courtship and romance rather than sex. Men's masculine identity is connected to class as travel to Latin America reflects men's desire to "get more bang for your buck" (Bishop and Robinson 2002). While the reference here is to sex, many of the men I interviewed repeatedly stated that in Latin America they could date and potentially marry younger and more beautiful women than in the United States. They hope for a fresh start in Latin America through their search for better wives and mothers while constructing a heightened moral and class status within the global world order as the "good guys," heroes, or sensitive "new men" crafted against the macho Latin male stereotype.

It is through the Internet that men's quest for a bride takes on new dimensions. The Internet's connectivity and interactivity have intensified the speed, repetition, and self-formulation of discursive imaginings between participants (Caldwell 2000). Unlike other forms of media technology, the Internet not only offers images and narratives of otherness but also guarantees one's ability to actively participate with the fantasies of women seductively displayed on Web sites. Internet companies offer more than a forum for purchasing brides; they also sell women's e-mail addresses, "Vacation Romance" tours where men and women meet, and how-to guidebooks and videos, and provide chat room boards where men may share their experiences. In other words, men do not embark on a solitary journey in search of a wife. Chat room discussants on Planet-Love spend months, even years, sharing "travel reports," swapping dating and marital experiences, and discussing cultural differences and immigration procedures.[2]

In this article I demonstrate a contemporary way that empire and globalization resurface through men's everyday lives, practices, and forms of intimacy. In considering why, at this particular moment, transnational marriages are so alluring, I argue that outsourcing the family from developing nations follows the logic of the transnational economy and corporate multiculturalism. Many company Web sites and men idealize Latin American women as having better genes than U.S. women or, as Jason described, better "raw materials" (interview, March 2005). This neocolonial imaginary persists in contemporary globalization as Web sites herald the benefits of shifting the site of production for the family outside of the nation. Latin American women are imagined as untainted by mod-

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[2] There are three chat boards available for men seeking brides from Russia, Asia, and Latin America on Planet-Love, which can be found at http://www.planet-love.com.

ern capitalist relations while also in need of being saved from anachronistic nationalism. Men in the United States imagine themselves as the benevolent force saving globally "disadvantaged" middle-class women (docile laborers) abroad as well as saving the U.S. nation from the so-called disintegration of the family brought about by feminism, women's entrance into the labor force, and U.S. women of color, who are stereotyped as welfare recipients (viewed as unruly and lazy laborers). As Ana Teresa Ortiz and Laura Briggs describe, in the popular industry of adoption of children from Romania the "Third World poor are romanticized as malleable innocents who can take advantage of the opportunities passed up by the dysfunctional domestic underclass" (2003, 42). By analyzing race, gender, and the family in a transnational context, I hope to bring Latin American women into a relational framework with immigrant women and U.S. women of color, whose labor is envisioned as polluting and crippling the progress of U.S. nationalism and family values.

While men lament that U.S. women are overdetermined by their labor outside the home, Latin American women represent the utopian prospect of importing spiritual rejuvenation and purifying the boundaries of the self, the nuclear family, and the nation. Latin American women embody the "last frontier," merging colonial and new cyberfrontier possibilities.[3] Thus, finding a foreign bride converges with four discourses: colonialism, modern self-help movements, transnational capitalism, and futuristic ideals of flexibility, mobility, and a postracial society. These themes demonstrate the ways technology and ideas about globalization are incorporated into men's everyday lives as a yearning for a utopian, multiracial, postbody affinity to masculinity and citizenship, regardless of skin color, profession, or class affiliation.

In chat room discussions, men from various ethnicities, classes, and professions construct themselves through fantasies of colonialism and empire and as cosmopolitan citizens of the globe. I am concerned here with the role of the Internet in altering patterns of intimacy and subjectivity, as well as the labor Latin American women's bodies perform as reproducers of the new nation. The thousands of men who flee the United States for wives and adventures abroad reveal one way men transform their sense of victimhood into empowerment. Men in the United States elevate their value and social capital through their association with hegemonic masculinity predicated on a traditional wife and family and on heroic ideals of global adventure, risk, and self-exploration.

[3] See Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002.

Methodology

In this article I combine chat room discussions, interviews with more than forty men at "Vacation Romance" tours, and guidebooks to show continuities between cyberspace discussions, face-to-face interactions, and Web site images and narratives.[4] I discovered that even as a lurker, or invisible voyeur, in Planet-Love, the stories men told me at the tours mimicked the stories repeated in Planet-Love's chat room. While I feared my identity as a mixed race Chicana from the United States would hinder the openness and sincerity during interviews with men at the tour in Guadalajara, Mexico, most men were eager to share their stories with me. The fact that I interviewed men and women, that I spoke Spanish, and that I had permission from company owners to conduct interviews at their tours contributed to my association by some of the men as "one of the guys." My willingness to listen to men's stories and the fact that I was racially visible as nonwhite (and to them, nonfeminist) contributed to my insider status.[5] While being one of the guys was neither my intent nor a position I felt comfortable with at all times, I was able to engage men in honest and open discussions to which, at times, I wished I was not privy. As an educated, confident, middle-class woman with knowledge of Mexican culture and language, I occupied a complicated position of power vis-à-vis the men I interviewed.

Unlike face-to-face interviews—carried out over a short period of time and with a limited number of people—chat room ethnography provides an unending dialogue among a rotating group of men. As people increasingly find intimacy and a sense of community through the Internet, this type of ethnography is an indispensable tool for following the ways men and women create consensus about their participation in this industry and how the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are drawn. Rather than focusing on what is true versus what is false, ethnographic narratives are important in unraveling the trends and frameworks within which people tell the stories they wish to tell.[6]

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[4] The Romance Tours are held at five-star hotels, and men usually pay steep prices to attend (from $500 to $1,200, plus travel expenses) while women are invited for free.

[5] Most men I interviewed equate feminism with white, upwardly mobile women and assume Latin American women and, to a lesser extent, U.S women of color, to be more feminine and thus not feminist.

[6] In order to answer the question of whether Internet chat room observations are "legitimate" or accurate places to do research because of preoccupations with deception and identity play, scholars have conducted in-depth analysis comparing online and offline interactions. Like Lori Kendall (2002) and Constable (2003), I found that there was not much

Global masculinities

The formation of first-world masculinities in the bride industry must be situated within global economic restructuring. Recent changes affecting men in the United States include the perceived loss of authority in the family, their departure from families in mostly rural areas to cities with high-tech industries and finance (where populations are predominantly male), blue-collar unemployment, and changing media images redefining masculine attributes in the labor force (Runyan 1996; Faludi 1999; Hooper 2001). Charlotte Hooper (2001) argues that global restructuring in the 1970s softened the previously dominant image of postwar hypermasculinity based on the myth of toughness, power, and strength. She writes, "Activities and qualities which were previously defined as feminine or effeminate are being increasingly integrated into hegemonic masculinity" (63). For example, she states, "flexibility in job descriptions and career paths is being reinterpreted as 'masculine' risk taking and entrepreneurialism; and computers have lost their feminine associations with keyboard skills, now being marketed as macho power machines" (156). In labeling work attributes as masculine, men attain a higher pay scale than women, they naturalize their entrance into gender-appropriate careers, and they access a collective masculine imaginary that draws on previous historical narratives of masculine bravado in wars, colonizing projects, and as frontiersmen. R. W. Connell (1995) argues that hegemonic masculinities can only be established if there is some link between the cultural ideal and institutional power. Thus, for men in search of a bride, information technology combined with an adventurous frontier manhood provide both the cultural and institutional capital on which hegemony relies.

Cybermasculinities formed in chat room discussions are more complex than scholars of globalization and masculinity such as Connell (2000) and Hooper (2001) have theorized. Drawing on feminist postcolonial scholarship, Connell perceives legacies of colonialism and imperialism as formative to the making of gender, racial, and sexual hierarchies. European and Western dominance shaped the formation of a white male national citizenship through the extraction of labor and sexuality from native others.[7] Virile masculinity and citizenship were predicated on the separation of the public and private spheres. The purity and honor of the domesti-

difference between online and face-to-face interviews and discussions. Even regarding face-to-face interviews, many have written about the varying degrees of exaggerated and false statements given by those hoping to tell the story they think we want to hear (Scott 1999).

[7] Connell relies on the work of scholars such as Anne McClintock (1995). See also Castañeda 1990; Limón 1998

cated white woman at home were distinct from sexual conquests with the hypersexualized, racial, and/or lower-class "other" and from the hypersexualized colonized male subjects outside the nation. Connell elucidates the continuities and disjunctures between colonial masculinity and its hegemonic manifestation, "transnational business masculinity" (2000, 51). He describes this current world gender order as "the masculinity associated with those who control its dominant institutions: the business executives who operate in global markets, and the political executives who interact . . . with them" (51).

This new transnational business masculinity departs from traditional bourgeois masculinity "by its increasingly libertarian sexuality, with a growing tendency to commodify women" (Connell 2000, 52). New sexualized industries have cropped up within patterns of transnational business, which include hotel porn videos and sex tourism. Similarly, Hooper describes corporate manhood alongside a sexual imaginary described as a "rape script," including images of penetrating markets and male exploration and adventure in "virgin territories" (2001, 139–40). The Internet marriage industry utilizes similar discourses of adventure, with landscapes imagined as women's bodies. Despite similar racial and sexualized fantasies, these metaphors create a simplistic binary between the violent gaze of white men, on the one hand, and victimized women, on the other. These debates do not take into account how multicultural configurations of race, sexuality, class, and the nation are transplanted onto a global economy of desire. I depart from this linear narrative of colonization to globalization by arguing that this new transnational masculinity builds on previous colonialist fantasies and rewrites them by drawing from the discourse of corporate multiculturalism. In other words, masculinity is not associated with colonial constructions of Western whiteness in contrast to racialized, native "others" or with contemporary anti-immigration nativism and white supremacy.[8] Instead, men imagine themselves as the benevolent engineers who racially uplift the moral fabric of the national family by importing a superior breed of women. Furthermore, in both Connell and Hooper's theorizations, global manhood is characterized through images of white, male entrepreneurs, erasing the ways men of color collude, resist, and compete with this Western white male construct.[9] Men access a multicultural patriotic manhood through adherence to the

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[8] For a discussion of U.S. nativism against immigrants, see Reimers 1985; Perea 1997; Chavez 2001.

[9] For an account of other versions of global manhood, see Kondo 1997; Ong 1999, Lu 2000.

ideal American values at the foundation of the immigrant's assimilation into the nation: hard work, traditional family values and gender roles, and notions of benevolence couched in romantic ethics of chivalry and the saving of women. Nationalism is founded on the preservation of an invented traditional past and a future vision of modernity.

For men who do not envision themselves on the cutting edge of global business culture, bride hunting in developing countries symbolizes men's entrance into the future. A former professor, Henry Makow, reflects on his search for a traditional Filipina in his book, *A Long Way to Go for a Date*. He writes, "All my life I have been like a man facing the rear on a speeding train. I have always had my back to the future. Although the future is unknown, at least now I feel I am facing forward" (2000, 12). For men eager to move forward and join the global economy, women's racial and sexual identities are critical to this Janus-faced masculine national identity between the past and future. While international dating and romance are not new, men insert themselves into the modern future as members of a global class where mobility is preconfigured by access to Internet technology, English, passports, and dollars, while women are conversely disadvantaged by their relative dependence on men in order to become mobile.

Contrary to Connell's association of business masculinity with men who enjoy a dominant position in the global marketplace, men's chat room discussions and interviews revealed their sense of disempowerment in the United States. Many felt alienated in some way from U.S. culture and society. Jason's quote, with which I began this article—"My whole life is abstract. . . . so on some level, going outside the country is an attempt to, you know, get past that cynical, detached experience that I have here"— demonstrates his exodus to Latin America as a way to, as he says, "break out of the mold" and leave behind relationships overdetermined by capitalist exchange (interview, March 28, 2005). His career in computer programming left him feeling estranged and devoid of relationships outside the hegemony of exchange value. He realized he was replaceable in both his professional and intimate life. He was fed up with the highly competitive market of the Silicon Valley, a situation exacerbated by the influx of highly skilled and lower-paid technicians from South Asia. He had divorced his previous wife and had to work unfathomable hours to maintain a high quality of life in California, both of which prevented him from realizing the American dream of having a family and owning a home.

Global multiculturalism

Just as corporate multiculturalism promises new markets and the comparative advantage that will solve all business problems, so too are men turning to Latin America to renovate their image back home. In the Internet marriage industry, women from developing nations embody the frontier of the future; their bodies and the products they represent promise spiritual vitality, a connectedness to nature, and access to a new, rejuvenated self. This departure from understanding race as a marker of inequalities to a celebration of cultural difference speaks to the excess labor racialized bodies provide in revitalizing a dominant U.S. subject position and the economy more broadly.

Technology ads contribute to a vision of a world unencumbered by race. An example of this genre of advertising is an advertisement by MCI that promotes conservative multiculturalism through images of people across age, race, and gender. The ad states, "There is no race. There is no gender. There is no age. There are only minds. Utopia? No. The Internet" (Nakamura 2000, 15). While race is idealized as no longer a relevant category for the future of our technological world in the West, where everyone now supposedly has access to technology, Internet ads also project those outside of technology, in developing countries, as the place race now resides. Lisa Nakamura also discusses an IBM advertisement that uses an Egyptian man on a camel to reflect the idea that technological modernity has yet to spread to underdeveloped nations, which are thus in need of corporations to bring development to the rest of the world (20). A better future is equated with developmental capitalism and a future time when the entire world will have access to technology. Thus, the U.S. corporate empire is projected as a benevolent force that promises to spread democracy through worldwide access and to wipe out racial difference and inequality. Yet this presents a contradiction, because for bride-seeking men, women from "developing" countries are imagined to embody traditions felt to be lost in U.S. culture. Women represent the last pure space untainted by modern life and in opposition to the crisis of the domestic sphere in the United States. This is the context, I argue, in which men imagine Latin American women as the last pure frontier, bodies that promise to rectify a crisis in U.S. masculinity and the breakdown of middle-class family structures. They moralize the need for new genes and bodies and for a postnational family structure that will rejuvenate not only the U.S. domestic sphere but also their own inner journeys to selfhood.

For example, many Internet bride Web sites offer links to an array of guidebooks or how-to manuals on finding a bride in another country.

These do-it-yourself books help men turn emasculating experiences with Western women into redemptive self-help narratives through the importation of a superior breed of women. Here is testimony from a male client who tells the story of why he is ready to find a mail-order wife. He describes his mother's "feminazi" thought process as the following:

> My final decision to pursue a foreign bride resulted from an argument I heard between my mother and her new husband. Mother was bitching moaning and carrying on about how her life was a drudgery and how she felt unappreciated. Her new husband got tired of her whining and shouted, "Fran, YOU have a brand new $250,000 dream home in the suburbs with every furnishing and knick knack you wanted, a new Isuzu Trooper, a healthy bank account, a very comfortable living, a husband who has bent over backwards to make you happy. . . . WHAT THE HELL MORE DO YOU WANT!" . . . This is when I realized that the odds are stacked against me finding happiness with an American wife, which has led me to say, "IT IS TIME FOR NEW GENES." (Clark, February 23, 2001, http://www.planet-love.com/gclark/gclark02/)

In the Oedipal cybernarrative above, the author envisions a better future by replacing his mother, rather than father, and infusing whiteness with "new genes" in a transracial family. The author degrades "spoiled" suburban white women who do not appreciate what they have, women who do not reciprocate with docile bodies in exchange for a capitalist and patriarchal order in the workplace and home. Earlier in the story he describes his mother's ideological participation in the feminist movement as the unhealthy "male-bashing environment" in which he unfortunately grew up. These women are labeled feminazis, women who are hypermasculinized, driven to crush all opposition in their path toward power and success.[10] As a castrating force, feminazis create gender and sexual disorder within the family and nation. Male participants want a less liberated woman, someone less spoiled and materialistic than the women in their lives. In this excerpt, found on a link from Planet-Love's main Web page, the testimonial serves—intentionally or not—to provide men with the language and ideology from which to understand and justify their desire for a foreign bride. This focus on genes continually reemerges in various forms during interviews, chat room discussions, and on Web sites.

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[10] In *Stiffed*, Susan Faludi (1999, 9) describes the term *feminazis* as used to apply to the radical feminists who men fear have gone beyond equal treatment and are now trying to take power away from and exercise control over them

Men with the same resentful feelings are prompted to take action against ungrateful women, to pick themselves up by the bootstraps and take charge of their lives through a foreign, less demanding, and more docile wife.

Many Latin American women I interviewed were aware that men wanted a woman who was more family oriented than U.S. women supposedly are. In fact, many rejected being labeled a feminist for fear of their association with white women popularly thought to be selfish, sexually loose, or too domineering. This did not mean, however, that women were not strong in their conviction that they wanted a man who respected them and who saw their contributions as carrying equal weight in the family.

While at a "Romance Vacation Tour" in Mexico, I was told by Blake, a forty-two-year-old Anglo club owner from Los Angeles with a muscular physique and a tanning-salon glow, that he was looking for a woman from Mexico because "I think these women are culturally grown to want what we also want" (interview, September 2001). Latin American and other "foreign" women are naturalized as having the right biological makeup and cultural grooming, making them more feminine, traditional, docile, and better mothers of the family. Unlike nineteenth-century constructions of racial mixing as degenerative, in this instance foreign genes are constructed as regenerative. This shift in racial construction connects with individualistic ideals of multiculturalism in the global marketplace. Once again, diversity and race are advertised as products that promise to bring one closer to nature, toward one's "true self," and to contribute to the making of "natural" gender and racial hierarchies. The idea of flexible genetic engineering emphasizes an understanding of women's bodies as mutable through the masculine hands and gaze of the Internet techie. Men imagine themselves as the heroic engineers of the family and nation (contradicting the popular image of them as outcasts), just as ethnic women embody the transformation. Even though suburban flight reflects the fleeing of whites from racial urban centers and the search for nature and purity they themselves have destroyed, these individualized interracial dramas remain at the level of the family. This personal lament connects with empire as chat room discussants reveal men's anxiousness to push into new frontiers, into countries with women less tainted by U.S. culture. These sentiments are echoed in the statement of a U.S. owner of a Colombian agency, Latin Life Mates, in an interview posted on his Web site: "Because of the drug wars . . . Colombia has been off the map for U.S. tourists for the past 15 years. During that period, the country experienced considerable economic growth. Now it is filled with well-educated women who have maintained 'pristine' values because they were isolated from

U.S. tourists. . . . You used to think of drugs when you thought of Colombian exports. . . . But forget that. Now the big demand in the States is for Colombian women" (November 1998, http://www.latinlifemates .com/faq.stm). The malleability of people, commodities, and notions of space reflects the ways decentralized production infiltrates the intimate spheres and desires of men's everyday lives.

Men's concerns with "natural" gender differences are part of a wider ideology endemic in popular men's movements, such as those of Robert Bly and within the religious right, and even within academic debates. David Popenoe, a professor of sociology at Rutgers University, contributed a lengthy study on the deplorable state of marriage and the family in contemporary times that was designed to help reinvigorate a dying social institution. He writes, "In order to restore marriage and reinstate fathers into the lives of their children, we are somehow going to have to undo the cultural shift toward radical individualism and get people thinking again in terms of social purposes" (1996, 197). In Wendy Kline's book, *Building a Better Race*, she argues that if we replace the word *social* with *race*, then this statement resounds with the earlier project of David Popenoe's father, Paul Popenoe, who in the 1920s and 1930s warned of the threat of race suicide if eugenic projects to reproduce white middle-class families were not taken with utmost seriousness (Kline 2001, 164).

Many men I interviewed concurred that it was high time for a new kind of family in the United States. An agency owner from Mexico suggested I speak to Barry, a well-known advocate of international marriages. Referred to as a guru of the cyberbride industry, Barry himself married (and later divorced) a woman from Colombia and attempted to open an agency; he now counsels U.S.-Colombian married couples and is writing a book about the industry. Barry capitalizes on David Popenoe's marriage study and his "academic cachet" to argue for the need not for racially superior (or white) families but for men to go outside the nation to find more appropriate wives. Like Popenoe, Barry uses biological gender differences between men and women to argue that the market dictates demand. During a phone interview in 2003, he described to me the thesis of his forthcoming book, *The Marketplace of Love*. He said that when you combine U.S. men's frustration with their relationships with U.S. women, and women's dissatisfaction with the way they are treated in Latin America, you have a natural market exchange of supply and demand. In fact, he argues, no man looks overseas first, but "the marketplace drives men" (interview, February 2003). In describing the development of the marketplace as inevitable and as taking on a life of its own, Barry does not

have to question historical processes such as colonialism and imperialism nor contemporary forms of global capitalism that contribute to the unequal distribution of resources within this "neutral" marketplace. The focus on genetics and evolution also mirrors popular conceptions of international business, where competition in the marketplace is described as a natural and inevitable Darwinian struggle for the survival of the fittest (Hooper 2001). Contemporary corporate multiculturalism both enables possibilities for love across borders and naturalizes inequalities between the kinds of labor men and women provide. Women continue to have value for their spiritual and domestic qualities while men provide the economic stability. At the macro level, the United States is constructed as a biologically masculine nation and Latin America as feminine in order to naturalize these kinds of transnational marriages.

Barry's forthcoming book and lifelong quest is to create a sense of normalcy in regard to the cyberbride business and, as Popenoe himself argues (through the lens of Kline), to create for the United States "a new, modern form of morality—a reproductive morality—[is] to counter the ever-increasing individualism in society and to build a better family" (Kline 2001, 164). In couching this moral quest as one in opposition to individualism, family values take on a social and even national imperative. Barry may support ethnic, religious, and class mixtures, but it is women's "differences" that ultimately support men's dominance and that of the United States more widely.

Latin American women as the "final frontier"

Latin American women's bodies are reconfigured within the global marketplace as young, untainted natural resources. For example, a former company out of San Diego called Sonoran Girls opened its Web site with a picture of smiling young women from the northern town of Sonora, Mexico; bold letters over the picture read: "Discover Mexico's Greatest Treasures" (fig. 1).

These photos are of young Latinas positioned in front of the colors of the Mexican flag, as symbols of the nation. Young *Mexicanas* are the new resources, or as Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Hochschild (2002) describe them, the "new gold," whose laboring bodies are in need of men to import them to the United States where they will become fully realized.

Other Web sites depict women as cultural and biological *mestizas* (fig. 2), hybrid bodies that visually narrate the progression of history and the nation. Women's bodies mark the transition between the indigenous past

Figure 1 "Girls of Sonora," Web site image from a former Internet marriage company, 2000. Color version available as an online enhancement.

and the modern future, and they are figured both as individuals yet simultaneously as overabundant and technologically reproducible (and thus expendable).

Figuring women's bodies as those of light-skinned *mestizas* also makes visible men's central role in neocolonial fantasies. Men take part in the colonial narrative of turning nature (raw materials) into culture (finished modern products). On these Web sites, women's bodies are young and pliable. Not only have these girls symbolically survived colossal regime changes, but they also synthesize the best cultural and biological traits from both worlds, signaling their partial assimilation into U.S. culture. Furthermore, *mestizaje* is visually narrated as a biological form of development where whiteness embodies the future and indigenous people exist only as a past to be excavated (Saldaña-Portillo 2003). Contrary to scholarship on immigrant Latina bodies as the site of pollution within the nation-state (Calvo 2001; Chavez 2001; Inda 2002), Latinas are revamped as the site of redemption from a breakdown of family values. Women are depicted in Web images alongside nature, embodying anticapitalism (thus making these women's labor invisible), and as existing outside corrupting forces such as materialism and feminism. Many men and Web sites echo the idea that U.S. feminism is the polluting force of the family and nation. Henry Makow reiterates this point: "Today feminism has morphed into a potent and virulent disease attacking the biological and cultural foundations of society" (2000, 123). The contemporary use of the language of eugenics resembles the surge of biological theories of gender in the 1970s that followed on the heels of the women's liberation movements.

In contrast to the bodies of U.S. women, Latin American women's

Figure 2 "Lima Ladies," Internet marriage Web site, http://www.limaladies.com, 2003. Color version available as an online enhancement.

bodies continue to gain currency as workers in the global economy—as bodies that maintain domestic order, as docile and hardworking immigrants, as moral caretakers, as adaptable and elastic bodies, and as cheap, abundant natural resources.[11] The position of women in the cybermarriage industry resembles the subject position of women in the feminized global economy, where African-American women, feminists, and white women fall to the bottom rung as the least desirable bodies, as those who are imagined to be too outspoken, too demanding of their worth.[12] Yet Latin American women also hold a tenuous position, as they can easily be lowered to the same degraded category as U.S. women. Women who do not produce docile bodies for their husbands or proper sexual and gendered behavior can easily fall from grace. In chat room discussions, women who divorce men, who display acts of selfishness, or who are too resourceful (and thus "conniving") are labeled "green card sharks," lesbians, feminists, or too modern, and thus overly influenced by U.S. culture. By locating culture within the body, citizenship is imagined not by national or political participation but by women's self-sacrificial relationship to men through their reproductive sexual, racial, and gender position in the home and, by extension, in the global economy.

In many chat room and interview discussions, men described themselves as active participants in assimilating women into the "American dream" of upward mobility. At one of the agencies in Guadalajara, Mexico,

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[11] See Fernandez-Kelly 1983, Iglesias Prieto 1997; Chang 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Parreñas 2001, Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002.

[12] This understanding of racial value in the global economy is strikingly similar to scholarship on the domestic service industry See Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001.

I interviewed an energetic seventy-year-old man named Stuart (who told women he was fifty-five) about his marriage to a twenty-seven-year-old Colombian woman. She had a child and came from an abusive family whose socioeconomic status had dropped dramatically due to the social unrest plaguing the country. They divorced after living together in the United States for almost two years, even, Stuart tells me, after he gave his wife everything from plenty of spending money, English classes, and a membership to an exclusive gym.[13] He says, "All she needed to do was go to school, learn the culture, and be a mother and wife. I had yearly passes to the zoo, parks—I just wanted them to experience American life, the American dream."

Like the female missionaries of the twentieth century who fulfilled their duty as moral citizens of the world by "uplifting" the natives, men too take on this role of the moral "good guys" who teach Latinas how to assimilate into the dream of liberal capitalism.[14] Chat room discussions about women marveling over skyscrapers and washing machines in the United States and men's emphasis of women's "traditional" qualities easily slip into colonial ideas of the "natives" as backward, primitive, and un-civilized. Yet Latinas are also modern enough to appreciate technology when faced with its magnitude.

Stuart's philanthropic spirit, his desire to share the American dream with "less fortunate" women, was mirrored in his own personal genealogy as he described himself to me as not simply as a wealthy Anglo businessman but someone who came to the United States as a poor (and, at the time, racially marked) immigrant who worked his way up the social hierarchy.[15] For many men, the benefits of white masculinity can be tapped into through upward social and class mobility. Envisioning oneself as a self-made man elides privileges of race and the values of individualism and materialism that men consistently critiqued about U.S. women and U.S. culture in general. What Stuart had to do to gain his fortune as an in-surance investor is less important here than his work ethic and desire to

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[13] It is interesting that they divorced after two years, because in 1986 President Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment (IMFA) in hopes of decreasing marriage scams by imposing a two-year waiting period for women to obtain permanent residency status.

[14] There has been a great deal of feminist scholarship on women's role as missionaries in relation to British imperialism and U.S. empire. See Tyrrell 1991; Chaudhuri and Strobel 1992; Abraham 1996; Santiago-Valles 1999.

[15] For more on the historical whitening of the Polish, Germans, Italians, and Irish, see Jacobson 1998.

uplift others. Having a foreign wife reinvigorates the idea that the United States is an immigrant nation where those who work hard can make the American dream come true, while erasing the unequal system of power, slave labor, and colonial violence at the foundation of this nation's continuing global dominance. For those who do not achieve this dream, the blame falls on pathologizing the individual—which Stuart describes as his wife's "laziness"—rather than examining deeper structures of disempowerment.

Self-help and chat rooms

The Internet has been a powerful medium for reflecting on and performing identity in new ways. That said, the Internet's technological capability for connectivity and interaction is not often discussed in tandem with other kinds of social formations. Chat room boards share a history with the emergence of self-help and support groups popular in the United States. Influenced by Protestantism, self-help culture emulates the desire for personal growth, a strong work ethic, and the idea that confession and personal redemption, exemplified through sharing and honesty, bring one closer to one's true self. Support groups help change behavior and reformulate the conception one has of oneself, combating social stigmas and redefining norms of behavior (Katz 1993, 34). Men who have no one else with whom to share their lives find that cyber chat groups offer a sense of camaraderie and a place where they can express themselves openly. Much like the processes Michel Foucault describes regarding sexuality and confession, describing one's intimate desires is how men come to uncover an assumed "truth" about themselves, women, and the cyberbride industry in general (Foucault 1990, 61–67).

Groups such as Bly's men's groups actively reclaim their own brand of masculinity or desirable masculine behavior. While feminists have worked hard to make men's gender power visible, many men interpret this as limiting their ability to assert a dominant or overtly masculine performance of gender. Many men's groups convey feeling disempowered by feminism and advocate empowerment, coming to self-actualization through the collective sharing of oneself. Based on women's consciousness-raising of the 1960s and 1970s, the self-help/support group model inverts the radical structure of consciousness-raising by placing value on the collective self rather than on larger structures of power. Divorced from the original goals of consciousness-raising—which were to critique how social structures affect the individual, to make the privileges of race and class visible,

and to connect the personal worlds of women with larger structures of power—men focus on the individual and ignore rather than reveal these privileges.

While the majority of participants on Planet-Love are Anglo-Americans, there are increasingly more men of color as well as men from a variety of regions in the United States and from a variety of professional, class, and ethnic backgrounds. In a chat room discussion, a Peruvian American participant named Doug responds to another participant, "hombre rosas," about the need for him to sacrifice time and money to fly to Latin America to meet a woman with whom he has been corresponding. Doug acknowledges, "It's easier for some than others. . . . You'll do it because good guys can ALWAYS find a way. She's counting on you" (Planet-Love.com chat room, December 3, 2000). They bond on two levels, as U.S. Latinos who have had to struggle more than others, and as professionals and citizens who now enjoy upward mobility.

On Planet-Love there was often hostility directed at the few African American participants who brought up race as a marker of structural inequalities or oppression. Anglo participants refused to believe that race influenced why some African American men had less success than Anglo-Americans in dating women from various countries such as Mexico. Yet cultural differences, such as Latino participants' familiarity with Spanish and/or Latin culture, were interpreted as a positive asset. For Latino men, their travel back to Latin America resembled the cultural nationalist project, whereby Chicanos would harken back to Mexican history and culture to authenticate and preserve a racial identity threatened by U.S. assimilation. Hombre rosas says:

> So here I am, turning to LW [Latin Women], turning inward, towards the center of who I am, where I came from, it has made me once again count the ways I value my latin culture. But again, I never used to openly celebrate latin values or compare and contrast them with American, out of respect for the general American public, my neighbors, friends and family. But these days I see that I'm not alone in many of my sentiments and there is a general atmosphere of criticism of AW [American Women] and their values, so I am less hesitant to celebrate being latino and saying where I'm from and all that. (Planet-Love.com chat room, December 2, 2000)

For hombre rosas, a critique of American women opens up a space to be critical of assimilation and U.S. values. Turning to "authentic" Latin American women (i.e., women closer to values of submission, unlike un-

ruly Chicanas/Latinas in the United States) signifies his journey to re-discovering his true self that he has had to hide in order to assimilate into Anglo culture. Situating Latin American women as the authentic other enables Latino men to construct an ethnic identity as white in relation to Latin American women, manual labor, and immigrants in general. Conversing on this board has connected hombre rosas to other professional Latinos—as well as to white men who appreciate Latin American culture—and it becomes a safe place for him to openly celebrate his cultural heritage. The act of revealing oneself personally serves as an initiation or a rite of passage where this new, "sensitive" masculinity is encouraged. In the world of self-help and male support groups, sharing one's experiences marks the journey of finding a bride, discovering one's self, and finding the "true man" one really is. Male camaraderie is founded on releasing the male energies participants believe are suppressed by domineering women from the United States and, for Latino men, by U.S. culture in general.

White men's self-conception as the good guy who is sensitive yet in control is fabricated alongside an idealized image of Latinas and in contest with hypermasculinized Mexican/Latino masculinities. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo and Michael Messner (1994) argue that white, educated, middle-class constructions of the sensitive new male image must not be too quickly heralded. This image builds itself on the backs of poor, working-class, and ethnically subordinate men who are the projected targets of aggression, domination, and misogynistic attitudes. Often overlooked, however, is how Latin men reassert their masculinity by feminizing white, Anglo men. A respondent called "The Watcher" says: "If any of these guys put down Latin men, they have some damn nerve! When they finally realize that 99% of the reason that ANY foreign woman would want to marry them and come to this country is for HER OWN opportunity and benefit and that of HER family, and NOT because American men are so special, then maybe they will check their egos and see the light" (Planet-Love.com chat room, June 24, 1999). Through his critique of U.S. men, "The Watcher" offers a disruptive moment of competing masculinities. He diminishes U.S. men's status by elevating women as creative survivors, thus negating women's supposed adoration of U.S. men. He also suggests women use men to improve their lives and that of their families. He continues, "Latinas need strong men. Men who are macho, that's right, I said MACHO, but in a good way. They don't want a man who will beat them around and treat her like trash, but they don't want some pansy who acts like a feminist sympathizer either. They want a Man who is not afraid to be a MAN!" (Planet-Love.com chat room, June 24, 1999). "The Watcher's" hostility reveals a Latin male perspective regarding white U.S.

men. He turns the tables on Anglo-Americans who go to Latin America by feminizing them as the sort of men who not only support feminism but who are also the ones who allowed women to take charge through feminism in the first place. By labeling feminist sympathizers as "pansies," he also implicates gay men and Anglo sexuality as feminized and overly domesticated, degrading the two alongside femininity. He also redefines his derogatory ethnic association with machismo from one that is undesirable to one that is highly desired by Latinas.

The discursive threat of white U.S. men's feminization in the United States has led to a refashioning of the cyberbride industry via popular culture. A cosmopolitan magazine, *Men's Journal*, disassociates men from domesticity and thus femininity by depicting them as travelers, adventurers, risk takers, and capitalists on the hunt for women in virgin markets. A recent article titled "Bride-Hunting in Russia/Project Wife" (Tayman 2000) captures this spirit of adventure and cosmopolitanism. It was placed alongside other articles on topics such as how to increase one's testosterone and exotic sporting adventures all over the world. The featured client in this article looking for a Russian bride is Spencer, who "flies planes and rock climbs, but he's lonely. He hasn't had a serious girlfriend in quite some time" (139). Couched in this quote is a critique of the dark side of wealth and success—loneliness and alienation. A dose of a third-world encounter, however, can offset this sense of feeling ungrounded, overworked, and lonely. In the article, the problem is not that Spencer works too much, is dissatisfied with his job, and participates in perpetuating the capitalist system but that he is undervalued in the United States. While structures of corporate white male masculinity may be perceived to be in decline in the United States, the average Joe, or José, is enticed to enjoy the comparative advantage of women who value his hard work ethic, find him attractive, and who are dying to marry men from the West. Interestingly, men are interpolated to understand themselves not only as consumers but also as prized commodities in the global marketplace.

This comparative status proves to be short lived. Another Planet-Love participant, Doug, warns others about the possibility of falling from the ranks of a knight in shining armor to an ordinary, overworked bad husband: "All of us who've been to LA [Latin America] know what a rush it is to date and get the time of day with young, beautiful, mostly sincere, sweet LW [Latin women]. We also know that we are in a foreign country on a quasi-vacation. We are perceived differently because of were [*sic*] we are from, not who we are. Have any of you given much thought about the role reversal that can/will occur when that woman becomes a fiancée, and then a wife here in the US? (Planet-Love.com chat room, November

5, 2000). Doug, who in another posting describes himself as having "rural Myanmarese and Paraguayan heritage," raises the centrality of national origin in these interactions and cautions that men may be seduced by the fact that they are on vacation in a foreign place. Doug reminds his readers that when they return home, the fantasy may dissipate once they return to being the modern, overworked "bad husband" who has no time to spend with his wife. Doug does not extend this critique of the U.S. work ethic to the increasing loneliness men feel, nor to their inability to maintain relationships or marriages with women from the United States. Ironically, it is this need to work unfathomable hours that affords men the ability to travel, own computers, and accumulate the surplus capital that solidifies their affiliation with a dominant heterosexual national identity.

Just as interesting is the way Doug shifts the gaze from the male perspective to that of his fiancée: "That same woman is no longer the lucky girl who found some 'rich' American (stereotype). She will be in a foreign country with only us. Any acheivement [sic] or status she has earned as an individual will mean little if anything here. Right now I'm trying to gently convince my fiancee [sic] that she is not prepared to work as an accountant here in the U.S. even with fluency in English" (Planet-Love .com chat room, November 5, 2000). Doug disrupts previous conversations on bringing a bride to the United States by articulating the unspoken motives and inequalities that may burst the romantic bubble once couples live together in the United States. He subtly touches on the power inequalities, racism, and licensing laws of particular professions that bar Latinas from enjoying the same level of employment once they cross the border into the United States. He also tries to communicate Latinas' perspectives, arguing that women may find American men attractive because they gain a degree of status from family and community members by dating and perhaps marrying successful men. John, who has participated in chat room discussions on Planet-Love for five years, talks about his ex-wife, whom he married in Colombia after knowing her for five days: "One thing I notice is when we are in Colombia she always treats me better. It's like I get more respect from her because I get respect from her family. I'm sort of the main attraction, even with her friends that come over. . . . But back in San Jose [U.S.] back to the same old. . . . Two big things happened in 2002. She got a job. And she got her permanent residency card. Both made her feel a lot more independent" (Planet-Love.com chat room, October 10, 2003). John's statement raises the question of whether men's dominant position is more fragile than previous studies on the mail-order bride industry have purported. While men may enjoy a boost in status in Latin America, they may find this wears off once they

return home. Similarly, women's subject positions and reasons for marrying U.S. men are also much more complex when examined from a transborder perspective.

Conclusion

The desire for a Latin American woman from outside the United States speaks to the power of the erotic imagination and the role of technology in transporting one's personal fantasies into a transnational social forum. The self-help model of individual transformation hijacks the feminist model of consciousness-raising, evacuating its radical potential through personalizing social transformation, and makes evident self-help's genealogical roots within Christianity and Western individualism. Men's search for a Latin American bride necessitates a critique of U.S. capitalist culture, yet men and industry Web sites ghettoize this critique onto U.S. feminist bodies rather than onto larger structures of power. In other words, men blame consumption, materialism, and even greed for high divorce rates, for the fact that women leave them for wealthier and younger men, or that women seek their own empowerment through entering the workforce. Mirroring the tension between the global economy and the state in protecting the unbounded needs of capitalism and, conversely, the bounded role of the state (Noble 2002), men justify their search outside the nation for foreign genes through a moral desire to improve the national family and, simultaneously, via fantasies of mobility through the tropes of empire and the heroics of global manhood. Through their desire to improve the culture of national family, they are caught in the dilemma of embracing ethnic, gender, religious, and national differences while maintaining global hierarchies.

The consequences of men's imaginaries are best reflected in an e-mail interview with Manuela, a *Mexicana* who participated in the *Latinaesposa/* Latinawife e-mail exchange for married women who moved to the United States to live with their husbands. She has been married to her Anglo husband for more than three years. In an e-mail interview she described to me one of the many contradictions discussed by women: "While men want a Latina because she is supposedly more passionate, when we have this passion, they don't know how to respond. Men prefer Internet pornography than to make love with us. They'd rather watch perfect women than normal and real women. All of us agree that we can't compete with these unreal bodies, that don't fight, that don't get angry, who don't veer from the norm. . . . It's easier for los gringos to masturbate in front of the computer, where they don't have to put forth any effort to satisfy

anyone. Like many things here (in the US), [U.S. men are] . . . the most individualistic and self-absorbed" (interview, December 10, 2004). Manuela's theorizing of Western individualism, masculinity, and whiteness in relation to technological power ends up deflating Western fantasies as getting lost in the maze of their own simulations. The role of the Internet in facilitating visual and interactive fantasies and even marriage speaks to yet another way U.S. individualism and the capitalistic gaze turn a potentially powerful means for men to experience themselves as a decentered subject rather than the center. While many men turn to Latin American women and culture in hopes of living a life outside of the tyranny of capitalism, materialism, and rugged individualism, many simply seek a fantasy-ridden image of women as the object of change they seek to import back home without having to change anything about themselves.

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Amy Sara Carroll

"Accidental Allegories" Meet "The Performative Documentary": *Boystown, Señorita Extraviada,* and the Border-Brothel→Maquiladora Paradigm

T he Border with a capital B has acquired symbolic and allegorical baggage in post-1980s scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. Often promoted as the signature signifier of the hybrid or migrant, the Border functions as a Möbius strip for rethinking questions of the (re)production of space, postmodernism, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization. Moreover, implicated in recent incarnations of Latino/Latin American cultural studies, the Border, like the U.S.-Mexico border proper in post–North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) reconfigurations of the North American continent, occupies a privileged position in overlapping U.S. and Mexican cultural imaginaries, where euphoric celebratory representations of late capitalist, supposedly postidentitarian transculturation and alternately stark renditions of a U.S.-Mexican "dirty realism" do not prove themselves to be mutually exclusive.[1] Acutely aware of the porous boundary between

[1] For instance, as various authors have pointed out, Homi Bhabha (1994) wields the Border and, arguably, the performance artist as stand-ins for the hybrid and the migrant. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) mobilize the Border/border in their rhizomic appropriations of Gregory Bateson's cartographic impulse (see also Hicks 1991; Brah 1996). Roger Rouse references the border's thickening postmodern significance to stake

the Border as a concept and borders as geography, Mary Pat Brady reminds us that "the U.S.-Mexico border is both a system with multiple and slippery meanings and symbologies and a state-sponsored aesthetic project" (2002, 83). Accommodating a relay reading of the Border/borders' performance-performativity, Brady's pronouncement furthers interpretations of the U.S.-Mexico border as also the space and place of identitarian (re)production.

Itself the product of continuous reinscription, the U.S.-Mexico border has come to signify sexual difference, the continental division of labor, and a twenty-first-century literalization of the Duboisian color line. Additionally, in the U.S.-Mexican borderlands' exemplification of the gap between the Border's iconicity and everyday allegorical practices of bordering, individuals construed as Agambean "exceptions"—as disposable or abandoned—are reinterpellated as the raw material of post-NAFTA Turnerian "social dramas" (Turner 1974, 1982).[2] Nowhere is this more clearly enacted than in the Border/borders' oppositional congealment around the key coordinate of racialized and sexualized working Woman. Both conflated with the Border in the tradition of pictorial allegories, which collapse the female body and territory into each other, and portrayed as the borderlands' victim, Woman, with a global(ized) capital W, provokes generalizations such as that of Ursula Biemann: "The border is a highly gendered region. Economic power relations along the lines of gender difference are spelled out in sexual terms" (*Performing the Border* 1999).

In what follows, I grapple with the Border/border as that which maintains the material (notably, economic and sexual) and symbolic

a claim to and for "ordinariness," where images such as the circuit and the border zone speak simultaneously to the intricacies of his ethnographic subjects' migratory experiences and "the complexities of postmodern hyperspace" (1991, 18). And then there's the re-mapping of American cultural studies, work like that of José David Saldívar (1997) and of José Limón (1998) that places representations of the border within the context of the region's geopolitical production, tracking the border's privileged position in a U.S. imaginary. Simultaneously operative in the work of cultural producers from Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) to Guillermo Gómez Peña (1996) are strategic essentialisms that cultivate reifications of "The New World (B)order" and/or the borderlands as the breeding grounds of the "new mestiza." Obviously, the handful of examples I reference are not conflatable, but their variations on a theme bespeak the critical mass of cultural production addressing both the Border and borders.

   [2] Giorgio Agamben writes, "The relation of exception is a relation of ban. He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather *abandoned* by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable" (1998, 28). On a related note, my use of the term *disposable* is in line with Ranjana Khanna's current reflections on disposability and the topic's relevance for (re)thinking transnational/global feminisms (2004).

(ef)feminization of Mexico within transnational formulations of the North American continent as a simultaneously broken and continuous imaginary geography. Closely reading two instances of cultural production whose originary moments have willfully ignored distinctions between the aesthetic and the sociopolitical—the "accidental allegories" of an archive of photographs of sex workers and their patrons titled *Boystown* (Wittliff 2000) and Lourdes Portillo's "performative documentary" *Señorita Extraviada* (2001)—in this article I consider the persistence of racialized and sexualized working Woman from the Texas-Mexico border in visual culture to make larger claims about shifting configurations of Woman and Border. Mindful of Francine Masiello's provocative hypothesis that "when the [Argentinean] state finds itself in transition from one form of government to another, or from a period of traditionalism to a more modernizing program, we find an alteration in the representation of gender" (1992, 8), my argument seeks to track representations of a contemporary alteration, which itself might be parsed as a turn-of-the-millennium conceptual paradigm. Contrasting prior configurations of Woman and work in the U.S.-Mexican borderlands with current discourses concerning women's work in the region, I propose here a border-brothel→maquiladora paradigm, which capitalizes on both *Señorita Extraviada*'s and my own overarching ambivalences toward *allēgoria* as a practice and process.[1]

Profoundly dissatisfied with both existing interpretations of the *Boystown* collection and representations of the missing and murdered women of Juárez, I approach Portillo's film as offering alternative models of allegorical exegesis. Imagining the latter project and the *Boystown* collection as visualization exercises in remapping the Texan-Mexican borderlands, my attention to *Señorita Extraviada*'s formal choices draws on my reading of the *Boystown* collection as predating a conceptual alteration in conflations and hyphenations of Woman and Border. Be-

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[1] To underscore the transitory historical moment I wish to name, I visually incorporate movement into my argument via the simplistic shorthand of an arrow that signifies ongoing conversion, the incestuous relationship between the brothel and the maquiladora in the U.S.-Mexican borderlands. In case the terms are confusing, *maquiladoras/maquilas* refers to the industries on the border, 80 percent owned by U.S. corporations, whose $16 billion revenue per year is made possible by workers who earn $4–$5 a day. Prefabricated parts are sent to these factories, which burgeoned after the signing of NAFTA. Workers, overwhelmingly young women, assemble the pieces into the coherent goods we know and love to consume. For an interesting study of the fluidity and stratification of gender in the maquiladoras, see sociologist Leslie Salzinger's *Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico's Global Factories* (2003).

ginning with a contextualization of the *Boystown* images, my argument opens onto the clearing of a theoretical discussion of the border-brothel paradigm via an examination of correspondences between Orientalism and Latin Americanism. Central to that discussion is a distinction between the conceptual work the harem and the brothel respectively perform in the consolidation of each geographic construct. Acknowledging the indispensability of the border for staging what José Limón (1998) has referred to as a U.S.-Mexican "erotics of culture," my argument subsequently (re)positions the *Boystown* collection less in terms of the value of a given photograph and more in terms of the importance of the images' collective presence as "(re)establishing border shots" prescient of the potential paradigm shift in conflations of Woman and Border coterminous with the emergence of export-processing zones along the U.S.-Mexico border.⁴ The movement of this shift, in turn, leads me to reflect on the anxious accumulation of symbolic meaning around the gendered spatialization of the maquiladora, idiosyncratically played out in neoliberal allegorizations of the missing and murdered women of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Finally, viewing *Señorita Extraviada* as a homeopathic antidote to these very allegorizations, my argument explores Portillo's resuscitation of compensatory "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977, 128) dependent on countervisual and aural allegorical habits.

Importantly, throughout, when I reference "the allegorical," I approach it as both revelatory and problematic. Negotiating cascading focal ranges, my analysis seeks to reconcile the circumstances that create a schism in representations of the Border and borders, Woman and women, even as it aspires to present an *Other* map of inter-American relations that, in the idiom of Rey Chow, "extend[s] the interpretation of image-as-woman to image-as-feminized-space" (1991, 18). Thus, while the readings I put forth do not presume to chastise "the allegorist," they do aspire, pace Portillo, to reflect on the everyday practices of allegory that contribute to the construction and maintenance of the North American corridor and to consider equally quotidian (re)presentational habits that, challenging the epistemic violences inherent in naturalizations of the lay of the land, provide parallel structures of affect and interpretation. In sum, on the one hand, I view the allegorical in *Señorita Extraviada* as narrating the details of the case of Juárez to earmark who and what goes missing in hyphen-

⁴ My use of the phrase "(re)establishing border shots" recycles the title and idea of a chapter in Claire Fox's *The Fence and the River* (1999). The importance of "establishing shots" is even more prominent in Fox's dissertation, titled "The New Border Establishing Shots" (1995).

ations/conflations of Woman and Border. On the other hand, I maintain that the allegorical in the *Boystown* collection and in prevalent interpretations of the Juárez murders and disappearances registers an impulse that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak identifies elsewhere as a marker of conversion. This impulse generates out of the sociocultural circumstances of the borderlands, "screen-allegories that foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism" (1988, 291)—including, in this instance, Mexican and U.S. cultural nationalisms in conflict and collusion.[5]

Boystown, or, the accident of allegory

Wittliff's (2000) catalog of photos from Boystown, a brothel zone on the Texas-Mexico border in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, includes a brief, performatively self-reflective essay by the screenwriter that ostensibly contextualizes the collection's problematic origins.[6] The anecdotal essay relates that in 1974 Wittliff traveled to Boystown in search of potential material for a movie. Boystown's legendary status as a space of initiation was not lost on Wittliff, a Texas native: countless Texas youths—Anglo, Mexican American, and African American—have made "hunting trips" to the zone, putting Boystown on the greater Mexico map as a Southwestern rite of passage.

Disappointed that it did not seem feasible to film in situ, Wittliff discovered that the enclosed community of Boystown would not suffer the dalliances of a self-proclaimed photographer/ethnographer/voyeur. When Wittliff tried to take pictures and video clips of the Mexican sex workers there (without even bothering to ask the women and cross-dressed men), they defended themselves against the violation, pelting him with rocks and demanding that he hand over his undeveloped film.[7]

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[5] To put the quote in context: critiquing Michel Foucault's serial logic, Spivak writes, "The clinic, the asylum, the prison, the university—all seem to be screen-allegories that foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism" (1988, 291)

[6] It should be noted that controlled prostitution is legal in Mexico. On the border, prostitution was and is confined to designated "zones of tolerance" (Arreola and Curtis 1993, 106), which enjoyed a mid-twentieth-century heyday but have steadily been in decline (Arreola and Curtis 1993, 115) The *Boystown* archive I examine is composed of photos from one of the many border "boys' towns," although it represents "the largest and most famous along the border" (Arreola and Curtis 1993, 110).

[7] Wittliff writes, "I went down there thinking Boystown might be a good location for a movie I was writing. I took my cameras with the vague notion of maybe running across a good image or two. No one seemed to mind at all the first night as I drifted in and out of the various whorehouses with two cameras slung around my neck—though they would permit no flash. As a consequence I got not a single photograph in those darkened envi-

Undeterred, Wittliff, allegedly in the name of "history . . . posterity . . . art" (2000, 107), hung around to observe the rhythms of Boystown. One phenomenon in particular caught his attention: itinerant photographers worked the clubs, providing patrons with quick-and-dirty snapshots. Befriending several of these photographers, Wittliff sweet-talked his way into their makeshift darkroom, observing its "ancient enlarger" and its "pile of negatives all stuck together" in the garbage bin (2000, 108). Initially rebuffed, Wittliff persisted in his advances, finally offering the photographers an irresistible amount of money for the negatives. The next day, enlisting the help of a local friend, Jack Suneson, Wittliff struck up a bargain: he would purchase the evening's garbage on a regular basis.[8]

Over a year and a month, Wittliff bought more than seven thousand single-frame negatives, which he washed, refixed, washed again, and proofed. From those negatives, he chose 950 to print and touch up (650 at 11 × 4 inches and 300 at 16 × 20 inches). He donated these to an archive he established at Texas State University (formerly Southwest Texas State University) in San Marcos, Texas, where they can be seen only after obtaining his permission. The rest of the images remain in Wittliff's possession and have been the subject of many flights of fantasy. In 2000, coinciding with the publication of an Aperture catalog of the prints Wittliff selected, Southwest Texas State University (now Texas State University at San Marcos) hosted an exhibition of the *Boystown* collection, which generated a firestorm of criticism.

Reviewers accused the university and archive of objectifying the women in the photographs and of revealing, without permission, the identities of the men who chose to patronize Boystown establishments. In a scathing critique of the catalog and exhibition, newspaper critic Bob Pomeroy refers to the *Boystown* exhibition as a collection of "accidental allegories," and

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ronments. . . . I went back early the next morning assuming I could catch Boystown as it woke bleary-eyed to a new day. Such was my gringo arrogance, I thought I might be welcomed or at the very least tolerated. I was wrong. Walking down the street I turned and took a single picture of a prostitute sweeping out her little streetside cell. She heard the click of the shutter and cut loose with a string of curses, all impugning my masculinity and condemning me to a fiery hell. Up and down the street other prostitutes emerged from their doors. In a second they were all shouting curses. Then they began pelting me with rocks and sticks, having recognized me for what I was: an exploiter and a thief, there to steal fragments of their lives that were not for sale until the sun went down. It was like when you're a kid in a strange neighborhood, and a dog comes snarling out of a yard—you know if you run he'll get you, and you know if you walk too slow he'll get you" (2000, 106).

[8] The situation suggests that Wittliff's position as ethnographer/collector/voyeur might better be described as that of the unrepentant garbageman.

he takes the liberty of titling one photograph "The Puta [Whore] and the Pig" (Pomeroy 2001, 26; see fig. 1). The image is striking: a corpulent, middle-aged Anglo man clutches a Mexican adolescent sex worker, his right arm pulling her toward him. The fingers of his left hand rest between her breasts. His lips are puckered into a kiss. She looks into the camera with a blank, troubled expression. Wearing what might be called an evening bikini, a choker, and sandals that wrap up her calves, she holds her hands in her lap. The picture suggests an "Other story," corroborating Pomeroy's prognosis that *Boystown* harbors an anxiety of reception:[9] "Wittliff & Co. have anticipated an outraged reaction from some viewers, and so try to head it off at the pass by including shots that provide a kind of pat recognition of the exploitation inherent in the situations they depict . . . weirdest of all, that recognition seems to perpetuate the exploitation. It's that familiar patronizing view the good ol' boy art/lit establishment holds toward Mexico: ain't our brown, bare-breasted sperm depository below the border . . . even when it's brutal, pretty gol' dang romantic?" (2001, 26).

Pomeroy's commentary resonates with novelist Dagoberto Gilb's express discomfort with the archive. In an equally scathing newspaper review, Gilb quips:

> All I could think was, "What IS this endless fascination for Mexican whores? Why do these guys obsess on this so much? If it were in their own poor neighborhood, if it were their poor junkie alcoholic aunts and cousins, would they be so intrigued?"
> And that's when a "found art" thing kicked in for me. This book, the entirety of its black-and-white photos—grainy, cheap, mundanely composed—is the unconscious subliminal: a dream, a fantasy, a phobia. These are the images of their Mexican border fetish, and it is depicted with such unawareness, with such a comfortable arrogance of historical power, it can seem to them, almost charmingly, like art. (2001, 3)

Gilb's pronouncement outs the contradictory logic of Wittliff's project. Aware of being "politically incorrect," the collection aspires to present portraits of the borderlands and what Wittliff has termed "an always all too human otherworld" (Wittliff 2000, 107). In response, Gilb, like Pomeroy, recognizes that such a narrative of intentionality situates the collection in the precarious position of begging to be approached allegorically.

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[9] Note *allegory*'s Greek etymology: the *allos* (Other) *agoreuein* (speaking in the public sphere), which embroils it in an Othering tradition (Brogan 1994, 7).

Figure 1 "The Puta and the Pig"

Gilb is game, interpreting *Boystown* as illustrative of sexual and racial politics in a Texan-Mexican borderlands unconscious. Making short work of converting the individual souvenirs of the collection into a collective monument of and to constructions of the border and U.S.-Mexico relations, Gilb and Pomeroy respectively view the images as shuttling between the private and the public, as reversing Susan Stewart's contention that "temporally, the souvenir moves history into private time" (1984, 138). Projecting onto the screen of allegory a border-brothel paradigm symptomatic of contemporary readings of the border as a literal geo-economic zone and as a critical construct, Gilb's and Pomeroy's "allegorical impulse" locates the collection as reinforcing a conflation/hyphenation of the Border/border and brothel. Yet in tagging the formal elements that constitute the hyphenation, neither commentator explores in depth the sexual and racial politics that undergird the collection, maintenance, and presentation of these images. Wishing to dismiss neither Wittliff's "collector's impulse" nor Gilb's and Pomeroy's counterinterpretative allegorical impulse, in what follows I seek to track more closely the impetus, indeed ideology, of the *Boystown* collection, that which might be read as (re)producing the "accident of allegory," which, in turn, choreographs the archive's reception.

(Re)establishing border shots

Never meant to be in greater circulation, the *Boystown* images, apprehended through the lens of Wittliff's thrifty recycling practices, establish Boystown as a cordoned-off zone of accidental allegories insofar as the cordoning off of these images replicates the processes by which Boystown as a location exists as an "imagined community" (Anderson [1983] 1991). A sexual bunker, Boystown has a strict border patrol; there is only one way to enter and leave the zone. Functioning as a miniature version of the confusion of the literal and the fictive in Spenserian "tales of the tribe" from the family to the nation—a grimly boisterous gated community of racialized-sexualized fantasy—Boystown is fashioned predictably around a model of penetration. Equally dependent on the discursive capital of its configurations, the name Boystown (like Storyville of New Orleans) suggests not only a too literal traffic in women but also the fantastic and fantasmatic work of realizing gender as a repeat performance in a (neo)colonial theater, which posits Woman as a moving target.[10] Drawing

[10] Why does this story sound so familiar? E. J. Bellocq took a series of photographs of sex workers in Storyville. These, in turn, were made famous by Lee Friedlander, who bought

on the market value of power imbalances, where crossing the border becomes the symbolic equivalent of dipping below the continent's waist(waste)line, the *Boystown* collection presents the resulting tab for the evening as a U.S.-controlling symbolic, which elides border crossing with the fantasy of entering "the erotic zone" of "unruly and transgressive bodies" (Gutiérrez 1996, 256). In particular, to create a sliding scale of Woman, *Boystown* exaggerates the border's status as indexical of measurement, as a stationary line or boundary that detects motion as transversally transgressive.

If the U.S.-Mexico border habitually documents a traffic in goods (including human beings and other unfinished business) by relying on the "establishing shots" of the fence and the river (Fox 1999), the *Boystown* images collectively present another point of reference against which "an allegorical way of seeing the region . . . continues to be invoked" (Fox 1999, 69). *Boystown* taps into a transnational image bank, cross-referencing the figure of Mexico as Woman—as sex worker, in particular—to illustrate how Woman acts as an important (recurring) coordinate on the cognitive map of transnational U.S.-Mexican relations. Moreover, the collection and its reception suggest that the image of the sex worker is anything but supplemental even as it functions as the quintessential deconstructive supplement. Reinforcing Mexican visual artist and critic Berta Jotar's observations that "the border is rearticulated through power relations that the crossing produces" (*Performing the Border* 1999), the *Boystown* collection, like the cultural production Debra A. Castillo and María Socorro Tabuenca Córdoba examine in *Border Women: Writing*

eighty-nine of Bellocq's glass plates in the late 1950s. Also collected for a catalog and an exhibit, these images precede the Boystown's photos as found objects—crucial to some history of photography insofar as they were (re)discovered as both aesthetic and sociocultural points of reference (Friedlander 1996). Susan Sontag wrote a crazy, voyeuristic, getting-in-touch-with-her-own-inner-machista introduction for this collection, which includes this speculation: "Two photographs show women wearing masks. One is a come-hither picture: an exceptionally pretty woman with a dazzling smile reclines on a chaise-longue; apart from her trim Zorro-style mask she is wearing only black stockings. The other picture, the opposite of a pin-up, is of a large-bellied, entirely naked woman whose mask sits as awkwardly on her face as she is awkwardly posed on the edge of a wooden chair; the mask (it appears to be a full mask minus its lower half) seems too big for her face. The first woman seems happy to pose (as, given her charms, well she might); the second seems diminished, even foiled, by her nudity" (8). Storyville actually takes its name from New Orleans's Alderman Sidney Story, who, with attorney Thomas McCaleb Hyman, finalized the draft of the city ordinance that brought Storyville as a district into being (Rose 1974, 38–39). Finally, to touch the tip of an iceberg of references to the "traffic in women," consider Lévi-Strauss 1969; Rubin 1975, Irigaray 1981; Sedgwick 1985.

from La Frontera (2002), testifies to the centrality of women and Woman in (re)articulations of the border as a free trade zone.

Performing close readings of texts written by border-dwelling Mexicanas and Chicanas, Castillo and Tabuenca Córdoba demonstrate the proximity of female sexuality and economic disparity in North American and international public discourse. In particular, they monitor a repetition compulsion, "a powerful shadowtext defining the whole of Mexico as a passive whore to be fucked over" (2002, 204), which generates a "border = brothel equation" (2002, 206).[11] *Boystown* suggests that this equation operates as a conjunctive paradigm that situates the brothel and the prostitute as indispensable in (re)establishing border shots. Choreographing the motion that rearticulates the border as a region, in Charles Bowden's terms facilitating the prevailing fantasy "across the border and into the flesh" (1998, 30), the border-brothel paradigm structures the establishment and maintenance of the *Boystown* images as an archive just as it enables the parallel repeat performance of Mexico as an effeminate, penetrable Other. Enjoying a lengthy history not only in the context of the border region but also in more general constructions of Mexicanidad and Latin Americanism, the border-brothel paradigm both reveals and conceals the performativity of identity (of gender, race, and sexuality) as well as the performativity inherent in the perennial consolidation of imaginary geographies more generally speaking.

The border-brothel paradigm: Orientalism and Latin Americanism

While Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) endeavors to create a Gramscian inventory of the infinity of traces deposited in the individual, Alain Grosrichard's *The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies of the East* ([1979] 1998; original title *Structure de sérail*, or *Structure of the Seraglio*), *Orientalism*'s contemporary, focuses on one trace in particular.[12] Gros-

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[11] Castillo and Tabuenca Córdoba note the centrality of the sex worker in fiction by Mexican border women Rosario Sanmiguel and Rosina Conde. Of Conde's (1984) nine short prose pieces, Castillo and Tabuenca Córdoba write, "Strikingly the 'revolutionary vignettes' serve as a performative act by which the theme of the border as a brothel takes shape, yet the name of the city 'Tijuana' never appears in the collection, and the main street [of Tijuana], 'Revolución,' is only mentioned in passing" (2002, 136).

[12] In a section of *Orientalism* titled "Imaginative Geography and Its Representations: Orientalizing the Orient," Said, pace Gaston Bachelard, suggests that "space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process" (1978, 55). Turning to the Orient in particular, he elaborates in theatrical terms. "Our initial description of Orientalism as a learned field now acquires a new concreteness. A field is often an enclosed space. The idea

richard tracks the structuring logic of the harem in the construction of Orientalism to parade a cast of characters on the stage of the Orient, including the figure of sexualized and racialized Woman in terms that assume her multiplicity. Indeed, the figure of Woman in Grosrichard's analysis is understood relationally, serving as the backdrop against which the Oriental despot allegorically emerges as the primary object-subject of analysis. Seeking to explain European fixations on Oriental despotism, Grosrichard notes that Enlightenment philosophers conceptualized the state and the citizen-subject in opposition to the construct of the Oriental despot. Grosrichard returns to this Enlightenment "primal scene" to offer what we might now recognize as a reading of Orientalism that parallels Said's. Grosrichard's detailed (veiled Lacanian) analysis, like Said's, draws on theatrical metaphors while predictably employing ample references to the visual.[13] Attentive to the overdetermined relationship between vision and power in the seraglio scene, Grosrichard demonstrates how the despot oversees those around him, literally and metaphorically engendering their blindness. The question of being able to see, in turn, formally influences Grosrichard's project. For instance, Grosrichard's copious descriptions of the seraglio consciously reinscribe the West's fetishization of the political organization of the harem into Grosrichard's own analysis.

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of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole East is confined" (63). Said maintains his theatrical language throughout the section, thus addressing the West's performance of the Orient in terms of its actual performativity. Then, in a surprising switchback, Said weds his reading of the West's performative practices to the machinations of allegory, without naming this union explicitly. He writes, "The Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from something into something else. . . . This process of conversion is a disciplined one: it is taught, it has its own societies, periodicals, traditions, vocabulary, rhetoric" (67) The interpretation suggests that the Orient's performativity is maintained via the veil of allegory, a point further inferred by Said's segue into an interpretation of the classic allegory, Dante's *Inferno*. Closely reading Dante's portrayal of the fates of the Muslims Mohammed, Saladin, Averroës, and Avicenna, Said returns to the macrologic, which the *Inferno* allegorizes: "And so, indeed, is the Orientalist attitude in general. It shares with magic and mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are *because* they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter" (70) If Said's point is that the Orient functions as an elaborate fiction of layered sedimentation against which Dante's layered levels of purgatory pale, his argument is brought home via an allegorical practice of reading that reveals the performative ideologies of allegory proper that contribute to the maintenance of Orientalism as a hegemonic metanarrative.

[13] Grosrichard writes, "The despotic state is a theatre stage upon which different actors succeed one another to take always the same walk-on parts in a play which is written once and for all, and re-enacted indefinitely" ([1979] 1998, 78).

The visual fixation of detail-oriented Orientalism that Grosrichard un-veils resembles Malek Alloula's treatment of the colonial voyeurism in-herent in photographs that the latter collects in and for his essay/catalog *The Colonial Harem* (1986). Bringing together ninety picture postcards taken and sent by the French between 1900 and 1930, Alloula literalizes Grosrichard's thesis, demonstrating that Orientalism would not have been possible without its fantastic embodiment, the harem, collapsed into the proliferating figure of Woman. Demonstrating how women, enclosed in the fantasy of the harem, become "the metaphorical equivalent of trophies, of war booty" (1986, 122), Alloula insists, "The postcard is constantly laying bets on the imaginary of its users" (96). Grosrichard and Alloula's analyses prove interesting here because the reduction of Woman to harem in Orientalism is curiously mirrored by the reduction of the brothel to Woman in representations of Mexico and the U.S.-Mexico border, where once again Woman becomes the privileged representative of (neo)colonial difference.[14]

Román de la Campa (1999) puts it differently, contending that Ori-entalism is twinned in and by Latin Americanism insofar as both are imag-inaries projected onto literal geographies. Yet while de la Campa explores the configuration of these projections in terms that monitor first-world attentions to magical realism, I push at the edges of his comparison to bookmark a paradoxically converging divergence between the two con-structs: the border-brothel paradigm, like the "Oriental harem," dem-onstrates the comparable centrality of racialized and sexualized working Woman to both Latin Americanism's and Orientalism's macrologics, while highlighting distinctions between the pair as ideological formations. No-tably, a harem and a brothel are not equivalents. A harem regiments private sex intended for the despot. In contrast, although a brothel still relies on control over female sexuality, it structures that control in terms of trans-action. Thus, if Grosrichard reads regimented masculinity and femininity in the seraglio as a proliferating smokescreen, as a screen-allegory of the Western fantasy of Oriental despotism (another transactional economy),

[14] Walter Mignolo (2000) puts forth an invaluable argument regarding colonial dif-ference, which unfortunately often overlooks the centrality of questions of gender and sexuality in and to the formation of Latin Americanism and "border thinking" as a phe-nomenon As an aside, various cultural producers have recognized convergences in Ori-entalism's and Latin Americanism's treatment of Woman in the (neo)colonial context. For instance, Mexican filmmaker Vicente Leñero literalizes the cross-cultural comparison in *El callejón de los milagros* (1993), an adaptation of Naguib Mahfouz's novel *Midaq Alley* ([1947] 1966). Leñero converts the context of the British occupation of Egypt into the neocolonial shadow the United States casts on Mexico.

Latin Americanism is regimented by the illicit motif of the encounter (read definitive transaction) where Latin America as a geoeconomic region emerges as a similar, yet distinct, object of brokerage/exchange.[15]

Small wonder: representations of Woman in the Americas, and in Mexico in particular, have been filtered through the coded terms of the (sexual) encounter as both a literal and an epistemological event, where the foundational fictions of the region established long before the nineteenth century rely on that quintessential cipher of colonial difference—the historic/ mythic figure of la Malinche or her traitorous equivalent. Moreover, in the Mexican/U.S. transnational context, formulations of the event have centralized the periphery to the extent that the border has become synonymous with the event's literalization. The by-product has been an accumulation of meaning around the border-brothel paradigm, betraying a power imbalance that scripts gender as a vibrating but stable signifier of (neo)colonial difference.[16]

Concretely speaking, just as Barbara Harlow contends in her introduction to *The Colonial Harem* (Alloula 1986) that the catalog depicts how "possession of Arab women came to serve as a surrogate for and means to the political and military conquest of the Arab world" (Harlow 1986, xv), there is an unmistakable resemblance between the postcards Alloula "replies to" and representations of U.S.-Mexican relations encapsulated in and by sexually explicit representations of Mexican Woman epitomized in the *Boystown* collection. Specifically, although the Algerian postcard images were meant to enjoy a life of circulation whereas the *Boystown* photographs were designed to serve as limited editions, they both act as bridges between the public and the private, as private memories of public expeditions. The *Boystown* images showcase the racialized sexualization of working Woman, allegorizing an inter-American, (neo)colonial brothel that demonstrates the paradoxically converging divergences in Orientalism's and Latin Americanism's gendered macrologics. This crucial distinction is played out in the postcards' and

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[15] Of course, Latin America has its own history of dictatorship/despotism, which has spawned the genre of the dictator novel as well as the stereotype in U.S. films and pop culture of the corrupt, despotic Latin American leader. For a recent example of various cross-fertilizations of the Oriental despot and the Latin American dictator, including the blinding of Johnny Depp as the corrupt U.S. CIA agent—what Grosrichard has indicated to be the privilege of the Oriental despot (the privilege to order the blinding of one's followers, [1979] 1998, 56)—consider *Once upon a Time in Mexico* (2003).

[16] For an interesting examination of the forms of twentieth-century cultural production, see John Welchman's "The Philosophical Brothel" (1996), which makes an argument for reading the border and brothel as parallel signifiers of the avant-garde and the modern

Figure 2   The *punctum* as a purloined letter

photographs' formal compositions. While the postcards Alloula recontextualizes overwhelmingly portray women as objects of fantasy, the *Boystown* images underscore the patronizing (pun intended) relationship between female or effeminate sex workers and their customers. Therefore, if the brothel constructs and maintains "Latin/o America" as a "dark continent," *Boystown* clarifies that Latin/o American fantastic and fantasmatic cartographies have been partitioned in terms of a traffic in Woman. Indeed, read against one another, the *Boystown* photos make good economic sense, highlighting the overhead costs of the conceptual construction maintenance of both the U.S.-Mexico corridor and Latin Americanism.

The *punctum* and the *studium*, or, how money talks (regardless of whether the subaltern can speak)

A young Mexican or Mexican American man leans into a Mexican sex worker. Both of his hands hold hers in place. He looks directly into the camera; her eyes squint in the opposite direction (fig. 2). In the foreground of the photograph, her Mexican handicraft change

purse rests on the table. An older Anglo man clutches a Mexican adolescent sex worker with his left arm. His left hand thrusts toward her a dollar bill. A college-age Anglo man holds an older Mexican cross-dressed sex worker in his lap. Next to a sweating bottle of Corona, her billfold-style wallet sits, waiting to be filled. A cracked mirror reflects the faces of a Mexican/Mexican American man and a pregnant Mexican sex worker. Pesos litter the table in front of the couple. A drunken older gringo man in mismatched plaids over-shadows a middle-aged Mexican sex worker, grasping her firmly, both arms around her waist. She looks up from his embrace as if a heavy coat were draped over her shoulders, touching lightly one of his hands. In her other hand, she clasps a small beaded change purse. A would-be officer of the law deputizes a Mexican female prostitute at the bar, pinning the symbolic capital of a sheriff's star on the front of her bikini's briefs. . . .

In *Camera Lucida* (1981), Roland Barthes sentimentally distinguishes between a photograph's *punctum* and its *studium*. Barthes argues that the punctum is something unique to a given photo that engages the viewer, whereas the studium represents the background against which the punctum stands out (1981, 26–27). Barthes's terms, which mark a photo's foreground and background, parallel a distinction between an image bank's micro- and macrologic. In the context of the *Boystown* collection, the studium of these photos might be read as the performatively sexual scene of the racialized brothel, what consolidates the border-brothel par-adigm as foundational for Latin Americanism and the borderlands as a critical regionalism, while their proliferating punctum appears in the form of women's change purses or currency on the tables or counters.[17]

   In the majority of the *Boystown* images, white, African American, and Mexican (American) men momentarily possess Mexican women for a price (see fig. 3). The documentation taking place here, then, is a complex representation of layered economic transactions, which, grossly reduced to their most common denominator, reinvent "the oldest profession in the world": a photographer is paid to make a memory of a business deal between a man and a sex worker in which this transaction is the subter-ranean subject of "the good times" that necessitate their own revelation, also known as the establishing money shot, as the Kodak moment. Money

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[17] Sigmund Freud argues for a symbolic and linguistic link between women's jewel cases and genitalia ([1905] 1963, 87). Logic would extend the argument to women's change purses.

Figure 3   An interracial "between men" moment

in these photos wounds and/or punctuates their composition, under-
scoring the inseparability of the economic and the sexual in the meta-
composition of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands. Yet if money is a prevalent
image, the most common form of (sociocultural) currency on display
remains the effeminized body, which captures identity's performative shut-
ter speed. This archive cannot be aesthetically separated from "what it
says in its own idiom (that of the icon)" (Alloula 1986, 120); Woman as
the Other side, as the accessory, necessary to initiate the primal inter-
American scene of violation and domination, even as Woman is not solely
the purview of literal women. As many commentators have pointed out,
it is not simply the women or those who pass as women (Woman, *broadly*
speaking—à la Patti Smith, being any gender is a drag [quoted in Jahr
1975]) in these images who inhabit competing identifications/counter-
identifications/disidentifications.[18] Instead, the men of the *Boystown* col-
lection, as much as their female counterparts, perform racialized and sex-
ualized identities, the prescriptive fictions of masculinity encoded in
porous transnational, transactional terms. Men become the standard of

[18] I am thunderstruck by the memory of a photograph in the archive (not included in
the show or catalog) that depicts a man showing the camera his "two cigars"—the literal
cigar between the forefinger and thumb of his right hand and his penis, protruding from
his unzipped pants, that he holds—like a cigar—between his left hand's fingers. I was denied
permission (by Wittliff) to make a Xerox copy or scan of this print.

comparison against which Woman operates as the stand-in for power imbalances, the effeminization of Mexico as a nation in relation to the United States.

Deepening an allegorical economy dependent on the traffic in women and Woman, the *Boystown* collection operates as more than the sum of its parts. Indeed, one might argue that there is nothing remarkable about the individual images in this collection. Compositionally, they are true to their makers' original intent; they function as quick references, as memory jogs of a border jaunt. Yet read in the shadow of the politics of their promotion as an archive, these souvenir snapshots cut their allegorical teeth on the punctum of a metastudium, where the punctum and the studium enjoy a dialectical relationship.[19] Offering irrefutable evidence of border trafficking, these photographs, like the women and money in them, trade hands to acquire cultural capital. Indeed, Wittliff's payment for their possession layers the effect of money and Woman/women in circulation, infusing his collector's impulse with the sepia tint of premaquiladora symbolic capital, albeit that of primitive accumulation.[20] In the final analysis, it is hardly coincidental that this collection was inaugurated post-NAFTA; for, as Roberto Tejada surmises, these images "foreshadow the rampant *maquiladora* border phenomenon that surrounded the signing of NAFTA in the early 1990s" (2003, 197). *Boystown*'s aestheticization enacts a nostalgia for a bygone *All the Pretty Horses* era when the border as a site of industry literally and figuratively stood in for the brothel versus the maquiladora. That both now exist simultaneously tightens the noose of economic readings of Woman and Border's allegorical intimacy in a transnational imaginary, suggesting an ongoing paradigm shift that increases the allegorical exchange value of Woman and Border as icons.

In what follows, I will explore the continuum that such a potential paradigm shift invokes via an examination of the relationship between the impetus behind Wittliff's (neo)colonial brothel and the politics of presenting another human archive—that of the missing and murdered women of Juárez. My goals in exacting this comparison are multiple

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[19] Barbara McBane makes a comparable conceptual leap regarding the punctum and studium when considering the cinematic efforts of Portillo. She writes, "In *Las Madres* history, the photographic portrait became a form of punctum with which the mothers pierced the ongoing studium of political oppression" (2001, 309).

[20] Transforming these photos into a found art exhibit without acknowledging the so-called ethical dilemmas that such a transformation exacts amounts to a lack of consciousness, which facilitates the subsequent insensitivity, in 2000, of sending a Christmas card sporting a Boystown sex worker, like an ornament, poised in front of the Christmas tree (inside greeting: —*Felis Navidad*).

(perhaps multiplying): I want to track the recursive figure of racialized and sexualized working Woman as the key signifier of transnational difference in the U.S.-Mexican borderlands; to consider her status in the creation and maintenance of geopolitical/economic locations as crossroads, switchpoints, or zones of tolerance/free trade; and to link the contradictions of the *Boystown* collection to ongoing ethical questions concerning the (re)presentation of racialized and sexualized working Woman and the Border as codependent allegorical figurations, where allegory as a genre and practice becomes both the prime suspect and eyewitness of symbolic enabling violations in turn-of-the-millennium remappings of the continent.

Señorita Extraviada: Neoliberal allegorical habits versus the everyday practices of allegory

> Las muertas de Ciudad Juárez son vergüenza nacional/The murdered
> women of Juárez are a national disgrace.
> —Los Tigres del Norte 2004

Conservative estimates suggest that since 1993 nearly 380 women have been raped and murdered and countless others disappeared in Juárez, Mexico, the border twin of El Paso, Texas.[21] The number of unsolved murders has earned Juárez the nickname of the city of the dead girls. Authorities and laypeople have generated a puzzling array of conspiracy theories of varying degrees of sophistication to explain the body count. At one point it was suggested that six Mexican men so wealthy that they are beyond arm's reach of the law are playing a gruesome game with one another. Later, Mexican officials hypothesized that an Egyptian national (Sharif Sharif, a maquiladora-employed chemical engineer who had served five years in prison in the United States for sexual harassment and battery) had committed seven of the murders and then from his jail cell paid a gang (Los Rebeldes) and subsequently bus drivers he knew to increase the numbers.[22] Francisco Barrio, governor of the state of Chihuahua, not discounting the serial killer(s) hypothesis, resorted to blaming the victims: "The problem is they're prostitutes. They have two lives, they're in a very

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[21] In reality, it is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the exact numbers here. Many have suggested that to date as many as five hundred women have been murdered.

[22] Suly Ponce, special prosecutor for the cases, claimed Sharif was the "intellectual author" of these crimes (*Señorita Extraviada* 2001).

high risk group" (*Señorita Extraviada* 2001). Other would-be super-sleuths have speculated that the women have been caught in the crossfire of the inter-American drug wars, or that the police themselves were the offenders, or that the women were "chosen" through pictures taken of them on payday at the maquiladoras. To round things out and give the situation a cutting transnational edge, CIA serial killer profiler Robert Wrestler proposed that a U.S. national was crossing the border for blood sport—a literalization of the hunting metaphor.

And then there are the theses that, equally prevalent in mass media, academic, and governmental venues, resemble accidental screen-allegories. This latter category of interpretation, which disrupts the crime scene in the name of theorizing politics, includes Charles Bowden's photojournalistic analysis *Juárez: The Laboratory of Our Future* (1998), Ursula Biemann's feminist intervention *Performing the Border* (1999), and Julian Cardona's recent interpretations of "appropriations" of the Juárez murders (2004). I examine these examples against the backdrop of Spivak's theoretical cul-de-sac "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988) and her subsequent revisions of that essay. Admittedly, I use the above-mentioned as ideological "straw people"—despite each author's important contributions to thinking, indeed "performing," the border—insofar as my analysis implicitly juxtaposes those texts with Portillo's performative documentary, *Señorita Extraviada* (2001), translatable literally as *Miss Missing*.

Screen-allegories: Theoretical and cinematic (im)possibilities

Bowden's *Juárez: The Laboratory of Our Future* interprets the Juárez disappearances and murders as symptomatic of globalization, claiming that "Juárez is a museum of the history of the fabled New World Order, in which capital moves easily and labor is trapped by borders" (1998, 76). Obsessed with (crime) images from the city taken by street photographers (images often compared to those of New York City's "famous street shooter" Weegee [Arthur Fellig; Bowden 1998, 62]), which he collected for another glossy Aperture catalog, Bowden argues, "I think that they are capturing something: the look of the future, and the future to me looks like the face of a murdered girl" (61). Bowden's catalog essay is problematic enough when he writes about the flows of labor and capital, but his shortcomings in such instances dim in comparison to those he exhibits when he stumbles on the root, in this case the corpse, of gender.[25]

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[25] For a perfect example of Bowden at his problematic best, consider his unreflective rescue fantasy (which also preoccupies Rosa Linda Fregoso [2003, 15]) "Sometimes I drift

Bowden's compulsion to collect and ruminate on photos of the murdered Juárez women rivals Wittliff's assemblage of the Boystown images. Using photos of the dead women to illustrate the effects of NAFTA, Bowden explains the Juárez killings in terms that parallel Mexican officials' and some academics' neoliberal habits of allegorization.

- Because several victims worked in the maquiladoras, many Mexican politicians and (inter)national social scientists have seen fit to argue that the deaths of the Juárez women are implicated in a larger situation in which (Latin) American women have become too alone/disconnected from the sticky webs of nature and nurture that previously "protected" them. Ignoring the statistics that more than half of the victims did not get up at four or five in the morning to go to work and had not migrated from another part of Mexico or Latin America (two characteristics often shared by the maquiladora victims), these interpretations risk converting the deceased into accidental allegories of "globalization versus family values." Reluctantly acknowledging the literal but not the epistemic violences perpetuated against the women, investigations and theorizations of the Juárez killings depend on facile narratives of contextualization that fixate on the racialized and sexualized figure of working Woman without acknowledging their investments in her status as an allegorical figuration.[24]

What Spivak has termed the "native informant," the subaltern-turned-Southern woman (as in Woman of the global South), representationally doesn't fare much better in Biemann's documentary *Performing the Border* (1999). While Biemann's film ostensibly serves as a welcome relief to Bowden's appropriation of the "brown woman," it also swerves into an allegorical interpretation of the women's deaths that reduces the victims to representatives of a quantifiable and expendable workforce. Offering a

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into a fantasy about a whore I met in Juárez and the life we will build together. Her name is Adriana and one night over drinks in a club she told me how she had worked in the maquilas but discovered the pay was not sufficient. Now she works on her back and her two kids eat. The face is fresh, the eyes flint, the hips curved, and the stomach sagging under the work. She is a good-looking woman who never got to be a girl and now thinks she will never get to be a person. In my fantasy, Adriana and I do the right thing and follow the instructions of our times. We build a small casa by the sea. Actually, she has wrapped up her graduate studies at the National Autonomous University of México, UNAM. She has an M.A. in romance languages, and of course, an M.B.A., plus a doctorate in anthropology for her groundbreaking study, 'Sexual Surrogates: Free Trade, Multi-Culturalism and the Feminist Perspective'" (1998, 103).

[24] These discussions reassemble those of turn-of-the-century England concerning Victorianism, prostitution, and industrialization (see, among others, Walkowitz 1980) or those that arose under many a Latin American liberal (and now neoliberal) regime (for an examination of the latter, see Masiello 1992).

pop psychological reading of economic inequalities, Biemann speculates:

> There is a connection between repetitive sexual violence and the form of production of a high-tech culture, between the technologies of identification, reduplication, simulation, and the psychological disposition of a serial killer. In his mind, there is a closed circuit between individual desire and collective information, between intimacy and technology. . . . The serial killer experiences identity—his own and others—as a matter of numbers, of simulation and likeness. He is a type of nonperson, he fails to distinguish himself from others and this lack of self-differentiation, self-distinction, is immediately translated into violence along the line of sexual difference, the one difference he recognizes. . . . Losing the boundaries between the self and others, he is perpetually in·search of a border. He is attracted by the border of his country precisely because it signifies the boundary of a larger entity of belonging—the nation. Going to the border becomes the physical expression of his mental extremity, merging his physical body with the national body, confusing the inside and the outside, the public and the private. . . . The border is a metaphor for the artificial division between the productive and the reproductive, between the machine and the organic body, between the natural and the collective body, between the sexual and the economic, between concepts of masculinity and femininity, but the border is also a site where the blurring of these distinctions takes violent forms. . . . Serial killing is a form of public violence proper to a machine culture. The Industrial Revolution has produced famous serial killers. Our era of the second Industrial Revolution called the Information Society has outsourced production to the U.S.-Mexico border exporting at the same time this urban pathology. (*Performing the Border* 1999)

While Biemann's belabored theory of alienation acknowledges a link between the arrival of the maquiladora industry and the disappearances and murders of large numbers of women, it further disappears the missing women from its analysis, focusing instead on the profile of a serial killer in the advanced stages of late capitalism. Paralleling the efforts of feminist activists who, according to some family members of the victims, visit Juárez as political tourists intent on portraying the injustices of NAFTA and the border in terms that dehumanize the murdered and the missing, Bie-

mann's documentary approaches the killings as the allegorical aftereffects of the extremities of a transnational political unconscious.[25]

In contrast, Cardona's ostensibly more encompassing gender-blind description of Juárez as "an experiment gone awry" that would universalize the carnage overlooks the very gendered repetition that Biemann's documentary memorializes—the alarming seriality that characterizes the area's killings, thereby converting them into a casebook example of femicide/feminicide (the moral of the myth of globalization). Taking Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's (1985) phrase "the privilege of unknowing" to new heights (or, arguably, new lows), Cardona contends that isolating the murdered women in this instance overlooks the seven hundred unsolved murders/disappearances of Juárez men that have taken place in the same time period.[26] Yet faced with the surmounting evidence, literally inscribed on the dead women's bodies, one is left with the bad taste of questions resonant with those posed by Spivak in "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988) and revisions of that now classic essay (Spivak 1999).[27]

In "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Spivak grapples with a tension between allegory and the allegorical when thinking about and through the limits of representation, especially the limits of representing the voice of the so-called Other. Attempting to move away from a model of screen-allegory, which reifies the example, Spivak imagines (with the help of Derridian deconstruction) a weaving of the macro and the micro into an exercise that deconstructs the complicity of *Vertretung*, rhetoric-as-persuasion, and *Darstellen*, rhetoric-as-trope. Advocating that the critic cultivate a Derridian inner ear in the hopes of "unlearning," or learning to hear his/her complicity in the politics of knowledge production as a form of translation, Spivak writes, "Faced with the dialectically interlocking sentences that are

[25] Cardona alludes to this problem, underscoring the resentment felt by families caught in between the insensitivity of government officials and that of activists supposedly speaking out in the name of the deceased. On a different note, of course, Biemann didn't pull her documentary's theoretical profiling out of a hat; Mark Seltzer spins a book out of linking serial killing to turn-of-the-century mass/machine culture (1998).

[26] Spivak refers to this privilege as "sanctioned ignorance" (1999, 2, 279).

[27] Following the distinction Arundhati Roy (1997) makes, one glimpses the God of Small Things in the individual cases: many of the recovered bodies bear similar markings, half circles or inverted V's carved into their backs, distinct patterns cut into their abdomens, the nipples of their left breasts bit off or otherwise removed. Almost all of the women were raped multiple times (anally and vaginally) before they were brutally killed (set on fire, their limbs hacked off, their throats and/or wrists slit, decapitated . .). Additionally, as a collective, they bear the burden of epistemic violence often enough perpetuated (against them) in their names

constructible as 'White men are saving brown women from brown men' and 'The women wanted to die,' the postcolonial woman intellectual asks the question of simple semiosis—What does this mean?—and begins to plot a history" (1988, 297).[28] Spivak's plot is allegorical to the extent that it becomes the imperative of her argument, "The female intellectual as intellectual [recognizes that she] has a circumscribed task which she must not disown" (1988, 308).[29] Similarly, the impossibility of giving voice to the deceased also haunts prevailing analyses of the Juárez killings. What Spivak identifies as the subaltern subject could be read as the murdered and disappeared of Juárez insofar as these women are translated into the causalities of visual and written excess that, gerrymandering the border, represents them as expendable. In such a cartographic economy, femin-icide produces an ongoing alteration in the border-brothel paradigm, out-fitting it with the additional allegorical baggage of the maquiladora.

In contradistinction, Lourdes Portillo's remarkable *Señorita Extraviada* (2001) recognizes the relationship between the shifty imaginary geography of the borderlands and the conundrum of the silenced even as it places the latter at its representational core (where this core is understood to be empty as an onion's—layered, but decentering).[30] Prefaced on the Public Broad-

[28] Spivak rewrites this formulation in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999): "Faced with the dialectically interlocking sentences that are constructible as 'White men are saving brown women from brown men' and 'The women wanted to die,' the metropolitan feminist migrant (removed from the actual theater of decolonization) asks the question of simple semiosis—What does this signify?—and begins to plot a history" (287). In her recent attempts to think about the figure of the subaltern, Spivak registers another rescue fantasy. "In this phase of capitalism/feminism, it is capitalist women saving the female subaltern" (1999, 386).

[29] Consequently, the essay's overarching question mutates. the subaltern cannot speak on a recognizable frequency, but what enables the female intellectual to speak aloud of the silence? What work must she do to perfect her own inner ear? What morphologies "render delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us" (Spivak 1988, 308)? Perhaps the conundrum eludes the tenets of critical representation, but that in the end may be the point. Evidenced by "Spivak's intellectual suicide" at the essay's close (a gesture of projection versus transference, Spivak's puzzling presentation of Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri's suicide sud-denly meant to be representative of enfolded silence and resistance), the ghost of Paul de Man haunts Spivak's argument. Her finale—a productive "failed performance"—underscores her parting declaration, "the subaltern cannot speak." Read alternatively (the Other of al-legory), the performative carves out a space for itself in Spivak's essay, functioning as the trace of Derridian indecision, ostensibly erased by Spivak's proclamation but lingering as her overarching catachresis, as that which resists rhetorical answers to her framing rhetorical question.

[30] My comparison takes its cue from Sylvie Thouard's citation of her student's description of Portillo's *The Devil Never Sleeps/El Diablo nunca duerme* as "a peeled onion that does not reveal a core" (Thouard 2001, 125)

casting Service's *Point of View* by Portillo's voice following an image of a woman-child disappearing/walking into the desert with the question "How do you decipher silence?" the film mourns the loss of countless young women while attempting to raise (inter)national awareness about the circumstances surrounding their absence. Experimenting with form to illustrate concretely the multifarious "false leads" of screen-allegory, *Señorita Extraviada* privileges the allegorical over the screen-allegory to speak to the performativity of Spivak's "failed" project—her essay's surprise return of the repressed, the specter of allegory, haunting its conclusion. Formally "*measuring* silences, if necessary—into the *object* of [its] investigation" (Spivak 1988, 296), *Señorita Extraviada* (re)deploys the trope of the *question*: How does one attempt to interpret the killing fields of Juárez? How does one (re)present sexualized and racialized sociopolitical and economic violences/violations while neither contributing to their maintenance nor choosing to ignore them? In turn, the rhetorical (im)possibilities of these lines of inquiry situate *Señorita Extraviada* in the recent tradition of what Bill Nichols has termed the "performative documentary" (1994, 92–106).[31]

Performatively documenting the quotidian vestiges of allegory

In *Blurred Boundaries*, Nichols revises his previous categorization of documentary to accommodate documentary work of the 1980s and 1990s, which he categorizes as performative:

> Though sharing the preference for the local, the concrete, and the evocative, performative documentary also generally insists on the dialectical relationship between precisely this kind of richly and fully evoked specificity and overarching conceptual categories such as exile, racism, sexism, or homophobia. . . . Performative texts thus avoid both the reductionism inherent to theory and the vacuous obsession with detail inherent to formism and contextualism. They are more properly, and fully, dialectical than a more abstract, theoretical account of dialectics could be. And as a dialectical representation, performative documentary addresses the fundamental question of social subjectivity, of those linkages between self and other that are affective as fully as they are conceptual. (1994, 104)

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[31] Writing of silence and rhetoric, Spivak notes, "This is the strongest sense of rhetoric, which works at the silences between bits of language to see what will work as meaning, to ward off a silence filled with nothing but noise" (1999, 239). Juxtapose this idea with Portillo's admission, "I wanted to develop the intuition to follow the little silences, the little clues" (*Señorita Extraviada* 2001).

Concretizing Nichols's formulation, Sylvie Thouard argues that Portillo's documentary *The Devil Never Sleeps/El diablo nunca duerme* (1994) calls to mind feminist performance art even as it refuses the temptation of narrative resolution (Thouard 2001, 119).[32] While Thouard's use of Nichols's theory of performative documentary delimits the political as well as ethical stakes of the hybrid genre, her choice of examples also articulates a link between the performative and the allegorical, which amplifies Nichols's conceptualizations of the genre's dialectical and affective dimensions.

Clearly legible as an example of the performative documentary, *The Devil Never Sleeps* unfolds as a faux melodrama, evidenced by the splicing of telenovelas into the film's plotline. The film, chronicled in the first person with various additional eyewitness accounts, documents Portillo's return to her birthplace of Chihuahua, Mexico, after the death of her favorite uncle, Oscar. Filled with reflection—in terms of Portillo's literal choices to film reflecting surfaces such as mirrors and sunglasses and her various observations and remembrances of the town—*The Devil Never Sleeps* examines the mysterious circumstances surrounding Oscar's demise, including speculations about his life (i.e., his closeted homosexuality).[33] While the film ostensibly gets bogged down in the petty intrigues of the mystery, the relationship between waylaying detail and the event of Oscar's suicide or murder takes on greater significance in the context of audience reception. Portillo remarks that while the film often confused international viewers, when it was screened in Mexico the response was unanimous: "I can't believe this film. This film is not about your uncle Oscar. This film is about Mexico right now, about the political situation, about deception, heroizing people" (anonymous viewer, quoted in Fregoso 2001, 45). Welcoming the coincidence of this interpretation and her own professed aspirations for *The Devil Never Sleeps*, Portillo contends, "The film goes way beyond a specific incident in my family. . . . What I feel the film tells is the story of Mexico" (quoted in Fregoso 2001, 45). Portillo's description of the documystery clarifies its location as a nearly perfect campy cinematic exemplification of "national allegory" (Jameson 1986), per-

[32] For a variety of readings of Portillo's work along with documentation of the work's presentation and process, see *"The Devil Never Sleeps" and Other Films*, edited by Fregoso (2001). The collection includes critical essays on Portillo's oeuvre as well as transcripts, photographs, and process notes from her various projects.

[33] The question of Oscar's sexual orientation haunts the reception of this film, arguably solidifying its status as a performative documentary insofar as Thomas Waugh develops the thesis that Nichols fails to explore the relationship between the genre of the performative documentary and the exceedingly high number of gay and lesbian films that he uses as points of reference (Waugh 1997).

forming not only Portillo's relationship to Oscar's mysterious death but
also a portrait of national allegorical practices that consolidates the nat-
uralness of patriarchal state formations. Presenting a documentary of the
formation and performance of social dramas, *The Devil Never Sleeps* ad-
vances Portillo's prior and subsequent attempts to portray the "situated
consciousness" of a border and allegorical skepticism (Sandoval 2000).

Indeed, striking similarities exist between the structure of *The Devil
Never Sleeps* and that of *Señorita Extraviada*. Both films showcase mys-
teries. Both are narrated by Portillo and those she interviews. Both are
doomed to inconclusion. Each utilizes photos as well as moving images.
Each shares a preoccupation with the allegorical's discursive status. Yet if
the flotsam and jetsam of camp buoy *The Devil Never Sleeps*, *Señorita
Extraviada* cannot find refuge in a parodically performative redeployment
of (national) allegory. Instead, *Señorita Extraviada* shares an affective
affinity with Portillo's myriad of requiems: *Las Madres: The Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo* (1986), *La Ofrenda/Days of the Dead* (1989), and *Corpus:
A Home Movie for Selena* (1998).[34] Along the lines of one newspaper's
headlines, "There is no better place to kill a girl in the world than Juárez,"
Portillo speculates in *Señorita Extraviada*, "In Juárez predators have no
trouble finding their prey. The only facts about the victims that we're sure
of [are] they were all poor, slim, they were dark and they had shoulder-
length hair" (2001). The revelation centers the interpretative confusion
enveloping the film. Rewriting the mystery of the local as global, even as
it resists staging a classic screen-allegory, *Señorita Extraviada* struggles
with form as well as content, performatively documenting the distinctions
and collusions of, first, that which falls through the cracks and is subse-
quently and conveniently read as a collection of accidental allegories; sec-
ond, the storytelling tactics that allow some anonymous "us" to make it
from sunup to sundown; and, finally, the deliberate representational
choices of an independent Chicana filmmaker who seeks to reveal the
violences perpetuated against those at the bottom of the socioeconomic
food chain.[35] Aware that there is more than one way to perpetuate vio-

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[34] Claiming *Señorita Extraviada* as a requiem for the deceased (Fregoso 2003, 26),
Portillo professes, "I came to Juárez to track down ghosts and to listen to the mystery that
surrounds them" (*Señorita Extraviada* 2001)

[35] Portillo is often considered a feminist filmmaker, although she does not claim that
title for herself. Fregoso parses Portillo's response like this: "I would qualify her statement
by pointing out that she is rather a different kind of feminist, a Third World organic
feminist whose take on feminism is not informed by the consciousness-raising groups of
the women's liberation movement, much less by feminist academic theory. She has more
in common with Mexican women who similarly frown on the label 'feminista,' even though

lence, *Señorita Extraviada* shelters the hope that it might be possible both to honor the deceased and to avoid the symbolic appropriation of "the pain of others" (Sontag 2003). Drawing an unsteady line in the sand, *Señorita Extraviada* presents the chasm that exists between performing a close reading that accentuates the allegorical, on the one hand, and converting the collective tragedy of Juárez into an accidental allegory, on the other. Furthermore, the film does so neither to cling to the disinterested interest of screen-allegories nor to inhabit the cultivated intimacy of the performative documentary but to unravel each genre's drive toward singularity.

In contrast to *The Devil Never Sleeps*, *Señorita Extraviada* presents a repertoire of quotidian allegorical habits that enable the film to develop an embedded critique of the performativity of allegory that nevertheless draws on the genre's classic investments in the work of mourning (Benjamin [1928] 1998). *Señorita Extraviada* achieves a synesthetic, collage-like quality, splicing the details of the women's deaths, photographs of the missing and the deceased, and information about the ongoing investigations into family members' testimonies. While the film relies on close-up establishing shots of the women and the dates of their disappearances, it interrupts trajectories of documentation and bereavement, inserting into its diegesis both a series of questions and seemingly unrelated visual references—a frayed Mexican flag flapping in the wind, several storefront window displays, and sequences that track the routines and routes of Juárez's inhabitants.[36] Additionally, if these pieces of the puzzle *Señorita Extraviada* extends are liable to leave one sleepless, individual families' attempts to make sense of the nonsensical, to recapitulate the events that surrounded the event(s) of their loved ones' disappearances, etch themselves into the viewer's memory.[37] Alluding to the accidental allegories

they actually practice a form of feminism that Sonia Saldívar-Hull calls 'femenismo popular'" (2001, 10). Fregoso's proposed reading is interesting but problematic, just as Saldívar-Hull's assessment of women's actions refutes their agency to reject the language and label of feminism (Saldívar-Hull 2000).

[36] For instance, the film, especially attentive to images of shoes, offers several shots of shoe store windows and women trying on shoes as well as images of shoes found in the desert and the shoes that remain on the lifeless bodies of the murdered

[37] Here I reference a discursive stalagmite of sorts—"While you were sleeping": first, the popular early morning Juárez sensationalism of the news segment "While You Were Sleeping" that chronicles the crimes of the night before, often broadcasting graphic photos of dead women (sometimes prior to their loved ones' notification); second, Bowden's infamous (1996) essay of the same name, which sought to bring the Juárez murders to the popular attention of U.S. readers; and third, the Mexico City feminist performance piece by Lorena

previously proposed as explanations of the killing, the film juxtaposes the presumptions of these explanations against the more modest allegorical practices of the victims' families. Working to unravel overarching narratives of *allēgoria*, *Señorita Extraviada* foments an allegorical impulse distinct from that which drives Pomeroy's and Gilb's readings of *Boystown* (and distinct from that which Craig Owens identifies as the trademark of post-modernism [1992]).

If Thouard notes that Portillo's films consistently deploy "whimsical imagery" (2001, 128), *Señorita Extraviada* exaggerates the phenomenon to reinforce Portillo's guiding observation, "The facts of the cases seem to be whimsically constructed. I find myself mistrusting everything I am told and everything I read. The only reliable sources of information are from the victims and their families" (*Señorita Extraviada* 2001). A cir-cular-turned-spiraling logic of violent visual and aural allegorical accu-mulation informs *Señorita Extraviada*'s movement. Silvia Arce's mother begins the film, testifying to Juárez's "untimely present": while she was pregnant with Arce, she herself survived a violent encounter, in which a female companion sold her to a man for fifteen pesos. The man drove his purchase around all night while she prayed to be allowed to escape so that she could give safe birth to her daughter. Eighteen years later, that daughter is disappeared under circumstances that smack of her shared in vitro experience with her mother. Arce's mother muses, "What nearly happened to me has happened to her. . . . I was pregnant with her. . . . When she grew up, why did it happen to her too?" A portentous opening, Arce's narrative clues viewers into *Señorita Extraviada*'s overarching desire to unroll a black interpretative thread in the labyrinth of explanation that constitutes the cottage industry of responses to the ongoing murders and disappearances. Arce's testimony stages the scene as being one of uncanny repetition, familiar in more than one sense of the term.

Yet if Arce's story signposts the accumulative logic of the allegorical, another mother's account recognizes the "dark conceit" of allegory as a repetition compulsion (Honig 1959). With nothing left to go on, Sagrario Gónzalez's mother reads the behavior of her daughter's pet parakeets on the days surrounding Gónzalez's disappearance as "signs," attesting:

> I knew something was wrong. Her boyfriend Andrés had given her
> two parakeets. When I put them in the sun . . . one of them was
> dead . . . the one called Clint. The parakeet called Luis only let her

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Wolffer *Mientras dormíamos (el caso Juárez)/While We Were Sleeping (The Juárez Case)* (2003).

Figure 4 An image of the parakeet. Film still taken from *Señorita Extraviada* (2001). Color version available as an online enhancement.

hold him. I started to take him out and he didn't bite me. I asked him about Sagrario. "Luis, do you know where Sagrario is?" And, he nodded. The parakeet seemed to understand. He shook his head as if he were saying, "Yes." The parakeet left on Tuesday . . . and on Wednesday they found my daughter's body. We found out on Thursday. I felt that the parakeets knew. (*Señorita Extraviada* 2001, subtitle translations)

Portillo's presentation of Gónzalez's (super)natural interpretation poignantly underscores the everyday practices of allegory that constitute the search for the trace of the Other in the seemingly unrelated natural world. The alternate language of the parakeets haunts *Señorita Extraviada*, reappearing as a visual referent in the film's credits, where images of the caged birds are shown in tandem with the names of those associated with the film's production (see fig. 4). It is perhaps the memory of the incongruency of Gónzalez's narrative coded in terms of the images, however, that ultimately spooks the viewer, for heard aloud there appears to be no correlation among the departure of the parakeet, the discovery of Sagrario Gónzalez's body, and the disclosure of the information to the family, except from the point of view of Gónzalez's bereaved mother. In turn,

the incongruency of maternal and official state interpretations is writ large in the uneasy relationship that the film stages between public and private religious imagery.

If *Señorita Extraviada* appeals to the accumulative and Othering logics of allegory, it likewise draws on allegory's genesis in biblical exegesis. The stories these families tell are filtered through the lens of the allegorical in the Catholic sense of that word (Jameson 1981; Tesky 1996). The traces of allegory's religious roots are reflected in the form as well as the content of *Señorita Extraviada*. Using Gregorian chants, including "Kyrie Eleison" for the dead, as the film's soundtrack, *Señorita Extraviada* subversively mobilizes spectacles of religiosity—activists painting pink and black crosses on telephone poles (the punctum, which dots Juárez, worrying merchants that business will be hurt [Cardona 2004]), home altars in remembrance of the victims, and scenes from funeral services, which are as annunciatory of the anger as of the grief surrounding the deceased's disappearances (e.g., painted in shoe polish on the windows of the cars in one funeral procession were demands for justice for all of the victims).[33] The film itself performs this same demand even as it is careful to document the spectacle of religiosity in collusion with conservative state and often international discourses, which posit the women as the equivalent of loose (change).

Of course, *Señorita Extraviada*'s attention to religious symbolism implicitly points to both the progressive elements of what Fregoso has termed "politicized spirituality" (2005) and the conservative underpinnings of religious discourse. For it is only in the mobilization of the right's religiosity against itself that a space of activism opens up. Like a window in time, this space reminds one of another of Portillo's films. *Las Madres: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo* (1986), codirected by Portillo and Susana Muñoz, chronicles the activism of the Argentinean mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who mobilized in response to the disappearances of their children. Pessimistically, Diana Taylor has written, "The Madres challenged the military but played into the narrative. The junta might be performing the authoritarian father while the Madres took the role of the castrated mother, but both parties were reenacting the same old story. Their positions were, in a sense, already scripted" (1997, 205). Taylor's argument forms part and parcel of her book's larger project to rethink the double bind of appropriation in social as well as aesthetic dramas—the limits of recycling practices as we have come to know them. *Las Madres*'s inter-

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[33] Fregoso christens this work by the grassroots organization Voces sin Eco/Voices without Echo "abrasions in public discourse" (2003, 29).

pretation of Las Madres' actions as well as *Señorita Extraviada*'s portrayal
of the allegorical habits of the families of the Juárez victims bypass the
riddle of the half-empty, half-full glass, throwing into question Taylor's
value judgments, simple readings of cause and effect. Remembering the
specificities of the Mexican context, *Señorita Extraviada* refuses to reduce
the "case of Juárez" to an allegory of globalization, cultivating an equally
productive skepticism of prescriptive nationalisms. Demonstrating how
the allegorical on which master narratives draw enjoys a lengthy history
both inside and outside of official state discourses, *Señorita Extraviada*
extends the scope of the whodunit plot that *The Devil Never Sleeps* de-
velops. Presenting borderlands' socioeconomic circumstances as the mys-
tery to be (re)solved, Portillo documents the heartbreaking irony of a
situation, paralleling Judith Galarza's observation, "Not even in the mov-
ies do you have such perfect crimes and no suspects" (*Señorita Extraviada*
2001). Throwing the temporality of literal and epistemic violences into
question—like Spivak's argument that "capital versus patriarchy as well as
capital colluding with patriarchy" represent "overdetermined script(s) of
cultural intervention" (1999, 237)—*Señorita Extraviada* folds the con-
tradictions of Mexicanidad into the stew of globalization.[39] The film rec-
ognizes Fregoso's apt observation, "Much of the problem with the dis-
course of globalism stems from its portrayal of sexual violence as primarily
an effect of global capitalism without accounting for the ways in which
global manifestations of power differ from as much as they intensify earlier
and more traditional forms of patriarchy within the nation-state. A more
nuanced understanding of sexual violence in Juárez identifies the multiple
sites where women experience violence, within domestic and public spaces
that are local and national as well as global and transnational" (2003,
18–19).

Offering a version of the more nuanced reading Fregoso advocates,
Señorita Extraviada makes suspects of "genders in production," the mu-
tually constitutive machinations of (trans/national) allegory and violence
(Jameson 1986 meets Tesky 1996).[40] As such, *Señorita Extraviada* con-

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[39] Similarly, Spivak argues, "There is something Eurocentric about assuming that im-
perialism began with Europe" (1999, 37).

[40] The epigraph to my discussion of the Juárez murders is a line from the song released
by Los Tigres del Norte, "Las mujeres de la Ciudad Juárez," which has been the subject of
much attention, garnering even a denunciation by the Fox administration. The song is
structured as a performative call to citizenship: "Citizens, the hour is upon us. If the law
won't resolve this (the killings), we must take the law into our own hands to capture the
men who prey upon innocent women" (my translation, 2004). Admirably, the song criticizes
the government for its inattention to the murders; yet, interestingly enough, the logic of

cretizes Nichols's hypothesis that performative documentary identifies as "its target an ethics of viewer response more than a politics of group action or an analysis of the ideology of the subject. Its very form exemplifies such an ethic in its own responsiveness to what has been, and been done" (1994, 99). Rendering visible how the figure of racialized and sexualized working Woman scripts contemporary portrayals of the Border and vice versa, the film presents the dialectical relationship between two strands of everyday allegorical practices: those that establish the borderlands as a meta–"critical regionalism" and those wielded in conjunctive disjunction that at times function below the radar screen of naturalized trans/national allegorical practices. Identifying literal and epistemic violences that perpetuate the maintenance of (neo)colonial brothels/industries at the expense of the expedient "bare life" of women (Agamben 1998), *Señorita Extraviada* neither condescends to the figural contradictions of reducing the missing and murdered women of Juárez to accidental allegories of globalization or cultural nationalism(s) nor jettisons the allegorical's performative potential. Instead, *Señorita Extraviada* enters the seemingly always already shifty terrain of Latin Americanism—the ideologically charged force field of effeminizing economic machinations whose shorthand refreshes a border-brothel→maquiladora paradigm—to suggest the simultaneous existence of alternative allegorical practices.

The Inter-American cognitive map: Allegorical figurations in the borderlands

There is an embedded watershed moment in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* when Spivak remembers *The Communist Manifesto*: "The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women" (1999, 67). Spivak's reversion to quotation clarifies the thread of an argument that runs through her text, her desire to track the "native informant"/Woman of the South.[41] Concerned with the labor extracted from women, Spivak

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this criticism depends on the concept of "national manhood" where citizenship and subjectivity are both conflated and understood as male. The conflation facilitates the lines, "Women are a blessing and miracle of faith, the fountain of creation" (my translation, 2004).

[41] Spivak writes, "In the pores of this book will be the suggestion that, the typecase of the foreclosed native informant today is the poorest *woman* of the South" (1999, 6)

vigilantly regards gender as the vanishing point of absolute difference.[42] Simultaneously reckless and subtle in her substantiation of this (im)possibility, Spivak draws on feminist scholarship's long-standing debates regarding "sexual difference," reinscribing gender as both the differentiator and differentiation.

In turn, the gendering-turned-worlding that drives Spivak's plot recognizes gender as a nuanced cascading effect where the economic and the racial play equally fractal roles in articulating Woman as the gold standard against which global citizenship is imagined. The cognitive map that Spivak (re)produces here and throughout her oeuvre centralizes the coordinate of racialized and sexualized working Woman. Case in point: concluding her essay "Women in Difference: Mahasweta Devi's 'Doulouti the Bountiful'" (1992), Spivak offers a filagreed reading of the denouement of Devi's short story: the prostitute Doulouti (whose name literally means "wealth") inadvertently dies on the map of India that a teacher has drawn in the schoolyard's clay. Excavating the story's last sentence, Spivak pauses, freezing the frame: "'Douloti is all over India' . . . one can hear that other sentence. . . . What will Mohan do now?—the traffic in wealth is all over the globe" (1992, 113). The paradox: as long as Douloti's form is read as the particular representation of a single woman, the point is elided, for Douloti's corpse in Devi's representational universe comes to stand in for a dividing and divvying up of the map around the primary figure of racialized and sexualized Woman.

In other words, Woman becomes a proxy of powerlessness in difference even as she stains that which renders her passive in a geopolitical symbolic committed to the repetitive action of binary notation. Put differently, in this concluding flourish, as elsewhere, Spivak's exacting attention to detail both sandbags her analysis and allows it to sidestep the irony inherent in reducing the stakes of interpretation to the metalevel, for, even as she telescopes up to view the lay of the land from above, she recognizes that literal women make possible the controlling symbolic she references. It is in this spirit that I write—when speaking of the plight of border women, the devil (who never sleeps) is in the historical details that facilitate an arrival at the conclusion that Border and Woman suffer conflation and/or hyphenation. In both the *Boystown* archive and *Señorita Extraviada*, the dominant trope is one that equates the racialized and sexualized

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[42] She contends, "Women outside of the mode of production narrative mark the points of fadeout in the writing of disciplinary history even as they mime 'writing as such,' footprints of the trace. . . . These elusive figures mark moments where neither medicine nor poison quite catches" (1999, 244–45).

female worker with the Texas-Mexico borderlands as a region. To think about the gendering of the Border, and the Texas-Mexico border in this instance, then, is to consider the effeminization of transnational imagined communities while simultaneously holding in the mind's eye the lives (and deaths) of women as anything but allegorical.

By instantiating the arguably "enabling violation" (Spivak 1999, 371) of comparing the women represented in *Señorita Extraviada* and those represented in and by *Boystown*, one witnesses shifts in the movement and blockage of transnational (cultural) capital in intimate relationship with women of the global South. There is a vital difference, however, concerning the location of the allegorical in the pseudodocumentary projects this article examines. Whereas the collection and maintenance of the *Boystown* images remains locked in the loop of a representational economy that eludes (self-)criticism/critique, Portillo's film clarifies the incoherence of overarching conspiracy theories. Serving as an antidote to whodunit plots as well as to prevailing interpretations of the *Boystown* collection, *Señorita Extraviada* emphasizes the performativity of Occidental allegory without jettisoning the allegorical. Salvaging the allegorical's alleged homeopathic powers of interpretation from the wreckage of allegory proper's obfuscations, *Señorita Extraviada* presents a tale that cautions against facile interpretations of the circumstances it performatively documents. Allegorical to the extent that Portillo insists women cannot go missing *again* from our naturalized conjunctive configurations of Woman and Border, the film teaches us that in reading the signs of our makeshift archives, we risk the accident of allegory, of doubly evacuating representation and the social real. In contrast, the impetus of the *Boystown* collection remains locked in a nostalgia for pre-(late-)capitalist modes of cultural production, where labor's face is not a murdered girl's but is sexually compliant for a price.

Ties bind the aforementioned: dependent on a repetition compulsion that (I repeat) marks the waist(waste)line of the continent, reconfiguring Mexico as some effeminate bottom (deputized Woman) to her U.S. top, *Señorita Extraviada* and *Boystown* bring to light collateral damage, the centrality of the periphery: those, seemingly without resources, who find themselves unable to contest the status quo but acquire the status of the Agambean exception. In turn, this timeworn script of exceptionality takes its toll on both the symbolic and the literal levels. To address that double vision, over the course of this article I have tacked between detailed readings of the *Boystown* collection, *Señorita Extraviada*, and the imaginary geographies that make these archives possible. In particular, I have attempted to think the figure of racialized and ·sexualized working Woman as a vital coordinate on contemporary cognitive maps

of the North American continent. My attention to cultural cartographies has led me to address what might be deemed a paradigm shift in conflations/hyphenations of Woman and Border, where Thomas Kuhn's transitional phase of "scientific revolution" ([1962] 1970) bears a curious resemblance to the "betwixt and between" location of Victor Turner's conceptualization of the "liminal" (1974, 1982). How translatable Kuhn's model is to the level of the symbolic in social dramas and to the realm of representation remains up for contestation. But I would submit—pace Masiello's observations regarding the Argentinean state—that we currently bear witness to a transnational alteration in representations of racialized and sexualized working Woman and Border, with this important caveat: that alteration, like streaming media, conceptualizes Woman-Border conflations/hyphenations in reference to allegorical figurations of both the brothel and the maquiladora. For the moment, then, perhaps it proves less urgent to chart out the specificities of the shift per se and more apropos to navigate and name in-betweenness, the conjunctive spatialization of the brothel and the maquiladora as reflective of a turn-of-the-millennium borderlands (re)production of space and place in a performative, inter-American imaginary geography: the border-brothel→maquiladora paradigm.

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Jacqueline H. Wolf

What Feminists Can Do for Breastfeeding and What Breastfeeding Can Do for Feminists

A lthough feminists have been at the forefront of women's health reform for decades, they have not critiqued prevailing medical thought about breastfeeding in the way they carefully examined obstetric practice beginning in the 1970s. The birth reform movement emanating from second-wave feminism led to a plethora of changes benefiting women: homey birthing rooms in hospitals, meaningful companionship during labor, certified nurse-midwives, and an end to routine episiotomies, enemas, and shaving pubic hair (Edwards and Waldorf 1984; Mathews and Zadak 1991; Morgen 2002). Birth reform proved so influential that the example of the activist patient modeled by feminists marked the beginning of the end of paternalism in American medicine.

Unlike obstetric practice, however, the value of breastfeeding and the factors that contribute to women's inability to successfully breastfeed have languished as virtual nonissues for feminists. While an early edition of the best-selling feminist health manifesto *Our Bodies, Ourselves* contained sixty-two pages on pregnancy, birth, and postpartum care, the same edition had barely two pages on breastfeeding (Boston Women's Health Book Collective 1976). This inattention to breastfeeding continued in ensuing years as feminists focused on other important issues in women's health: contraception, abortion, and breast cancer, in addition to obstetric practice. Yet we seem to have paid for this collective inattention to breastfeeding with collective ill health. Dozens of recent studies comparing the short- and long-term health of breastfed and formula-fed infants seem to demonstrate that few activities in life have the potential to contribute as much to the health of women and children as breastfeeding.

This article argues that feminist scrutiny today of societal and medical attitudes toward breastfeeding might prove to be as valuable to women and children as feminist criticism of birthing practices was thirty years ago. It also argues that working to facilitate successful breastfeeding would advance feminist interests in areas as varied as maternity leave, flexible work schedules, day care, breast cancer incidence, body image, and health reform. In these contentious times an issue like breastfeeding also has the potential to galvanize women of disparate political persuasions behind an uncontested mutual interest: improved health for women and children.

Scant support for breastfeeding in the medical community

Although most physicians pay lip service to breastfeeding, studies show they are just as likely to simultaneously assure mothers, "But today's formulas are almost as good as human milk." Responses to one American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) survey indicated that most pediatricians agreed with or had a neutral opinion about the statement "breastfeeding and formula-feeding are equally beneficial infant feeding methods" (Schanler, O'Connor, and Lawrence 1999). The survey also indicated that physicians lack knowledge of even the most mundane aspects of breastfeeding management. Although the AAP, pediatricians' premier professional organization, has recommended since 1997 that babies be breastfed exclusively (i.e., given no other food, not even water) for six months, that mothers continue to breastfeed for "at least" one year, and that breastfeeding be maintained thereafter for as long as mutually desired by mother and baby (American Academy of Pediatrics 2005, 499), 65 percent of pediatricians recommend exclusive breastfeeding for a mere month. Only 37 percent recommend breastfeeding for one year. Physician approval of breastfeeding beyond a year is almost nonexistent. There is such a chasm between AAP guidelines and the advice meted out in pediatricians' offices that researchers concluded, "Pediatricians have significant educational needs in the area of breastfeeding management" (Schanler, O'Connor, and Lawrence 1999).

Despite this educational deficit, it is so rare for medical schools to spend any time teaching medical students about lactation physiology, human milk composition, and clinical aspects of breastfeeding management that another study indicated that the best predictor of a doctor's ability to give accurate advice to lactating mothers is whether that physician or that physician's wife has breastfed (Freed et al. 1995). Chance personal experience is not how we expect doctors to acquire expertise, yet the medical community has relegated breastfeeding to just such an arena. More than

a century ago, Joseph DeLee, now dubbed "the father of modern obstetrics," complained that students graduated from medical school without examining a pregnant woman or attending a birth (DeLee 1895–96, 5–6). Today, medical students graduate without learning about potential links between formula feeding and chronic disease and without observing a baby properly latched onto the breast, and members of the medical community are as unperturbed by that gap in medical education as they were in DeLee's day when pregnancy and birth received only token attention.

Given their lack of education, physicians tend to give such inappropriate advice to women about breastfeeding that a favorite activity of international board-certified lactation consultants is exchanging stories about doctors' ignorance. One doctor warned a pregnant woman that she would be unable to breastfeed because she didn't drink milk. Fortunately, the woman checked with a lactation consultant who advised her to ask that doctor how much milk dairy cattle drank. Another physician forbade a mother to breastfeed because her blood type was different from her infant's (Smith and Wiggins 1999). These tales are not aberrant; many experienced physicians are ignorant of breastfeeding. Some years ago, a friend complained to me about her obstetrician/gynecologist father who received his medical training in the 1940s and subsequently delivered more than ten thousand babies. As he watched his first grandchild breastfeed in the early 1980s, he warned his daughter, "That will ruin your breasts, you know." My friend remained perplexed by his statement. "What," she asked me, "does he think breasts are for?"

Low U.S. breastfeeding rates

Due in part to this lack of support for and knowledge about breastfeeding in the medical community and the concomitant normalization of formula feeding, breastfeeding rates are exceedingly low in the United States. Although the annual survey by Ross Products Division of Abbott Laboratories—the manufacturer of Similac—indicates that breastfeeding initiation rates in the United States are at their highest—at 69.5 percent in 2001—since Ross began collecting data in 1955 (Ryan, Wenjun, and Acosta 2002), that statistic is largely meaningless. "Initiation" means only that a baby is breastfed at least once before hospital discharge.

It is in Abbott Laboratories' interest, as the largest manufacturer of infant formula in the country, to appear socially responsible by tracking and announcing burgeoning breastfeeding initiation rates each year. Yet in setting itself up as the most visible statistician of U.S. breastfeeding practices, Abbott defines the parameters of data collection. It is this type

of conflict of interest that feminists can expose to the public, for breast-feeding duration is a more meaningful statistic than initiation. When Ross publicizes initiation rates each year, that emphasis effectively convinces the public that only breastfeeding initiation matters. The implication is that once a baby is breastfed, supplementation with formula is inconsequential. This message creates a sizable market for infant formula, even among breastfeeding mothers.

Yet considerable knowledge has been amassed recently about the value of exclusive and prolonged breastfeeding. The amount of breast milk consumed in the early years of life appears to be of such import that many researchers now argue that human milk and human health have a dose/response relationship. That is why breastfeeding initiation rates alone should not be celebrated. Almost 70 percent of U.S. mothers initiate breastfeeding, but 53 percent of mothers feed their babies formula within six weeks of giving birth. Only 14 percent exclusively breastfeed their babies for the recommended six months. Fewer than 18 percent are breast-feeding at all when they celebrate their babies' first birthday (Li et al. 2002; Centers for Disease Control 2004).

In the early twentieth century, when the infant death rate was 13 percent, concerned pediatricians estimated that fifteen artificially fed babies died for every one breastfed baby (Wolf 2001, 1). Since the 1930s, however, after the high infant death rate from diarrhea became insignificant due to the passage of municipal and state laws governing the manufacture and sale of cows' milk, doctors have dismissed low breastfeeding exclusivity and duration rates as inconsequential. Most physicians came to believe that if formula feeding factored into ill health at all, it contributed only to an increase in trivial childhood illnesses. Recent studies do show that these latter-day doctors were partly right: formula-fed children suffer from significantly more gastrointestinal infections (Mitra and Rabbani 1995; Goldman 2000), respiratory infections (Wright et al. 1995; Scariati, Grummer-Strawn, and Fein 1997), and middle-ear infections (Duncan et al. 1993; Aniansson et al. 1994) than breastfed children. Evidence of increased acute illness among formula-fed children is so strong, in fact, that some researchers argue that the normalization of formula feeding redefined "normal" infant and child health. If children are fully breastfed, these researchers suggest, the "normal" colds, stomachaches, and ear infections of childhood are not inevitable at all.[1]

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[1] Hanson 1997; Small 1998, 177–212; Garofalo and Goldman 1999; Heinig 2001.

Human milk and long-term human health

Recently, however, scientists have relayed even more disturbing news about formula feeding, for they now believe that human milk not only bestows transient immunity to assorted illnesses when ingested but also enhances maturation of the immune system, conferring better health throughout life.[2] Thus, while any amount of breastfeeding is unequivocally better for infant health than no breastfeeding, not getting adequate human milk as an infant seems to increase infant mortality and rates of serious chronic diseases and conditions in older children and adults. These include sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), obesity, diabetes, asthma, cardio-vascular disease, leukemia, and lymphoma (Davis 2001). Prolonged breast-feeding also enhances women's health. When women breastfeed according to AAP guidelines, they enjoy reduced rates of breast cancer and osteo-porosis.

In the aggregate, current studies on breastfeeding overwhelmingly support the positive relationship between human milk and human health, although, due to the history of women's medical treatment, feminist skepticism of this research is understandable. Yet feminists are accustomed to challenging medical claims. Just as the feminist health movement scrutinized the evidence for episiotomy and hormone replacement therapy, leading to the abolition of those treatments as routine, feminist investigation of recent claims about breastfeeding and health would only make for better designed, more widely publicized studies.

Women have the right to know that current research indicates that breastfeeding duration matters. Some studies show, for example, that babies breastfed for two months or less are almost four times more likely to be obese when they enter elementary school than babies breastfed for more than a year (von Kries et al. 1999; Gillman et al. 2001). Scientists are not sure what causes the greater tendency toward obesity in formula-fed children, but they do know that human milk contains factors that inhibit the production of chemicals associated with fat deposits. Since babies double their weight during their first six months, a feat they will never come close to repeating, scientists theorize this time period might be crucial for the lifelong establishment of weight regulation (Butte 2001; Picciano 2001).

Given the possible connection between obesity and formula consumption, it is unsurprising that studies also show that prolonged breastfeeding seems to help prevent type 2 diabetes in children (Young et al. 2002). This disease, once called adult-onset diabetes, is increasingly observed in

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[2] Hanson 1997; Garofalo and Goldman 1999; Hamosh 2001; Heinig 2001.

children because of increasing rates of obesity. There also appears to be an association between breastfeeding for less than a year and the more serious type 1 insulin-dependent diabetes (Johansson, Samuelsson, and Ludvigsson 1994; Virtanen and Aro 1994).

The increase in childhood obesity has been paralleled by an increase in asthma among children, and some studies indicate that, as with obesity, the less time a child is breastfed exclusively, and the less time a child is breastfed in general, the higher the asthma risk (Dell and To 2001; Oddy et al. 2004). Some researchers believe this is due in part to the propensity of foreign proteins (like the cows' milk in formula) to trigger allergic reactions in susceptible individuals (Stanaland 2004).

Other research indicates that breastfeeding is associated with lower cholesterol levels in adulthood. Consequently, investigators believe that breastfeeding might have long-term benefits for cardiovascular health (Owen et al. 2002). Other studies do indeed link breastfeeding to decreased heart disease mortality, and at least one study suggests this may be due to the blood-pressure-lowering effects of human milk. For each three-month period a baby is breastfed, systolic pressure falls by .2 millimeters of mercury at 7.5 years of age. Since researchers contend that a mere 1 percent reduction in population systolic blood pressure means eight thousand fewer premature deaths each year, raising breastfeeding duration rates now could reverberate in terms of improved national health for eight decades or more (Martin et al. 2004).

Scientists have also argued for years that there is a link between formula feeding and childhood cancer. Some studies indicate that babies who are breastfed six months or less are almost three times more likely to contract a lymphoid malignancy during childhood compared to babies breastfed longer than six months (Bener, Denic, and Galadari 2001). This was unsurprising to Swedish researchers, who announced in 1999 that human milk was the only substance they tested that consistently killed human cancer cells in the laboratory. These researchers theorized that the errant cells that become cancerous appear in infancy only to be ferreted out by the alpha-lactalbumin in human milk (Radetsky 1999). Since human milk contains epidermal growth factors, it is also unsurprising that other researchers found that human milk applied topically cures viral warts. Since the human papilloma virus causes most warts as well as cervical cancer, scientists hope this discovery will offer a clue as to precisely how human milk prevents cancer (Bavinck and Feltkamp 2004; Gustafsson et al. 2004).

Breastfeeding also appears to have an impact on the ailment that scares parents of newborns most—SIDS. One study indicates that babies who

are breastfed less than four weeks are five times more likely to die of SIDS than infants breastfed more than sixteen weeks (Alm et al. 2002). Other researchers contend this is likely due to the ease with which breastfed infants are aroused from sleep compared to their formula-fed counterparts. Some scientists theorize that arousal from sleep is an impaired survival mechanism in SIDS victims (Horne et al. 2004).

Mode of infant feeding also appears to affect overall infant mortality, even in the sanitized United States. One study, which controlled for low birth weight, found that formula-fed infants were five times more likely to die before their first birthday than breastfed infants (Chen and Rogan 2004). This link between formula feeding and higher infant mortality becomes particularly evident when scrutinizing causes for the race gap in infant mortality. In 2001, 5.7 of one thousand white babies died and 14 of one thousand black babies died. Epidemiologists have long theorized that the significantly higher death rate among black infants is due to black women's lack of access to prenatal care. Consequently, black women give birth to more low-birth-weight infants than white women. Some researchers now contend, however, that the fact that white women initiate breastfeeding at more than twice the rate of black women might account for the race gap in infant mortality at least as much as low birth weight (Forste, Weiss, and Lippincott 2001).

Breastfeeding enhances more than the health of the breastfed; it enhances the health of women doing the breastfeeding. This link has gone largely unrecognized—probably because formula feeding was the linchpin of scientific motherhood, which promised women orderly, efficient lives and healthy children (Apple 1995). As such, formula feeding seemed to wholly benefit women. Yet in one recent study, women who breastfed each of their children for more than two years decreased their risk of breast cancer by 50 percent compared with women who breastfed each of their children for only one to six months (Zheng et al. 2000; Collaborative Group on Hormonal Factors in Breast Cancer 2002). Another disease identified with older women in the United States is osteoporosis. In one study, women reduced the risk of hip fracture after menopause by 13 percent for every additional six months of breastfeeding per child after the initial six months of breastfeeding. Some researchers believe this explains why hip fractures are more common in elderly men than women in China. Historically, Chinese women have practiced prolonged breastfeeding, which seems to be particularly beneficial for bone health in populations with low calcium consumption (Huo, Lauderdale, and Li 2003).

History of infant feeding practices in the United States

It is vital that feminists aid in publicizing this recent research linking formula feeding with chronic diseases and conditions, as infant feeding has always been an activity shaped by women. As I discuss elsewhere (Wolf 2003), colonial-era women typically breastfed through a child's second summer. Acutely aware of the high infant death rate from diarrhea caused by spoiled food (particularly cows' milk) in this era before ready access to ice, mothers commonly breastfed their babies for years rather than months and scrupulously avoided weaning during hot weather (Salmon 1994). By the 1880s, however, women's letters and diaries frequently referred to a new practice: "feeding" infants (a shortened version of the term *hand-feeding* or feeding babies artificially) before babies were three months old. As one mother told *Babyhood* magazine in 1887, "We have just welcomed our sixth baby, and, as our babies need to be fed after the third month, we are feeding this baby after the second week from its birth" (*Babyhood* 1887, 170).

This mother was hardly alone; many late nineteenth-century mothers reported an inability to produce enough milk to breastfeed and the consequent need to "feed" their babies. This phenomenon became so pervasive that the *Journal of the American Medical Association* complained in 1912, "now it is largely a question as to whether the mother will nurse her baby at all" (*Journal of the American Medical Association* 1912, 542). Delegates at child welfare conferences discussed the likelihood that the nonfunctioning mammary gland was the next step in human evolution (Levenstein 1983). Even today, the complaint of not enough milk remains a common one.

Rather than being an irreversible physiological event, however, this condition likely stemmed from a change in cultural practice.[3] Human milk production is based on supply and demand: the more a baby sucks on her mother's breast, the more milk that breast produces. If a baby is not put to the breast whenever she exhibits hunger signs—due to a feeding schedule, or pacifier use, or fear of spoiling a baby, all practices and beliefs integral to American culture—a mother's body will not produce adequate milk for her baby's needs (La Leche League International [1963] 2004, 371–78). Supplementation with formula and weaning quickly follow.

Adherence to a feeding schedule is a particularly efficient way to di-

[3] Contemporary studies address this still-pervasive complaint and thus provide some insight into women's inability to breastfeed more than a century ago. Julia Tully and Kathryn Dewey (1985) argue that what is now dubbed "insufficient milk syndrome" is a cultural phenomenon, created by the lack of cultural and social support for breastfeeding.

minish milk supply. Indeed, the popularity of infant feeding schedules beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century likely prompted women's complaints of not enough milk. As scheduling became vital to the management of railroads and factories, time became an important American value. Popular wisdom soon dictated that if schedules made businesses productive, perhaps they could do the same for households. One typical doctor likened infant care to running an efficient factory when he urged, "First, we must teach regularity, the cultivation of accurate habits in the baby; make a machine of the little one. Teach it to employ its various functions at fixed and convenient times" (Eaton 1909, 41).

Prior to industrialization, feeding advice did seem to acknowledge breasts' supply-and-demand mechanism. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, women learned to breastfeed according to babies' cues: "As to the time and hour it needs no limits, for it may be at any time, night or day, when he hath a mind" (quoted in Salmon 1994, 256). By the end of the nineteenth century, however, advice emphasized limiting babies' access to mothers' breasts. As one writer suggested, a baby on a strict schedule "will . . . become a creature of habit, and consequently will be less troublesome to care for" (Hogan 1892, 287).

This wisdom prevailed. Mothers learned from the Chicago Department of Health that "a clock in the baby's room is as important to the mother and baby as a good watch is to a railroad engineer. . . . *Doing things by the clock* develops the habit of doing things on time and at the same time makes a baby with good habits" (Bundesen 1926, 120). Widely disseminated scheduling advice on infant feeding became explicit: never nurse baby for more than twenty minutes; wait four hours before breastfeeding again (Holt 1914, 46; Hess 1928, 43). In 1911 the Chicago Department of Health berated women, "Never feed the baby oftener than every three hours; four hours is better still. If the baby 'won't go three or four hours,' it's your fault, not his" (Brennemann 1911, 5).

Feeding schedules, although antithetical to the supply-and-demand trigger of human milk manufacture, became the watchword. And so women were likely right—their bodies were not producing enough milk for their babies. However, the phenomenon was due to cultural rather than physical or evolutionary causes.

Perceived insufficient milk was by no means the only reason for plummeting breastfeeding rates in the early twentieth century. Indeed, causes were exceedingly complex. Economic pressure, class conflict, and changing views of time, efficiency, self-control, health, medicine, science, sex, marriage, motherhood, and nature prompted women of all classes to begin

to doubt the efficacy, propriety, and necessity of breastfeeding.[4] Women's complaints of insufficient milk are worth particularly close examination, however, because that disturbing condition invited doctors' involvement. And physicians' resulting misogynist theories of lactation failure portended a mistrust, which lingers even today, of lactation as a reliable body function.

Doctors theorized that women's complaints of insufficient milk were wrought by dual evils: the "overcivilization" and the "overeducation" of women. Convinced that city life unnerved women, eminent pediatrician L. Emmett Holt encouraged mothers to "lead a simple natural life" free from the anxiety that caused "the failure of the modern mother as a nurse" (1914, 47). Another physician likened women who lived in urban areas to "hot-house plant[s]" forced to "conform to definite rules," as opposed to rural women, who led "natural lives" and who, consequently, breastfed with ease (Newell 1908, 533, 537–38).

The notion that rural life strengthened bodies and urban life weakened them permeated public consciousness. One mother complained to *Baby-hood* magazine that "civilization, which has brought so many blessings," also caused debilitating worry. She protested, "Placid existence which is absolutely necessary to a nursing mother is impossible. Nerves are rampant; neuralgia, the worst of enemies, acts like a thunder-storm in the dog-days on the mother's milk" (*Babyhood* 1886, 175–76). Referring to urban hubbub, one physician warned, "All this activity costs . . . and as each person has a limit beyond which she or he cannot go, nature must retrench somewhere. Many functions of the body may suffer" (*Babyhood* 1902, 7).

Physicians theorized that girls were more susceptible than boys to the failure of body functions because girls' bodies developed in one brief, exhausting burst, while boys' bodies developed slowly and steadily throughout adolescence (Clarke 1873). Thus, as one doctor explained, schools taxed girls' brains "to the utmost" at precisely the time when "nature is concentrating all her energies upon the development of the generative organs and the establishment of their physiological functions." Physicians consequently believed that schoolgirls' brains monopolized the energy their growing reproductive organs needed. Doctors acknowledged that girls needed an education but argued that education should not be overly taxing and should not rob the women that these girls would become of their "natural privileges"—the ability to give birth and breastfeed (Newman 1901). The presumption in both the medical and lay communities that urbanization weakened women added credence to the notion that

[4] Apple 1987, 97–166; 1995; Wolf 2000, 2001, 9–41.

inadequate breast milk was inevitable. After all, girls who lived in cities could not altogether avoid the traffic, shopping, entertainment, and schooling that doomed their procreative abilities.

By the 1930s, lack of faith in the efficacy of breastfeeding had become the cultural rule. One woman warned mothers in an infant-care magazine in 1938, "Don't count too heavily on nursing your baby. . . . Even if you are breastfeeding you may be ordered by your doctor to give him supplementary feedings by bottle, so it is fairly safe to count on bottles" (quoted in Apple 1987, 126). One typical doctor cautioned women about breast milk: "The fact that the fluid comes from the maternal mammary gland does not make it good. It may be nothing but water" (Tow 1934, 407). Few professionals or friends sympathetic to and knowledgeable about breastfeeding existed by the 1930s to reassure and advise mothers interested in breastfeeding.

Infant formula manufacturers exploited this societal suspicion of breastfeeding and human milk. By the mid-1950s, formula companies employed "a nationwide force of full-time medical detail men" to peddle products in physicians' offices (Bell 1962, 102–3). One longtime Chicago-area obstetrician remembered, "They gave you a long line about how their formula was better than mothers' milk. . . . Perhaps that swayed me." He also recalled the many lavish vacations he and his wife enjoyed paid for by formula companies: "They paid fantastic amounts of money for doctors to go on their trips. . . . We had nice, beautiful accommodations, all of us . . . always the best."[5]

There is no question that formula companies provide a necessary product. But a product originally invented in the nineteenth century, largely to save the orphaned and abandoned infants dying of diarrhea in foundling homes due to their ingestion of spoiled and adulterated cows' milk (Wolf 2001, 74–78), should not be a growth industry.

La Leche League steps in

Women eventually rebelled against the pervasive ignorance about lactation. La Leche League (LLL), an educational organization espousing "mothering through breastfeeding," began in a Chicago suburb in 1956 with an initial meeting of seven friends. All seven women were white, middle-class, Roman Catholic, and members of the Christian Family Movement (CFM), an organization championing family and social justice issues. Following the example of the CFM, the seven organized LLL into

[5] Dr. David Turow, interview by author, tape recording, Winnetka, IL, July 12, 1996.

tinue to breastfeed. Yet the chapter also made clear that LLL did not sanction the practice. Mothers' stories focused almost exclusively on women who enjoyed working before their babies were born but who enjoyed staying home with their babies even more (La Leche League International [1963] 1981, 55–71). The league did not explicitly recognize the reality of contemporary women's lives until the fourth edition of its best seller in 1987, when the organization finally offered practical advice to mothers who wanted to continue breastfeeding when they returned to work. Tips included how to pump and store milk and how to establish a routine amenable to both working and breastfeeding (La Leche League International [1963] 1987, 161–90). The league assured lactating mothers "whether . . . employed or at-home" that the organization existed to offer support. The chapter on "Breastfeeding and Working," however, ended by urging new mothers to think carefully before returning to work: "The early months and years set the course for the rest of your child's life, and they can never be recaptured" (La Leche League International [1963] 1987, 190).

As Weiner (1994) has observed, LLL, with its radical advice to women in the 1950s to wrest the care of infants from doctors and return it to mothers, presaged feminist views on medicine by twenty years. Not until the mid-1970s did the Boston Women's Health Book Collective, in its best-selling *Our Bodies, Ourselves,* similarly urge women to "do something about those doctors who were condescending, paternalistic, judgmental and non-informative" (Boston Women's Health Book Collective 1976, 11). Yet by the time *Our Bodies, Ourselves* initiated a revolution in women's medicine, LLL was effectively rebuffing feminist aspirations by urging mothers to stay home with their children. Thus, in Weiner's words, LLL offered "both prologue and counterpoint to the emerging movement for women's liberation" (1994, 1381).

Formula companies convince HHS and AAP to alter breastfeeding campaign

Given a host of controversies—LLL's singular influence in the breastfeeding world, the organization's emphasis in its messages to mothers, the American tendency to define women in terms of their bodies, and the propensity to blame mothers for sick children—it would be unsurprising if some feminists recoil from the suggestion that they embrace breastfeeding as a feminist issue. Yet this retreat from a vital women's issue has engendered silence on the part of feminists even when breastfeeding controversies beg for feminist voices.

In 2003 and 2004, for example, an extraordinary public squabble occurred among infant formula companies, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and the Ad Council (McCullough 2003; Petersen 2003). The disagreement should have been condemned as evidence of what U.S. scientists charge is the Bush administration's suppression and distortion of science to further its political agenda (Union of Concerned Scientists 2004). But while the scientific community has roundly criticized the refusal to fund stem cell research and the suppression of Environmental Protection Agency studies, the Bush administration's censorship of information about breastfeeding received relatively scant attention. Feminist involvement in breastfeeding advocacy might at least have gotten the matter the attention it deserved, in the same way that the media reported the refusal of the Food and Drug Administration to allow emergency contraception to be purchased over the counter despite overwhelming evidence of its safety.

The uproar began when infant formula company representatives prevailed on the AAP leadership and Tommy Thompson, appointed secretary of HHS by George W. Bush, to quash a series of public service announcements (PSAs) about breastfeeding designed by the Ad Council, a consortium of the country's top advertising agencies that come together to offer personnel to design PSAs pro bono. Prompted by formula company concerns, HHS insisted that key elements be cut from the planned campaign. Feminist organizations never protested, although the editing of the ads undermined the right of U.S. women to get accurate medical information in order to make informed decisions about infant feeding.

Although few think of formula as a public health threat, David Satcher, the U.S. Surgeon General under Bill Clinton, did. When he authored the *HHS Blueprint for Action on Breastfeeding* in 2000, he termed breastfeeding "one of the most important contributors to infant health," dubbed low breastfeeding rates in the United States "a public health challenge," and called for "national, culturally appropriate strategies to promote breastfeeding." Public service announcements were one of his proposed strategies (Department of Health and Human Services Office on Women's Health 2000, 3). Prompted by Satcher's call, the Ad Council announced in June 2002 that its next major campaign would publicize the importance of breastfeeding to health.[7] As the instigator, HHS sanctioned and supervised the campaign.

The breastfeeding community (including lactation consultants, LLL members, nurse-midwives, and select pediatricians, obstetricians, family

[7] See http://www.adcouncil.org/about/news061902.

physicians, and neonatal nurses) reacted to the Ad Council's announcement with enthusiasm. One Boston pediatrician recalled thinking, "Hallelujah, finally. You know, we're struggling here in the trenches. And to have the government get in and help us out was just going to be terrific" (Ross and Rackmill 2004a). Breastfeeding advocates like this physician had long made largely futile attempts to raise consciousness about the link between human milk and human health and so were particularly delighted that the Ad Council, renowned for its ability to change Americans' behaviors, would now be the conduit for this message. In the past, the Ad Council had altered national consciousness about an array of detrimental activities: the careless use of matches ("Only YOU can prevent forest fires"), seat belt use ("You can learn a lot from a dummy"), and drinking and driving ("Friends don't let friends drive drunk").[8]

The anticipated PSAs on breastfeeding, however, were inexplicably delayed. Though they were first due to air in May 2003 in honor of Mothers' Day, they did not. Rescheduled to make their debut during World Breastfeeding Week in August, they failed to materialize again. Someone had leaked the ads to the formula companies, and formula company executives were not happy with what they saw.

The Ad Council, as was its custom, had devised an atypical approach to an old topic. Instead of enumerating the familiar benefits of breastfeeding in its campaign, the council highlighted the risks of not breastfeeding. This perspective, campaign developers believed, would prompt behavioral change because, while it is easy to dismiss a benefit, risks are hard to ignore. As lactation specialist Diane Wiessinger explains, "Our own experience tells us that optimal is not necessary. Normal is fine, and implied in this language is the absolute normalcy—and thus safety and adequacy—of artificial feeding." Long before the Ad Council decided to publicize the risks of not breastfeeding, Wiessinger advised a similar strategy. She observed, "Because breastfeeding is the biological norm, breastfed babies are not 'healthier'; artificially-fed babies are ill more often and more seriously" (Wiessinger 1996, 1).

The three PSAs devised by the Ad Council and viewed covertly by formula company executives portrayed visibly pregnant women partaking in dangerous activities. One showed them participating in a logrolling contest, another showed them riding violently bucking mechanical broncos, and a third showed them bashing into each other in a roller derby. In all three spots a voice-over admonishes, "You wouldn't risk your baby's health before it's born. Why start after?" Then statistics appear

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[8] See the Ad Council Web site at http://www.adcouncil.org.

on-screen. Among babies who are fed formula, leukemia is up 30 percent, ear infections are up 60 percent, and insulin-dependent diabetes is up 40 percent. The ads end with one of the Ad Council's trademark pithy slogans: "Babies were born to be breastfed" (Ross and Rackmill 2004a).

Formula company executives were horrified. Charging the campaign was "negative," they went directly to Joe Sanders and Carden Johnston, then the executive director and president (Sanders has since resigned), respectively, of the AAP, to seek support in denouncing the ads (Petersen 2003; Gartner n.d.). Sanders and Johnston proved a sympathetic audience. Johnston immediately wrote to HHS, now headed by Tommy Thompson, to repeat formula company concerns (Johnston 2003). Dismayed, Dr. Lawrence Gartner, chair of the AAP's Section on Breastfeeding, charged that AAP officials were simply appeasing the AAP's biggest donors—the formula companies. Ross Laboratories alone contributed $500,000 to the AAP in 2001. "There is a lot of money involved," Gartner told the *New York Times* (Petersen 2003, C1; Ross and Rackmill 2004a).

Scrambling to keep the Ad Council campaign intact, Gartner wrote letters to both Thompson and Johnston explaining how the ads had been devised. The Ad Council, in conjunction with the country's foremost experts on breastfeeding and human milk, determined through focus groups that if the PSAs were to succeed in normalizing breastfeeding and undermining formula feeding in the collective American mind, the most convincing strategy was to enumerate the risks of not breastfeeding. Gartner pointed out that the Ad Council had used a similar ploy quite successfully in their seat belt campaign: "they provide[d] examples of what can happen when not wearing a seat belt" (Gartner 2003).

The battle continued. The International Formula Council hired Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture under George H. W. Bush and former Republican Party chairman, to lobby the U.S. government. Yeutter wrote a letter to Thompson (bearing the salutation "Dear Tommy") complaining that the planned ads contained "egregious distortions. . . . For our government to give all these mothers a guilt trip would just be appalling" (Yeutter 2004). Gartner countered, "The ad campaign is backed by scientific research . . . that has been reviewed now by two different panels." Yet with Yeutter's help, formula industry executives arranged a private meeting with Thompson to discuss the ads. Breastfeeding proponents were unable to arrange a similar meeting to defend the ads (Ross and Rackmill 2004a).

Sanders and Johnston continued to ignore the exhortations of their own organization's breastfeeding experts to allow the ads to run intact. Instead, Sanders told the *New York Times* he was worried that if a mother

saw the ads and still chose not to breastfeed she might feel guilty if her baby eventually developed leukemia or diabetes (Petersen 2003). Later that month, Johnston appeared on CBS's *Early Show* to explain that he wanted mothers to breastfeed for "positive reasons" rather than be persuaded by "scare tactics" (CBS Television 2003).

In early June 2004, the week before heavily edited breastfeeding PSAs began to appear in select markets, the ABC news show *20/20* aired a segment exposing the successful collusion of the nation's formula companies, the premier organization of American pediatricians, and HHS to hide the risks of not breastfeeding from mothers. Brian Ross, who narrated the segment, introduced the story by describing the planned breastfeeding campaign as having been "kept off the air by the Bush administration." Jay Gordon, a Santa Monica, California, pediatrician and a member of the AAP Section on Breastfeeding, explained why the 3-billion-dollar-a-year formula industry had worked so hard to alter the planned ads: "When you say 'not breastfeeding is risky,' what you're saying is 'using infant formula is risky,' and this is true and they know it." A befuddled Sanders, who clearly had never seen the ads he had worked so hard to suppress, told *20/20*'s Ross, "We saw the information from the Ad Council and there was something about a pregnant woman riding a bull. I don't think a pregnant woman belongs on a mechanical bull, do you?" (Ross and Rackmill 2004b).

The ads that began to air in mid-June 2004 in a few select areas (and then quickly disappeared) relayed a message so different from the campaign's original intent that the agency that developed the PSAs insisted its name be removed from the final product. The consequences of not breastfeeding and its obvious corollary—the ramifications of formula feeding—had disappeared. There was no mention of the 40 percent increased incidence of diabetes, or the 30 percent increase in leukemia, or even the relatively well-known 60 percent increase in ear infections among formula-fed infants (Ross and Rackmill 2004a). All reference to long-term diseases and the more obvious references to the health risks linked to not breastfeeding had disappeared.

The question of guilt
In the 1960s and 1970s, health activists in the women's movement lobbied for fully informed consumers and the corollary: an end to patronizing physicians who withheld information from their patients (Boston Women's Health Book Collective 1976; Morgen 2002). Yet thirty years later feminists did not protest when formula companies, the HHS, and leaders of

the AAP successfully conspired to hide the health consequences of not breastfeeding in the name of protecting women from guilt lest they choose to formula feed.

Normally, U.S. physicians do not hesitate to make patients feel guilty about an array of harmful behaviors and omissions: smoking, excessive drinking, not exercising, not immunizing children, not using an infant car seat. Why isn't "not breastfeeding," or, better yet, "formula feeding," on this list? Would Sanders, pediatrician and former executive director of the AAP—who does not want women to learn about the potential relationship between formula feeding and diabetes because it might make the formula-feeding mother of a diabetic child feel guilty—hesitate to tell a pregnant woman not to smoke because she might feel guilty if she ignores his warning and her baby is born prematurely in severe respiratory distress? Would Sanders forgo chastising a mother who holds her newborn in her lap when she rides in the passenger seat of a car because she might feel guilty if she disregards his advice and her baby is killed in an accident? In what other area of medicine and public health does fear of invoking guilt prompt physicians to refuse to inform patients about health risks?

Why is breastfeeding unique? Physicians' lack of knowledge about breastfeeding management and lactation physiology obviously contributes to their reluctance to discuss breastfeeding with patients. Nancy Wight, a San Diego neonatologist and president of the Academy of Breastfeeding Medicine, also argues that doctors classify breastfeeding as an inconsequential "lifestyle choice" rather than a vital public health issue, in large part because most physicians, even those who specialize in pediatrics, have only meager understanding of infants' immunological and nutritional needs (Wight 2001). Wight also contends that doctors' fear of invoking guilt if they discuss breastfeeding with women is groundless—a mother's guilt about a sick child customarily manifests as regret for making the wrong decision due to lack of information: "If only I'd known. If only my doctor had told me" (Wight n.d.).

Women should indeed be free to choose between formula and human milk, but women also have the right to be fully informed when they make that decision. Feminists should be especially concerned when the nation's foremost health organizations use the concept of choice to deny women information.

What feminists can do

The ability of formula companies to intimidate and co-opt the AAP and HHS is one consequence of feminist inattention to breastfeeding. Most

women continue to be unaware of the numerous studies linking formula feeding with chronic illness because formula feeding is the cultural norm and thus goes unrecognized as a detriment to public health. Feminist promotion of breastfeeding might bring this long-neglected issue to public attention and help make breastfeeding the cultural norm it should be.

Almost thirty years ago, in response to formula companies expanding their markets to developing countries, where lack of potable water meant formula-fed babies were likely to die of diarrhea (not unlike U.S. babies in the early twentieth century), the women's health movement orchestrated protests and boycotts (Baumslag and Michels 1995). Now U.S. feminists can turn to the health ramifications of formula feeding on the domestic front. With a growing body of research indicating that the propensity to formula feed causes excess maternal and infant morbidity and mortality in the United States, feminists can urge government and health organizations to estimate and publicize the cost of formula feeding to society. Under the rubric of preventive medicine, feminist organizations can call on Medicaid and private health insurers to reimburse for breastfeeding-related expenses such as breast pumps and lactation consultant services. Feminists can lobby state governments for legislation requiring businesses to provide lactating employees with flexible work hours, frequent breaks, and a private room with a refrigerator so they can pump and store milk. "Nurse Your Baby at Work" days might bring attention to society's lack of support for breastfeeding in the same way Take Back the Night events spotlighted society's negligent attitude toward violence against women and Bring Your Child to Work days encouraged children to think of women as workers. Feminists can also recommend that formula promotion be regulated like tobacco promotion since both formula feeding and smoking negatively affect public health. At the least, these activities would promote national awareness of the effect of formula feeding on health and put pressure on medical schools to make breastfeeding and the use of human milk an integral part of medical school curriculums.

Because breastfeeding for years as opposed to months appears to be so important to women's and children's health, feminists can also increase breastfeeding duration rates by helping to define breastfeeding. In the United States, breastfeeding for a short time is the norm. Indeed, the ploy by formula companies to limit the definition of breastfeeding to initiation has made formula mandatory for virtually every American infant. Feminist-led discussion of a definition of breastfeeding could be invaluable—prompting not only a national change in infant feeding practices but also a redesign of breastfeeding studies. As one group of Swedish researchers has complained, a definition of what constitutes breastfeeding

is so inadequate that extant studies do not include a category of infants exclusively breastfed from birth (Aarts et al. 2000). Studies that include three categories—babies breastfed according to AAP guidelines (i.e., exclusively for the first six months of life and then for a year or more as other foods are added to infants' diets), babies breastfed briefly or with formula supplementation, and babies wholly formula-fed—might produce sounder evidence of the differences in health outcomes in thoroughly breastfed as opposed to partially breastfed/partially formula-fed and thoroughly formula-fed infants.

In lobbying for societal support of breastfeeding mothers, feminists can simultaneously reopen a national dialogue about an array of currently dormant feminist goals: lower breast cancer incidence, equitable treatment in the workplace, legal protections to stay home and care for an infant without harming a career, day care close to work sites, flexible work hours for mothers of young children, better informed consumers of medicine, and healthy body image for young women. Despite feminist calls, with some success, in the 1970s and 1980s for women to celebrate their bodies regardless of size and shape, that concept seems to have disappeared from the cultural landscape. Today's young women are so uncomfortable with their appearance that there have been recent news reports about teens receiving breast augmentation surgery as a high school graduation gift from their parents (Davis 2004; Wahlberg and Oliviero 2004; Hamilton 2005). Feminist focus on the physiological purpose of breasts might help young women accept their breasts as, foremost, functional body parts rather than decorative appendages.

The connection between breastfeeding and health can also be a conduit for a reexamination of U.S. maternity leave policy. Health choices are rarely strictly voluntary, and contemporary breastfeeding practices are a good example of that. Today, the reality of women's lives prevents working women with young children from freely choosing the healthy infant feeding option. In the United States, law dictates that women and men be treated equally in the workplace. In Europe, however, where paid maternity leave is the norm, women and men not only receive equal treatment at work, women also enjoy special protections so their unique ability to bear and breastfeed children does not hinder their career aspirations. This kind of special protection is antithetical to U.S. policy guaranteeing women equal treatment—meaning the same treatment as men—in the workplace. Thus the U.S. definition of equal treatment puts working women who choose to become mothers at an inherent disadvantage to working men (Demleitner 1992).

Today more than half the American women with children less than a

year old work outside the home (Lindberg 1996), yet few employers accommodate women's decisions to fully breastfeed since such a decision would require some combination of lengthy, paid maternity leave, on-site or nearby day care, flexible work hours, frequent breaks, and a private room in which to pump and store milk. Although there is now a weak Family and Medical Leave Act in the United States, there has never been any explicit attempt to associate legally mandated leave from work with the specific needs of mothers who want to breastfeed their children, despite the obvious benefits to society such a requirement would confer.[9]

Feminist instigation of this broad discussion would be one more way to demonstrate that feminists are not "anti-family," as some conservatives would have the American public believe (Coulter 2004). ABC's *20/20* reported that the Bush administration—an ostensible booster of "family values"—came down squarely on the side of formula companies instead of the infants deprived of their mothers' milk due to individual ignorance and societal nonsupport of breastfeeding. Feminists have long known that terms like *family values* and *pro-life* are empty tactical phrases. When an allegedly profamily presidential administration chooses the growth of the formula industry over the health of babies, feminists can use the incident to expose the "family values" rhetoric for what it is—language designed to mask egregious behavior.

If not feminists, who will push for the reconciliation of women's busy lives and their infants' need for their milk? Improving women's and children's health has such broad appeal that the customs of exclusive and prolonged breastfeeding, and the enormous advantages society would enjoy from such a cultural change of habit, are ideal vehicles for a national discussion of the needs of working mothers and their infants. For fifty years, LLL has helped individual women overcome difficulties breastfeeding. Today, feminists and feminist organizations like the National Organization for Women and the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) can call for much broader backing of breastfeeding—a societal decision to support in myriad ways the women who want to fully breastfeed their babies. Support of this issue on the part of NARAL could be especially significant—a step toward widening the current narrow, uncompromising debate about reproductive rights, for the ability to fully breastfeed, if one chooses to do so, is certainly a reproductive right. Feminists who fought in the early twentieth century to legalize contraception

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[9] The Family and Medical Leave Act grants those who work for employers with fifty or more employees up to twelve weeks unpaid leave to care for an immediate relative or if they are sick themselves. See http //www.dol.gov/esa/whd/fmla.

argued convincingly that controlling births did not devalue children or motherhood. Quite the contrary, they contended, a birth-controlled population placed greater value on children and motherhood by enhancing women's ability to take the best possible care of the children they did have (Gordon 1990; May 1995). In that spirit, feminist support of breastfeeding today could expand the current national debate about reproductive rights to include the right of children to attain optimum health. Thus feminist embrace of breastfeeding as a feminist issue would not only prompt a discussion of ways to enhance maternal and child health that women of all political persuasions could support, it would simultaneously revitalize a host of feminist issues.

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Obesity at the Crossroads: Feminist and Public Health Perspectives

> People need to realize that in the current environment . . . in order to
> maintain a healthy weight you have to act not only personally, but
> politically.
> —Margo Wootan (quoted in Krisberg 2004, 10)

The genesis of this essay lies in the dislocations one of us (Emily Abel) experiences every time she walks across the UCLA campus between the School of Public Health and the Women's Studies Program, her two academic homes. Although both departments are proud of being multidisciplinary, they draw on a different range of disciplines and thus value different modes of knowledge production. Gender and, increasingly, class, race, and ethnicity are categories of analysis in women's studies scholarship but are simply research variables in public health. Public health researchers frequently dismiss as anecdotal the in-depth, qualitative studies that form the core of feminist research methods. Some women's studies scholars attach the derogatory label "positivist" to the large quantitative studies that dominate public health. Postmodern thought, which infuses much of current women's studies scholarship, has yet to gain a substantial foothold among public health researchers.

But it is the conflicts about the correct approach to women's weight that seem particularly surprising and troubling. Lavishing attention on the cultural valuation of thinness and such eating disorders as bulimia and anorexia, women's studies tends to view fat as an aesthetic and moral issue and thus to slight accumulating data about the health consequences of the obesity epidemic and to ignore the socioeconomic inequities that place

women at higher risk for obesity. This article represents an attempt to present those data in such a way as to engage the attention of women's studies scholars and spur them to action.

Current feminist perspectives on obesity

Women's studies scholars might have been expected to highlight the findings of recent obesity research. As we will show, women are more likely than men to be obese, and these conditions are especially prevalent among groups at the forefront of feminist concern—women who are poor, of color, and lesbian. Moreover, feminist health researchers and activists routinely criticize the biomedical model, focusing instead on the social and economic conditions that make us sick (Ruzek, Olesen, and Clarke 1997). Thus, feminist breast cancer advocates chastise researchers for concentrating on individual risk factors while ignoring possible environmental and occupational causes (Batt 1994). But as recognition of the obesogenic (i.e., obesity causing) environment and its deleterious influence on women's health grows (e.g., Swinburn, Egger, and Raza 1999), women's studies scholars and teachers remain preoccupied with the health consequences of the cultural promulgation of female thinness (bulimia, anorexia) that affect only a small minority of women.

Susan Bordo's 1993 book, *Unbearable Weight*, helped to set the agenda of feminist critical studies of the body. Brilliantly reading the Western representations that help to produce anorexia and bulimia, Bordo views overweight status and obesity primarily as the mistaken perceptions of some very thin women or as excessively maligned physical states. The 2004 edition of *Women's Health: Readings in Social, Economic, and Political Issues*, edited by Nancy Worcester and Mariamne H. Whatley, has a similar slant. Perhaps because the editors seek to introduce students to essays that have achieved classic status as well as to those incorporating newer research, most of the articles reprinted in the section titled "Food, Body Shaping, and Body Projects" address the cultural obsession with thinness, the stigma attached to overweight bodies, and the serious health consequences of diets and surgical interventions; several directly challenge statistics about the dangers of obesity. The sole article originally published after 2000 ("Weight and Health: Analyzing the Surgeon General's 'Call to Action'"; McAfee and Lyons 2004) begins with the important observation that strategies to curtail obesity must include increasing access to physical activity and healthy foods as well as fighting the "vested corporate interests of the food, soft drink, media, advertising, and weight loss industries" (345). However, the bulk of that article as well as much of recent

feminist literature (e.g., Carryer 2001) focuses on the high failure rate of many weight loss programs, the health risks associated with them, and the need to combat discrimination against fat people (McAfee and Lyons 2004). We argue that strategies involving broad-based social and economic change to support healthy eating and active living should move from the margins to the center of feminist concern.

Contours of the epidemic

Obesity has reached epidemic proportions in the United States, with nearly two-thirds of adults now classified as overweight and one-third as obese (Koplan and Dietz 1999; Flegal et al. 2002). During the past two decades, the prevalence of obesity has doubled in adults and children and tripled in adolescents (Flegal et al. 2002). Within just five years, from 1997 to 2002, obesity rates in Los Angeles County's relatively young and quite ethnically diverse population of 10 million rose 40 percent among African Americans and Latinos, 33 percent among whites, and 50 percent among Asians/ Pacific Islanders (Los Angeles County 2003). Although food industry critics argue that recent changes in the definition of overweight account for these trends, researchers have consistently found these increases when current definitions are applied retrospectively. Industry critics also capitalize on the widely varying estimates of costs and deaths attributable to obesity (Mokdad et al. 2004; Flegal et al. 2005; Warner 2005), a result of the differing definitions, data sources, and assumptions used in this new area of investigation, to create a mistaken impression of scientific uncertainty about the epidemic's severity (California Center for Public Health Advocacy 2005). The commensurate rise in chronic disease rates (e.g., the tenfold increase in type 2 diabetes incidence among Cincinnati adolescents between 1982 and 1994 [Pinhas-Hamiel et al. 1996]) contradicts the notion of a "paper epidemic."

Obesity is a serious health problem because it contributes to various common chronic diseases, including heart attack, stroke, postmenopausal breast cancer, colon cancer, type 2 diabetes mellitus, gallbladder disease, polycystic ovary disease, osteoarthritis, sleep apnea, and injuries resulting from falls in the elderly (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001). Obese individuals have 1.5 to two times the risk of premature death than those with weights in the healthy range (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001). A conservative estimate is that three hundred thousand deaths per year may be attributable to obesity, physical inactivity, and poor diet (e.g., Allison et al. 1999); the combination of poor diet and physical inactivity may soon surpass tobacco as the leading

cause of preventable mortality (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001). A modest weight gain in adulthood of eleven to eighteen pounds doubles the risk of diabetes, and a more substantial (and typical) gain of forty-four pounds is associated with four times the risk (Ford, Williamson, and Liu 1997). Moreover, as a result of the increase in childhood obesity, some chronic diseases (most notably type 2 diabetes) that were previously essentially restricted to the adult population now affect growing numbers of youth (Rosenbloom et al. 1999). Obesity does, however, decrease the risk of osteoporosis, a major concern of elderly women, though this benefit is offset somewhat by obese women's increased prevalence of falls (Scott and Hochberg 1998).

Because obesity rates are 25 percent higher in women than men (Flegal et al. 2002), obesity contributes more to the development of many chronic diseases in women than in men. For example, more than 20 percent of cancers are attributable to overweight/obesity among women ages 50–69 who never smoked, compared with 14 percent among men of similar age and smoking status (Calle et al. 2003). A moderately to severely obese woman (body mass index of 34 kg/m² or higher) has more than six times the risk of endometrial cancer as a nonoverweight woman (Weiderpass et al. 2000).

Women of color have higher levels of overweight and obesity than do white women, and they have experienced greater increases in obesity during the past decade (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001; Flegal et al. 2002). Among women ages 40–59 years, 79 percent of Mexican Americans and 82 percent of African Americans are overweight, compared with 61 percent of non-Hispanic whites (Flegal et al. 2002). Among Asian Americans, increases in chronic disease risk may even occur at weights lower than the current definitions of overweight (Smith et al. 2005). The effect of poverty varies by racial/ethnic group. Poor white women are 40 percent more likely to be overweight than middle-income white women, compared with a 21 percent higher rate among poor Latinas and a 5 percent higher rate among poor black women (Williams 2002). Lesbian and bisexual women are also at greater risk of overweight/obesity. A recent Los Angeles County study found higher rates of both conditions among lesbian and bisexual women than among heterosexual ones (Mays et al. 2002). For example, 40 percent of lesbian/bisexual African American women were obese, compared to 16 percent of their heterosexual counterparts. The rates were 8 percent versus 4 percent for Asian Americans, 36 percent versus 18 percent for Latinas, and 23 percent versus 16 percent for whites (Mays et al. 2002).

Driving the epidemic

Overview

In the public health world, it is now reasonably well accepted that social and economic factors rather than solely individual choices are the underlying cause of the rapidly increasing proportion of overweight and obese people, not only in the United States but worldwide (World Health Organization 1998). The case for an obesogenic environment has been made in an abundance of scholarly papers (e.g., French, Story, and Jeffery 2001; Kumanyika 2001; Hill et al. 2003) and in books aimed at informing the public more generally (e.g., Nestle 2002; Schlosser 2002; Brownell and Horgen 2004).

Some environmental factors, such as changes in food production and processing, have made energy-dense foods extremely inexpensive and have had the effect of promoting obesity across all population groups. Other factors, as will be discussed below, are linked to, or operate through, gender, social, and economic inequalities, which cumulatively have the effect of putting low-income women of color at the highest risk of becoming overweight and obese. Such women are often blamed for making uninformed or self-indulgent choices and thus becoming fat. It would be more accurate to recognize that they struggle daily against environments that increasingly promote excessive food intake and discourage physical activity (e.g., Powell, Slater, and Chaloupka 2004; Lewis et al. 2005).

This relatively recent reconceptualization of the obesity epidemic as primarily driven by social, physical, and economic environmental factors has led to a second piece of accepted wisdom in the public health community, namely, that prevention policies and programs will be much more effective than individual weight loss strategies in reversing the precipitous increase in overweight, obesity, and their negative health sequelae (Nestle and Jacobson 2000; Dietz and Gortmaker 2001; Visscher and Seidell 2001). In 2002, Americans spent approximately $40 billion on weight loss products, programs, and diet aids (Spake 2004). Much of this weight loss industry advertising targets women. At any given time, 44 percent of U.S. women and 29 percent of their male counterparts are trying to lose weight (Spake 2004). Even among comparatively affluent and highly motivated individuals, however, relatively little sustainable weight-related lifestyle change has been produced by these commercial expenditures or by other individually targeted interventions (Jeffery et al. 2000; Kumanyika et al. 2000; Marcus et al. 2000). It is increasingly recognized that this failure is largely attributable to a pervasive contemporary environment promoting sedentariness and excessive energy-dense food consumption,

particularly of the highly palatable but nutrient-poor variety (Swinburn, Egger, and Raza 1999; French, Story, and Jeffery 2001; Jeffery and Utter 2003). Kelly Brownell and Katherine Horgen state the case eloquently in the introduction to their recent, carefully researched book, *Food Fight*: "Choices people make are important, but the nation has played the will-power and restraint cards for years and finds itself trumped again and again by an environment that overwhelms the resources of most people" (Brownell and Horgen 2004, 5).

Cheaper fattening foods and more elusive physical activity

Over the past thirty to forty years, biology and food technology have come together in a formula for easy weight gain. A human preference for energy-dense foods—those that contain a lot of fat, sugar, or both—seems to be widespread, suggesting to most scientists that an innate taste for sweetness and fattiness (as well as saltiness) has evolutionary benefits and is essentially hard wired (Drewnowski 1998). In the early 1970s, falling farm profits and rising costs of basic foods created a food sector crisis in the United States. Under the leadership of Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz, farm regulations were loosened and export markets opened up in a way that led to a boom in food production, most notably a corn surplus. This paved the way for the development of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), which is six times sweeter than sucrose and improves the appearance and shelf life of many foods. By the end of the 1970s, the cost of high-sugar foods had fallen dramatically as a result, in part, of tax subsidies, and a whole range of new, enticing snack and dessert foods was being developed and marketed (Critser 2003). Perhaps the largest single contributor to increased consumption of inexpensive, appealing, easily accessed energy has been soft drinks (for the past twenty years sweetened with HFCS). In the 1990s, soft drink consumption increased more quickly than con-sumption of any other food group, and in the process soft drinks have displaced milk consumption among children and adolescents (French, Story, and Jeffery 2001).

In the post–World War II period, the food-processing industry also developed better, cheaper ways of producing stable, easily used, separated vegetable oils. At the same time, growing competition from European, South American, and South Asian oilseed production led to increased subsidies and export promotion of American oilseeds (primarily soybeans), which led to significant reductions in the cost of vegetable oils (Sims 1998). This combination of improved vegetable oil extraction technology and lower costs of oilseeds has made possible a much wider variety of inexpensive, high-fat processed foods. The result is that total fat in the

American diet has steadily increased (Sims 1998). Between 1970 and 1996 there was a 22 percent increase in added fats and oils in the U.S. food supply (French, Story, and Jeffery 2001).

These falling prices of sweeteners, fats, and other food commodities are also implicated in the expanding portion sizes offered in out-of-home meals and snacks (French, Story, and Jeffery 2001). Exploiting the quintessentially American value of "more is better," food industry competitors derive an advertising and promotion advantage by increasing serving sizes with little or no price increases, since the raw food itself is a small part of the cost (Nestle 2002).

While experts differ somewhat on the decade they pick for the start of the trend and on which change in the American diet has been the most detrimental, virtually all public health and nutrition professionals agree that over the past thirty years a wide variety of attractive, inexpensive, good tasting, nonperishable, energy-dense foods has become increasingly accessible and widely consumed (Hill et al. 2003). The fact that this has been accomplished in large part with government-funded research and tax breaks adds insult to injury. In addition, of course, such foods have been heavily advertised. As just one example, a 1994 study of Saturday morning television on major networks found that over a half of the commercials advertised presweetened breakfast cereals, candy, fast food, sodas, cookies, and chips (Nestle 2002).

On the energy expenditure side, there has also been a dramatic change in the United States, although this is perhaps spread out over a longer period of time than the food technology and marketing changes described above. Adults in the United States used to be paid to be physically active because many jobs required hard physical labor. While it is important to recognize that there are still many low-wage jobs that are extremely physically demanding (e.g., hotel workers who clean fifteen rooms an hour), overall occupational energy expenditure has significantly declined. Labor-saving technology and changing global trade patterns have shifted the distribution of workers in the United States away from agricultural occupations and manufacturing and toward service and entertainment jobs, which generally have lower energy expenditure, along with decreasing energy cost in such jobs as gardening (French, Story, and Jeffery 2001; Brownell and Horgen 2004). The use of computers and, more recently, e-mail have continued the trend toward small but significant energy reductions across a broad range of types of work.

Another major trend, this one partially subsidized by the federal government, is the increasing use of automobiles for transportation. Public policy at the state and local level has directed societal resources toward

cars and roads at the expense of mass transit and pedestrian projects. Walking or biking requires substantial energy expenditure, but even use of public transportation provides more exercise than driving door to door. Between 1970 and 1990, there was an 11 percent increase in the proportion of U.S. workers who commuted by car, truck, or van, and over a similar period of time the use of cars for all categories of trips increased (French, Story, and Jeffery 2001). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention calculations based on Department of Transportation data for the late 1990s suggest that 25 percent of all trips were less than one mile and 75 percent of these were made by car (Koplan and Dietz 1999). Urban sprawl and the relocation of more households to suburban settings have contributed to the dependence on automobile transportation, not only as a result of limited or inconvenient public transportation but also because such settings often lack sidewalks, protected crosswalks, and connecting foot or bike paths from one part of town to another (Lopez 2004). Similarly, commercially driven public policies invest resources in spectator sports (school physical education geared to cultivation of elite athletic talent for revenue sports, such as men's football and basketball, stadium construction with public funds, etc.) rather than in skill building for lifetime physical activity pursuits and community recreational facilities.

Increased environmental risks related to social inequities

Being overweight and being obese are infrequently framed as a consequence of socioeconomic disparities, but it is increasingly clear that they should be. Obesity prevalence differences are rooted in less healthful eating and physical activity patterns in some demographic groups, which in turn are substantially due to social and physical environmental differences (Kumanyika 2001; Nielsen, Siega-Riz, and Popkin 2002; Yancey, Wold, et al. 2004). Factors such as gender roles related to food acquisition/preparation and child rearing, neighborhood disparities in access to fresh produce and parks, and ethnically targeted advertising make the obesogenic environment particularly hard for women, the poor, and populations of color to avoid (e.g., Morland et al. 2002; Sloane et al. 2003; Powell, Slater, and Chaloupka 2004). As a result, a focus on environmental causes may be particularly beneficial in reducing overweight and obesity among the demographic segments of the population that are at highest risk. As Shiriki Kumanyika of the University of Pennsylvania trenchantly observes, "Latitude in personal choices related to eating and physical activity tends to be greatest among the socially advantaged. Thus, without structural changes, individually oriented health promotion may inadvertently increase disparities between the

more and less advantaged by only fostering risk reduction among those who find it feasible and affordable" (Kumanyika 2001, 299).

Despite their increasing participation in the paid labor force, women, including mothers of young children, still shoulder the responsibility to procure, prepare, and serve (in some manner or another) meals for the family, a responsibility that has remained a defining feature of their gender role. Increasingly, however, in the face of the demands of work outside the home, plus the demands of child care (including by low-income grandparents) and elder care, women have moved away from preparation of meals at home: "A generation ago, three-quarters of the money used to buy food in the United States was spent to prepare meals at home. Today about half of the money used to buy food is spent at restaurants—mainly at fast food restaurants" (Schlosser 2002, 4). The invention and spread of fast food restaurants has been one of the most striking economic successes and culturally defining phenomena in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. On any given day about one-quarter of the adult population of the United States visits a fast food restaurant. However, fast food restaurants are particularly helpful and appealing to low-income employed mothers because they provide quick, inexpensive, prepared meals that their children will eat and enjoy (Schlosser 2002).

Fast food restaurant advertising and marketing target women directly and through their children. Partially by linking their food products with popular commercial products, including movies and television shows, fast food restaurants have become the eating places of choice for most young children (Nestle 2002). Fast food restaurants also target communities of color; relative to other types of restaurants, there are more fast food restaurants in these communities (Lewis et al. 2005). A somewhat ironic development in the spread of fast food restaurants occurred in the late 1960s. African American groups protested that McDonald's was moving into minority neighborhoods without giving minorities the opportunity to become franchisees. In response to the negative publicity, McDonald's began actively recruiting African American franchisees, which helped the company become more successful in penetrating low-income urban markets (Schlosser 2002).

Low-income urban communities also have fewer supermarkets and thus less access to reasonably priced healthier foods such as low-fat snacks and fresh produce (Morland et al. 2002). Given smaller inventories and less rapid turnover of stock, it is difficult for small independent corner grocery stores to provide perishable foods such as fruits and vegetables. A recent study, using a community-based participatory research method, surveyed

markets in three low- to middle-income Los Angeles neighborhoods with high concentrations of African Americans. In comparison with the wealthier, predominantly white "contrast" neighborhood in West Los Angeles, stores in the target areas were significantly less likely to sell fresh fruits and vegetables, the variety was more limited, and the quality was inferior (Sloane et al. 2003). Similar findings have been reported from studies of many other urban low-income communities throughout the county (Brownell and Horgen 2004). In general, culturally targeted advertising, marketing, and promotion focus on less healthy food options and images, which exacerbates these access problems (Pratt and Pratt 1995; Tirodkar and Jain 2003; Lewis et al. 2005).

A large number of studies from the United States and other countries have implicated television watching as a factor driving the obesity epidemic. The magnitude of the effect varies, but more television time consistently correlates with a higher prevalence of overweight and obesity and with poorer dietary patterns (Brownell and Horgen 2004). Television watching contributes in several ways to obesity. It is an extremely appealing, almost addictive, sedentary way to spend leisure time; it encourages consumption of high-fat, high-sugar foods through advertising; and studies have shown that people are particularly likely to snack while watching television.

Television watching is virtually ubiquitous in the United States, with the majority of households having more than one television, but there are also significant ethnic differences in television watching time (Crespo et al. 2001). These ethnic differences in television watching may contribute to obesity-related ethnic health disparities. California Health Interview Survey data on adolescent television watching found that half of white males and 60 percent of white females watched two hours or fewer of television per day, whereas only a third of African Americans reported this desirably low level of daily television time (Yancey et al. 2003). This increased television exposure may be particularly detrimental for adolescents of color. A recent study revealed more than a fourfold difference in overweight/obesity between "black prime-time" actors and general audience prime-time actors, compared with a less than twofold black-white population disparity in body mass index–defined overweight or obesity (Tirodkar and Jain 2003). Although the reasons for this discrepancy are unknown, it is possible that ethnic differences in the valuation of thinness influence the decisions of advertisers and casting agents, distorting television "reality." These culturally targeted media depictions may reinforce ethnic obesity stereotypes ("Aunt Jemima") and create the impression

that obesity is normative in the black community, thereby influencing teens' body image ideals.

An additional determinant of high levels of television watching among children living in low-income urban communities of color is concern about safety. Fewer sidewalks, bike paths, and crosswalks and a lack of well-lit, well-maintained parks make parents reluctant to allow their children outside to play and probably deter the adults from outdoor physical activity as well. Well-grounded fears of violence often compound concerns about unintentional injury.

Women in general are more sedentary than men, and even lower levels of physical activity are reported among women in many ethnic minority groups (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2001). Relative to boys and men, girls and women lack encouragement, facilities, and role models for leisure time athletics. Commercial advertising for gyms and sporting equipment primarily targets men. Women, especially older women, women of color, and women already carrying some extra weight tend to feel quite uncomfortable in most commercial gyms. A research study in which two of us were involved (Antronette Yancey and Joanne Leslie) explored the possibility of improving fitness and reducing cancer risk among African American women through nutrition education and gym-based exercise at a black-owned facility. An evaluation of the relative success of different recruitment strategies revealed that women with less formal education and those who were already overweight were more reliant on word-of-mouth reassurance that the gym was for people like them: "Focus group participants . . . communicated their discomfort with other exercise environments when surrounded, in their words, by 'skinny white women'" (Yancey, McCarthy, and Leslie 1998).

Adolescent girls are a particularly important focus for assessing physical activity disparities and directing promotion efforts (Baranowski et al. 2000). A study of high school students by the Centers for Disease Control found the highest rate of vigorous physical activity among white girls (28 percent), a lower rate among Mexican American girls (21 percent), and the lowest rate among African American girls (17 percent) (Centers for Disease Control 1992). The passage of Title IX, the 1972 legislation barring sex discrimination in higher education, has greatly expanded opportunities for girls and young women in sports (from 3 percent of girls involved in high school sports nationwide in 1972 to nearly one-third involved in 2002) and changed cultural norms regarding their sports participation (Weiner 2004). However, disparities persist. A recent National Women's Law Center and Harvard University study revealed that, in 2001,

50 percent of Massachusetts high school girls participated on one or more sports teams, compared with 58 percent of high school boys; only 37 percent of African American and 28 percent of Hispanic high school girls participated in team sports, compared with 54 percent of white girls (National Women's Law Center and Harvard School of Public Health 2004). When surveyed about barriers to physical activity, teen girls and their mothers mentioned several factors, including gender bias—a perception that boys are encouraged more than girls and get more access to equipment and facilities (Leslie et al. 1999). Cultural norms and lack of role models have also been found to inhibit athletic participation and leisure time physical activity, particularly among Latina girls and women (Leslie et al. 1999; Taylor et al. 1999).

Conclusion

The silence of feminist scholars about the obesity epidemic is especially disturbing because they have the potential to contribute significantly to its control. Various feminist scholars examine the central role of women in feeding their families, the many barriers to women's participation in sports and other forms of physical activity, the harmful effects of advertising on women's lives, and the overwhelming stresses that encourage some women to overeat. Each of these topics is relevant to the obesity crisis, and each points to constructive avenues for feminist activism and scholarship.

The feminist agenda for change should include public policies that support active recreation over spectator sports and mass transit over private transportation. Feminists also should join with the groups (such as the California Center for Public Health Advocacy and the Center for Science in the Public Interest) that urge state and federal governments to cease providing the price supports and tax advantages that make energy-dense but nutrient-poor foods readily and inexpensively available. And feminists should encourage local and state governments to improve both food security and access to healthy food choices (e.g., through incentives for locating supermarkets and farmers' markets in low-income neighborhoods) and to increase recreational opportunities through the maintenance of street lighting and sidewalks and land use policies integrating green space and community gardens.

Obesity control also provides an opening wedge for grassroots activities that could promote alliances across class and race/ethnicity lines. For example, because many women feel little entitlement to take time to engage in physical activity at home, it is particularly important to advocate

for restructuring of workplaces to include exercise breaks and physical activity opportunities as a part of organizational routine (e.g., Yancey, McCarthy et al. 2004). Similarly, nutrition literacy is an important component of health education in schools, helping to empower girls to resist the barrage of destructive media images and messages focused on extreme thinness. Healthy food choices in school cafeterias complement this effort. And the provision of adequate amounts of physical activity through daily physical education and recreational sports (and other active leisure pursuits) encourages girls to change the sedentary behaviors that are so highly reinforced in the present environment and substitute more athletic body images for waiflike model-thin ones.

The issues raised in this article also suggest fruitful avenues for feminist research. As noted at the beginning of the article, numerous feminist scholars have highlighted the exalted cultural value placed on thinness and the corresponding stigma surrounding fat. If feminist scholars now seriously engage the political, gender, class, race, and sexuality aspects of the obesity epidemic, they may appropriately ask if we can find ways to highlight and combat the high prevalence of overweight and obesity without increasing the stigma surrounding fat. One possibility is that by focusing on environmental changes rather than on direct messages to the public concerning body size, we may actually reduce the likelihood of contributing to eating disorders and distorted perceptions of body image (Swinburn, Egger, and Raza 1999). Some evidence suggests that obesity rates are highest among ethnic groups in which cultural standards less frequently equate slimness with attractiveness. Thus, heavier African American women are more likely than their white counterparts to have high self-esteem and positive body images (Kumanyika, Wilson, and Guilford-Davenport 1993; Stevens, Kumanyika, and Keil 1994; Riley et al. 1998). How can we preserve such feelings of self-worth even as we attack the conditions leading to excessive weight? And why is higher socioeconomic status less protective against overweight in these groups? Similarly, we can speculate that the extremely high rates of overweight and obesity among lesbian women stem not only from unhealthful eating patterns caused by discrimination-related stress but also from a lack of concern about male preferences for thinner female bodies. How might that indifference to male attitudes be turned to an advantage in addressing the prevalence of obesity among lesbians?

As we began by noting the wide gap between public health and women's studies, we conclude by emphasizing their similarity. Most significantly, the two fields share a commitment to producing knowledge to advance social justice. Just as feminists increasingly focus on women who

are disadvantaged by class, race, and sexuality, so public health researchers direct increasing attention to vulnerable populations and the need to address health disparities. Both fields also emphasize the social, historical, and physical environmental factors shaping our lives. As we have learned from other major public health issues such as tobacco control, injury prevention, and infectious disease control, success at the population level is unlikely to take place until environmental influences are identified and modified. We advocate the fruitful collaboration of feminist scholars and public health researchers and practitioners to curtail the escalation of overweight and obesity. For a movement whose watchword has been that the personal is political, advocacy and scientific endeavor promoting environmental approaches to healthy eating and active living are quintessentially feminist.

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Patricia H. Miller

Contemporary Perspectives from Human Development: Implications for Feminist Scholarship

Feminist theories and theories of human development have had relatively little influence on each other. Several developmentalists have attempted to encourage a dialogue by exploring implications of feminist theories for developmental psychology.[1] In this article I explore the opposite direction: How can theories from developmental psychology enrich feminist scholarship?

Theories of psychological development have occasionally contributed to feminist theories in fruitful ways over the years. By far the most influential has been psychoanalytic theory, particularly its account of parenting and socialization (e.g., Dinnerstein 1977)—most notably in object relations theory (e.g., Chodorow 1978). Psychoanalytic theory regularly appears on lists of feminist theories (e.g., Tong 1998), and psychoanalytic studies are common in feminist literary analysis, art criticism, and media and film studies. However, the influence of psychoanalytic theory in human development scholarship has waned over the years, and most contemporary theories of developmental psychology (e.g., Miller 2002) have had little or no impact on feminist theorizing and are rarely referred to by feminist scholars. This lack of dialogue between developmental and feminist theory is unfortunate because the two fields address many of the same issues, often in complementary ways. Examples of these issues are the effects of social institutions on people, the nature of and acquisition of knowledge, the construction of identity and situated perspectives, inequities among people, personal and social change, life transitions, cultural differences around the world, and the socialization of gender.

In this article I first present a case for adding contemporary concepts

about development to feminist scholarship. I then describe several theories of developmental psychology, particularly those focused on childhood, that could enrich feminist work, and I suggest ways to do this. I then expand on my proposal that developmental theories could contribute to feminist accounts by clarifying the processes by which change occurs. I conclude the article by asking whether "developmental feminism" should be a new feminist theory or should simply add a new dimension to each existing feminist theory. My perspective reflects my background in developmental psychology, my immersion in feminist scholarship as director of women's studies for the past three years, and my work on applications of feminist epistemologies to the study of the development of knowledge during childhood.

What would greater attention to human development add to feminist scholarship?

Feminist theories tend to focus almost exclusively on adult women. From the perspective of developmental theories, most feminist theories, and women's studies more generally, seem adultcentric. A complete feminist theory would be inclusive of females of all ages. After reading a recent special issue of the *NWSA Journal* (Zimmerman 2002) on twenty-five years of the National Women's Studies Association (NWSA), one might ask, "Where are the infant girls, older girls, adolescent girls, and elderly women in feminist scholarship?" A more satisfactory feminist theory would begin not only with the experiences of women aged 20–60 but also with those of other ages and would not focus on adults more than on younger and older people.

Any feminist theory with a "view from nowhere" in development is somewhat limited. Each developmental phase contributes to a person's social location, and any experience is filtered through this social location. Specifically, each phase opens up new possible experiences, denies access to other experiences, and constrains how experiences are understood, in part because people enter different social institutions and cultural discourses in each phase. For example, beginning elementary school broadens a girl's social network, but at the same time social constructions of gender discourage girls' participation in sports and physical science. The institution of school introduces new concepts about the world, but girls cannot yet construct the abstract concepts that they can during adolescence and adulthood. A similar argument concerning the need for feminist theories to address the cultural discourses about gender and about the new pos-

sibilities and constraints of each developmental phase could be applied to motherhood and the aging years.

It also is important for feminist theories to analyze childhood because attitudes toward women and other marginalized groups are formed during that time. Any attempt to eliminate the oppression of women cannot ignore these formative years. Developmental psychology can suggest strategies to remedy these inequities.

Another way in which developmental theory is important for feminist theory is that a particular feminist theory may be more useful for understanding some phases in the life span than others because each developmental phase has its own particular issues of importance to females. The implications of being female differ for a one-year-old, a seven-year-old, an adolescent, a young woman, a middle-aged woman, and an elderly woman. Girls are not simply miniature women ("little women"); they have their own issues stemming from both their age and their particular generation. For example, issues of voice and body image may be particularly important during preadolescence (Gilligan and Brown 1992), whereas issues concerning poverty and declining health may be more salient for an elderly woman. Patriarchy has different impacts at different developmental times. In other words, females have different needs and different perspectives at different phases of development throughout the life span.

In addition, the form of a particular feminist issue, such as women's voices, the empowerment of women, standpoints, and power, may change developmentally. For example, a young girl may struggle to separate herself from boys so that she can play with other girls, which she prefers. In contrast, an adolescent girl may struggle to maintain her own autonomy while also establishing a romantic relationship with another person. Another example is that an eight-year-old girl is allowed to venture farther from home by herself than is a three-year-old girl, but with these new social contexts and new opportunities for growth come new issues of personal safety and discrimination in new arenas.

The concept of developmental level includes the contributions of not only experience but also biological change, an analysis especially missing from most feminist work. For example, any account of changes in identity from childhood to adolescence to adulthood to the aging years is incomplete without attention to physical maturation, which brings new motor skills, greater brain functioning, and sexual maturity. These biological contributions to changes in identity cannot be ignored in feminist accounts of identity. Thus, any point in developmental time is a particular biological

and psychological moment that influences any topic addressed by feminist theories.

When feminist work does in fact address females who are not aged 20–60, it tends to do so in a static, almost essentialist manner. A prime example is the exciting, booming feminist work on girls.[2] Examples of topics are loss of voice, girls' meanness to each other, eating disorders, and barriers to entering science and technology. Although this is a promising step toward a developmental focus within feminist work, the work thus far is limited in two ways. First, it tends to be atheoretical (e.g., empirical documentation of girls' meanness) and at best loosely connected to existing feminist theories. A theoretical account of this topic is overdue. Second, this work typically is nondevelopmental. That is, it describes the lives of girls but rarely ties these lives to their prior or later developmental phases or examines processes of change from one phase to the next. Girlhood cannot be frozen in time and decontextualized from its larger developmental context. The social location of girls in fact leads to the social location of older girls and then women. Simply studying girls does not clarify the causes, processes, and consequences of change—the focus of truly developmental accounts. A developmental approach would trace the connections from infancy to childhood to adolescence to adulthood to aging, and thus tell the complete story of females' lives.

Feminist theories would be enriched by acknowledging that females' experiences, interests, and values vary from one age to another. For example, feminist socialist theories could fruitfully address how the material conditions of females' position in gender-based capitalist patriarchy take a different form and have a different effect at different ages. For an infant girl, the lack of social support for her single mother may lead to poverty, which may affect the infant's health care and nutrition, and thus her brain development. For a young girl developing her identity, the nuclear family and the division of labor in both the family and in the outside workforce provide models of males in more dominant and better-paying positions. During later childhood and adolescence, a capitalist society pressures girls to become consumers, particularly of products that make their bodies more attractive to males. Girls also are directed away from the science, math, and technology that would prepare them for well-paid jobs. Adult women often are marginalized by the capitalist division of labor and lack of quality day care, and mothers often engage in uncompensated domestic work. Finally, many elderly women live in poverty.

[2] See, e.g., Walkerdine, Lucey, and Melody 2001; Collins 2002; Simmons 2002; Brown 2003.

A central concept in feminist theories is the notion of intersectionality, or interlocking oppressions due to gender, race, class, and sexual orientation. From a developmental perspective, attention to these intersections should be expanded to include age or developmental phase. First, age probably is as important as these other factors in defining social location. Just as the experiences of African American women and European American women are somewhat different, so are the experiences of African American girls and women, or European American girls and women. Moreover, the ways that age matters cannot be separated from the ways that class, race, sexuality, ethnicity, and nationality matter. The social location of a particular gender, race, and class involves a constructed category with particular expectations, roles, barriers, power, and access to particular contexts, a category that differs from age to age. For example, a light-skinned African American upper-middle-class girl living in Atlanta has a social location that differs from that of a dark-skinned African American girl from a low-income family living in another part of Atlanta or in rural Mississippi. The same is true of white female adolescents in rural Nebraska and Brooklyn, New York. These differing social locations lead to very different experiences and beliefs. In short, a consideration of age changes what we say about intersections of gender, race, and class. Any female's life story would be told in the context of her race, ethnicity, social class, and sexual orientation at each developmental phase in her life.

In summary, I have argued that a developmental perspective identifies several gaps in feminist theories. Feminist theories tend to neglect females' early and later years, and even recent accounts of girls are not placed within a larger developmental context. Moreover, feminist theories do not adequately address processes of change. Finally, the feminist focus on intersectionalities has not included age as one contributor to social location. In this article I attempt to show that developmental theories can help fill these gaps and thus enrich feminist theories by adding material on childhood and, in particular, by focusing on processes of change—the core notion in development.

Studying processes of change

Feminist theories implicitly focus on change—both personal change through empowerment, equity, new identities, and greater feminist consciousness; social change through the dismantling of structures that oppress women; and through the development of new structures that transform institutions. Social change is a main goal of feminist activism. Many women's studies classrooms attempt to cause change in students' aware-

ness and understanding of gender, race, and class. By knowing the processes of change in individuals and society, feminists have tools for speeding up that change. However, processes of change are undertheorized in feminist theories. As discussed in this article, developmental theories can clarify the processes of change described or implied in feminist theories. I will focus in particular on how developmental concepts of change, based to a great extent on research on children, can be extended usefully to adults' learning and development. Because childhood is a time of rapid change, developmentalists have found this period a fruitful source of information about general principles of change.

Developmentalists focus on transitions from one point to the next in people's lives. They study the nature of change and the forces that stimulate it. They attempt to understand a changing individual in the context of a changing world, and they offer dynamical views of humans, which are compatible with feminist thought.

More specifically, developmentalists focus on two sorts of personal or social change. One is moment-to-moment change, as when a person acquires a new concept or skill, often called learning. A feminist example would be the "click" that comes when a heterosexual white student suddenly becomes conscious of the heterosexual normativity of society or of white privilege. The second is more long-term change over days, months, and years, such as changes in identity. Regarding long-term change, one concept about change from developmental psychology that would be useful for feminist analyses, especially historically oriented ones, is the notion of age-related changes versus generational changes. If one compares thirty-year-old women and seventy-year-old women, are their differences due to age differences or to the fact that they have lived in different sociocultural-historical times, or both? A teenage girl today grapples with issues of sexuality and birth control that differ greatly from those that her grandmother faced at that same age. Both age-linked experiences and experiences tied to particular sociohistorical contexts cause change. Applying that awareness to feminism, we might ask, "To what extent does third-wave feminism reflect the young age of the women in this wave versus the times in which they grew up?" Feminist scholars could use conceptual tools from human development to address all these types of change.

Three theories of human development for feminist scholarship

Developmental theories describe and explain various aspects of psychological development such as cognition (knowledge and thinking), social behavior, language, morality, physical maturation, and perception. Each

aspect mutually influences each of the others to bring about change. Each developmental change can be understood in terms of a child-in-context. A person is never in a social vacuum. She always develops somewhere, in a particular social, cultural, and historic context. As in women's studies, developmental theories are necessarily interdisciplinary. Because of the complexity of human behavior, developmentalists must draw on fields ranging from anthropology and sociology, to biology and neuroscience, to philosophy and linguistics. Biology and environment are always intertwined, with each driving and constraining the other during the process of change. For example, the human biological predisposition to acquire a language rapidly is expressed by immersion in a particular language environment, such as French. Beyond these shared beliefs about development, contemporary developmental theories differ in what questions they ask and what aspects of development they emphasize.

Theory plays a somewhat different role in developmental psychology and women's studies scholarship. Unlike feminist theories, developmental theories generate and organize empirical findings, and are modified in light of these findings. Thus, developmental theories can provide support for many of the tenets of feminism. I now examine three main contemporary developmental theories—sociocultural theory, Piagetian theory, and core knowledge theory—and explore promising points of contact with feminist theories.

Sociocultural theory

Of the developmental theories that currently influence developmental research, the one most compatible with feminist thought is sociocultural theory. Historically, this theory began with Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934), a Soviet psychologist and educator whose work led him to be blacklisted by the emerging Communist Party. His work is related to that of several thinkers more familiar to women's studies scholars, in particular, Mikhail Bakhtin (e.g., 1981). More than most psychologists, Vygotsky emphasized the cultural, social, and historical forces that shape individual minds (Vygotsky 1978; Miller 2002, chap. 7). Although he rarely addressed gender, his work and that of more recent sociocultural theorists such as Michael Cole (1999), Mary Gauvain (2001), and Barbara Rogoff (2003), have important implications for feminist studies that focus on how a gender-stratified culture shapes and constrains the activities and development of females and consequently their cognitive and social development.

Sociocultural theory can enrich several undertheorized issues in feminist work. By what process do internalized racism, internalized homophobia,

and other internalized beliefs described by feminism come about? How does the material reality of social class affect a person's thinking about society? What is an alternative to essentialism, a way of thinking heavily critiqued by feminists? What are the specific processes of learning involved in feminist pedagogy?

One key concept in sociocultural theory is that thinking is always social and is an internalization of adults' language, discourses, and behaviors. Socially created tools such as language, writing, computers, and a number system construct minds. For example, children learn to use language to guide their thinking, as when they at first think aloud to help themselves solve a hard problem and later do so completely mentally. Cultural practices such as schooling, child care, and household work provide settings through which children are brought into the activities and settings valued by the culture. An example is a Mayan girl who weaves cloth along with her mother (Rogoff 2003). The mother "scaffolds," or supports, her young daughter's attempts to learn to weave. The young girl gradually takes on more and more responsibility in the activity, and the mother gradually withdraws her assistance as the child internalizes the skill. In this way, culture constructs minds. What was initially external and cultural (a parent's knowledge and support) gradually becomes internal and psychological. Although minds are far from passive, the larger social institutions influence cognitive development more than minds influence changes in those institutions.

This sociocultural notion that thinking is always social and is a result of internalization relates particularly well to one important concept in feminist epistemology—that of an epistemological community (Code 1991) in which knowledge is constructed by an individual embedded in a sociocultural group with a particular view of reality. Community knowledge gradually becomes personal knowledge.

The internalization of patterns of thinking, beliefs, and cultural narratives often happens within the family. Interaction with adults leads to the internalization of patterns of thinking, often from language, conversation, and narratives. Parenting is a social practice based on the parents' culture and social location. Cultural values, norms, and traditions are expressed through the parents' behavior and language. Children, by following another mind through the process of solving a problem or by making sense of an experience, learn to use those patterns of thought.

By participating in cultural settings and talking with adults, children gradually internalize the linguistic interaction and the differential power underlying the form of that interaction. Parents talk differently to children than to other adults, and they talk differently to boys than to girls. Some

studies find, for instance, that parents talk more about emotions, especially sadness, with daughters than with sons (Adams et al. 1995). Moreover, mothers' talk places emotional events in a more interpersonal context with daughters than with sons (Fivush et al. 2003). Consequently, girls and boys may mentally internalize different patterns of thought or ways of thinking and may focus on different topics.

Thus, sociocultural theory can identify processes by which a social system organized along gender lines insures the perpetuation of a patriarchal system, a focus of feminist critiques. In sociocultural theory, gender roles, privileges, and barriers are expressed in concrete settings with certain sorts of social interaction, including conversation, between people.

The same is true of social class. For example, in the United States, middle-class parents tend to consider expressing one's view a natural right for children, but working-class parents tend to consider this something to be earned and defended by children (Wiley et al. 1998). Thus, parents' social position, with its greater or lesser power, shapes their belief system and consequently their interaction with their children, and ultimately their children's ways of thinking.

As these examples from sociocultural research suggest, both gender and social position influence how children think about themselves, other people, and the relationship between them. Race may operate in ways similar to gender and class. Thus, sociocultural theory can provide for feminist theories a dynamic account of how a child's social location (regarding gender, race, class, etc.) leads to certain sorts of social interactions, which are internalized into particular ways of thinking.

Sociocultural theory hypothesizes that the social interactions that are internalized, from the external-cultural to the internal-mental, can lead to positive or negative development. The feminist notion of internalized oppression may be understood, from a Vygotskian perspective, as the internalization of negative conversations and messages from social interactions in which more powerful and dominant people demean less powerful and more marginalized people. In this process of internalization, these negative interactions become self-oppressing patterns of thinking. The *inter*mental (e.g., racism, sexism, homophobia) become *intra*mental (e.g., self-destructive ways of thinking, poor self-esteem).

The process of human development through engaging in material cultural activities helps explain the class differences, gendered division of labor, and oppression of women described by socialist feminism. Socialist feminism shows how class, gender, and capitalist patriarchy create particular social positions. Sociocultural theory shows how these positions provide particular experiences that create particular standpoints, or perspec-

tives (e.g., cognitive categories, values, and beliefs). Vygotskian theory shows how a society's economic structure and the sort of work activity in which one engages shapes thinking along certain lines. Societies encouraging collaborative work settings versus those with capitalist hierarchical structures at work may encourage different sorts of thinking in their children. Moreover, following the collectivist principle of shared goods, Vygotsky believed that the adult collective is responsible for sharing its knowledge with children in order to advance their cognitive development ("it takes a village . . .").

A second central concept in sociocultural theory is that parent-child intersubjectivity, a topic of interest to many feminist scholars, facilitates development. *Intersubjectivity* in this context refers to a shared understanding between a child and an adult based on shared experiences, a common focus of attention, and a common goal. For infants and young children, this person is most likely to be a parent or sibling because their frequent experience together builds these shared understandings. Sociocultural theory shows how intersubjectivity enhances the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next because shared experiences help children understand the meanings that parents try to convey. Thus, sociocultural theory strengthens feminist work on intersubjectivity by showing its developmental origins and its role in the cultural transmission of views of reality.

A third key concept from Vygotsky's theory is that scientific thinking is one particular sort of discourse and thus socially constructed. His work thus supports feminist critiques of science. Young children, in their daily activities, develop intuitive concepts of how the world works and how each category, such as "grandmother," "seasons," and "distance," is defined. Teachers, in their classroom dialogues with children, turn these intuitive concepts and ways of thinking into more formal, logical categories and scientific concepts. The children learn a new sort of discourse.

A fourth central concept in sociocultural theory is the notion of the zone of proximal development—the distance between a child's current developmental level, as determined by the child's independent problem solving, and a higher developmental level that is revealed during problem solving under adult guidance or when working with more capable peers. In this dynamic view, humans are always in a process of becoming, never static. For example, Vygotsky viewed intelligence not as something that one "has" but as something that one can achieve.

This dynamic approach to development may provide a solution for the tension between those who embrace essentialism and those who attack it. A person "is" a particular "potential to become." One might say that

people are dynamically essentialized; the potential to learn is part of human nature, but the actualization of this potential depends on cultural contexts—opportunities or barriers regarding learning. That is, a person "is" only a being with a potential to learn a particular concept or solve a problem. Vygotsky showed that children may differ in their zone of proximal development, with some children learning more quickly than others. Most cultures have inequities between races, social classes, and genders in the encouragement and means to achieve the higher level. The same is true for the areas (e.g., white-collar or blue-collar jobs, science or literature) in which achievement is permitted.

Vygotsky's notion of the zone of proximal development could also contribute to feminist pedagogy, particularly collaborative learning. Vygotskian theory could ask: What is the process by which a feminist teacher supports students' self-directed learning? According to sociocultural theory, a teacher scaffolds a student's fragile, emerging knowledge. She gives hints, prompts, and suggestions until the child constructs the concept herself. Then the teacher gradually withdraws her support as the child can take on more and more responsibility for the task at hand. Teachers and students meet halfway. In numerous studies, sociocultural work examines the process by which peers (or adult and child) learn to solve problems together (Rogoff 2003). This work on change through collaboration could provide a starting point for examining what specific sorts of interactions based on feminist pedagogy lead to learning, social change, or personal change.

Finally, a key concept from sociocultural research in various countries is that there is considerable diversity in thinking and behavior due to race, class, ethnicity, nationality, and sexuality. This information about the range and nature of diversity, so central to feminist thought, provides empirical support for many of the arguments of global feminism, postcolonial feminism, and women-of-color feminism.

Piagetian theory

One very influential developmental theory is that of Jean Piaget (1896–1980), a French Swiss biologist-philosopher-educator who pioneered the field of cognitive development (Piaget 1967; Miller 2002, chap. 1). Work by Piaget and contemporary developmentalists working in his tradition addresses several issues also important to feminist epistemologists: How does agency further cognitive development? How is a perspective or standpoint acquired, and how can we learn to understand the perspectives of others? How are old knowledge and identities reconciled

with new knowledge and identities? Like feminist epistemologists, Piaget asked how knowledge is acquired. His emphasis on human agency and active learning makes his approach quite compatible with feminist pedagogy. Both see the teacher as a coach who facilitates self-directed learning. Students are not passive vessels to be filled with knowledge.

Piaget's work broadens the feminist focus on active learning and empowerment of the learner by finding that agency begins in infancy and that the type of activity that enhances learning depends on the age of the person. An infant learns through sensory-motor exploration of objects and spatial layouts, whereas a preschooler can construct mental representations of the world and use symbols to think about experience. During the elementary school years children's active learning can occur on the mental plane. They mentally manipulate objects and events and thus can experiment with various outcomes. By late adolescence and into adulthood thinking becomes even more abstract; people can actively think about thinking or other mental representations, such as justice or love. The sort of agency that is possible depends on a person's past experiences and level of development.

A main tenet of Piagetian theory that makes it developmental is that the influence of a particular experience on a child depends on that child's past experiences, as expressed in his current cognitive level. Children's cognitive level constrains the effect that an experience can have and what they can learn. For example, a baby experiences a magnet as a hard, unyielding object to explore with the mouth, whereas an older child detects its magnetic properties. Similarly, one cannot understand a woman's experienced reality without knowing the knowledge, beliefs, and values that she brings to that experience.

Piagetian theory addresses the notion of perspective, a concept central to feminist theory, particularly postmodern and standpoint feminist theories. A critical cognitive-developmental milestone is when children can decenter their thinking and understand that the self and each other person have a perspective, and that these perspectives may differ. For example, a preschooler may not realize that the fact that his mother was not at his day care center means that she does not know that there was a birthday party there. In contrast, older children learn that each perspective is just one among many and brings with it partial knowledge. Children learn that people differ in perspective before they understand how differences in position affect the content of different perspectives. That is, a young child may know that someone else has a different perspective but may not yet be able to calculate or infer exactly what that perspective is.

For feminist work, this raises the question of whether this process also

is true of adults. When, for example, white women learn about the perspectives of women of color and white privilege, they decenter from what they may have considered a "normal" perspective. Moreover, although adults know that people have different perspectives, they may still be working out the specific differences in certain unfamiliar contexts, such as racial groups or nationalities with whom they have had little contact. Thus, Piagetian work provides an angle on perspective that might enrich feminist analyses.

Piagetian work has also shown the tremendous difficulty that young children have with combining two perspectives, as in the feminist concept of double vision (e.g., Collins 1990). Preschoolers find it very cognitively demanding to hold in mind simultaneously, for example, their own perspective and that of someone in a more powerful position, such as a parent. At first a child's own perspective dominates; later a child can think of something in one way (e.g., her perspective) or a second way (another person's perspective) but not both ways simultaneously. Only during middle childhood do children easily think of something as simultaneously one thing and another—for example, a mother is both a mother (the child's perspective) and a teacher (other people's perspective). In an application of this work to feminism, the ability of an oppressed person to infer the perspective of the oppressor as well as to know her own perspective (Collins 1990) and to "bracket" her own perspective in order to compare positions and place them both within a larger framework is a developmental accomplishment.

Piagetian research suggests ways to encourage multiple perspective taking and the identification of others' standpoints. Both general cognitive development and specific experiences with peers are important. For example, by arguing over who is right or what the rules of a game should be, children learn that not everyone experiences the world as they do (Piaget 1932).

Piagetian work also can inform current feminist work on negotiations of knowledge and identity at borders. Feminist writings have addressed the dynamic of living in two cultures that characterizes people living in the borderlands, moving from one culture to another, or having a multicultural or multiracial heritage (e.g., Anzaldúa 1987). A main issue is how a person negotiates these two conflicting belief systems or two different identities. When a girl or woman leaves one country or culture to live in another one, how does she reconcile old and new beliefs? How does she identify with her new country without losing her old self/identity? More generally, how do people negotiate truth (or at least *their* truth) from both the old and the new?

Piagetian theory suggests how change might come about. At any age a person tries to understand new information or a puzzling experience in terms of what she already knows. If she is unsuccessful, perhaps because her cultural background cannot make sense of it, this new experience challenges her current knowledge system and throws it into conflict, or disequilibrium. She strives to develop a new level of understanding that resolves the contradictory beliefs. When this more complex level of understanding is reached, equilibrium is again achieved. Then the cycle begins again: this new level of understanding leads her to notice things she did not notice before and again leads to disequilibrium. This understanding of the world, like the one before it, necessarily distorts perceptions in some way because nearly all knowledge is partial and imperfect. Thus, this partial knowledge inevitably breaks down at some point during its application and again leads to disequilibrium. In this way a person comes to understand new experiences or even a new culture.

More specifically, just as an infant goes through these cycles when learning about toys and blankets, or an adult develops expertise in a particular occupation, so may a child or adult go through these cycles when immigrating from one culture to another. An immigrating Latina attempts to understand a U.S. experience, and this interpretation is shaped somewhat by her previous non-U.S. beliefs about the world. As her earlier beliefs are challenged by her experiences, they change in light of these new experiences. This new cognitive structure in turn makes her aware of other aspects of U.S. life, and thus new understandings are possible, and the change cycle continues. Through these cycles, she gradually constructs a new identity. In this way, personal change occurs very slowly, according to Piaget. The old and the new interact to construct a new idea or a new identity. As postmodern feminists claim, knowledge and identity are always fluid, always changing. The degree to which the old self is kept at the core of her new identity depends on both the immigrant woman and the people and social institutions in the new setting. This influx of new perspectives in the United States may also contribute to larger social change in that country.

One conceptual tool from Piagetian theory that might be useful for feminist scholars studying personal change is analyses of various possible relationships between old and new knowledge (Flavell 1972). When an immigrant experiences a new culture, five types of relations between the old and the new are possible: First, an immigrant keeps her old cultural belief system but adds on her new cultural belief system as much as possible (i.e., where there are no direct conflicts), as when adding new foods to the diet. Second, in certain areas (e.g., beliefs about the education of

women) she drops the old culture in favor of the new. Third, she transforms her old culture into the new one, as when her old belief in an extended family is transformed into building a nonfamily community for herself in her new country. The old belief is expressed in a new form. Fourth, her old beliefs become a part of her new, broader belief system. She may keep her religion, but it may be connected to a new religion in the new culture; the two together become parts of a larger, more encompassing system of religious beliefs. The new whole is more than the sum of its parts. Finally, new experiences in the new culture show her the diversity of belief systems, which causes her to question her previous beliefs and values and develop a new, more relativistic belief system. That is, experiences in the new culture serve as a catalyst to form another belief system, but, unlike in number four, she does not simply incorporate the new cultural beliefs into her belief system. These five types of developmental relationships provide a more differentiated analysis of the types of changes in cultural identity that are possible.

Thus Piagetian theory provides conceptual tools for identifying the subtleties of personal and social change in feminist work. The theory suggests questions for feminists such as, Is change qualitative-stagelike or quantitative-gradual? For example, a person may become a feminist suddenly during an insightful moment or may change much more gradually after encountering repeated inequities or while taking a women's studies class. Another developmental issue concerning change addressed by Piaget is by what complex processes biology and environment interact to cause a change over the life span. There are biologically based individual differences among women, as well as between women and men, that should not be ignored. For example, some types of personality temperament may tolerate ambiguity and change more than do others. Finally, a main theme about change in both developmental psychology and feminism concerns continuity versus change. What stays the same despite changes over one's life span or changes in society? And what changes despite continuity in self and society?

Core knowledge theory
Core knowledge theory is the most recent of the three theories discussed here. These theorists believe that children develop domain-specific concepts about areas such as numbers, physical causality, people, and biology (e.g., Wellman and Gelman 1998). A child develops an organized, coherent set of knowledge—or a theory—about each of these domains. The most vigorous area of research in the core knowledge framework is chil-

dren's understanding of the mind—their so-called theory of mind. People of all ages have a theory of mind. Of particular interest is the understanding, developed during the preschool years, that people mentally represent the world rather than perceive the world directly, like a camera. Once this is understood, then it follows that such representations, or beliefs, can be true or false. In a commonly used false belief task children are told the following story, which the experimenter acts out with dolls (Wimmer and Perner 1983): A boy puts some chocolate in a blue cupboard and then goes out to play. While he is gone, his mother moves the chocolate into a green cupboard. When the boy returns for his chocolate, the experimenter asks children where the boy will look for it. At age three children immediately say "the green cupboard," where the chocolate actually is, even though the boy in the story did not know that the chocolate had been moved. By age four or five most children say "the blue cupboard," because, unlike the three-year-olds, they have an understanding of mind in which what one believes may differ from the actual state of affairs. They know that people act on the basis of their knowledge and beliefs, regardless of whether the beliefs are true or false. Three-year-olds and older children are said to have different theories of mind—different underlying principles about mental states and how they are connected to behavior and to objects and events in the physical world.

This understanding that representations can be true or false can be applied usefully to the feminist focus on detecting false beliefs and deconstructing "realities" that are more apparent than real. For example, the understanding that one's belief is constructed rather than a mirror of reality and is only one of many possible beliefs, and thus may be false, is central to acquiring the ability to question one's long-held beliefs about gender and race. Although a child acquires this ability in a simple way, many adolescents and adults go through a deeper and more profound questioning of their own beliefs about gender, race, class, and sexuality. One goal of women's studies classes is to teach students that their particular perspective is just one of many possible perspectives and not necessarily better than those of other social groups. Thus, core knowledge theory contributes to feminism the concept that the maturing brain and the child's conceptual level influence the understanding of standpoints and the appreciation of different standpoints.

Understanding false belief also includes the knowledge that appearances can be misleading. Something may look like an apple but really be a candle; a person may seem to be nice but actually be evil. Such cognitive skills are essential for engaging in feminist deconstruction, such as detecting social facades, and questioning what appears to be natural, such as the

patriarchal social order. Moreover, teaching girls to detect a seemingly trustworthy adult's intent to commit sexual abuse may involve acquiring this ability to look beneath the surface.

Another core knowledge topic particularly relevant to feminist scholars is essentialism. Susan Gelman (2003) has documented young Western children's tendencies to hold essentialist concepts. For example, they assume that boys have a "boy essence" and girls have a "girl essence." A preschooler claims that a boy raised with only girls and women goes fishing rather than puts on makeup "'cause that's the boy instinct" (Gelman 2003, 97). Developmental work suggests that "essentialism is a default assumption that enables children to simplify the diversity they encounter and to provide meaning to the information they receive" (Scholnick and Miller 2000, 245–46). In a complex world many adults may continue to use essentialist concepts, in part as a way to simplify the world.

The process of change in core knowledge theory involves moving from one theory to a more advanced one through testing one's theory. Research suggests that personal theories can be very resistant to change, a finding that explains why sexist, racist, and homophobic beliefs can be very difficult to change. Changing one's beliefs about race or gender, for example, involves not just interacting with diverse people or learning new facts about males and females but rather changing a broader belief system about the nature of reality.

Why is developmental change important for feminist scholarship?
The developmental theories presented here contribute language and models for one undertheorized aspect of feminist theories, namely, processes of change. Feminist scholars implicitly study change when they study females' lives and transformations of social institutions and cultural discourses. The theories presented here show that the concept of change—personal or social—is complex and nuanced. I will now present several contemporary principles of change flowing from developmental theory that seem particularly useful for feminist work and suggest applications to this work.

Developmentalists have identified five aspects of change (Siegler and Crowley 1991) that could be applied in feminist scholarship: path, rate, breadth, variability, and sources of change. Regarding paths, change often takes different routes. Different people can reach the same end point, such as understanding positionality, in different ways, with different steps. Regarding rate, there are social and biological influences on how fast a person or a social system changes. As for breadth, change can be localized or

widespread. Regarding variability, there are individual differences in the pattern of change. Finally, there are numerous sources (causes) of change, operating at levels ranging from the biological to the global institutional, and these levels interact to cause change.

Feminist work on these aspects of change would provide some insights into the diversity in females' lives. Their lives may change in some or all of the five dimensions described above. Females follow different life-span developmental paths and at different rates. Regarding rate, some may establish agency and self-esteem quite quickly, and others do not reach this point until late in life. Areas of dramatic change may be narrow (i.e., one aspect of the self) or widespread over many areas of a female's life. Females' identity change may be characterized by low or high variability over time. Some females may need to try out different identities before ending up with a stable new one. Finally, regarding sources of change, different sorts of experiences may serve as catalysts for personal change in different females' lives. Interactions among levels of analysis, from biological to cultural, may also operate in feminist analyses of various areas such as gender, bodies, identity, community, relationships, health, work, families, and violence. Thinking about changes during a female's life in these nuanced ways may be particularly useful to biographers of women's lives.

All three theories depict change as complex, fluid, and variable. One metaphor of change used by developmentalists is that of overlapping waves (Siegler 1996). A person does not change from A to B across a boundary in an all-or-none, stagelike, way. Rather, there are several selves that exist simultaneously. At one time, or in one context, one aspect of self may predominate, but other aspects emerge at other times and places. Over time certain aspects of self become stronger and more prevalent, and others diminish. Thus, a self, identity, ability, or skill is multiple, fluid, and ever changing; the balance simply shifts.

One theoretical developmental notion about change important for feminist theories is the fact that a small event at one point can have a large effect at some later point. This could be applied to work that shows, for example, that a small discrimination against a woman may have no noticeable immediate effect but sets in motion a series of discriminations that build on one another to eventually produce a large discrimination, as described by Virginia Valian (1998) in the case of new women faculty members. Another example is that one woman's social activism may have little discernible effect immediately but may set in motion a series of events that leads to a large social change later.

Another developmental notion about change is that a small event or change can cause changes throughout the system, the way a small stone thrown into a lake causes expanding ripples over a large surface. One implication is that removing an inequity in one social institution may cause positive rippling effects through other social institutions.

Another useful concept about change is that sometimes a number of very small beneath-the-surface changes pass a critical threshold and a seemingly new behavior or event appears to emerge suddenly. For example, we sometimes have students who seem to continue to resist feminist concepts and seem not to change at all until, near the end of the term, they finally "get it." Developmentalists would suggest that there has been beneath-the-surface change all along that finally led to the emergence of a reorganized way of thinking about the world.

There may be particular moments that are most fruitful for studying change, specifically, periods of readiness to change when a person is poised to move to a new developmental level. These unstable periods sometimes involve contradictions, a concept central to feminist work. For example, children may give one answer with their words and its opposite with their hands (e.g., Goldin-Meadow 1997). After seeing a glass of water poured into a taller, thinner container, some preschoolers claim that there now is more water, but at the same time their hand gestures show an awareness that the container now is thinner and that this is relevant. These contradictions actually are empowering for development. Children are particularly open to change and learning during these times when contradictions abound (Church and Goldin-Meadow 1986). Similarly, in feminism contradictions may be a necessary step to the development of a more equitable and satisfactory society. Marxist, women-of-color, and postcolonial feminisms, for example, address conflicts due to differences in class, race, and nationality. In some cases conflict between the powerful and powerless, the oppressor and the oppressed, may provide fruitful conditions for social change.

One can imagine feminist scholars drawing on these concepts to study various sorts of change central to feminists—analysis of life changes in biographies or autobiographies, changes in students after feminist curricular transformations, changes in a discipline or the workplace as more women enter it, and historical changes in feminist theorizing. Other examples are phases in developing into a feminist, changes in both immigrants and in the host country after reaching a critical mass of a given group of immigrants, and changes in the relationships between women and men as more opportunities open up to women. In short, develop-

mental analyses can add a new dimension to scholarship that takes any sort of object for study—literature, historical materials, human behavior, social policy, or laws.

Two examples—change in an immigrant's identity and cognition and change in white women as they are exposed to the perspectives of women of color—were presented earlier (see relevant recent research by Michael Chandler et al. [2003] and Cigdem Kagitcibasi [2003]). For a final example I draw on Peggy McIntosh's (1984) phases of curriculum transformation, particularly Sue Rosser's (e.g., 1990) modification of these stages to describe the integration of women into science. This phase theory could be reanalyzed in terms of the processes of change that move a curriculum or discipline from one phase to another. One could examine the processes by which science (or scientists or science curricula) moves from each of these phases to another: first, scientists typically do not notice the absence of women; second, scientists and feminist scholars recognize that most scientists are male and that science may reflect a masculine perspective; third, feminists identify barriers that prevent women from entering science; fourth, feminist scholars search for women scientists and their unique contributions; fifth, researchers begin to explore the unique aspects of science done by women; and finally, scientists redefine and reconstruct science to include us all. Rosser has described in detail some of the interventions that can move the discipline from one phase to the next. The developmental theories described in this article could offer new questions for studying this change from one phase to the next. For example, does a later phase replace, subsume, or become integrated with the previous phase (see Flavell 1972)? Do several of the phases coexist within a scientific discipline (as in the overlapping waves theory described earlier [Siegler 1996]), or does the discipline abandon the previous phase and move completely into a new one? Is the change from one phase to another gradual or abrupt? Is it quantitative (gradual change in degree) or qualitative (a new view of women or of the discipline)? Are the causes of, and effects of, the change proximal or distal? The answer to each question might be different for different transitions, for example, from phase 1 to 2 versus phase 4 to 5.

A new feminist theory?

Among feminist theories, only psychoanalytic feminist theory is explicitly developmental; views about development and change are only implied by the others. However, even psychoanalytic feminist theory gives little attention to the processes of change or to development after childhood.

Moreover, it examines only a narrow range of parent-child interactions rather than the broader set of such interactions, including peer, sibling, and media influences that we now know are important for socialization.

If a new theory, developmental feminism, were constructed, it would differ from all other feminist theories in its focus on the process of change. Development would be at the center of the theory rather than at the margins. A developmental feminist theory would focus not only on personal change but also on social change, the goal of feminist activism. The theory would also address the distinction between sex and gender by drawing on developmental work on the complex intertwining of biological and environmental influences. Such a theory would, of course, be informed by other feminist theories. For example, the diversity of women and the workings of power hierarchies and oppression would provide an ever-present context for any sort of change.

Alternatively, developmental theories can function to suggest developmental extensions for existing feminist theories. Developmental theories raise a number of questions for these theories: Does the intersection of gender, race, and class differ for people at different developmental levels? By what process do girls achieve equality with boys, and what sorts of socialization practices work best (liberal feminism)? In the study of girls, how does girls' lesser power erode their self-confidence, and what are the subtle mechanisms by which they are channeled away from activities (e.g., math, science, computers) that lead to occupations with good pay (socialist feminism)? What values and experiences associated with people of color lead to developmental pathways that differ from, but are as valid as and adaptive as, those of white children (African American/ethnic feminism)? How do biological predispositions interact with environmental events to cause development along particular pathways (essentialist feminism)? By what social and cognitive processes are girls constructed as "the other" (existential feminism)? What do girls learn in girl-only play groups or schools that they do not learn in groups that include boys (radical feminism)? Do the differences and marginalization of adulthood have roots in childhood (postmodern feminism)? How do girls learn to operate both inside and outside the dominant culture (postcolonial feminism)? More generally, for each theory an issue is the developmental processes by which gender is constructed.

A bridge between developmental psychology and feminist theories would contribute to a broad and dynamic account of females' lives. Each approach has strengths that can remedy the other's weaknesses. The strengths of developmental theories are their accounts of change and their attention to how a person's cognitive level constrains the effects of cultural

experiences. One main limitation of most developmental theories, however, is the undertheorizing of the larger societal forces that shape human behavior. A second limitation of most developmental theories is the preference for studying universal concepts—concepts acquired by all children. This draws attention away from the diversity of children and contexts. Feminist theories can remedy these limitations by providing conceptual tools regarding the gendered organization of social structures, the operations of power, and the intersections of gender with other social markers such as race and class. The weaknesses of feminist theories are the paucity of theoretical tools for studying change and the interweaving of biology and experience at the individual level—limitations that developmental theories can remedy. Thus, the two sets of theories are complementary, and together they could form more inclusive and powerful theories.

In summary, although psychoanalytic theories have been an important source of ideas for feminist scholars over the years, contemporary developmental theories can provide a rich set of theoretical concepts that so far have rarely been tapped by feminist scholars. Developmental theories can offer new conceptual tools for feminist studies of change and open up new areas of inquiry within feminism. I suggested several issues that cannot be understood as well if they are not conceptualized in developmental terms. I illustrated what a feminist scholar can do with a developmental perspective as a tool of analysis that cannot be done with current feminist theories. This article is an attempt to encourage a dialogue between women's studies scholars and developmentalists. In conclusion: "Feminists situate gender in a social-historical context. Developmentalists situate the understanding and practice of gender in the context of a growing and changing organism. Each is a single lens on a two-dimensional landscape. Combining the lenses adds depth to re-vision our analyses" (Scholnick and Miller 2000, 253).

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Lisa M. Diamond

Careful What You Ask For: Reconsidering Feminist Epistemology and Autobiographical Narrative in Research on Sexual Identity Development

F eminist theory has had an undoubtable—but inconsistent—influence on developmental psychology. Although feminist perspectives have productively challenged developmental models centered on male experiences (Gilligan 1982) and have called attention to socialization practices that reproduce systematic gender inequalities (Bem 1993), more radical feminist perspectives on scientific epistemology and methodology have had considerably less influence (see Rosser and Miller 2003). On the whole, developmental psychologists tend to embrace the logical-positivist goals and assumptions of straightforward empiricism (summarized in Sprague and Zimmerman 1993), emphasizing the pursuit of objective, quantifiable facts about human development that are free of historical and personal bias. In contrast, feminist standpoint epistemology and feminist postmodernism would claim that objective understanding of human development is fundamentally impossible and that psychological models of development function as culturally specific origin-stories reinforcing the interests of dominant social groups.[1]

Although many psychologists would consider these critiques to be fundamentally irreconcilable with standard empirical methods (see Chafetz 2004), others have sought workable compromises between feminist epistemology and empirical research.[2] These compromises are typically manifested in qualitative interview studies that aim to empower research participants by allowing them to articulate their own subjective experiences and to replace statistical reductionism with thick description.[3]

    [1] Hartsock 1983; Harding 1986, 1991; Collins 1990; Haraway 1991.
    [2] Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Nielsen 1990; Allen 2004; Baber 2004.
    [3] Stern 1990; Gergen, Chrisler, and LoCicero 1999; Tolman 2002; Bettis and Adams 2003.

These methods, however, engender a number of epistemological dilemmas when applied to developmental investigations. Specifically, recent research on the interpersonal construction of selfhood through autobiographical storytelling raises troubling questions about the extent to which qualitative investigations actually coconstruct the developmental phenomena they seek to investigate.[4] My goal in this article is to elucidate how this dilemma has manifested itself in my own qualitative, longitudinal research on sexual identity development over the past ten years (Diamond 1998, 2000, 2003a, 2005a, 2005b) and to suggest how a more explicit integration of feminist epistemology with research on the developmental functions of autobiographical narrative can transform and advance the knowledge gained from developmentally oriented qualitative research.

Feminist empiricist perspectives on sexual identity development
Sexual identity development is conventionally defined as the process by which sexual-minority (i.e., nonheterosexual) individuals come to acknowledge and accept their same-sex sexual orientation and to develop a positive integration between their nonheterosexual identity and other aspects of selfhood. Given the hegemonic status of heterosexuality, the processes through which heterosexual identities develop have, not surprisingly, received scant attention (with the notable exceptions of Hyde and Jaffee 2000; Tolman 2002). Early models of sexual identity development were riddled with problems that will be familiar to feminist critics of scientific methodology and epistemology. First, most were based on data collected exclusively from men, and thus when these models were applied to women, women appeared "off time" or "off course" with respect to the major developmental transitions that were proposed (Sophie 1986). Second, the models suggested impossibly uniform, inexorable, and linear developmental trajectories, beginning with maladjusted confusion and progressing toward healthy ego integration, consistent with the long-documented bias in developmental psychology toward notions of progress, goal attainment, and the consolidation of autonomous "selfhood" (Miller and Scholnick 2000).

These models also presumed fundamental continuities between early and later erotic experiences, as well as between childhood gender atypicality and adult same-sex sexuality (Boxer and Cohler 1989), reflecting the historical conflation of homosexuality with gender inversion (Krafft-Ebing 1882). Correspondingly, sexual identity models typically conveyed an implicit bi-

[4] Fivush 2000, Thorne 2000; Pasupathi 2001; Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker, forthcoming.

ological essentialism in which same-sex desires were always the stable products of intrinsic, early-appearing sexual predispositions. This notion directly contradicts the proliferating evidence for fluidity, circumstance, and even choice in same-sex sexuality, particularly among women.[5] Also, consistent with most contemporary developmental psychology, these models adopted fundamentally individualized notions of sexuality and identity that placed the solitary person at the center of analysis, granting only ancillary roles to culture, community, and relationships despite accumulating evidence of the fundamental importance of these domains for women's sexual development (Peplau and Garnets 2000; Diamond 2003b).

Finally, all of these models were based on the reports of openly identified gay and lesbian adults retrospecting about events and feelings that transpired up to thirty years earlier. Not only did this produce what Andrew Boxer and Bertram Cohler criticize as a "developmental psychology of the remembered past" (1989, 325), but it failed to acknowledge that individuals' memories of the sexual questioning process were not objective snapshots of "what happened" but rather active reconstructions of selfhood that their conscious and unconscious agendas fundamentally influenced.[6] Perhaps the most important of these agendas was validation of one's lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity, implicitly manifested by consistency with the coming-out stories rapidly proliferating in multiple media outlets (Plummer 1995; Russell, Bohan, and Lilly 2000).

Over the years the weaknesses of sexual identity research have been ably critiqued and (with varying success) corrected. Such corrections are typically made in the context of parallel revisions to the broader study of adolescent sexuality, where a more nuanced, contextual assessment of youths' sexual feelings and behaviors increasingly replaces the long-standing emphasis on theoretically impoverished tabulations of the timing, frequency, and risk profile of various sexual behaviors (Tolman and Diamond 2001; Tolman, Striepe, and Harmon 2003; Savin-Williams and Diamond 2004). Consequently, contemporary studies of sexual identity development are now more likely to study both women and men, to employ qualitative methods, to follow individuals over time, to take cultural and interpersonal contexts more seriously, and to devote more significant attention to sexual fluidity and developmental discontinuity.

[5] Golden 1987, 1994, 1996; Pillard 1990; Rust 1993; Weinberg, Williams, and Pryor 1994; Whisman 1996; Baumeister 2000.

[6] McAdams 1993; Baumeister and Newman 1994; Kihlstrom 1996; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000; Fivush 2000; Tversky and Marsh 2000; Pasupathi 2001; Dudukovic, Marsh, and Tversky 2004.

These changes have undoubtedly enhanced our understanding of the complex psychological process through which individuals with same-sex attractions and behaviors come to think of themselves (or not, as in Diamond 2003a, 2005a, 2005b) as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Nonetheless, they are not without deeper problems, especially when considered from the perspective of feminist philosophy of science. To elucidate this point, the implicit rationale for undertaking qualitative, longitudinal investigations of sexual identity development bears discussion.

Why collect longitudinal narratives?

The collection of longitudinal, qualitative interview data has been advocated as an important methodological "fix" for many of the pitfalls of traditional sexual identity research. Not only do qualitative interviews allow individuals to articulate subtleties about their subjective experiences that conventional quantitative surveys poorly represent (Tolman and Brydon-Miller 2001) but also longitudinal observation has been posited as a particularly powerful corrective to the problem of retrospective distortion (Boxer and Cohler 1989). As Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz note in an influential article, "It was common for [respondents] to say that prior changes in sex-object choice were part of a past history of self-misperception, and that they had finally found their sexual 'place.' *A follow-up interview often contradicted their assertions*" (1977, 174; emphasis added). Thus, in this conceptualization, longitudinal observation allows one to "catch" inaccuracies of memory as well as motivated attempts at self-presentation (Hardin and Higgins 1996; Thorne 2000; Pasupathi 2001), thereby allowing the psychologist to model the identity development process on the basis of more accurate data about individuals' "real" sexual-developmental trajectories.

It was for these reasons that I launched, in 1994, a longitudinal interview study of adolescent women's sexual identity development that integrated detailed qualitative analysis with more conventional quantitative investigations of the prevalence and developmental timing of different acts and experiences (Diamond 1998, 2000, 2003a, 2005a, 2005b). My goal was a relatively straightforward one: to examine young women's sexual identity development from women's perspectives and particularly to launch a systematic inquiry into the experiences of change, fluidity, and situational variability in same-sex sexuality that had long been anecdotally noted in the psychological literature on female sexuality but that had received little systematic empirical attention (reviewed in Baumeister 2000). In particular, I hoped that by following young women over time I could capture changes and discontinuities in desire, behavior, and iden-

tity before they were potentially erased by women's selective memories. By eliciting detailed narratives I intended to more accurately represent the nature of these phenomena via women's nuanced descriptions of their antecedents, subjective quality, and eventual repercussions.

Sure enough, over the ten years of the study the majority of participants have changed their identity labels and have undergone notable fluctuations in their sexual behavior and even their self-reported sexual attractions (Diamond 2000, 2003a, 2005a, 2005b), allowing me the opportunity to question women in detail about the motives behind and consequences of these transitions both as they occurred and as they were recollected years later in ensuing interviews. From this perspective, then, the use of a qualitative, longitudinal approach would appear to be a success.

But it is not quite that simple. Rather, as I have analyzed and reanalyzed these data over the years, I have become increasingly preoccupied with two fundamental dilemmas that spring from the very nature of my qualitative, longitudinal methodology and that have critical implications for feminist investigations of human development. The first dilemma concerns the problem of discerning which version of events should be considered more accurate when women's self-reported autobiographical narratives show divergence and self-contradiction over time (which I call *the authenticity problem*). The second dilemma concerns the extent to which women's own participation in the study—specifically, the process of regularly recalling and recounting sexual events and memories to me during a series of qualitative interviews—has fundamentally influenced, and some might say created, the very identity development process I have sought to model (*the reflexivity problem*). Both of these issues are undoubtably familiar to those well versed in feminist and postmodernist philosophy of science, and my goal is not to rehash their basic parameters. Rather, in the following sections I first illustrate the specific manifestations of each of these problems within longitudinal sexual identity research and then argue that theoretical and empirical work on the developmental functions of socially recounted autobiographical narratives (Pasupathi 2001) provides a productive way to work within these dilemmas from a feminist framework, to consider a more useful and generative set of questions about the phenomenon of sexual identity development and how psychologists should study it.

The authenticity problem: "What really happened?"

First interview
In fourth and fifth grade, I was aware that I wasn't doing the things

that other girls did, and that made me feel bad. I was a tomboy, played with my brother and did the things that he did. . . . Later on, in junior high, everyone started to date and I wasn't into the dating thing, and that made me wonder about my sexuality and think back to how I'd been different from other girls. But I still didn't connect it to my sexuality, since I still had crushes on boys, and I would think "I'm straight, I just don't have anyone I really want to date." It wasn't until my senior year of college that I really began to question, 'cause I met a lot of gay people, started to hang out with them and really enter their world. Eventually I met a woman that initiated something, and that was it. (Interview with anonymous respondent, 1995)

Two-year follow-up
The first thing I think about now is having crushes on camp counselors—that's my most vivid memory now. That's when I started to fight with myself about it, saying "I better stop this. . . ." That was when I was fifteen. I was sort of scared, but it wasn't all that conscious. It got more conscious when I was maybe a sophomore in college. I had a fight with this friend about this "coming out" program that everyone in our dorm had to go to. I thought it was totally stupid, and I didn't want to go, and she said, just for the sake of argument, "Well what if I was gay, what would you think about that!" And the whole thing really stayed with me, and I kept thinking afterward "Why did that get me so angry, why was I so mad at her?" But it took me another year to really put it together. I remember always being called a tomboy when I was really young, but I didn't really understand what that meant. (Interview with same anonymous respondent, 1997)

Five-year follow-up
I think it was just looking at women and feeling sexually attracted to women and not knowing how to deal with it 'cause it was something that had never been talked about. Being confused. I seemed to feel that familiar quiver in my thighs when looking at a woman rather than just a man, and that and the other part was that I was always a tomboy and that stereotype always went with lesbians. But around ten, eleven, twelve I started wanting to hang out more with certain counselors at camp, and they all happened to be women. (Interview with same anonymous respondent, 2000)

Which version of this respondent's coming-out story is true? Did she first

discover same-sex attractions through crushes on camp counselors, her lack of interest in heterosexual dating, her overly vehement objections to a college information session on coming out, or feeling quivers when she looked at other girls?

The authenticity problem springs from the conventional emphasis in longitudinal qualitative methodology (exemplified by Blumstein and Schwartz 1977) on catching and correcting memory errors or reconstructions by attending to discrepancies between accounts given at different times. The stakes, from an empiricist perspective, are high—if the researcher inadvertently accepts an inaccurate report as authentic (i.e., "I experienced my first same-sex attraction at the age of ten" vs. "I had no awareness of same-sex attractions until I was in college"), one risks building a model of sexual identity development that fundamentally misrepresents this process (e.g., "Sexual minorities typically experience their first awareness of same-sex sexuality in middle childhood").

Yet, taking a step back, it becomes apparent that the very framing of the authenticity problem relies on two problematic assumptions: first, that the goal of longitudinal research is to uncover a true and generalizable trajectory of development; second, that consistency across successive longitudinal accounts is a marker of authenticity, such that we should pay most attention to those aspects of an individual's autobiographical narratives that have undergone the least change over time. Both of these presumptions are misguided. First, researchers are increasingly challenging the notion that sexual identity development is an inherently linear and internally coherent process with an objectively discernible beginning, middle, and end, casting doubt on the notion that developmental psychologists should seek to discover or validate one or more discrete "pathways" from heterosexuality to homosexuality in the first place.[7] Second, findings from psychological research on autobiographical memory suggest problems with using consistency as an implicit marker for authenticity. Although it might seem straightforward enough to assume that accurate memory for a particular event facilitates consistency in its telling and retelling, this assumption sidesteps the more basic dilemma of defining and identifying "accurate memories" to begin with. All memories are dynamic and situationally influenced (Davies and Harre 1990; Schacter 1996; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000), and autobiographical memories are particularly sensitive to individual's present goals, self-perceptions, and

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[7] Sophie 1986; Cass 1990; Weinberg, Williams, and Pryor 1994; Peplau and Garnets 2000; Diamond 2005b.

interpersonal contexts.[8] This is perhaps particularly true for the autobiographical memories of lesbian, gay, and bisexual-identified individuals, whose "authenticity" as members of this social category (in the eyes of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community and the culture at large) is often implicitly judged on the basis of recounting a series of childhood and adolescent events that have been deemed emblematic of "homosexual" development, including early feelings of differentness, latent and unnamed same-sex desires, social stigmatization, and even adolescent suicidality (Plummer 1995; Russell, Bohan, and Lilly 2000; Savin-Williams 2001).

Thus, whereas researchers employing longitudinal assessments tend to assume that immediate recountings are accurate and only later recollections are distorted and reconstructed, findings from psychological research indicate that this is not necessarily the case. Rather, narrative reconstruction is an ever-present process through which individuals actively enact present goals and self-perceptions through autobiographical reflection and recall, and it shapes the very encoding of personal experiences (reviewed in Pasupathi 2001) as well as the recollection of these experiences five minutes or twenty years later. Perhaps most important, consistency is itself an important motivator for reconstruction and reinterpretation, given that individuals typically seek to present a stable and coherent sense of self to themselves and to others.[9]

Hence, the very process of telling self-stories to social partners (or social scientists) engages multiple psychological mechanisms that promote later consistency by organizing and consolidating preferred versions of events (Schank and Abelson 1995; Tversky and Marsh 2000). Consequently, the question posed earlier—"Which of two discrepant accounts is really true?"—begins to seem fundamentally unanswerable, and the practice of tacitly assuming the veracity of a respondent's consistent accounts comes to seem equally problematic. This is not to suggest that consistency is fundamentally arbitrary or that it has no meaning whatsoever within the context of the self-story, only that it may mean something altogether different than first thought. Perhaps the question we should be asking is not "What was the impact of this (true) event on X?" but "What is it about this particular scenario or memory that has given it such prominence as a core feature of this individual's narrative sense of self?"

[8] McAdams 1993; Kihlstrom 1996; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000; Fivush 2000; Tversky and Marsh 2000; Pasupathi 2001; Marsh and Tversky 2004.

[9] Blumstein and Schwartz 1977; Cass 1990; Plummer 1995; Thorne 2000; Pasupathi 2001; Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker forthcoming

The reflexivity problem: Coconstruction in the researcher/participant relationship

Twenty-one-year-old bisexual, first interview
I should probably tell you that I'm not one of those people who "knew" from an early age. . . . I'm probably not a very good example of a gay person, and I don't want to mess up your study or anything, so it's okay if you don't want to interview me after all. (Interview with anonymous respondent, 1995)

Nineteen-year-old lesbian, two-year follow-up interview
When I was twelve I used to have these fantasies about women. . . . But you know, I don't think I ever thought of this until after you first interviewed me. (Interview with anonymous respondent, 1997)

Twenty-five-year-old bisexual, five-year follow-up interview
What I remember about first questioning my sexuality was that a lot of my friends were questioning—actually, I think you interviewed some of them—and that really made me think about it, and then I had that interview with you, and then I was reading more in my feminism class, and I realized that I really related to a lot of it, it really opened my mind. (Interview with anonymous respondent, 2000)

Twenty-nine-year-old unlabeled woman, eight-year follow-up interview
I finally made out with a girl! I remember thinking afterward, "Hey! I can talk about this in my next interview." (Interview with anonymous respondent, 2003)

A standard tenet of logical-positivist scientific methodology is that the process of investigating the phenomenon of interest must remain fundamentally independent of the phenomenon itself. As exemplified by the quotations above, qualitative interviews typically—and some would say unavoidably—threaten this requirement. The intense interpersonal engagement afforded by in-depth qualitative interviews, especially when the topic at hand is personal and personally meaningful to the participants, tends to engender reflexivity, or bidirectional influence, between researcher and participant.

Strict empiricists consider reflexivity a threat to the neutrality of the researcher and the independence of the data, and they therefore advocate clear boundaries between researcher and participant and careful standardization of interviewer behavior to keep bias at bay. In sharp contrast,

postmodern feminist perspectives on scientific methodology (particularly feminist standpoint epistemology) actually celebrate and welcome reflexivity as productively disrupting the traditional power imbalance between researcher and participant (Baber 2004), challenging the rigid Western dichotomization of self and other (Harding 1998), and permitting deeper and more accurate knowledge "through participating in an empathic relationship rather than through a private, neutral process" (Welch-Ross 2000, 115). As Robyn Fivush argues, "More objective knowledge will be garnered from the scientist and subject participating together in constructing knowledge than from either viewpoint alone" (2000, 89).

Importantly, however, these perspectives tend to take for granted that the researcher-participant relationship, and the knowledge produced in the context of this relationship, occupies a singular moment in time. Yet, in the context of developmental research, when qualitative interviews between the same researcher and the same participants are repeated at multiple time points, the implications of the reflexivity problem change. In this respect, the developmentally oriented work of Monisha Pasupathi (2001) is particularly pertinent. She argues that the conversations we have about ourselves with social partners are themselves important forces for developmental change largely as a function of two key principles: *coconstruction*, referring to the fact that any autobiographical recollection told to a social partner is fundamentally the product of both the speaker and the interpersonal context, and *consistency*, referring to the fact that the narratives we tell about ourselves feed forward to canalize future recollections. This alters the autobiographical knowledge base so that we are successively more likely to recollect and recount memories that portray a consistent sense of self. In sum, "what we tell certainly influences, and may become, what we 'know' about our own past. . . . The social shaping of memory may also be a process by which the self is socially shaped" (Pasupathi 2001, 661). Pasupathi (2001) supports her perspective with a sweeping synthesis of empirical research on the specific cognitive processes underlying coconstruction and consistency in the domain of autobiographical memory, and thus one might argue that her work elucidates the psychological underpinnings of what Michel Foucault describes as the productive nature of discourse, such that language and other regulated social practices "systematically form the objects of which they speak" (1972, 49).

Although Pasupathi was speaking specifically of individuals' "real-life" interpersonal conversations with friends, lovers, family, and colleagues, the methodological implications with respect to conversations with researchers

are notable and profound. Specifically, her work suggests that the researcher-participant relationship (especially in the context of qualitative, longitudinal, autobiographical interviews) not only coconstructs the very self-story being told to the researcher but also has lasting implications for the participant (and perhaps for the researcher as well). Consider, then, the implications for studies of sexual identity development, in which processes of change and stability in sexual self-concept are the primary locus of interest. According to the principles outlined above, this sexual self-concept is, to some degree, a creative work in progress that takes shape during the sexual identity interview as the individual organizes and coordinates his or her autobiographical memories with respect to his or her own goals and the presumed goals of the researcher (as in one of the examples quoted earlier, where some participants assumed that I wanted only "good examples" of sexual identity discovery).

Yet long after the interviews end, the coconstructed autobiographical narratives they elicited remain forces for continued identity development, further channeling and organizing self-views in the service of consistency and coherence. Thus, not only might sexual identity be conceived as an emergent property of the qualitative sexual identity interview—"not something we *have* but something we *do* in interaction" (Fivush 2000, 97)—but sexual identity development might be correspondingly conceived as an emergent property of longitudinal observation. Modifications in sexual self-concept might, in fact, become clearest, most coherent, and most formative the moment that the individual begins to answer the question, "So, has anything changed about the way you see your sexual identity since the last time we spoke?"

Reframing developmental questions

Of course, the aforementioned dilemmas of authenticity and reflexivity are only problems from a strict empiricist perspective. As noted earlier, both feminist standpoint epistemology and feminist postmodernism are unremittingly skeptical about claims regarding scientific truth and neutrality altogether, and they would therefore cast doubt on both the possibility of identifying "authentic" identity narratives and the possibility of neutral, fully independent relationships between researcher and participant. Yet does this obviate the possibility of gaining any systematic understanding of sexual identity development?

The challenge of refashioning scientific practice so that it generates useful and meaningful knowledge while accounting for the multiplicity,

partiality, and inherent interdependence of that knowledge has, of course, been a long-standing project within feminist philosophy of science.[10] My own approach to this challenge, in the specific context of longitudinal sexual identity research, springs from the fundamental role of autobiographical narrative in this domain. Specifically, I would argue that one way to "save" the study of sexual identity development from the inherently partial, coconstructed, and contextualized nature of the qualitative longitudinal interview is to move these interviews from the domain of method to the domain of content, following in line with parallel approaches by theorists (obviously Foucault 1980), sociologists (Plummer 1995), historians (D'Emilio and Freedman 1988; Duberman, Vicinus, and Chauncey 1989), and, most recently, developmental psychologists (Pasupathi 2001; Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker forthcoming). In other words, we need to shift from thinking about autobiographical narratives as a way of determining what develops to thinking about autobiographical narratives as—to some degree—that which develops.

In other words, if the goal of (repeatedly) asking respondents "How did you first come to first realize your same-sex attractions?" is to arrive at a consistent and generalizable model of how this process "actually" unfolds in childhood or adolescence, then this objective—and the use of longitudinal, qualitative interviews to achieve it—is problematic. But I would argue that this might not even be the most interesting or developmentally informative question we could ask. Rather, a more revealing—and answerable—question is "How do individuals craft developmentally specific, goal-relevant interpretations of their own erotic subjectivity in the service of maintaining a comfortable, coherent, and socially meaningful sense of self?"

This is a particularly useful perspective to apply to longitudinal qualitative research because it fundamentally changes the nature and significance of discrepancies between successive autobiographical narratives. No longer are they unwelcome signs of inaccuracy that must be resolved (presumably by prompting participants to "think harder" or "be honest"); rather, they are actually the most important data generated by longitudinal interviews, since they reveal critically important information about how individuals make different types of meaning out of their personal pasts depending on changing social, interpersonal, and developmental contexts. Forthcoming work by Pasupathi, Emma Mansour, and Jed Brubaker provides an elegant example of this approach, as the authors have focused on identifying specific types of self-event relations that individuals invoke when telling about autobio-

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[10] Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Harding 1991; Hekman 1997.

graphical events that do or do not characterize the way individuals view themselves. Their preliminary investigations indicate four types of self-event relations: explain/illustrate relations, in which an event is described as exemplifying an existing trait or characteristic; dismiss relations, in which an uncharacteristic event is discounted; cause relations, in which an event is portrayed as instigating change in the self; and reveal relations, in which an event prompts discovery of a hidden truth about the self. The applications to coming-out stories are notable (particularly with respect to dismiss and reveal cases), and Pasupathi's team has already begun to productively explore the specific relevance of this approach for clarifying sexual identity development (Brubaker 2004).

Expanding this approach to investigate longitudinal change in these narrative strategies is the next step. Thus, one might ask not only why some individuals talk about early same-sex contact in terms of causing their sexuality and others as revealing their sexuality, but why and how some individuals might invoke causation at one point in time and revelation at another (to either the same or different social partners) as they actively manage their own understanding of their erotic autobiography across the life course. From the perspective of standpoint epistemology, one might argue that this approach shifts from seeking a multiplicity of knowledges by studying different individuals to seeking a multiplicity of knowledges through examining multiple time points in any single individual's life.

Finally, the problem of reflexivity in the context of longitudinal, qualitative sexual identity interviews actually emerges as a particular strength of this methodology when one considers the specific importance of socially performed autobiographical narratives for the development and enactment of sexual-minority identities (Plummer 1995; Jones 2000). If the narrative self is something we "do" rather than "have" (Fivush 2000), then how better to model the process of identity development and maintenance as it is enacted in countless coming-out and "how I first knew" conversations with friends, lovers, and parents than to instantiate that process in the researcher-participant relationship over time? This is made particularly clear in the case of one participant (pseudonym "Anna") for whom the identity development process is largely a series of conversations. During the first interview Anna recounted that she had first begun questioning her sexuality during her second year at college, when she was supporting a close friend who was questioning her sexuality. Anna reported that she and her friend had a series of long and involved conversations about bisexuality and about their own sexual feelings, and Anna claimed that she inadvertently started to "tag along" in her friend's coming-out process.

Eventually, both women identified as bisexual. By the second interview, however, Anna had entered graduate school and was living in a much more socially conservative environment; by the five-year follow-up interview she had decided to identify as heterosexual instead of bisexual:

> *Interviewer:* How do you currently label your sexual identity, if at all?
>
> *Anna:* Well, you know, this is an interesting thing, 'cause it's actually funny that you called me around this time. Recently, I was talking with some friends, and we decided that I have to come out as heterosexual.
>
> *Interviewer:* Now, what does it mean when you say that you have to come out as heterosexual?
>
> *Anna:* It was kind of bizarre. It really has to do with a lot of the questions in your interviews, so it's kind of like a coincidence it seems. I was visiting some friends of mine who have never been really comfortable with people identifying as bisexual. I used to identify as bisexual, I think I still do in some contexts, but they were never really comfortable with that, and anyway my relationships in the past couple years have been primarily with men. So in order to appease my friends, I'm coming out as heterosexual. So I have to label myself for their benefit, and also for other people's benefit. It's just a more comfortable identity for everybody involved.
>
> *Interviewer:* Does it feel more comfortable for you?
>
> *Anna:* At first it didn't, I thought like, oh my God, am I sort of betraying some real nonheterosexuality in me by forcing myself to adjust to this necessary cultural label? At first I was upset about myself, but now it's sort of a safety. . . . I mean, my department is very homophobic, so I feel that it's a safe place for me to identify as. So let's just say it's out of safety.
>
> (Interview with anonymous respondent, 2000)

It is particularly fascinating to read this narrative with an eye to the identity construction process itself, regarding not only the conversations with friends that have undoubtedly shaped her self-concept but also the rhetorical strategies that she uses during the interview to create a specific interpretation of her own motives for identity change and their repercussions. She repeatedly signals her own ambivalence about reidentifying as heterosexual, perhaps in order to leave herself the possibility of future same-sex sexuality. For example, she says "I used to identify as bisexual, *I think I still do* in some contexts," notably shifting from past to present tense, and she also explicitly notes that part of her motive for identifying

as heterosexual is to *"appease* her friends" and feel politically "safe," given her new more conservative environment. Later, she seems to actively engage me in substantiating this interpretation of her identity transition by concluding "So *let's* just say it's out of safety," as if we need to collectively agree on a "reason" for the transition that will preserve consistency with her prior interviews while also leaving open the possibility for future attractions to women (for the record, however, by the eight-year follow-up interview she had gotten married, although she continued to acknowledge attractions to women).

Thus, to the extent that the interview process feeds back to shape the identity development of the participant, this process is analogous to parallel mechanisms occurring in individuals' social relations and in their own self-talk and thus is analyzable in these contexts. Consequently, acknowledging rather than constraining reflexivity allows the researcher to consider a variety of questions regarding how discursive social relations constitute a critical force for psychological development.

Conclusion

Importantly, the notion that sexual identity should be investigated from a fundamentally narrative perspective is not new. Numerous (typically feminist) theorists have argued that a lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity is better conceptualized as a status of *becoming* rather than *being* (Fuss 1989; Butler 1990; Phelan 1993), suggesting the importance of investigating sexual identity as "a narrative, a story" (Garber 1995, 87) rather than an essence. Yet, historically, this point of view has been more influential within the domains of feminist and queer theory, sociology, history, and cultural studies than developmental psychology. To some extent this is ironic—after all, if sexual identity takes its very meaning from the ongoing, reconstructive, recursive processes of speaking, remembering, and acting across diverse social and interpersonal contexts over the life course, then all studies of sexual identity are fundamentally developmental.

Yet to the extent that developmental psychologists continue to mine sexual identity narratives only for the "objective truth" about how same-sex sexuality "naturally unfolds," we will remain hamstrung in our understanding of sexual-minority development. No qualitative interview can provide a fundamentally accurate portrait of how one's sexual-minority identity was "really" experienced in—or developed from—erotic feelings and behaviors at age eight, or twelve, or fifteen. However, analysis of the specific correspondences and gaps between longitudinal narrative accounts within the specific domain of the interviewer-interviewee relationship reveals how

we "come to report a particular event given the situation we are in" (Fivush 2000, 98) and how individuals construct a "self in progress" out of disparate stands of experience to suit their own lay notions of development (Pasupathi, Mansour, and Brubaker forthcoming).

Thus integrating feminist epistemology with recent psychological research on the coconstruction of autobiographical narrative provides a road map for working within the problems of authenticity and reflexivity in sexual identity research to reach systematic and useful information about this phenomenon in different individuals and contexts. Feminist epistemology, then, leads us to conclude not that longitudinal, qualitative research on sexual identity development has no valid knowledge to offer but rather that this knowledge is of a fundamentally different sort than we originally thought, elucidating development not as an inexorably forward-moving program with a fixed outcome but as an emergent, discursive, fundamentally social process. Importantly, this does not imply that developmental psychologists should systematically abandon any and all attempts to locate erotic events and experiences in "real" chronological time in investigating sexual-minority lives. Rather, following Joyce Nielsen (1990), I would advocate a dialectical approach that synthesizes and alternates between a focus on developmental events and a focus on their reenactment, reconstruction, and recounting, working toward an understanding of sexual-identity development that most ably represents its fundamentally social-contextual status.

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Feminist Psychology

The invention of feminist psychology began in the 1970s.[1] Its beginnings were memorably noted and analyzed in *Signs* in 1975 by Mary Parlee, on the occasion of the first inclusion of the psychology of women as a special topic in the *Annual Review of Psychology* and the formation of a new American Psychological Association (APA) division on the psychology of women. In her article, Parlee focused particularly on the impact of feminism on psychology, noting with approval that these developments meant that "women, at least as a topic of research, are unlikely to be excluded with the same efficient thoroughness as they have in the past" (1975, 119). At the same time, she registered some reservations about the concept of a psychology of women: "Considered as a subfield of psychology . . . the notion of a 'psychology of women' seems to me to be a conceptual monstrosity . . . an institutionally sanctioned distinction between 'psychology' . . . and 'psychology of women'" (120).

In 1976, also in *Signs*, Reesa Vaughter reviewed the contributions feminist researchers had made to empirical research in many areas. However, she concluded that the important challenges coming from feminist psychologists were methodological and epistemological: "There is nothing new about women being psychologists. What is revolutionary is the force of women in psychology and in the psychology of women to change the structure of the belief system of science to construct a psychology of human behavior" (1976, 146). Vaughter's emphasis, like Parlee's, was on the changes to be wrought in psychology by the impact of feminism.

[1] Of course there were important precursors before then—occasional studies of women, or of sex differences, or of issues particularly affecting women by psychologists sympathetic to women, who often (though not always) were themselves women. We are focusing here, though, on the creation of a relatively organized subfield within the discipline of psychology, one marked by the creation of courses, textbooks, journals, and a division within the American Psychological Association (APA).

In 1979 Parlee largely maintained this focus; she discussed four kinds of work that concerned "the relationship between feminist psychology and the field as a whole" (1979, 123). Here she considered the vigor of feminist psychologists' critiques of methodological practices in the field, as well as their empirical research. Her article was much less hopeful than Vaughter's earlier one, however, as she noted "the strength of psychology's resistance to feminist insights" (133).

In 1985 Nancy Henley again reviewed "patterns of development within feminist psychology and its relation to mainstream psychology" (1985, 101) but also enlarged the focus of consideration. She noted that although there were important empirical developments in feminist psychology, "psychologists of women and gender have seldom brought broader feminist theory into their work. Discussions that have occupied the feminist scholarly community—for example, discussions of [Nancy] Chodorow's or Michel Foucault's theories, topics that should be of interest to psychologists—get little if any attention in feminist psychological writings" (119). In short, Henley emphasized the impact—or lack of it—of interdisciplinary women's studies on feminist psychologists. In fact, the relative absence of psychology from *Signs* over the subsequent decades suggests a rather distant relationship between the two. Apart from narrower essays on particular topics (Rochelle Semmel Albin [1977] on rape, Richard C. Friedman et al. [1980] on the menstrual cycle, Janet Hyde [1990] on meta-analysis and the psychology of gender differences), Henley's is the last review essay focused on the discipline as a whole by psychologists in *Signs* until this one.[2]

Twenty years have passed since that review, years during which psychology has played a minor—sometimes invisible—role in interdisciplinary women's studies. Despite that fact, we believe there is evidence of a deep transformation in feminist psychology from the beginnings reviewed by Parlee, Vaughter, and Henley, even as many themes still persist. That transformation can be understood both by looking back at the earlier work from the perspective of feminist psychologists who have contributed throughout this period and by looking directly at the scholarship a new generation of feminist psychologists is producing today. We therefore focus our inevitably selective review on work by feminist scholars who were "there at the creation" (that is, who published feminist scholarship in the

[2] Some humanists have reviewed psychologically significant topics (e.g., Marianne Hirsch [1981], on mothers and daughters, and Judith Kegan Gardiner [1992] and Michele Barrett [1992], on psychoanalysis and feminism). These are, of course, different from psychologists' own reflections on the work being produced in psychology.

1970s) and work by feminist scholars at the beginning of their careers now. This generational lens reveals both how things have changed over time and what is common among contemporary feminist psychologists of different generations.

Looking back: Seventies feminist psychologists reflect on the field

In the past few years, some of the feminist psychologists who made early contributions have engaged in a public process of stocktaking of their own roles in the field and of the field itself. The resulting work provides a collective reflection on the creation and development of a field within psychology and is therefore the focus of our own; it also provides evidence of a real conversation with interdisciplinary women's studies.[8]

One of the most influential figures in the seventies, Sandra Bem, also produced in 1998 one of those more recent reflections. Bem, whose work was discussed in all of the *Signs* reviews on psychology in the seventies and eighties, began from inside experimental psychology and pressed hard for a rethinking of psychologists' use of categories of masculinity and femininity both as descriptors of personality and as normative prescriptions for individuals. Her work critiqued narrow definitions of sex roles and argued in favor of psychological androgyny. In the beginning she articulated a largely behavioral notion of gender (which would now be considered in terms of gender performance). She increasingly became interested, though, in the different ways people think about gender, contributing the notion that people vary in the degree to which they organize the social world in terms of gender (or are "gender-schematic"). Over time, and at least partly in response to a lively debate with other scholars in psychology and in women's studies, she developed a much more radical theory of the psychology of gender, one that argues for keeping androcentrism, biological essentialism, and gender polarization quite separate and for recognizing the separate importance of normative heterosexuality (Bem 1994). As Bem commented in her subsequent memoir, "If *The Lenses of Gender* is the statement of my theory, *An Unconventional Family* is the statement of my practice"

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[8] We have focused on works published in the past few years by psychologists who also made important contributions in the 1970s. Our focus forced us to omit some important exemplars who had published reflections earlier (e g., Michelle Fine [1992], Jeanne Marecek [1995], Jill G Morawski [1994]). It is also worth noting that Blythe McVicker Clinchy and Julie K. Norem published a major *Gender and Psychology Reader* (1998), and Rhoda K. Unger published a *Handbook of the Psychology of Women and Gender* (2001), another kind of marker of the institutionalization of the subfield.

(1998, x). For the most part, then, the book is not a reflection on Bem's personal history of feminist psychology; it is instead a reflection on her attempt to live out her commitments to a feminist psychology in her personal life, both in an egalitarian marriage and in raising children. Along the way, though, Bem does comment on what it felt like to develop feminist psychology as well as on the reception of feminist psychology in the field.

Early on, Bem struggled with her own indifference to the research questions around her; she describes her transformation into a passionate researcher:

> Then the idea occurred to me. . . . I could do empirical research on the question of whether so-called androgynous people might be healthier in some way than more conventionally gendered people. And by doing this, I could also introduce the concept of androgyny into the psychological literature and thereby begin to challenge the traditional assumption of the mental health establishment that a mature, healthy identity necessarily requires women to be feminine and men to be masculine.
>
> From that moment on, my political, personal and professional passions fed one other [*sic*] during every moment of the day. I had not just a job; I had a mission. (1998, 142)

This sense of mission and purpose was not, however, validated in her actual job: "My research interests and goals did not fit into the Stanford psychology department's intellectual structure" (1998, 148). Bem was rewarded with many early successes, including the APA's Early Career Award in 1976. But despite her accomplishments, Bem, like many other early casualties among feminist psychologists, was denied tenure.

Creating an interesting turning point for Bem, Cornell's women's studies program recruited her as director at the time of her tenure denial at Stanford. In that role Bem went on to hire seven other feminist scholars, all of whom ultimately were tenured, and she worked hard and successfully to bring an adequate analysis of gender and sexuality to bear on the potential tensions within women's studies between lesbian and heterosexual feminists. After her long leadership of women's studies (from 1978 to 1985), Bem produced her theoretical book, *The Lenses of Gender* (1994)—a book that is quite remarkable within psychology for its forthright politics and its radical rethinking of the importance, and possibility, of transforming the cognitive structures that hold gender in place. It is a book that Bem describes as her effort to "tame a whole menagerie of

ideas on gender and sexuality from disciplines as diverse as anthropology, biology, history, philosophy, and law" (1998, 160).

Bem's trajectory is surely individual—beginning with an effort to blend a critique of mental health paradigms with experimental research that appeared successful within mainstream psychology by many indicators but was ultimately unacceptable, at least for Bem's tenure review at Stanford; developing into an interdisciplinary exile in women's studies; and then resulting in a transformative theory of the psychology of gender. Her story is, importantly, not merely a cautionary tale about the dangers of doing feminist psychology; it is also a tale of the possibilities for invention and integration that interdisciplinary women's studies provided for one psychologist.

Writing from two faculty appointments—one in women's studies at San Diego State University and one in psychology at the California School of Professional Psychology—Oliva Espin offers an account of a very different career path in her late 1990s collection of her own previously published essays, *Latina Realities: Essays on Healing, Migration, and Sexuality* (1997). She comments on the "basic threads" that "run throughout the essays" (xiii): "Although I did not intentionally focus on women immigrants in some of my early projects, the studies highlighted them nonetheless. For example, the Latina lesbians and the Latina healers of my early research all 'happened' to be immigrants. Similarly, I see in retrospect that in the articles focused on feminist therapy with women of color I used two clinical examples of Latin American immigrant women. Likewise, during my years as a practicing feminist therapist my clientele consisted almost exclusively of women of color, immigrant and refugee women, and many Latinas" (xiv). In the book's essays, Espin presents theoretical arguments, methodological critique, and empirical evidence in an unusual mix for psychology. She points out that "feminist psychologist researchers, practitioners, and writers have proffered a new vision of gender studies in psychology. My contribution to that process, alongside the work of many others, has been to distill the significance of gender in the psychological development of women who are twice or sometimes three times 'othered' by 'mainstream' psychology" (xiv). This focus on immigration, ethnicity, and sexuality in Espin's work reflects not only her own experiences (on which she draws explicitly in some of the essays, e.g., "Giving Voice to Silence: The Psychologist as Witness") but also the experiences of those she studied, experiences mostly absent from mainstream psychology when Espin began her research.

In an even more recent book, *Women Crossing Boundaries* (1999), Espin examines the same issues—immigration, sexuality, and ethnicity—

in interviews with a sample of forty-three women who immigrated to the United States from all over the world. She continues in this work to illuminate how developmental processes (most of the women immigrated as young adolescents)—and social and historical events and circumstances associated both with departure from one country and with arrival in another—construct and reflect women's experiences and identities.

Stephanie Riger's book, *Transforming Psychology* (2000), also brings together essays written over an extended period, and in the process she engages in reflection on what is and is not "transformed" about psychology along the way. Interestingly, Riger too writes from a joint appointment in psychology and women's studies, and she served as a director of women's studies for ten years. The book is divided in two. The first part focuses mainly on epistemological issues; here Riger provides crisp analyses of most of the important issues taken up by feminist critics of psychology both from within psychology and from women's studies: bias in psychology and the goal of objectivity, the (contested) distinction between sex and gender, the adequacy of individualism to construct our social behavior, the adequacy of psychology's methods for studying contexts of lives, and the importance of contextualizing agency within an understanding of social construction and even of postmodernism.

In the second section of the book, Riger examines a number of social and organizational contexts of women's experience, including sexual harassment at work, efforts at empowerment, management, low-paying jobs, feminist organizations, and violent men. Here Riger provides thoughtful critiques not only of psychology's limited view of women (and that of many organizations) but also of some feminist efforts. For example, she unpacks some feminist community psychologists' well-intentioned but misguided efforts to "empower" women in highly individualistic ways that actually might undermine community connections.

Riger comments that for her "writing is a means of channeling emotion, of pouring my anger into a form that would broadcast it widely" (6). She says, further, that "writing is a vehicle for protest, a way to make others see the world my way and in so doing, to challenge their views" (6). Riger's contributions to feminist psychology are explicitly oriented toward social change. They come from the perspective of community psychology, with a serious focus on the ways that policies—from sexual harassment policies in particular organizations to national welfare policies—reflect and create our gendered relations, increasing or decreasing human suffering along the way.

In 2001, Mary Gergen published *Feminist Reconstructions in Psychology:*

Narrative, Gender, and Performance. She uses the volume to explore what would happen "if one did psychology in that empty space of possibility beyond the domain of the everyday and taken for granted" (2001, 1). She provides an overview of feminist critiques of psychology and then offers some methodological experiments in doing new kinds of psychology, projects "presented not as prototypes but rather as intimations of future possibilities" (5). She examines a variety of aspects of gendered experiences of the life course, social interactions, and (especially) the body in a series of chapters recounting studies with features of the new psychology. These include studies of popular autobiographies written by men and women and a group of women's discussion of their experience of menopause. She turns then to a study of "social ghosts" or imaginary interlocutors in adult life, an analysis of the discourse surrounding a controversial incident on a college campus, and scripts associated with performance psychology. Though Gergen is probably the scholar most willing to take up new methods among those we are reviewing here, she comments that "I discovered along the way to practicing a new psychology that it is very difficult and not altogether wise to bypass traditional solutions to research problems at all times. Overall, in these chapters, some more than others, there is a melding of more traditional approaches with more unconventional ones" (5).

Gergen notes that she was generally uncomfortable with an awareness that her work was not wholly outside the traditional discipline: "When I found myself not at the margins of the discipline but directly in the middle, I became rather disconcerted. I could not imagine any alternatives to traditional practices, or I was unaware that I had replicated them. Eventually I concluded that the notion of margin versus middle is an overworked polarity in itself. The borders between insider and outsider are not so clear and clean as one might wish or pretend. The suspicions that I have developed concerning binary oppositions have also been a postmodern gift" (2001, 5–6). The book is conceived as "addressed to feminist scholars" (6), both within psychology and outside it. It provides feminist psychologists with some exemplary and innovative examples, and it offers interdisciplinary women's studies scholars a purchase on the ways in which psychologists are using narrative and performance methods in their research (and some of the troubles they have when they do). In her conclusion, Gergen invokes interdisciplinary women's studies scholars Kum-Kum Bhavani, Donna Haraway, and Judith Butler to help articulate her vision of feminist psychology.

Finally, the most recent book we will consider is by Stephanie Shields

(2002) and concerns the always important issue of gender and emotion.[4] Shields, like Bem and Riger, holds a joint appointment in psychology and women's studies and has directed two different women's studies programs. Her earliest research included groundbreaking articles about the history of psychology and gender, including one published in *Signs* (Shields 1975, 1982). In her latest book, *Speaking from the Heart* (2002), Shields reviews ways in which gender stereotypes create a paradox in our interpretations of emotions (e.g., by construing men as both more angry and less emotional than women). Shields explains that her book grew out of her frustration that "questions relevant to gender and emotion, questions that seemed urgent to students and friends in real life, and that were becoming increasingly central to my own reading of the field, figured as insignificant in mainstream emotions research" (xi). She explores how this situation arose as a result of the narrow way in which emotion theorists conceptualized both emotions and gender: "Giving priority to the pursuit of 'true' emotion and defining essential emotion in terms other than social meaning ensure that gender, race, class, and historical era are set aside as peripheral to the main objectives of theory. This state of things has not been helped by the tendency to view gender effects from the rather theoretically impoverished perspective of empirically identified sex-related differences (and similarities). . . . Psychologists who study emotion, rightly or wrongly, have tended to conclude that gender is not particularly important to explaining emotion" (2002, 13).

Shields argues, in the remainder of the book, that in mainstream research similarities between men and women in the experience of emotion are exaggerated, while differences in the way in which "gender matters in very particular conditions" (16) are underexamined. She provides evidence drawn from different historical periods and different social contexts (including, for example, fatherhood), in terms of different norms about emotional responses, and concludes that it is our beliefs about emotions that are particularly gendered and that those beliefs are consequential. Shields summarizes: "Judgments about the presence and meaning of emotion in oneself and others are not made casually or lightly. Who gets called 'emotional' depends on who is doing the naming, who is named, and the circumstances in which emotion occurs. The relationship between gender and emotion is not just a subject of academic inquiry, but one that profoundly affects every aspect of lives in ways that we often do not even suspect" (2002, 185).

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[4] Several other feminist psychologists, including Francesca Cancian (1999) and Leslie Brody (1999), have published significant integrative books focusing on gender and emotion.

Each of these five scholars offers a perspective on domains within feminist psychology that she helped to create. The specific domains are inevitably accidental, given that the selection of these particular scholars to review depended in part on the timing of publication. But the issues central to their work—cognitive schemas; immigration, sexuality, and identity; epistemology and methodology; gender and organizations; the body; and gender and emotions—are also a sensible sampling of issues with persistent importance in feminist psychology. All of these scholars have been contributing to the field since the seventies, and what is striking and different from the earlier reviews in *Signs* is that it is clear they have been deeply influenced by interdisciplinary women's studies. All of them write with an explicit recognition that psychology and psychologists can contribute to an analysis and critique of the status quo or to an endorsement of it; they cannot in fact avoid doing one or the other. All of them aim to contribute to a different and better social world. Finally, they all write with some degree of frustration but also with some amazement at what they, along with many others, have accomplished in creating a feminist psychology.

Looking ahead: New hands building feminist psychology

We would have a very limited picture of the state of contemporary feminist psychology based solely on the reflections of one generation. We hope to balance this picture with accounts of some of the cutting-edge work in feminist psychology being carried out by colleagues who have joined this effort more recently. Their work builds in some direct ways on the work of the generation of scholars we have just discussed, but it is also different. Much of their work is on topics such as the body, sexuality, and transgender and intersex studies—topics that are both familiar to interdisciplinary women's studies scholars and deeply shaped by postmodern and Foucauldian notions about agency, identity, power, and institutions. These foundational ideas in women's studies and feminist discourses are appearing in some specialty areas in psychology, in particular disciplinary forms. Some of the features of this work—though published in mainstream psychology journals—in fact derive from theories and discourses quite unfamiliar to most psychologists. It is a new and exciting development for feminist psychologists to be grounding their work in feminist theory and bending psychological methods to study those theories.

It could be argued that the topics studied are somewhat old news in feminist circles; equally, many of the studies could be viewed as vulnerable to one or another of the core critiques of traditional disciplinary conven-

tions of psychology that have preoccupied feminist psychologists from the beginning (see, e.g., Gergen's 2001 review of facets of traditional psychology especially in need of reform).[5] In contrast to the prior generation, the younger scholars we have identified are less focused on directly discussing these issues; they use a range of methods familiar to psychologists quite flexibly, sometimes unorthodoxly, and sometimes with direct challenges to the various epistemological and methodological articles of faith that feminist psychologists have attacked persistently and without much obvious impact on the field.

These younger scholars seem to be engaged, then, in three important tasks. First, they conduct research that directly builds on some of the work of feminist predecessors in the field. Second, they continue to confront biased and exclusive assumptions of the field that are still relevant in their current form. For example, they are still making arguments to justify mixed or alternative research methods and interdisciplinarity, and they are often challenging universal laws and applications of human behavior. As will be seen below, Katy Day, Brandon Gough, and Majella McFadden (2003) analyze their data on working-class women's aggression with somewhat unconventional methods for traditonal psychology, including a "Foucauldian style of discourse analysis" (146), and Peter Hegarty's (2002) research tackles biologically essentialist attributions about sexuality, linking such overarching beliefs to politics rather than to "nature." Finally, all of these scholars' work reflects full and deep familiarity with both interdisciplinary women's studies and mainstream psychology—and is framed within the terms of both. It is creating new fusions and integrations that look different from much of the work generated by the previous generation.

In reviewing current exemplars of feminist psychology, we could not hope to be exhaustive, so we needed criteria for selection. We were interested in recent research conducted by promising scholars who directly build on the work of feminist psychologists who came before them. We required, then, in choosing our exemplars, that they demonstrate a consciousness of this legacy by citing earlier feminist psychologists in their work. We focused on psychologists who obtained their PhDs in 1995 or

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[5] The first is that "the scientist is or should be an uninvolved and unbiased spectator who simply collects the data from subjects" (Gergen 2001, 2). Another assumption in need of reform is that "general laws of human behavior can be established through experimental methods" (3). Gergen's third tenet, that "traditional science had made claims to a stance of value neutrality" (3), is closely connected to the fourth, that "facts are independent of the scientist who establishes them" (4). The last is that scientific methods are superior techniques for establishing "truth" (4)

after to ensure that they could reasonably have been exposed to the work of feminist psychologists. We restricted ourselves to psychologists who had published at least some of their work in mainstream psychology journals because this kind of work was the focus of earlier *Signs* reviews and also because we were genuinely interested in examining the kind of work that appears in these disciplinary locations. Many of these young feminist psychologists aim explicitly to address race, class, gender, and sexuality as social identities and constructions, just as the exemplars from the seventies also do in their current work (but often did not in their earlier work). These issues preoccupy virtually all feminist psychologists today, but the specific approaches they use to study them differ.

Jessica Morris was trained in clinical psychology at the University of Vermont. In 1997, while a doctoral candidate, she published an article in the *Journal of Homosexuality* titled "Lesbian Coming Out as a Multidimensional Process" (Morris 1997). She offers a theoretical approach to studying lesbian coming out characterized by four dimensions: sexual identity formation, disclosure of sexual orientation to others, sexual expression and behavior, and lesbian consciousness. This research is explicitly feminist and innovative in a variety of ways. She complicates both the traditional linear narrative of developmental stage models of sexuality and generalizations between gay men and lesbians; historicizes general research on sexuality and, more specifically, "outness"; and considers multiple identities and social contexts that include age, race, ethnicity, religion, geographic location, income, employment, and education. Morris cites influential feminist interdisciplinary scholars such as Carla Goldin, Beverly Greene, Celia Kitzinger, Audre Lorde, Cherríe Moraga, Adrienne Rich, Esther Rothblum, and Paula Rust, to name a few.

In 1999 Morris collaborated with Rothblum in a study titled "Who Fills Out a 'Lesbian' Questionnaire? The Interrelationship of Sexual Orientation, Years 'Out,' Disclosure of Sexual Orientation, Sexual Experience with Women, and Participation in the Lesbian Community." Here they implemented a version of Morris's multidimensional frame in an empirical analysis and provided an interventionist interpretation: "Researchers who are studying one aspect of the lesbian experience (e.g., outness to others) need to ensure that they are not assuming such behavior based on other dimensions (such as frequent participation in lesbian community activities or years being out), especially among White and Asian American lesbians" (1999, 538). Morris and Rothblum differentiated and clarified aspects of experience and behavior, and they warned against generalizations based on ideas about lesbian and racial-ethnic identities. This research uses main-

stream psychology approaches to measurement to develop a research strategy that incorporates some of the complex understanding of sexuality that has emerged in women's studies.

Lisa Diamond, who received her PhD from Cornell University in 1999, has published studies of the romantic relationships of sexual minority and heterosexual youth (Diamond 2000a; Diamond and Lucas 2004), as well as a longitudinal study of lesbians' sexual identity, attractions, and behavior (Diamond 2000b, 2003a). Like Morris, Diamond carefully differentiates separate elements of lesbian experience and demonstrates the remarkable fluidity of different elements of sexuality, at least among young women, over time. In this research Diamond has documented some young women's relinquishment of lesbian and bisexual identities and has developed a "biobehavioral model" of sexual orientation (2003b). Her research, like Morris's, incorporates references to and aspects of the scholarship on sexuality in women's studies (including, e.g., the work of Estelle Freedman and of Carroll Smith-Rosenberg) while drawing heavily on mainstream psychology theories and methods and the work of feminist psychologists (including Janet Hyde, Kitzinger, Sue Wilkinson, Pauline Bart, Anne Peplau, and Rothblum).

Kimberly King received her PhD in clinical psychology from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1998. In an article titled "Do You See What I See? Effects of Group Consciousness on African American Women's Attributions to Prejudice" (2003), King conducted the first empirical study of womanist consciousness, or of "the integration of ethnic and feminist consciousness among women of color" (19). She distinguished between feminist consciousness, ethnic consciousness, and womanist consciousness, providing "empirical support for the long-standing theoretical assertion by feminist scholars of color that women of color do not conceptualize their (our) gender status independently of ethnic status" (25). By integrating and operationalizing the concept of intersectionality, King advances the dialogue in psychology toward feminist aims. She cites important feminist predecessors such as Patricia Hill Collins, Lillian Comas-Diaz, Faye Crosby, Susan Fiske, Paula Giddings, Pat Gurin, bell hooks, Hope Landrine, M. Brinton Lykes, and Peggy McIntosh. In her examination of group consciousness, King makes active and intentional claims against antifeminist research that aims to show that marginalized groups exaggerate experiences of discrimination: "It seems important to clarify that the approach of the current study emphasizes individual differences in social perception as a means of better understanding the process of experiencing prejudice but does not support the proposition that members of low status

groups are motivated to perceive more prejudice than is objectively accurate in order to protect their self-esteem" (King 2003, 21).

The work of Eileen Zurbriggen (Zurbriggen 2000; Zurbriggen and Yost 2004), who received her PhD from the University of Michigan in 1997, serves as an example of scholarship that has emerged out of feminist theory and is served to psychologists in the language of science. One of Zurbriggen's experiments explores the relationship between power-sex associations and aggressive sexual behavior. She implements traditional experimental research methods to investigate hypotheses that are grounded in the work of feminist theorists Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon. Through implicit measures, Zurbriggen found that "social motives and cognitive power-sex associations are able to predict part of the variance in self-reported aggressive sexual behavior" (2000, 577). By operationalizing and measuring feminist arguments—in this case, that the linkage between power and sex is not essential or universal in men but when present is destructive to women—both women's studies and psychology can claim and make use of this research. In another study, Zurbriggen and Megan R. Yost (2004) examine relations among power, dominance, desire, and pleasure in men's and women's sexual fantasies, in part explicitly examining some of the claims made by Carol Vance (1989) and others about women's sexuality. In addition to grounding her research in the work of interdisciplinary women's studies scholars such as Tania Modleski, Ann Snitow, and those already named, Zurbriggen also cites many feminist psychologists, among others Martha Burt, Mary Koss, Barbara Gutek, Elene Haavio-Manila, Janet Spence, and Jan Yoder.

Emerging feminist psychologists have built on women's studies' emphasis on all power hierarchies, not just gender. For example, Joan Ostrove (who received her PhD from the University of Michigan in 1996) and Elizabeth Cole (whose degree was a bit earlier, in 1993) edited a special edition of the *Journal of Social Issues* (2003) on social class and education. One paper (Bullock and Limbert 2003), by Heather Bullock (who completed her PhD at the University of Rhode Island in 1996) and Wendy Limbert (currently a doctoral student at the University of California, Santa Cruz), explores low-income women's perceptions of status and opportunity, while in a related one Ostrove (2003) shows the different meanings of social-class background among college-educated women. In a third, Ram Mahalingam (2003; he completed his degree at the University of Pittsburgh in 1998) examines essentialism in beliefs about social class and caste. All of these authors (and others in the volume) cite feminist psychologists, as well as interdisciplinary women's studies scholars, in their articles.

In related research, Day (who completed her doctorate at Sheffield Hallam University in 1997), Gough, and McFadden studied "Women Who Drink and Fight: A Discourse Analysis of Working-Class Women's Talk" (2003). As the title suggests, the study is a qualitative exploration (through focus groups discussions) centered on working-class femininities and aggression. The researchers explicitly challenge the essentialist notion that women are "the non-aggressive sex" and "moves beyond a reading of female-female aggression that is reduced to competition for men" (153). In addition, the authors attempt to incorporate a geographical and poststructuralist perspective into their method and analyses.

Another recent development in the field is the investigation of justification ideologies. Hegarty, who completed his dissertation at Stanford University in 1999, has published several articles examining how people explain or rationalize their opinions about gays and lesbians. In one study (Hegarty 2002), he explores the relationship between beliefs about the immutability of sexuality and stigmatization, complicating the reasoning and politics of connecting biologically essentialist explanations of sexuality to tolerance. Hegarty cites interdisciplinary and feminist scholars such as Butler, Erving Goffman, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Greg Herek, Kitzinger, and Shane Phelan. He also compares U.S. and British samples, drawing attention to U.S. ideologies as culturally bound. Hegarty's research is both politically interventionist and critical of the relationship between politics and science. He unapologetically asserts, "Yoking tolerance to biological determinism undermines pedagogical practices aimed at developing students' skills at detecting and critiquing masculinist and heterosexist ideological assumptions in biological science. The present studies are consistent with the proposition that heterosexual-identified people may be constructing their beliefs about brain nuclei, genes and hormones to fit their sexual politics rather than the reverse" (2002, 163).

What does this generational perspective on feminist psychology offer?

The work of feminist psychologists from these two generations seems to us to look both similar and quite different now than it did when Parlee, Vaughter, and Henley surveyed it. Some issues—such as persistent resistances from mainstream psychology—remain thorns in the sides of feminist psychologists. At the same time, both seventies and emerging feminist psychologists are producing new work that is deeply influenced by interdisciplinary women's studies scholarship. In this sense it is clear that both groups are working in the same field at the same time.

The generational difference, we think, is that the scholarship by emerging feminist psychologists is less preoccupied with staking out claims about the nature of their enterprise than that by the earlier ones. Is this a sign that some arguments have actually and at last become unnecessary, at least some of the time? This new research also seems to us to draw unapologetically, freely, and readily from a wide range of disciplines and ideas, especially from interdisciplinary women's studies, while being published in mainstream psychology journals. Finally, it seems to us that it offers examples of feminist psychologists using conventional psychological methods to confirm feminist theories (as Zurbriggen does), to challenge them (as King does), and to develop them (as Morris does).

It is clear from both their accounts and their recent work that the seventies psychologists have worked hard to develop their own work into truly integrated feminist psychology; the result was hard-won. The emerging scholars seem more easily able to begin from there, and they are moving on to develop exciting new feminist psychologies—work that we hope will influence both psychology and women's studies, as it is fully grounded in both.

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Women and Reading

Azar Nafisi's *Reading Lolita in Tehran* (2003) is a compelling book. Nafisi tells how, in the second half of the 1990s, she gathered together a group of her former students, who met weekly in her apartment to discuss a range of Western novelists. The young women are vividly characterized. Nafisi shows us the tensions between their individuality—as expressed through their very divergent attitudes toward their faith, men, children, family relationships, and their symbolic forms of rebellion through dress or nail polish—and the regime's coercive homogenization of them through their gender. "Although they came from very different backgrounds, the regime that ruled them had tried to make their personal identities and histories irrelevant. They were never free of the regime's definition of them as Muslim women" (12), she writes. She sets the group's reading—of *A Thousand and One Nights*, of Vladimir Nabokov, Henry James, Jane Austen, Saul Bellow, and Gustave Flaubert—in the context not just of the weekly sessions and the experiences and ideas the young women bring to them but of her own personal history under an increasingly oppressive regime. On returning from graduate school in the United States to teach at the University of Tehran in 1979, Nafisi already had a sense of how things were changing from her younger days: the government had started to close down foreign language bookstores and was blocking the distribution of foreign books in Iran; the debates over the new constitution continually drew attention to the regime's desire to prescribe and monitor women's roles. From the start Nafisi felt passionately about the importance of getting her students to think about the value of reading fiction:

> I wrote on the board one of my favorite lines from the German thinker Theodor Adorno: "The highest form of morality is not to feel at home in one's own home." I explained that most great works of the imagination were meant to make you feel like a stranger in your own home. The best fiction always forced us to question what we took for granted. It questioned traditions and expectations when

they seemed too immutable. I told my students I wanted them in their readings to consider in what ways these works unsettled them, made them a little uneasy, made them look around and consider the world, like Alice in Wonderland, through different eyes. (94)

Reading Lolita in Tehran is remarkable for the ways it lends new eyes to those of us who take the reading privileges of a Western democracy more or less for granted. Reading—presented, to be sure, by someone whose experience has made her a fervent advocate of Western liberalism—becomes simultaneously an escape from oppression, especially gender oppression; an intellectual transgression; and a promise that life might and can be otherwise. Reading provides liberation through the imagination. Rather than being representatives of a taken-for-granted canon, the authors Nafisi's students read "were revered names, emissaries of that forbidden world which we would turn into something more pure and golden than it ever was or would be" (39). The texts also provided some very direct reminders (for Nafisi's students, for us) of cultural relativism: we are reminded, in relation to Lolita, that "this child, had she lived in the Islamic Republic, would have been long ripe for marriage to men older than Humbert" (43).

I shall return to the specific issues raised by Nafisi's book in a moment. But what is also highly telling about this work is the way its concerns mirror many of the important emphases in the developing discussions about women and reading of the last decade. In many ways these developments are a consolidation of the research, methodological innovations, and critical insights of the 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, Elizabeth A. Flynn and Patrocinio P. Schweickart's groundbreaking collection of essays *Gender and Reading* (1986), Cathy Davidson's edited volume *Reading in America* (1989), and the pioneering work of Tania Modleski (1982) and Janice Radway (1991) in respect of women's romance reading remain essential points of reference.

Reading Lolita is a vivid demonstration of the way reading is increasingly acknowledged to be an activity poised between an intensely private, inward experience, on the one hand, and, on the other, as inseparable from a social world—whether in terms of what reading represents or because of the debates reading has the power to provoke, or the sense of connection (or of separation) that a shared acquaintance with particular books can foster. Indeed, it is noticeable how women's reading has, of late, been thought of in social terms. The 1990s saw a flourishing of book groups, ranging from quasi-clandestine gatherings such as the one Nafisi held in her apartment to Oprah Winfrey's much-publicized endeavor. In

the wake of these groups came a growing interest in book groups as a
phenomenon (and a salutary set of historical reminders that these groups
had plenty of antecedents and in some cases could be traced back to the
nineteenth century's heritage of pioneering foremothers), in guides for
reading and discussion, and in investigations of the relationship of book
groups to trends in book publishing and, especially, to the new forms of
dissemination of information and ideas provided by the Internet. The
attention to reading in its social context is symbiotically linked, moreover,
to developments in the increasingly important field of the history of the
book. Attention to audiences in a broad sense, and to individual reading
experience, forms an integral part of this (sub)discipline and of its chal-
lenge to the traditional boundaries of both literary and historical studies.
And the welcome growth of knowledge about all kinds of earlier readers
is continually being augmented by the proliferation of new memoirs—of
which *Reading Lolita* is but one—in which books are granted a crucial
role in the determination of an individual life. Studies concerning women
and reading in the last few decades of the twentieth century drew out the
various prohibitions and expectations that were attached to the figure of
the woman reader and showed, simultaneously, how reading could be a
site of personal expansion, both emotional and intellectual. In so doing,
these studies demonstrated how unrealistically constricting attempts to
describe or prescribe reading activity on gendered grounds are, and yet
how awareness of one's gender, as one reads—as one resists or relaxes
into a text's manipulations—is inseparable from one's understanding of
the practice of consuming, devouring, or cautiously nibbling at books.
The gustatory metaphors are, of course, deliberate: the ingestion of print,
as has frequently been noted, is more than a casual trope, and it allows
for books to be allied with the polar effects of nurture and poisoning,
encouraging one to consider the somatic implications of reading (see
Gilbert 1997).

The members of Nafisi's reading group nourished themselves on sticky
pastries as well as on novels and conversation. The food contributed to
the creation of a safe space in which the women could take the imaginative
narratives as a jumping-off point for a discussion of what was happening
in their lives, their country. The lessons that emerged from the sessions,
by Nafisi's account, were in many ways an extension of the literary phi-
losophy she had expressed in her classroom: "Nabokov calls every great
novel a fairy tale, I said. Well, I would agree. . . . Every fairy tale offers
the potential to surpass present limits, so in a sense the fairy tale offers
you freedoms that reality denies. In all great works of fiction, regardless
of the grim reality they present, there is an affirmation of life against the

transience of that life, an essential defiance" (47). With a redeeming acknowledgment of her own potentially sanctimonious pedagogic voice, Nafisi recalls, "Every great work of art, I would declare pompously, is a celebration, an act of insubordination against the betrayals, horrors and infidelities of life" (47). But even if this is the stance of a young and idealistic teacher, it is a stance borne out by the importance that her (largely) Western humanist texts have for the women readers with whom she debates them.

What is most striking, in the context of the politics of gendered reading in late twentieth-century Iran, is the radical charge that is carried by novels from the past. Thus Clarissa Harlowe and Sophia Western, "two modest and seemingly obedient daughters" (194), become exemplary for the way they change the course of narrative and call into question the institution of marriage: "Every great book we read became a challenge to the ruling ideology. It became a potential threat and menace not so much because of what it said but how it said it, the attitude it took towards life and fiction. Nowhere was this challenge more apparent than in the case of Jane Austen" (289). For what Austen's fictional organization manifests is the power of multivocality, her diverse voices and intonations providing

> one of the best examples of the democratic aspects of the novel. In Austen's novels, there are spaces for oppositions that do not need to eliminate each other in order to exist. There is also space—not just space but a necessity—for self-reflection and self-criticism. Such reflection is the cause of change. We needed no message, no outright call for plurality, to prove our point. All we needed was to read and appreciate the cacophony of voices to understand its democratic imperative. This is where Austen's danger lay.
>
> It is not accidental that the most unsympathetic characters in Austen's novels are those who are incapable of genuine dialogue with others. They rant. They lecture. They scold. This incapacity for true dialogue implies an incapacity for tolerance, self-reflection and empathy. (268)

Such figures are the early nineteenth-century counterparts to the attitudes of the new regime's avatars, as personified by Mr. Ghomi, the student who asks what it is that makes the women in the texts they read in class so revolutionary. For him Daisy Miller "is obviously a bad girl; she is reactionary and decadent. We live in a revolutionary society and our revolutionary women are those who defy the decadence of Western culture by being modest. They do not make eyes at men" (195). But for the

young Iranian women Daisy is something of a hero, the woman with whom they most identified (despite James's own ambivalence about her giddiness). They "would go back to her time and again, speaking of her courage, something they felt they had lacked" (333). Astutely, Nasifi puts her finger on what, precisely, it is that James's fiction offers. Despite the fact that so many of his protagonists are in some measure unhappy at the conclusions of his novels, he nonetheless grants these women a sense of achievement, an arrival at self-respect: "It is because the characters depend to such a high degree on their own sense of integrity that for them, victory has nothing to do with happiness. It has more to do with a settling within oneself, a movement inward that makes them whole" (225). For the readers in Nafisi's apartment, recognition of—identification with—this inner courage is something internalized both individually and by members of a group. (It is also, one might add, doubtless intensified through a desire to emulate the interpretive integrity of their literary mentor: in Nafisi's account the power dynamics of the reading group are more of an unspoken undercurrent than a part of her analysis.)

The back cover of the U.S. edition of *Reading Lolita* bears testimony from Geraldine Brooks (journalist, memoirist, and author of *Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women* [1995]), who proclaims that "anyone who has ever belonged to a book group must read this book." It is worth pondering the implications of this endorsement in the light of the attention that has recently been paid to women's reading groups, whether in their current vibrant and multifarious incarnations or as historical phenomena. The sociologist Elizabeth Long, through the insights arrived at in her very thoughtful study *Book Clubs: Women and the Uses of Reading in Everyday Life* (2003), offers some possible connections between Western readers and this group of Iranian women. *Book Clubs* is based on her investigation of a number of predominantly white women's groups in the Houston area, her own role sliding between that of scholarly researcher and participant-observer. She notes the tendency in book groups for patterns of empathy—and complex patterns of identification—to emerge, and many of the book group members seem to use literature, in Kenneth Burke's famous phrase, as "equipment for living" (Burke 1941, 293). Literature may lead members to personal insights, to reassessments of the social order, and to the exploration of disjunctions between social strictures and women's own experiences and/or ideals. Long also notes that, especially in relation to literary classics and texts concerned with race, book discussions can direct members "toward creative and expansive appraisals of social 'others' as well as of their own

historical situation and life choices" (xviii)—although she ruefully notes that such expansiveness is not inevitable.

But the potential for connection exists at a deeper level than that of relatively privileged women empathizing with or extending their knowledge of those whose lives differ in many respects from their own. For when Long identifies U.S. women's reading groups as "counterhegemonic publics" (she borrows the term from Nancy Fraser [1989, 167]), she brings the readers of Houston into a loose parallel with the readers of Tehran. Even within a Western democracy, these groups are frequently an undervalued cultural phenomenon. She ponders the "disjuncture between women's feelings about the importance of reading groups to their lives and the groups' relative invisibility—or dismissability—to most men and historically male-dominated scholarship" (Long 2003, 219), a response that became painfully obvious to Long when she attempted to interest colleagues in her own work and to convince them of its importance. In part this can be attributed to the fact that members of reading groups often read in a way that runs counter to the norms of much academic reading. Members of these groups, like Nafisi's students, will raid books for what they themselves find interesting to discuss: here Long borrows Michel de Certeau's wonderfully evocative simile of the poacher raiding interpretive terrain that is owned and patrolled by the elite of the academic and literary establishment (de Certeau 1984). Furthermore, while what these readers find interesting may be based on the extremely personal, it derives a fuller force and meaning from being discussed in a collaborative way. In her study of predominantly British reading groups— a work that contains numerous testimonies drawn directly from replies to surveys—Jenny Hartley (2002) draws on Deborah Cameron's (2000) research into women's communicative practices when she comments that "it might be said that the reading group is a forum for the kind of talk associated with women: co-operation rather than competition, the model of 'emotional literacy' which values teamwork, listening, and sharing over self-assertion and winning the argument" (Hartley 2002, 137). Yet Long is very clear about the ways reading groups differ from the plethora of other support and political groups with which women may be involved:

Reading groups do not generally deal with the inmost reaches of subjectivity, and indeed, groups often perceive members who become too preoccupied with their personal problems as difficult or disruptive to the real purpose of the meetings. Reading groups also do not pathologize members' personal issues, so they are not con-

tributing to the spread of a "patient" or "victim" mentality. On the other hand, reading groups do not generally have a political or even a public mission. Yet they allow members to think about themselves and the social world in ways that, if not collective, can often provide critical purchase on the dilemmas facing contemporary women. (72)

What distinguishes the reading group from all these other sites of shared discussion is the fact that its members continually, at some level, return to a text and to their encounter with it, both as individuals and as members of a community. Indeed, as Long remarks in her conclusion, the "difficulty of classifying reading groups as either wholly public or private also suggests that such interstitial groups may be a very interesting site for investigating the relationship between the public and private aspects of social life" (221).

The bridge between solitary reading and collectivity that women's book clubs provide has long been a feature of their existence. Long opens her study with a number of images of women reading, showing the tendency for pictures of this activity—as practiced by men as well as women—to focus on the reader's solitariness. However, this absorption into a text tends, in relation to a man, to be coded as serious and scholarly, whereas convention has more readily associated the reading woman with frivolity, escapism, and, at worst, with giving herself over to mindless sensuality. As I have argued in *The Woman Reader* (Flint 1993), the image of the woman reader makes the figure an ideal screen onto which all kinds of cultural assumptions may be projected: "The self-absorption of the readers depicted implies some of the reasons why the public activity of reading tended so persistently to come under scrutiny. It hints at the subject's vulnerability to textual influence, deaf and blind to all other stimuli in her immediate environment. It suggests the potential autonomy of her mind, mirrored in her self-sufficient postures" (4). As we shall see, concerns about influence, and the shape these concerns take, continue to be an important strand in historical studies of women's reading. But women's book clubs have represented, and continue to provide, an important counterbalance to the popular dismissive idea that women's book consumption is symbiotically linked to irresponsible escape. As Long puts it, "when women get together to discuss books, they are often searching for intellectual companionship they cannot find in other areas of their lives" (22). Discussions both follow the path of humanistic literary criticism, reflecting on moral and ethical dimensions, and engage with social and political issues. This latter tendency of women's reading groups was set in motion by the New England Women's Club and the New York literary group Sorosis, both established in 1868, which served as models for dozens of

others across the nation and which built on the combination of the increased leisure time many middle-class women enjoyed and their desire to look beyond a limited personal horizon. From 1896, African American women's book clubs were organized nationally as part of the National Association of Colored Women. In *Intimate Practices* (1997), an important and detailed study of women's clubs, Anne Ruggles Gere counters the popular image of women's clubs as constituting a white Protestant middle-class movement by considering those clubs formed by women from Mormon, Jewish, and working-class (as well as African American) backgrounds, and she also shows how traditions of studying religious texts, whether the Bible, the Torah, or the Book of Mormon, frequently informed literary analysis. In all cases these clubs provided women opportunities to reflect on their rights, roles, and responsibilities (regardless of whether William Shakespeare or Henrik Ibsen provided the starting point); to develop nurturing, empathic, collective ties with other women; and to develop skills of speaking and organization, which frequently proved extremely useful outside the group.

Elizabeth McHenry's *Forgotten Readers: Recovering the Lost History of African American Literary Societies* (2002), an exemplary and fascinating piece of literary history, explores in detail the fact that "reading in early black communities was not always an individual enterprise" (13) and further demonstrates the importance that the spoken word held within such societies: a number of their members participated in their activities without ever acquiring the ability to read or write for themselves. Her focus falls on the century between the height of the antislavery movement and the Harlem Renaissance, moving from the development of literary societies in free black communities in the antebellum North, through the intersection of the earliest literary societies with the black press prior to the Civil War, to some case studies of particular groups. Her fourth chapter, on the black women's club movement of the 1890s, shows, like Gere's and Long's studies, the conflicting forces operating on many of these women readers, who were at once eager to seize opportunities and to push back boundaries yet simultaneously anxious about maintaining the credentials of "respectable" femininity. What emerges strongly and positively, however, is the arena that such clubs provided for emerging black writers of this time. McHenry also draws our attention to the "conflicting claims that would continue to be made on the African American 'literary woman' throughout the twentieth century: one, the fundamental human need to affirm the specificities of one's personal experience, however 'typical' or 'atypical,' through reading and writing; the other, the no less

compelling imperative to use literature to express solidarity with those whose lives and sufferings take similar forms from similar causes" (250).

In her concluding chapter McHenry reinforces this observation by discussing the important role played by reading groups and book clubs in the black community today, something that is affirmed textually in such guides as the *Go On Girl! Book Club Guide for Reading Groups* (Greenwood, Johnson, and Mitchell-Brown 1999), or Pat Neblett's *Circles of Sisterhood: A Book Discussion Group Guide for Women of Color* (1996), which is alert to the development of book groups among various ethnic communities. McHenry takes as her starting point Terry McMillan's marketing strategies and the energetic efforts of self-promotion that went into forming an initial audience for her popular novels. The details of McMillan's campaign—her reading tours (with stops not just at colleges but also at jazz clubs and community centers), her correspondence with small black bookstores, and so on—offer a dynamic example of the general observation that reading groups themselves intersect with social infrastructures in many ways. They may be hosted by independent or chain bookstores; they may be aided and aired by magazines or radio and television shows, most famously "Oprah's Book Club" on Winfrey's show, whose success is described and analyzed by McHenry. Book groups also have a strong Web life. Hartley's *Reading Groups Book* has a useful appendix of those Web sites that enable online discussions. The site Bookcrossing.com is a virtual reading group with a notably huge and lively membership—currently over forty thousand strong. Links created by online bookstores create chains of information. For example, if on Amazon.com one searches for a well-known text such as Rita Mae Brown's *Rubyfruit Jungle*, one is led down paths of lists that branch out from "great books for queer teen girlz," "baby dykes: stories to read when you're coming out," and "MY lesbian world" (which include, incidentally, *Mrs. Dalloway*, three Brontë novels, Emily Dickinson, and Willa Cather). Looking up a woman thriller writer, Nevada Barr, offers connections to "great female sleuths," "books about strong women," and so on. Thus are virtual communities created in a way unimaginable ten years ago.

The consideration of reading groups, whether as actual social entities or in their virtual configuration, forms part of one of the major areas of literary historical expansion over the last ten years: the history of the book. Itself a field that collapses disciplinary boundaries, it pays attention to a text's existence as an artifact—or as a series of artifacts if one considers the successive versions and formats in which a text may appear—and to the conditions of its publication, dissemination, and consumption. The

examination of reading and reading practices has formed an important component of this new turn in book studies. In his highly influential essay "First Steps toward a History of Reading," Robert Darnton threw down a provocative gauntlet when he maintained that "the experience of the great mass of readers lies beyond the range of historical research" (1990, 177). Certainly, the paucity of records from earlier periods may prove a considerable drawback, yet a number of studies have devoted themselves to uncovering the experience of women readers and to amplifying our knowledge of the contexts in which they read—including the expectations that devolved on them specifically as women. A further challenge feminist scholars of reading face, moreover, is the negotiation of much more recently established assumptions and values, the immediate legacy of the pioneering generation that preceded them. Thus Rebecca Krug, in the opening to *Reading Families: Women's Literate Practice in Late Medieval England* (2002, viii), comments that "recent studies of medieval women and writing often assume that women's participation in literate culture is evidence that women rejected medieval misogyny. In these discussions, writing and reading are described as acts of resistance against dominant social configurations. I insist, in contrast, that for most medieval women, acquisition of literate skills and text-based knowledge was a practical response to social changes and not a revolutionary act." Krug goes on to show that while there was plenty of evidence that medieval women were discouraged, rhetorically speaking, from interaction with the written word, whether as writers or, to a lesser extent, as readers, practice was often somewhat different. A number of women not only expected men to tolerate their reading and writing of texts but often engaged in this activity "at least in part because it served male-dominated social hierarchies, especially the patriarchally structured medieval family" (4). Following earlier scholars (especially Carol Meale [1993], Felicity Riddy [1993], and Anne Bartlett [1995]), she emphasizes this importance of the family to the literate medieval woman, even when she was a member of a religious group such as the Lollards or the Bridgettine order.

Such evenhanded pragmatics may not always yield the heroic model of resistance or interpretive innovation that one would hope to find among female reading subjects—that is, if one's scholarship is itself imbued with a strong emotional or ideological commitment to unearthing instances of resisting readers. This is the spirit with which Caroline McManus approaches her subject in *Spenser's "Faerie Queene" and the Reading of Women* (2002), explicitly carrying on the demand that Carol Neely made in a 1988 article that a feminist critique of Renaissance literature must of necessity "over-read . . . read to excess, the possibility of human (espe-

cially female) gendered subjectivity, identity, and agency, the possibility of women's resistance or even subversion" (15). This advocacy—for criticism as cultural compensation—differs from Krug's position, which builds on the belief, aired by Sherry Ortner in *Making Gender* (1997), that human action may be constrained by the given social and cultural order but also plays its part in "making" that order, whether through transforming or reproducing it (2). Niko Besnier's remark that literacy is "not . . . a monolithic phenomenon but . . . a multifaceted one, whose meaning, including any consequences it may have for individuals, groups, or symbolic structures, is critically tied to the social practices that surround it and to the ideological system in which it is embedded" (1995, 2–3) is as true for practices within contemporary academic circles as it was for the inhabitants of the Polynesian atoll that he studied, or, for that matter, for the women readers of Elizabethan England.

As McManus shows, Edmund Spenser's *Faerie Queene* incorporates practically all of the literary genres that Suzanne Hull's (1982) pioneering research identified two decades ago as typifying the recreational reading of women of the time, including romances, poetry, jingles, jests, epigrams, novellas, female biographies, and occasional classical narratives retold or retranslated for a female audience (15). Yet, as McManus also explains, the paucity of extant reading journals and the generic conventions that governed their composition plus the lack of substantive marginal annotations in copies of the poem that are known to have been owned by women mean that we can only reconstruct what it meant for women to read the *Faerie Queene* through internal evidence—through showing the divergent interpretive roles imagined for them through Spenser's incorporation of different genres and through the interpretive autonomy McManus claims such heterogeneity encouraged. Such readings obviously owe more to a reappropriation of notions of implied readership than they do to the empirical methods of contemporary book history, a method of proceeding from internal as well as external evidence that still needs to be borne in mind when dealing with later periods but that can increasingly be supplemented by circumstantial records. In her contribution to volume 4 of the *Cambridge History of the Book in Britain, 1557–1695*, Maureen Bell (2002) usefully addresses some of the problems in finding these records, while at the same time offering caution about the practice of inferring women's taste from extant books: what it is expected that groups of women will buy, read, or have read to them does not necessarily correspond to actual practice. But it is hard to be certain about which books were owned by women when women's collections have been subsumed into the larger family libraries of gentry or aristocracy. Where they can be

found, signatures, marginal comments, and wills and inventories offer some clues, although rarely unambiguous ones—not least because the sort of books that were considered frivolous or ephemeral may never appear at all. Similarly, negative evidence (say, a book of poetry inscribed to a woman by husband or brother but bearing no signs of actually having been read) may be telling, but we only really come to "secure evidence of reading and of the ways in which women read" (Bell 2002, 447) when we have diaries and memoirs (and even then, these are invariably forms of writerly performance at some level, whether for oneself or others). Nevertheless, such diaries as have been left by, say, Margaret Hoby and Anne Clifford, start to offer insights into the reading practices of their time.

Direct evidence of women's reading habits and methods increases enormously by the time one reaches the eighteenth century, and there is much more evidence still waiting to be uncovered in letters and diaries in private collections and public archives (and again, the Internet is playing an important role here, as the increasing online availability of catalogs to collections helps publicize the extent of research opportunities). Two detailed studies typify recent work dealing with both sides of the Atlantic: Kevin J. Hayes's *A Colonial Woman's Bookshelf* (1996) and Jacqueline Pearson's *Women's Reading in Britain, 1750–1835: A Dangerous Recreation* (1999). Hayes takes as his starting point the neglected intellectual life of early American women and notes that although most of the studies in early American women's history—whether localized or generalized—"mention the idea, now widely accepted, that many more early American women could read than previously has been supposed, none specifically has asked what books women read in colonial America. Nor has any asked: In what contexts and for what reasons did early American women read?" (ix; although, as he notes, both Davidson and Linda Kerber have notably posed these questions in relation to the period after U.S. independence). Looking at wills and estate inventories, public and private library catalogs, sales ledgers, surviving subscription library borrowing records, literary references, and contemporary biographical sketches, Hayes brings to light evidence of much more reading by women than had previously been acknowledged. This is a groundbreaking piece of materialist investigation. Pearson is similarly compendious, considering the explosion of women within the British literary marketplace of the time and showing how discourses about women and reading throw light on broader social issues. More of a literary critic than Hayes, she spends rather more time exploring the resonances of imaginative texts. She brings out well the way this period saw an elision of sexuality and textuality, an elision that emphasized the

dangers of novel reading for women, and she articulates the ways in which novel reading could not be separated from the changing formations of domesticity, family, and community—all themes that were to resonate throughout the Victorian period and beyond. Pearson examines both private and sociable reading and draws on all kinds of writing—imaginative and didactic, published and unpublished—in her valuable demonstration of the centrality of the figure of the woman reader to social and cultural debate.

And yet, in studying the nineteenth century it continues to be more difficult to discern what women felt and thought when they were reading than it is to arrive at ideas of men's responses to the written word. This is particularly true once one moves away from the (relatively) leisured classes. As Jonathan Rose points out at the beginning of his extraordinarily thorough *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (2001)—a work that is careful to bring in material relating to women when available—women account for only about 5 percent of memoir writers born into the working classes before 1870, rising to about 15 percent for those born 1870–89 and about 30 percent for the 1890–1929 cohort. This is not, of course, to say that fewer working-class women than men were reading but merely that they had less occasion or impetus to record their lives and to reflect on the range of texts that formed a role in their self-fashioning. Notably, this changes once "working women became more active in corporate bodies such as the Labour Party, the Co-operative movement, trade unions, and mutual improvement societies" (Rose 2001, 76). Notable too are the affirmations of those women who, like the Lancashire weaver Deborah Smith, found in reading circles "the questions, the friendly discussions, the exchange of opinions about many things [that] all teach us to be tolerant" (78).

One of the many strengths of Rose's book—as of all the works discussing the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries that I have mentioned so far—is the rich portrait he gives of the great variety to be found in women's patterns of reading. It is impossible, as I have explored elsewhere (Flint 1993), to arrive at any homogenous picture of "the woman reader," even though anxious commentators have in the past had occasion to construct images of self-indulgence or vulnerability based around just such a figure. The more evidence one accumulates about individual reading practices, the more evanescent the woman reader becomes, and the more necessary it is to consider individual examples in relation to all sorts of other determinants, whether of age or of class, of race or nationality or location. In *Reading, Writing, and Romanticism* (2000), Lucy Newlyn acknowledges the hypotheses (primarily derived

from the works of Carol Gilligan and Nancy Chodorow) that have been developed by such critics as Schweickhart and Judith Kegan Gardiner, that male readers, like men in society more generally, are more likely than women to define themselves through individuation and separation from others, while women, with their more flexible ego boundaries, are more likely to be prone to patterns of identification. Newlyn also cites the cognitive work into gender and reading, which has tended to confirm these distinctions. Nevertheless, she argues, "we must avoid making essentialist generalizations . . . and we should be wary of allowing theoretical constructions to interfere with an awareness of the practices of individual writers and readers. . . . No one person reads in a certain way simply by virtue of their gender, and no reading-practice can be straightforwardly labelled according to a binary opposition of detachment and sympathetic identification" (2000, 233–34). However, one cannot get away from the central role that reading has long played in individual women's identity formation, supplying us with reading positions and characters with whom we may identify, or against whom we may defiantly rebel—identity formations we may use for escape. For all that, Nafisi employs literature for deliberate and, in her political context, defiantly humanistic ends, encouraging her students and fellow readers to acknowledge the liberatory power of the imagination; there is a revelatory and endearing moment when she describes Tehran coming under bombardment in the Iraq-Iran war, when she "read a thick Dorothy Sayers mystery, safe and secure with Lord Peter Wimsey, his faithful manservant and his scholarly beloved" (2003, 207). Reading may be an adult comfort blanket just as much as it has, to quote Shoshana Felman, "historically been a tool of revolutions and of liberation" (1993, 5).

Felman makes this remark at the same time that she utters a warning: a warning against being too scrupulous when it comes to adopting the position of—in Judith Fetterley's influential (1978) phrase—a "resisting reader." Felman warns us against policing our responses too heavily, lest we miss out through not being open enough: "Does not reading involve one risk that, precisely, cannot be resisted: that of finding in the text something one does not expect? The danger with becoming a 'resisting reader' is that we end up, in effect, *resisting reading*" (1993, 5–6). Encouraging reading, while at the same time ensuring that younger readers do not internalize ideas about their gendered selfhood that will hold back their potential, has become an increasingly explicit preoccupation of educators. Today's young women are better served than their predecessors in many respects. "The literature in which I was schooled in college and in a good part of graduate school was built on a system of values in which

men had authority and women—and particularly daughters—were without authority," comments Paula Marantz Cohen in *The Daughter as Reader* (1996, 2); "Even the novels by women that I read as a girl appeared to support this unequal division of power. These books conditioned me in a daughterly role that I have since come to resent and that I still feel limits me" (2). Cohen goes on to acknowledge, however, that the discomfort that she felt in reading such texts encouraged her to be a critical reader, to doubt, to subvert established opinion, to resent.

Even with a market that is more sympathetic to feminism than was frequently the case in the past, there is still a way to go. Aimed at both teachers and parents, Kathleen Odean's *Great Books for Girls* (2002) does an energetic, comprehensive job of presenting synopses of texts, ranging from picture books to biographies and fiction aimed at young teens. These texts offer portraits of brave, strong, independent girls and women, characters who take risks; regard setbacks as ways to learn; like machines, insects, snakes, rocks, and dirt; enjoy fixing things; sometimes get into fights; and, above all, puzzle out their own solutions (or cooperate with other girls to reach their goals). "For in books, as in real life," Odean writes, "adults tend to do things for girls, while they challenge boys to do things on their own" (9). In her introduction to the 2002 edition of this work, Odean acknowledges that the publishing situation is more encouraging than it was even five years previously but proclaims the continuing need to find books to set against what Mary Pipher terms "our girl-poisoning culture" (1994, 12), in which movies, television, magazines, and music continually emphasize women's looks and sexuality. "Girls," as Odean puts it, "don't need any more lessons in being nice; they need lessons in making decisions for themselves" (2002, 10). This is arguably a modern version of the medieval Chevalier de la Tour Landry's declaration that "girls should learn to read in order to learn the true faith and protect themselves from the perils that menace their soul," quoted by Alberto Manguel in his stimulating, idiosyncratic, sometimes personal, and always wide-ranging *A History of Reading* (1996, 73), which, while rarely focusing for long on women's experiences, continually draws illuminatingly on them. Odean certainly presents opportunities for reading that Deborah O'Keefe wishes had been available to her. O'Keefe's *Good Girl Messages: How Young Women Were Misled by Their Favorite Books* (2000) is part memoir, part dismal litany of the books O'Keefe encountered in her childhood—all published before 1950 and many of them dating from the nineteenth century. These led her—already, it would seem, a docile and "feminine" girl—to internalize obedience, regard patriarchal hierarchies as natural, and consider the presence of women in an active

world to be an insignificant one. Unlike many commentators and mem-
oirists of the past couple of centuries, her own experience did not en-
courage her to believe that girls ignore gender when it comes to identifying
with active heroes; rather, she believes, "many girl readers," like herself,
"learned from their reading that females are the bystanders and the
comforters and the sufferers, not the adventurers" (13).

The immediate temptation, of course, is to rush to oppose this from
one's own experience (speaking personally, I tried to make sure that the
pockets of my cord pants were as resourcefully filled as those of Tom
Sawyer, attempted to build a shelter like Robinson Crusoe's, and, despite
her being nearly my namesake, lost interest in Susan Coolidge's Katy once
she discovered boys). Yet this aggressively personalized response is highly
indicative of the fact that there is something compelling about the so-
lipsistic activity of reading about reading. It is, on the one hand, narcis-
sistic, with the potential to be highly identificatory, especially when one
connects with memoirs of those who are more or less of the same gen-
eration: suddenly, it is as though someone else has taken over writing
about one's intimate past. Since the description, together with a record
of emotional response, is much more detailed than in conventional literary
criticism, one is immediately enfolded into a highly personalized inter-
pretive community. And yet, on the other hand, reading about the literary
habits of others also involves curiosity—even a kind of voyeurism, as we
are invited into what the authors themselves acknowledge to be highly
private moments. "All the reading I did as a child," writes the novelist
Lynne Sharon Schwarz in *Ruined by Reading: A Life in Books*, "behind
closed doors, sitting on the bed while the darkness fell around me, was
an act of reclamation. This and only this I did for myself. This was the
way to make my life my own" (1996, 119). Jane Tompkins tells of how
she read to fill her childhood sensations of emptiness and loneliness and
of how fiction gave her the opportunity to displace her personal anguish
onto the suffering of others. Of Will James's *Smokey* and Anna Sewell's
Black Beauty she writes, "I think the reason I love those books is that
they gave me a chance to cry for myself without seeming to. I could let
myself go, abject, awash in misery, because it was for this poor, abused
horse I was crying, the one who got stolen from his kind master and was
so cruelly treated, beaten, bruised, ignored, maligned, neglected, far from
home, in the hands of a brutal owner" (1996, 43). Nor is the intensity
of the personal encounter with texts necessarily restricted to reading one-
self into someone else's position. It may be related to the power of lan-
guage itself, to coming to a realization that words can provide power,

protection, and resistance. In *Once in a House on Fire*, Andrea Ashworth recounts:

> Whereas I used to hide the fact that I smoked cigarettes or swigged whisky or wagged days off school, the things I now kept secret at home were words. Long, complicated ones I discovered in stories by Jane Austen and Hardy and the Brontë sisters. . . . Short, simple ones that would sparkle unexpectedly in the middle of poems. *Long lion days. Life with a Hole in it. That vast moth-eaten musical brocade. The Importance of Elsewhere.*
>
> I worshipped Philip Larkin, who got stuck into the dullest corners of life and picked up ordinary, everyday stuff to smack you with art. *In the hollows of afternoons / Young mothers assemble . . . Behind them . . . An estateful of washing, / And the albums, lettered /* Our Wedding, *lying / Near the television.* It was as if he could step inside people's skin, to take photographs of them from the inside out:
> *Their beauty has thickened.*
> *Something is pushing them*
> *To the side of their own lives.*
>
> I would pore over the poetry anthology from school, feeling words gathering and buzzing inside me, like the mob of bees inside the box in Sylvia Plath's poem: *Small, taken one by one, but my god, together!* When Dad was having a go at me, poking his finger against the bony bit of my chest and ranting, assuring me I was good for nothing, I imagined letting them loose like swear words, only carrying a more beautiful sting. (1998, 259–60)

Or, as Brenda Daly, a survivor of childhood sexual abuse at the hands of her father, writes in *Authoring a Life: A Woman's Survival in and through Literary Studies*, reading can emphasize the power and importance of narrative. If victimhood leaves one in a position where it is impossible to imagine oneself the author of one's own life, learning to tell a story is essential to claiming a sense of agency. Furthermore, for Daly, reading brought her up sharply against emotional depths that she had been deliberately avoiding. In junior high, reading Edgar Allan Poe's stories, she "first encountered the darkness, the darkness I was always pretending not to know. Exploring this darkness became, for me, a strategy—a therapy—for emotional, spiritual, and cognitive survival" (1998, 37).

The presence of accounts of reading in recent memoirs, and the cultural work that these accounts perform—especially and inevitably in accounts penned by academics—is inseparable from the turn to the personal that

has been a noteworthy phenomenon in feminist literary study over the past decade or so, following in the wake of Rachel Brownstein's *Becoming a Heroine* (1982), which may now be seen as pioneering the trend. The place of the personal within literary study, and the ways in which it both counters yet could not exist without "high theory," has been well documented in *The Intimate Critique*, the volume edited by Diane P. Freedman, Olivia Frey, and Frances Murphy Zauhar (1993), in Nancy Miller's *Getting Personal* (1991), and in other works. Yet important though it is to recognize the role that individual experience plays in shaping our responses to what we read, our literary preferences and resistances, the language in which Daly describes her readerly exploration also serves as a warning. Reading may function as a form of therapy, but this personal appropriation of texts does not guarantee a compelling narrative or analysis for someone who is outside the protagonist's own mindset. This is particularly clearly demonstrated in Janet Mason Ellerby's *Intimate Reading: The Contemporary Women's Memoir* (2001), which analyzes this fertile genre, attributing its current popularity to "a hunger for connection with other people that springs from a particularly modern lack of intimacy" (190). In order to create a culture where women and children feel safe—both physically and emotionally safe—we need, Ellerby argues, "to heed Adrienne Rich's advice when she urges us (in *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence* [1979]) to talk to each other, to tell our life stories, to read aloud to one another the books that move and heal us, to read our own words to each other, to remember what has in the past been forbidden to mention" (Ellerby 2001, 145). *Intimate Reading* is itself centered around Ellerby's "unmentionable" past: the fact that she had a baby while a high school student and that she gave this daughter up for adoption. This part of the book is extraordinarily well told, its tone inviting understanding not just of Ellerby herself, or anyone who has an analogous painfully buried incident in her past, but of the societal pressures that constructed the conspiracy of silence in which she was compelled to participate. The problem, however, is that the other memoirs that she proceeds to discuss—other narratives of sexualized shame and silence, of trauma, of mental illness—seem only to matter to her in terms of her own past, continually leading her into a loop of repetition in which, effectively, she judges the success of these accounts according to whether or not they chime with her own working through her long and carefully guarded secret.

The fact that similarity of experience does not necessarily mean identification on the part of a reader—indeed, it might mean quite the opposite—is an important insight at which a number of contemporary memoirists arrive and one that, necessarily, bears importantly on one's

understanding of the diversity of women's reading experience. Marianna Torgovnick writes well about this when, in a chapter of her memoir about growing up Italian American, she interrogates the problematic implications of the word *we*. It offers, as she says, both the "bribe of authority and tradition" (1994, 142) but also has the potential to establish "false alliances" (142). It is employed at the cost of losing touch with the "'I' behind the 'we'" (142). It masks individuality and one's unique experience—yet to write in the first-person singular is to ignore what may be held in common, even if that commonality is a negative one: "To me it is axiomatic that Italian American females can and do write in many ways, about many topics, and with varied politics. There is no special identity, no natural sisterhood between Camille Paglia and Sandra M. Gilbert, for example, or Barbara Grizzuti Harrison and Mary Gordon—though all are Italian American females and writers. Still, and above all, writing as an Italian American woman means an awareness of paradox: reading, thinking, writing, finding a voice; imping onto a tradition of active intellectual life which has no branch marked Italian American and female" (1994, 150).

Such paradoxes are increasingly echoed from many quarters by those who come from minorities within the academy. At the same time they function as a reminder of how much work is still to be done, globally as well as domestically, on the actual reading habits and experiences of those whose access to print has not necessarily been shaped by dominant institutions, or whose responses have been formed through ethnic, as well as gendered, resistance to their norms—who, like Jamaica Kincaid's Lucy, are nauseated by the Wordsworthian resonances of daffodils or who are stimulated into writing by the failure to find a place for themselves in what they read. Toni Morrison explained that the genesis of *The Bluest Eye* lay in her need to find a voice for "the people who in all literature were always peripheral—little black girls who were props, background, those people who were never center stage and those people were me" (quoted in hooks 1997, ii). With the exception of McHenry's study, there seem to be curiously few studies to date of the part that reading plays in the lives of women of color within anglophone countries—despite the numerous testimonies in such autobiographical anthologies as *This Bridge We Call Home* (Anzaldúa and Keating 2002) and *Colonize This!* (Hernández and Rehman 2002), the transformative effects of writers such as bell hooks and Audre Lorde, Patricia Williams and Gloria Anzaldúa, and the pioneering contributors to *This Bridge Called My Back* (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983).

The time has come, too, to consider alternative analyses of the effects

that emotionally affective texts have on their readers. Too ready an assumption that affective responses stem from identification gets in the way of considering the power of rhetoric, as Robyn Warhol shows in her important new book, *Having a Good Cry: Effeminate Feelings and Pop-Culture Forms* (2003). As she reminds one at the start, "Reading is a physical act. Depending on how you look at it, reading is also a cognitive activity, a psychological process, a political engagement, an intertextual encounter, an aesthetic exercise, an academic discipline, a communitarian endeavor, a spiritual practice, a habit. But whatever else it may entail, reading always happens in and to a body. What is the somatic experience of taking in a narrative text? How does reading feel?" (ix). She cites D. A. Miller's influential discussion in *The Novel and the Police* (1988) of the somatic effects of reading Victorian sensation fiction and of how the physical impact of such novels was imagined in terms that effectively feminized male readers. Warhol sees in nineteenth-century theories of mind-body interactions a precedent for later twentieth-century challenges to the mind-body binarism. For she is well aware of the bodily effects of formulaically induced feelings and, in the tradition of confessional criticism, owns up to some weepy moments of her own. She is careful to separate *gendered* from *sexualized*, for her definition of feminized affect is dependent on a recognition of "the styles, the looks, the moves, the gestures, the postures, the inflections, and the touches that mainstream American culture has enforced and reinforced as appropriate to women's bodies or to men's" (Warhol 2003, 2), and this distinction is surely something that can usefully be taken further back than Miller. Warhol herself, for example, uses this distinction to suggest that, while Susanna Rowson's sentimental 1791 novel *Charlotte Temple* may well, as Davidson (1989) has argued, have worked on its audiences' emotions through their identification with its heroine, this might "not have been the only process at work in Rowson's crying readers. Many of the 'mechanical' techniques still operating in today's 'good-cry' texts must have been at least partly responsible for that first U.S. best-seller's emotional impact" (Warhol 2003, 20). Suggesting that our strong emotional responses are frequently not merely stimulated by the representation of a situation but are dependent on the author's manipulation (conscious or otherwise) of certain key stock rhetorical and narrative maneuvers draws attention to the mediating power of language and structure, reinstating, in other words, the importance of paying attention to the formal aspects of cultural expression in stimulating readerly responses.

In acknowledging that one might find oneself bursting into tears as readily at a shlock movie as when reading *King Lear*, Warhol is, impor-

tantly, directing her argument away from traditional hierarchies of literary value. In doing so she is implicitly severing gendered response from presumptions that have habitually been made about the relationship between gender and the preferences for certain literature genres. Nonetheless, work done during the past ten years has built on the important hypotheses that Modleski (1982) and Radway (1991) advanced about women's reading of the romance. For example, jay Dixon mounts a strong defense of the genre in *The Romance Fiction of Mills and Boon, 1909–1990s* (1999), not least in the evidence she produces that shows how recent "romance writers have adapted certain creeds of both the First and Second Waves of feminism to fit the dominant beliefs which their own writings exemplify. In particular, both feminist philosophy and romance ideology demand a change in the way sexual, emotional, economic and working relationships between men and women are conducted. They both have a Utopian vision of a society which puts women's desires first, where men adapt themselves to women's needs, and not vice versa, and where there is no perceived difference between the status and social position of men and women" (194–95).

Other research has brought out how, at various periods, women readers have explicitly been publishers' targets when it came to the promotion of certain types of literature. In the introduction to their collection of essays, *Middlebrow Moderns: Popular American Women Writers of the 1920s* (2003), Lisa Botshon and Meredith Goldsmith tell how middle-class female readers "found themselves the objects of the burgeoning middlebrow culture industry of the 1920s, which proposed to use literature as a vehicle for self-improvement, to protect literary and cultural values in a moment of enormous cultural flux, and, perhaps most importantly, to sell books in an increasingly fluid literary marketplace" (9). Taking advantage of the publishing climate, writers used the sentimental traditions that they inherited both to appeal to conventional readers and to mask their political and social ambitions in a way that covertly allowed them to enter into a public sphere of opinion and culture making. Radway's detailed and readable account of the history and workings of the Book-of-the-Month Club, *A Feeling for Books: The Book-of-the-Month Club, Literary Taste, and Middle-Class Desire* (1997), is an exemplary and symptomatic piece of book history that calls tacit attention to gender issues throughout. It draws on personal reminiscence insofar as Radway's own access to books as a girl throws light on conditions of reading in the recent past and on how middlebrow books "modeled a form of subjectivity and structured desire in a way that was recognizable to readers like me precisely because we had *already* reaped certain benefits" from the accidents of their class and

race (351). *A Feeling for Books* also shows the combination of principles—ones that applauded accessible yet thoughtful writing and placed the needs of the intelligent general reader above those of the academy—and personalities that underpinned the influential concatenation of commerce and culture that the Book-of-the-Month Club represented. And it arrives at an understanding of why Radway chose to write *Reading the Romance* (1991) at a time when feminist literary study was less concerned with popular culture than it is today: "In some ways it was my unknowing act of homage to a universe I had rejected, a universe of woman readers who managed to cobble together the planks, nails, nuts, bolts, joists, and beams necessary for self-fashioning from books and histories framed only to reveal the architecture of lives lived by men" (1997, 350–51).

This shared heritage of literary construction workers may, in the long run, be what binds women readers of the past—and the study of them—together. For if one thing has emerged from the empirical studies of the past ten years, and from the detail that is emerging about the specific patterns of women's reading and the ways in which women historically have read, it has been the impossibility of generalizing, whether about what women read or how we process print. *Victorian Sensation*, James Secord's remarkable (2001) history of one book—Robert Chambers's anonymously published *Vestiges of the History of Creation*—serves, among many other purposes, as a counterblast to any easy assumption that the sensationalism Victorian women fell for was that found in the fiction of Mary Braddon or Ellen Wood, whose plots foregrounded adultery, bigamy, and other scandalous crimes; he shows the cross-class, cross-gender appeal of this provocative scientific work. On a much smaller scale, but no less telling in its conclusions, Barbara Sicherman's study of *Little Women* as a cultural phenomenon sets out to show "what it can tell us about the relationship between reading and female identity" (1995, 247) and finds that "not all readers of *Little Women* read the same text" (264). How it was read depended, among other factors, on a reader's "experiences and aspirations. It has been read as a how-to manual by immigrants who wanted to assimilate into American, middle-class life and as a means of escaping that life by women who knew its gender constraints too well" (264). Moreover, Sicherman demonstrates how skilled many readers were at refusing to internalize the marriage ending for Jo (something made easier, of course, by the fact that Louisa May Alcott bucks convention by having her marry not Laurie, the more conventional romance figure, but the rumpled Professor Bhaer). Like so many of the readers of the book clubs discussed earlier, women readers of *Little Women* have been adept at appropriating the materials that best suit their own ends. Hooks writes

for many when she remembers how, as a child, "I find remnants of myself in Jo, the serious sister, the one who is punished. I am a little less alone in the world" (1997, 77).

Reading—like the field of women's studies—provides a nexus of interdisciplinarity. Its very practice is inextricably bound up with theories of cognition, of association, and of memory, and hence with the intersection of neurology, psychology, and philosophy, of body and mind, an intersection that allows one to attempt to explain the work that texts perform in relation to both individuals and reading communities. The circumstances of reading, whether today or in the past, raise sociological questions of access to the written word: the availability of books for loan or purchase; restrictions and taboos governing the right to use or discuss them; matters of personal space, silence, and solitude; social obligations; and oral sharing. Reading continues to be both a means of escape and a way of taking risks with both the intellect and the imagination. It is a means of inward, social, and political exploration. As research continues to show, reading has historically been a route into the formation of womanhood according to conventional dictates, a path through which to resist expectations, and a stimulus to writing. And, as more contemporary testimony continues to show, it can still perform these functions for women. This is what Nafisi articulates when she describes what the discussion of fiction could provide for her reading group in Tehran—an opportunity for that simultaneous recognition of individuality and solidarity with which reading has historically provided women: "It allowed us to defy the repressive reality outside the room—not only that, but to avenge ourselves on those who controlled our lives. For those few precious hours we felt free to discuss our pains and joys, our personal hang-ups and weaknesses; for that suspended time we abdicated our responsibilities to our parents, relatives and friends, and to the Islamic Republic. We articulated all that happened to us in our own words and saw ourselves, for once, in our own image" (2003, 57).

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Feminist Interpretations of the Philosophical Canon

As graduate students in philosophy in the late 1970s, we learned that almost every philosopher who had ever lived was male, and what little we learned about what these male philosophers thought about women was negative and degrading. To be perfectly honest, I can recall studying exactly one female philosopher (G. E. M. Anscombe), and I can remember only one class discussion of G. W. F. Hegel's views on women.[1] I recall annoyance at my professor's gleeful description of Hegel's assessment of women and the secondary (yet necessary) theoretical role women play in his political thought, but we all shared the assumption that whatever Hegel thought about women just wasn't all that important. For the most part what we learned about women in the history of philosophy was nothing.[2]

For the past six months I have had on my bookshelf twenty-four vol-

I would like to dedicate this essay to the memory of Susan Moller Okin, whose groundbreaking and important feminist work on the history of Western political thought inspired many of us in our research (see Okin 1979).

[1] It is noteworthy that the Re-reading the Canon Series discussed in this essay does not include a volume on Anscombe, who was a very influential thinker in certain circles. She died in 2001. John Haldane ends her online obituary: "She certainly has a good claim to be the greatest woman philosopher of whom we know, and to have been one of the finest philosophers of the twentieth century" (http://ethicscenter.nd.edu/news/documents/Haldob.pdf). One obvious reason for Anscombe's neglect by most feminists is her lifelong opposition to abortion.

[2] In part this was because analytic philosophy dominated the American scene in the 1970s, and it cultivated an ahistorical methodology. Analytic philosophers, modeling philosophy on science, were genuinely perplexed concerning what value the history of philosophy might have for philosophy and for philosophy's main function, which was solving philosophical problems. Consequently, analytic philosophers read only those philosophers who in one way or another were seen to prefigure a contemporary philosophical problem. And, prior to the development of feminist philosophy, there was no problem that might provoke interest in what earlier thinkers had said (or not said) about women. The absence of women philosophers in the historical record was considered a matter of fact and not a very philosophically interesting one at that. While continental philosophy did not disconnect philosophy from its history, and, indeed, in some cases stressed its historical horizons, the end result was no different with regard to women—as my Hegel anecdote attests.

umes in the Re-reading the Canon Series (edited by Nancy Tuana), which
were published beginning in 1994.[3] There are six more volumes in the
wings.[4] The series has the bold ambition of making feminist assessments
of canonical philosophy widely available, and it has realized that ambition.
Its broad reach includes the full sweep of the historical canon, including
great philosophers of both the analytic and the continental traditions.
Each volume contains a broad range of feminist interpretations of an
individual philosopher, from Plato to David Hume to Martin Heidegger.
My own contribution appears in the Aristotle volume (Witt 1998). Re-
reading the Canon will be of interest and value to philosophers, feminist
theorists, political scientists, historians, and other scholars in the human-
ities. An earlier appreciation of Re-reading the Canon provides an alter-
native overview of the purposes of the series and a focus on volumes
different from those I have chosen to discuss here (Alcoff 2000).

All but five of the books in the series consider the thought of male
philosophers; of women philosophers, only Mary Wollstonecraft, Simone
de Beauvoir, Hannah Arendt, Mary Daly, and Ayn Rand are included.
Their inclusion is both puzzling and provocative, and I will have more
to say about the canon, the history of philosophy, and how to include
women in either later on. In light of my graduate education, typical of
philosophy in the 1970s, it is worth reviewing briefly how it is that this
series (and the profusion of similar collections and monographs published
over the past twenty-five years) could exist at all.[5] How did our under-
standing of the philosophical canon change so radically that, once silent
on the topic of women and feminism, it now speaks in volumes?

As is well known, recent feminist scholarship grew out of an active
social movement that began in the late 1960s and demanded the equality
of the sexes and the end of male oppression.[6] These political goals were
soon transferred to academic contexts as activist feminists began to ex-
amine both the assumptions of their disciplines and the structure of the

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[3] See Tuana 1994, Honig 1995, Simons 1995; Falco 1996, 2004, Hekman 1996; Mills
1996; Holland 1997; Leon and Walsh 1997; Schott 1997a; Freeland 1998; Oliver and
Pearsall 1998; Bordo 1999, Gladstein and Sciabarra 1999; Murphy 1999, Hoagland and
Frye 2000; Jacobson 2000; Chanter 2001; Holland and Huntington 2001, Seigfried 2001;
Code 2002, Lange 2002; Scheman and O'Connor 2002; Nelson and Nelson 2003.

[4] See Di Stefano forthcoming; Gatens forthcoming; Heberle forthcoming; Hirschmann
and McClure forthcoming; Olkowski forthcoming; Stark forthcoming.

[5] See Lloyd (1984) 1993, 2002; Bordo 1987, LeDoeuff 1991; Tuana 1992; Bar On
1996a, 1996b; Ward 1996; Deutscher 1997; Alanen and Witt 2004.

[6] For a useful comparative study of the emergence of feminist work in five disciplines,
including philosophy, see DuBois et al. 1985.

academy itself. During the same period, and independently of the advent of feminism and feminist scholarship, some philosophers and historians of philosophy began to reconsider the relationship between philosophy and its history as it was understood by analytic philosophy (Rorty, Schnee-wind, and Skinner 1984). The confluence of these two movements, one primarily political and the other primarily intellectual, began a new debate over the relationship between philosophy and its history, over how canons of philosophy are formed and how they change, and it raised broad ques-tions of inclusion and exclusion in the academy.

Of course, both the political origin and the practical orientation of feminist scholarship are perfectly compatible with feminist scholarship con-tributing significantly to what we know about the history of philosophy. There is no reason to think that an interested, or pragmatic, search for truth and knowledge is impossible or that it is any less likely to succeed than a disinterested approach. Quite the contrary. It was precisely feminist scholars' situatedness as women and their pragmatic interests as feminists that made possible their significant contribution to the search for complete historical truth and genuine historical knowledge.[7] For example, the "dis-covery" of women philosophers and the recovery of their thought in the history of philosophy simply would not have happened without the advent of feminism and the interested work of women scholars.

The fact that feminist scholarship has an explicitly political goal (the equality of the sexes and the end of male oppression) puts it on a collision course with philosophy's traditional self-image as the disinterested search for truth and knowledge. Indeed, in relation to that self-image of philos-ophy, it is not surprising that the integration of feminist work into the philosophical canon has been problematic or that its claim to be truly phil-osophical has been questioned. Recent philosophy in both the analytic and the continental schools contains resources for changing the terms of debate concerning the pragmatism of feminist thought and the overt situatedness of feminist philosophers. In particular, as I discuss later, analytic philosophy following W. V. Quine has emphasized pragmatism and holism with regard to knowledge and belief. And continental philosophy following Heidegger has developed the idea of the pragmatic situatedness of human beings. The philosophical tradition itself offers different ways of thinking about what

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[7] The volumes of Re-reading the Canon do contain some essays by men, as do other volumes of feminist work in the history of philosophy. A feminist orientation in theory or practice is available to both male and female philosophers, although women predominate in the field. This suggests that feminist work in the history of philosophy is often motivated by the philosophers' situatedness as women as well as by their feminist politics.

philosophy is, what it does, and who does it. These perspectives, I believe, can help formulate strategies of integration for feminist philosophy, including feminist history of philosophy.

I have argued elsewhere that feminist work on the history of philosophy divides into three basic categories: scholarship that revises the history of philosophy to include women philosophers, research that catalogs the explicit or theoretical misogyny of a canonical philosopher (or a historical period), and an exploration of what resources the tradition might hold for feminist purposes (Witt 2004). The first two categories of feminist work make clear contributions to the truth of the historical record of philosophy, and the third category provides new resources for feminist theory and opens up new avenues of interpretation of the classics. Most of the essays in the Re-reading the Canon Series explore issues of the third sort by debating a given canonical philosopher's potential for feminist theory, although many volumes also include discussions of sexism in a philosopher's work and in traditional interpretations of that work. Debates over the utility for feminist theory of a given philosopher inevitably raise broad questions about what feminism is and what kinds of theoretical resources it requires. Moreover, since feminist approaches to the history of philosophy have also helped, along with other trends in the field, to reawaken interest in and debate over the relationship between philosophy and its history, we might wonder what can be learned on that topic from Re-reading the Canon (LeDoeuff 1991; Freeland 2000; Lloyd 2000). I will return to these larger issues later. First, I want to consider how feminist work in the history of philosophy has amplified our understanding of that history by correcting the wholesale omission of women philosophers.

Rewriting the canon: Feminist revisions to the history of philosophy

Re-reading the Canon provides only a glimpse of the wide range of work done by feminist historians of philosophy seeking to reinscribe into history the names of forgotten women philosophers.[*] At first glance this limitation seems unproblematic since the series has another focus, namely, to provide feminist interpretations of canonical philosophers, and recently "discovered" women philosophers are certainly not part of the canon. But then Wollstonecraft, Beauvoir, Arendt, Daly, and Rand are not canonical figures in the normal sense of the term. Indeed, until very recently none of them

[*] The series volume on René Descartes is an exception; it contains four excellent essays on women philosophers influenced by Descartes (Harth 1999; O'Neill 1999; Perry 1999; Wartenberg 1999).

even received mention, let alone extended discussion, in standard reference works in philosophy.

The 1967 *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Edwards 1967), with articles on more than nine hundred philosophers, turns up no entry for Arendt and not even a mention of Beauvoir, Wollstonecraft, or Rand.[9] Important women philosophers from earlier periods are missing as well: Hypatia, Anne Conway, Elizabeth of Bohemia, Damaris, Lady Masham. In sharp contrast, the 1998 *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Craig 1998) has entries for all of them and for many other important women philosophers.[10] The documentation of scores of women philosophers who would otherwise not have found their legitimate places in the history of philosophy is a major achievement of feminist historians of philosophy over the past twenty-five years. Mary Ellen Waithe's pioneering *History of Women Philosophers* (1987–91) must be mentioned in this connection, although many other scholars have done important work, especially on women philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Wider 1986; Atherton 1994; O'Neill 1999). This is an enormous, ongoing scholarly project that includes extensive archival work, editing, and translating in order to make available for the first time in English the work of many forgotten women philosophers (Shapiro 2004).

As we know more and more about the existence and texts of women philosophers, questions arise concerning how to integrate them into the history of philosophy. Re-reading the Canon exemplifies one problem that faces those who would include women philosophers in the history of philosophy or in the canon. Given that the women philosophers included in the series are not canonical, why include *these* five women philosophers rather than others? Why include Arendt and Beauvoir rather than Anscombe and Iris Murdoch, who are arguably women philosophers of equal importance? Perhaps the inclusion of the five (and the omission of many other equally worthy women [or men] philosophers) was simply a practical matter of finding interested potential editors rather than a principled editorial decision. But the question I want to discuss is: What could serve as a principle underlying that decision? I raise this question because the brief list of women philosophers seems arbitrary in a way that the much longer list of men philosophers does not (even though some of them are arguably not canonical figures). Why is this?

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[9] There is no entry for Daly, but this is not surprising since her first book was published in 1965 (Daly 1965)

[10] Daly does not have an entry, but she is mentioned several times in the "Feminist Theology" entry.

One reason is that philosophers often find it difficult to believe that women philosophers were omitted from philosophy's history just because they were women. And the reason they find it difficult to believe, even in the face of considerable evidence, is that philosophy presents itself as a gender-neutral activity and discipline. If a woman was omitted, there must have been good reason—she was not a philosopher at all or not a significant philosopher or not an original philosopher—take your pick. A recent dispute over whether Elizabeth of Bohemia warrants the title philosopher is an example of this phenomenon (Alanen 2004). The aura of arbitrariness that hovers over the five women philosophers included in the series draws on the same underlying intuition, which is that they were included just because they were women, and since philosophy is a gender-neutral discipline, that criterion is arbitrary. Notice that this image can withstand even the evidence of gender specificity presented in many of the essays in Re-reading the Canon because the gender neutrality of philosophy is normative and therefore not amenable to mere empirical refutation.

However, even if we become convinced that women philosophers really were omitted just because they were women and that therefore their inclusion as women is a necessary adjustment of the historical record, there still remains a question of how best to achieve this. How can they be rewoven into the history of philosophy so that they are an integral part of that history? In a recent essay, Lisa Shapiro (2004), considering the case of women philosophers in the early modern period, argues that it is not enough simply to add a woman philosopher or two to the reading list to rectify women's past exclusion. Rather, according to Shapiro, we need to find a stronger thread that provides internal reasons (rather than an external, feminist motivation on the part of the teacher or editor) for the inclusion of women.

One way to do this is to show how certain women philosophers made significant contributions to the work of male philosophers on central philosophical issues. We could call this the "Best Supporting Actress" approach in that the central cast remains male and the story line of philosophy is undisturbed. It is a good strategy for several reasons: it is relatively easy to accomplish, and it provides an internal anchor for women philosophers. On the other hand, it reinforces the secondary status of women thinkers, and if this were the only way of integrating women philosophers, that would be an unfortunate result. The wholly inadequate interpretation of Beauvoir's philosophical thought as a mere application of Jean-Paul Sartre's is a good example of the limitations of this strategy. Not only does it reinforce a secondary, handmaiden role for Beauvoir, but it also

promotes a distorted understanding and appreciation of her thought (Simons 1995).

Alternatively, we could find in the work of women philosophers issues that they have developed in a sequential fashion. Shapiro suggests that there are certain philosophical issues concerning women's rationality, nature, and education that women philosophers of the seventeenth century discuss extensively in a sequential, interactive fashion. The thread extends into the following century in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Wollstonecraft.[11] Since philosophers become canonical as part of a story anchored at one end by contemporary philosophical questions that are thought to be central, the task would be to make these questions ones that we turn to the tradition for help in answering. And, of course, these are precisely the central questions posed and discussed extensively by contemporary feminism. Thus, the idea is that as we pose new kinds of questions to the history of philosophy we will find in women philosophers an important, sequential discussion that we can securely thread into our curricula and textbooks.

However, as evidenced by Re-reading the Canon, just raising questions concerning women, rationality, and related issues need not do anything to include women philosophers in the conversation since these feminist questions are put to a mostly male cast of performers. So it may be the case that, at this stage, we still need an external motivation to include women philosophers, at least to the extent of insisting that it is important to hear what women philosophers thought on those topics because those views are generally overlooked and because their views might be of particular relevance since each of them lived as a woman and as a thinker.

Without discounting the subtle problems outlined by Shapiro, therefore, I endorse all three strategies for integrating women philosophers; at this relatively early stage of the process I think that we need them all. There is nothing wrong with a purely external approach. By all means one should include a woman philosopher on a topic just to provide an indication that there are some interesting and important women working on a particular topic. And the strategy of anchoring a woman philosopher's work to a male canonical figure can also be a useful strategy as long as it is done in a manner that preserves the independence and originality of her work. Finally, it is important to ask new questions of the tradition,

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[11] Re-reading the Canon includes volumes on both Wollstonecraft (Falco 1996) and Rousseau (Lange 2002) It is interesting to note that the feminist interpreters of Rousseau do not use Wollstonecraft, and she is mentioned only a few times.

questions that might allow some women philosophers to play a starring role rather than a walk-on part. Most of the volumes in the Re-reading the Canon Series are intent on bringing feminist questions to bear on canonical texts written by male philosophers. As we will see in the next section, this approach not only has shed new light on their views of women and the role of gender in their thought but also has illuminated other aspects of their theories as useful for feminist theorizing.

Appropriating the canon: Feminist uses of the history of philosophy
One of the great strengths of Re-reading the Canon is its inclusive conception of the philosophical canon; the series includes both major and minor philosophers from the past (Plato *and* Niccolo Machiavelli) as well as leading contemporary figures from both the analytic and the continental traditions (Quine *and* Heidegger). Simply from the point of view of teaching and curriculum, the series allows anyone teaching a canonical figure (past, present, analytic, continental) to have available a broad range of feminist interpretations of that figure from which to choose. The meager number of volumes on women philosophers is an ironic but serious shortcoming of the series in this context. Still, the provision of generally high-quality feminist scholarship to the philosophical community is a significant accomplishment.[12]

The inclusion of contemporary philosophers, some of whom are still living, helps bridge the gap between the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy. The reader cannot simply dismiss the present relevance of a feminist interpretation on the ground that "it's all ancient history." And the inclusion of the greats (and not-so-greats) of both the analytic and the continental traditions forecloses on the claim of one school or the other to be intrinsically more hospitable either to women or to the concerns of feminist thinking (though Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas, despite the heroic efforts of their feminist interpreters, do seem like throwbacks to the worst of the nineteenth century and lost causes to this reviewer).

Given this extremely broad historical and doctrinal range, it is not surprising that the focus of feminist interpretation varies as well. Unlike earlier feminist work on canonical figures, most of the volumes do not elaborate in great detail the sexist comments of past philosophers, nor do

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[12] The volume on Rand (Gladstein and Sciabarra 1999) stands out for its poor level of scholarship and meager philosophical content. While there are weak individual papers in other volumes, and an uneven level of editorial consistency among volumes, this is to be expected given the size of the project.

they focus exclusively on the negative theoretical role that women or gender play. True, Immanuel Kant's supercilious views of women, ethics, and philosophy ("I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles" [Schott 1997a, 324]) are ably recounted by Hannelore Schroder (1997) and Robin Schott (1997b) in their contributions to *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant* (Schott 1997a). And the Hegel volume does include critical discussion of the fact that he places full ethical life outside the grasp of women, who are also (and not coincidentally) unfit for philosophy (Benhabib 1996). Unsurprisingly, the volumes on Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche contain papers that record each author's sexism and misogyny (Watkin 1997; Clark 1998), although other essays explore the resources that their philosophies offer for feminism. Keeping in mind the inevitable diversity in a large project, Re-reading the Canon primarily excavates the texts of mostly male, mostly great philosophers in search of useful ideas or fruitful theories for feminism. It marks a second stage of feminist commentary on the philosophical canon. The volume on Aristotle is typical in that it assumes, and builds upon, a foundation of feminist criticism of Aristotle's overt misogyny in considering (and debating) other important feminist issues, including the utility of his thought for feminist projects (Freeland 1998). The Aristotle volume broaches many interesting issues, including questions concerning method in the history of philosophy. Should feminist readings adhere to polite rules of historical interpretation, including the principle of charity? Or can they use irony, parody, and humor as well? Should they attempt to loosen or to tighten a knot in Aristotle's thought? Reading Aristotle from a feminist perspective also raises interesting questions about what feminism and a feminist perspective are. Can we simply mine Aristotle's texts for useful or interesting nuggets, or should we always regard his thought with suspicion? And, if we do endorse appropriation, we might wonder what makes an idea or theory useful or interesting for feminism and hence worthy of appropriation by feminists? What counts as a feminist appropriation?

The origin of feminist philosophy in a movement for political change provides one criterion for what might count as feminist philosophy, including feminist work in the history of philosophy. Feminist philosophers bring questions about women to the history of philosophy because they are interested in political change for women, and they wonder what resources the tradition might offer and what obstacles it might contain. Therefore one criterion for what counts as a feminist interpretation is that it yield pragmatic results for feminist theory and politics. So, one way canonical philosophers (no matter what they might have said about women or the role of gender in their theories) can serve as a resource is by

providing concepts and theories that are directly useful for framing feminist politics. We find this kind of direct political resource discussed (and debated) in the volumes on Arendt, Beauvoir, Rousseau, Plato, and others. While feminist interpreters do not embrace any of these philosophers' thoughts without criticism, there is a clear and direct connection between these philosophers' ideas and theories and the political goals of feminism broadly construed, and these volumes examine their ideas in relation to that connection.

We find a second, less direct appropriation of philosophical ideas for feminist purposes in other volumes, like those on Heidegger and Quine. These collections of feminist interpretations do not appear to meet the pragmatic criterion because there is no direct or obvious link between the ideas or theories under discussion and feminist theory or politics. Neither Heidegger nor Quine seems to provide much traction for feminist interpretations because they do not discuss women, feminism, ethics, or political philosophy.[13] How could ideas or theories culled from entirely non-political, nonnormative theoretical projects provide inspiration for feminist theory, which must have a practical and normative dimension?

Given the philosophical chasm that divides them, the Heidegger and Quine volumes have fascinating similarities. Both open with a discussion of the puzzling lack of attention by feminist theorists to the philosopher and his work, and each maintains that this neglect is mistaken. Yet in light of what follows, that neglect seems neither puzzling nor mistaken. Both collections begin with introductions of more than fifty pages, which include long interpretations of each philosopher's thought that do not mention any issues pertinent to feminism; clearly, it is possible to provide a full description of the outlines of these theories without connecting them, either positively or negatively, to feminist projects. Why isn't benign neglect of their work by feminist interpreters perfectly sensible? And how can an appropriation of their ideas count as feminist given the pragmatic criterion?

Heidegger's philosophical writing is "suprapolitical, seemingly esoteric, and nonempirical" (Holland and Huntington 2001, 2) and explicitly gender neutral in the central figure of Dasein, an embodied, but not gendered, way of being. In her introduction, Patricia Huntington stresses the nonpragmatic character of Heidegger's thought, which puts it at odds with my suggested condition for feminist philosophy—namely, that it have a

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[13] We know that both philosophers were conservative politically; Quine was a public supporter of Richard Nixon during the Vietnam War era; and Heidegger was a supporter of National Socialism and Adolf Hitler during the 1930s.

political goal: "The simple truth is that Heidegger's thought resists usage, 'being put to work' for ends of any kind, in a fundamental way" (Huntington 2001, 2). Yet Huntington describes Heidegger as a "seminal" theorist of interest to women and feminists because of his rejection of Western metaphysical thinking. Huntington emphasizes the resources in Heidegger for ecofeminism and feminist theology, and she holds up Heidegger's work tracing the metaphysics of presence in the Western philosophical tradition as a model for recent feminist work on the history of philosophy such as that of Luce Irigaray.

Since Quine is a neopragmatist and a friend of instrumental reason, his philosophical writings are apolitical in a different way from Heidegger's. Beginning with a radical critique of logical positivism, Quine's writings center on basic issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science, areas of thought that do not lend themselves in any obvious way to questions about gender or sex, on the one hand, or to thinking about political change, on the other. Yet the contributors to the volume explain how Quine's thought provides resources for feminist philosophers of science and epistemologists, especially for feminist critics of the logical positivist tradition. The basic idea is that feminist critics of science and its methods and of traditional philosophy of science can find important resources for these critiques in Quine. For example, Louise Antony ([1992] 2003) argues that naturalized epistemology provides an account of theory bias that might be useful for feminists, and other authors stress Quine's holism and naturalism as positive elements for feminists thinking about science and knowledge (Nelson [1990] 2003; Duran 2003).

The value of these philosophers for feminist theory and practice is indirect. Each connects to feminism via independent assumptions concerning the requirements of feminist theory. For example, we can find two basic assumptions connecting Heideggerian thought with feminism. One concerns Heidegger's understanding of the significance of the history of philosophy for philosophy, including feminism—in other words, the present significance of the philosophical tradition for feminism. This idea is central to the work of Irigaray and others, who think about women and gender through understanding their suppression in the history of philosophical thought. The second is an assumption about the relationship between feminism and modernity, namely, that feminist theory cannot be properly formulated using the concepts, theories, or presuppositions of the modern period. The articulation of this position can find much of use in Heidegger. But, of course, not all feminists would agree with the relevance to feminist projects of the two bridge theses.

In particular, I suspect that the feminist interpreters of Quine would

find little of interest for feminism there. Rather than reject the assimilation of all thinking with the methods and assumptions of the sciences characteristic of modernity (including instrumental reason), these feminists think that Quine has something important to offer them precisely with regard to our understanding of the sciences. For example, Quine's holism might provide an important resource to feminist philosophers of science interested in questioning the distinction between the origin and the justification of scientific theories. Quine's naturalism shifts the focus from viewing science as a normative, justificatory project whose structure can be probed in ideal terms to understanding science as the activity and product of human beings working in concrete cultures and specific contexts of inquiry. These "nuggets" are useful for those feminists who think it is important to engage critically with science, with what science tells us about being human, being female, and gender, because science is an important authority and source of knowledge in our culture. These assumptions are not shared, of course, with our sampling of Heideggerian feminists.

As we have just seen, Re-reading the Canon illuminates as much about issues in contemporary feminism as it does about what the views of canonical philosophers concerning women, gender, and political philosophy look like considered from a feminist perspective. Indeed, the series shows that there are many feminist perspectives from which to read and reread the philosophical canon. The very best essays in these collections prompt us to consider not only what we feminists can appropriate from canonical philosophy but also what we feminists ought to borrow from it. The inclusion of a wide range of philosophical perspectives is particularly useful in this regard since it disallows an overly simplified view of feminist thinking.

When it comes to appropriating the past, feminist historians of philosophy have been dexterous, imaginative, and greedy. They have provided many threads to connect feminist philosophy internally to the canon. One thread asks what the history of philosophy says or doesn't say about women and gender. Another thread considers women's nature, reason, and education. A third considers the history of political thought and ethics with an eye on the normative resources of Western philosophy. A fourth connects feminist issues to broad themes like the relation of philosophy to its history, the value and limitations of empiricism in the philosophy of science, and the legacy of modernity and the Enlightenment.

With so many themes and threads connecting feminist perspectives to issues in mainstream philosophy, their inclusion in teaching curricula and other academic contexts might seem a foregone conclusion. But it

is not, and I think the reason turns on the powerful self-image of philosophy as a nonsituated (gender-neutral) and nonpragmatic discipline, a self-understanding that is extremely resilient and resistant to alteration. It just seems deeply unphilosophical to include material in a philosophy course that is openly political and that transparently reflects the situation (the gender) of the author. What happens to the image of the disinterested, gender-neutral philosopher floating above all that and following reason wherever it may lead him?

There are many alternative ways to think about the person of the philosopher and the activity of philosophy. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, both Quine and Heidegger provide resources for understanding philosophy as a pragmatic activity engaged in by situated thinkers, even though neither of them considered gender in relation to the context of inquiry or to the situation of the inquirer. But we can use their ideas to reframe the self-image of the philosopher in ways more hospitable to women and feminist work. We can think about her as using philosophical and nonphilosophical resources to write about women, reason, and subjectivity, as Beauvoir did. Or we can think of her as passionately interested in the history of philosophy and what it has to say about the family and political justice, as Susan Moller Okin was. It seems to me that the routine but genuine inclusion of women philosophers and feminist perspectives into the discussion of philosophical topics goes hand in hand with a richer, more varied image of the philosopher, what she does, and why she does it.

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Book Reviews

Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende, 1964–1973. By Margaret Power. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.

Contentious Lives: Two Argentine Women, Two Protests, and the Quest for Recognition. By Javier Auyero. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

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The literature on women and politics in Latin America is moving in new and exciting directions. For much of the 1990s, accounts of women's political participation in the region documented the role of women in the transitions to democracy during the 1980s and early 1990s. In Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, a wide variety of women's movements, ranging from human rights groups to urban poor women and feminist organizations, challenged the military regimes and struggled to shape the democratic future. In Central America, human rights was the main focus, but the mobilization of women under the socialist government of Nicaragua, the demand for equal rights in traditionally democratic Costa Rica, and the timing of the democratic transitions added new dimensions to the significant shift in political culture that made women for the first time political actors in their own right. Women's movements may have lost ground after the return to democracy, as many now argue, yet today more women are elected and appointed to office, women's issues are on national agendas, and, at last count, thirteen countries have some form of electoral quotas for women. In Argentina, where this innovation has been most successful, women now hold over 30 percent of seats in the national legislature.[1]

[1] For a recent review of political representation and other data comparing women and men in the region, see Sylvia Chant with Nikki Craske, *Gender in Latin America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003).

The two books reviewed here provide provocative examples of the new trends in research. Margaret Power examines the origins and strategies of Poder Feminino (Feminine Power), the women's movement that pressured the military to carry out a coup against the elected socialist president of Chile, Salvador Allende, who held office from 1970 to 1973. Allende tried, against strong U.S. and domestic opposition, to bring about a radical redistribution of wealth and power in Chile. He was overthrown in a 1973 coup led by General Augusto Pinochet (1973–89), who then disbanded Poder Feminino (247). Power's study challenges the widely held assumption that women's movements are always progressive; it also shows that the 1973 coup was not due solely to U.S. machinations.

In Power's view, women's organizing was critical to the success of the anti-Allende movement in Chile and to the legitimacy of the military regime that replaced it. Poder Feminino involved poor and working-class as well as elite women; it mobilized members of the centrist Christian Democratic and the rightist National Party (3). She finds several reasons for its success. Chilean women had long been noted for their resistance to communism and, indeed, had been denied full suffrage until 1949 by parties fearful of women's conservative votes. A key reason for women's distrust, she argues, was the left's criticism of the family (chap. 3). Further, unlike the previous center and center-right governments, Allende's government concentrated on organizing male workers and paid inadequate attention to women.

Two conjunctural factors are also important. Early successes in Allende's economic reforms were succeeded by disruptions in production. Strikes by Chilean teamsters, supported in part by clandestine U.S. funds, cut off the flow of goods from the countryside to the cities and from Chile's ports to the interior. Women had the responsibility to see that their families were supplied with basic goods and food, and the strikes affected them directly, forcing them (or their maids, in the case of elite women) to stand in long lines and often do without. As the economic situation worsened, women became more desperate and more willing to go out into the streets. To this day Chile is polarized between those who support the center-left coalition that succeeded Pinochet and has held office since 1990 and those who would never vote for the current president, Ricardo Lagos, because he is a socialist associated with the "shortages and disorder" (1) of the Allende period.

The tactics of the elite leadership were very successful. Even before Allende took office, the National Party began an advertising campaign to build up women's fears of a "communist victory." As Power illustrates in

fascinating detail, there was a historical basis for a gendered campaign against the left. The event that turned the tide against Allende's government was the famous "March of the Empty Pots and Pans" of December 1971, when thousands of women protested Allende's policies and a visit by Fidel Castro. The march galvanized the opposition and convinced the women they could be a force in Chilean politics. That a women's march helped bring down Allende is generally known to those who study the region, but Power provides the historical background, interviews with key players, and analysis to permit a deeper assessment.

Power also draws some contemporary implications: Chile is still polarized, and gender is still a factor in that polarization, which has affected the trajectory of the women's movement in Chile and the legitimacy and capacity of the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM), or National Women's Service, Chile's women's ministry.[2] This helps explain why Chile is the only country in Latin America today where divorce was illegal until 2004. As Power observes, not without consternation, many women supported the overthrow of democracy not as dupes of men but as willing participants. When confronted with the facts of military abuse, as documented by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the discovery of mass graves, some denied the evidence, and others complained that Pinochet had been too soft on his enemies (Power, 257–58).

While Power looks at the period before military authoritarian regimes dominated the Southern Cone, Javier Auyero brings us into the post-authoritarian period in his compelling account of two women who engaged in two recent episodes of collective struggle against the consequences of neoliberal policies in Argentina in the mid-1990s. Auyero argues that the actions of the women he studied, neither of whom had prior experiences of militancy, were "sunk in a complex layer of biographical themes" (3) in which gender played an important role. Like other Argentineans, Laura and Nana were reacting to economic policies that deprived people of jobs and middle-class incomes and to corruption and dissatisfaction with their elected representatives. Laura was provoked to take a leadership role when she was attacked as ineffective by a fellow picketer because she was a woman. In Nana's case, Auyero argues that

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[2] Even the title National Women's Service is taken from an earlier conservative initiative. On the politics of SERNAM, see María Elena Valenzuela, "Women and the Democratization Process in Chile," in *Women and Democracy Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik, 47–74 (Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). For a comparative study of feminist outcomes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, see Mala Htun, *Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

her political activism was consistent with her earlier role—as a carnival queen. In both cases, he concludes, drawing on theories of signification and rejecting rational choice explanations of political action, the women (and their fellow protesters in general) were not primarily seeking material gain or political power but respect.

Auyero's "storytelling," as he calls it, probes the structural conditions that allow collective action and the complex individual motivations that make it happen. He is sensitive to how political events are interpreted as drama by participants and observers in an ongoing process of historical creation and contestation.

Contentious Lives and *Right-Wing Women in Chile* extend our historical and analytical knowledge of women's political mobilization in the Southern Cone. They offer contrasting but ultimately complementary ways of understanding why and how what was nearly unthinkable thirty years ago—that women and women's movements would become significant factors in Latin American politics—is now a fact, though not always in the ways or with the effects many expected.   ı

Ghosts of Slavery: A Literary Archaeology of Black Women's Lives. By Jenny Sharpe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.

Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden Frontiers. By Joane Nagel. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Elizabeth DeLoughrey, Cornell University

Although feminist theorists have long argued for the importance of engaging the multiple vectors of identity in women's studies, the field has tended to be recalcitrant about challenging the boundaries of national frameworks. Thus these two recent volumes are a welcome addition to the growing body of scholarship that engages the mutually constitutive relationships between gender, sexuality, race, and empire, particularly in the transatlantic context. In her ambitious *Ghosts of Slavery*, Jenny Sharpe assembles a compelling mosaic of black women's lives in the New World, deftly weaving between colonial and autobiographical texts as well as oral and printed archival materials. This work excavates paradigmatic figures of postcolonial study, from the eighteenth-century Jamaican Nanny of the Maroons to her contemporary in the Surinamese Joanna,

placing gender at the core of the historiography of slavery. Broad in its scope and historical context, the book aims to recover black women's narratives, paying tribute to the ghosts of the past without reducing these complex figures to facile tropes of resistance, assimilation, or romance— the very tropes that made their narratives so amenable to the colonial record in the first place.

Sharpe's first two chapters explore black women under slavery in the context of the domestic, defined here in both intimate and national terms. Of Nanny of the Maroons, she traces a genealogy of representations from her appearance in the colonial archive as an eighteenth-century rebel leader to her revitalization in the Jamaican nationalist movement, particularly by feminist writers. As a vital figure in oral tradition and living memory, Nanny is found to test the limits of colonial historiography much like the ways in which she has been attributed with the power to stop British bullets with her buttocks. Sharpe is cautious to pinpoint those moments in the colonial archive that seek to erase Nanny's historical agency and to connect her leadership as a complex sexual, defiant, and nurturing Obeah woman to African practices in the diaspora. While readers might expect a fuller exploration of why this figure has become such a powerful icon of Jamaican nationalism, Sharpe's investigation of gender and the domestic takes a more intimate turn with the subsequent chapter on Nanny's Surinamese contemporary, Joanna. By comparing the manuscript editions of John Stedman's 1796 *Narrative of a Five Years' Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam* alongside accounts by his colonial contemporaries, Sharpe deconstructs a visual and textual circulation of "the sable venus" (47) and builds on Mary Louise Pratt's argument that transatlantic romance narratives mystified the disparity of colonial relations through tropes of reciprocity and equal exchange.[1] Her examination of how idealized accounts of domesticity were encoded in the figure of the slave "mulatta" engages the plantation Americas in the era of slavery.

In the subsequent chapter Sharpe examines how antislavery discourse has traveled across the contemporary Atlantic and informs the works of British-Caribbean novelists such as Beryl Gilroy and Caryl Phillips. Given the ways in which Gilroy's son Paul has garnered critical attention as an icon of the black Atlantic in contrast to her own neglected legacy of critical and fictional work, it is particularly gratifying to see the ways in which her novelistic revision of Stedman's narrative, *Stedman and Joanna: A*

[1] John Gabriel Stedman, *Narrative of a Five Years' Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam* (London: J. Johnson, 1796); Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

Love in Bondage, functions as a woman-authored, transatlantic text. Sharpe finds that while Gilroy recovers a more complex rendering of gendered creolization in the plantation Americas, she "projects onto an eighteenth-century male-authored travel narrative a perspective on slavery that was developed by nineteenth-century abolitionists" (95), a charge that would be interesting to engage in terms of Gilroy's other historical rewrite, *Inkle and Yarico*.[2] Interestingly, Sharpe concludes that Gilroy brackets off the institutional impact of slavery, choosing to narrate Joanna's relationship with Stedman in terms that uphold rather than disrupt colonial romance (101).

In her concluding chapter Sharpe turns to autobiography, particularly narratives written by black women in slavery such as Harriet Jacobs and Mary Prince, to engage questions of morality, agency, and voice. By examining how feminist critics have excavated black women's subjectivity in the ruptures of the slave narrative, she explores the interweaving of moral and sexual agency in narratives that had to negotiate a complex and often contested reading public, but perhaps more importantly, she calls attention to the ways in which contemporary feminist reading practices "conceal the critic as agent of 'a black female voice'" (xxiv). The careful and historical distinctions Sharpe makes between narratives of subject liberation (Marxist, feminist, abolitionist) are an important and far-reaching contribution to feminist recovery projects.

An equally broad and ambitious book, Joane Nagel's *Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality* traces a sociological trajectory of the "ethnosexual" in the modern frameworks of nationalism, war, tourism, globalization, and empire. Her early chapters challenge the restrictive frames of these institutional paradigms by foregrounding the "cruising" and "crossing" of ethnosexual settlers, invaders, and adventurers from the Unites States and Britain to the Internet. While her subsequent chapters trace out a genealogy of the social construction of ethnosexual boundaries in the West, they are at times sketchy. For instance, key contributions such as Adrienne Rich's critique of heteronormativity are missing, while at other points the emphasis on the patrolling of social, legal, cultural, sexual, and other borders tends to uphold the very boundaries the volume is meant to deconstruct (44–46).[3]

[2] Beryl Gilroy, *Stedman and Joanna: A Love in Bondage* (London: Peepal Tree Press, 1991), and *Inkle and Yarico* (London: Peepal Tree Press, 1996).

[3] Rich's essay was first published in *Signs* and created a series of debates in this journal and elsewhere. See "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 5, no. 4 (Summer 1980): 631–60.

At the center of her book Nagel engages the intersections of sex with conquest, race in the Americas, nationalism, and war. Although the book is marketed for an undergraduate audience, it falters in its historiography of transatlantic empire, moving too quickly between the fifteenth-century Spanish Caribbean colonial context to the nineteenth-century Anglo-American west, missing the careful historicism of postcolonial scholars who have long theorized the complexities of these "contact zones" (to borrow from Pratt). Her subsequent chapter on the intersections of sex and race adopts Anne McClintock's theorization of the "porno-tropics" but discards this framework of climactic determinism to pursue a more tangential link to (temperate) Missouri, confusing the framework for a chapter that concludes "the sexual history of Africans in America lies at the heart of the social history of race in America" (125).[4] Although it has a broader geography, Nagel's subsequent chapter on sex and nationalism is more conceptually cohesive, as is her examination of the hypersexualization of local women during the peaks—all too evident today— of global militarization and hypermasculinity (190).

In those chapters that focus on the most current indices of ethnosexual rupture, we find Nagel's work to be at its most compelling and valuable. Her concluding chapters on the intersections between sex and tourism, globalization, and contemporary sex- and race-baiting are a welcome examination of the ways in which ongoing practices of exploitation are a vital dimension of a globalization that too often relegates these inequities to the past. However, there are some omissions. In a section on the colonial romance of the "dusky maiden" in Polynesia, Nagel glosses over the work of Margaret Jolly, who has specifically not argued, as Nagel has it, that all "the Pacific Islands thus were personified . . . as lovely, bare-breasted, beflowered, and deflowered young women."[5] In fact, Jolly has revealed the ways in which the Pacific region was literally and sexually mapped by European men through a binary opposition between presumably receptive eastern Pacific women ("Polynesians") against the purportedly more resistant women of the western Pacific ("Melanesians"). This chapter is also missing reference to a vital Pacific theorist, Teresia Teaiwa, and her groundbreaking work on the Bikini and Pacific "mili-

    [4] Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
    [5] Margaret Jolly, "From Point Venus to Bali H'ai: Eroticism and Exoticism in Representations of the Pacific," in *Sites of Desire, Economies of Pleasure: Sexualities in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Lenore Manderson and Margaret Jolly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 201.

tourism."[6] Nevertheless, like the subsequent chapter on globalization, this chapter engages usefully with subtopics such as romance tourism, men's sex work, sexual slavery, and the global traffic in children's bodies. But like the chapter on globalization, these sections tend to emphasize women's victimization in the world historical process, leaving little room to engage women's agency and activism at the global or local level. And while some readers might agree with Nagel that the ethnosexual is a foundational key to unlocking other social vectors of identity, they might rightfully question the ways in which this tool becomes heterosexual in its application to both the colonial archive and this feminist critique. ∎

[6] Teresia Kieuea Teaiwa, "bikinis and other s/pacific n/oceans," in *Voyaging through the Contemporary Pacific*, ed. David Hanlon and Geoffrey M. White (Lanham, MD. Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World. By Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies. By V. Spike Peterson. London: Routledge/RIPE Series in Global Political Economy, 2003.

Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion? Women's Movements and International Relations. Edited by Marianne Braig and Sonja Wölte. London: Zed, 2002.

Michelle V. Rowley, University of Cincinnati

Modern systems of profit maximization depend on historical inequities. These systems manipulate historically constructed weaknesses to their continued advantage through their capacity to morph and meander along a global Möbius strip. They course in search of the next marginal site of economic production, the next marginal body, their fuel derived from globalized stories about the absorptive capacity of these bodies and spheres. These systems do not leave a smooth road in their wake; they erode protective mechanisms within these marginal spheres, expelling a fictitious exhaust of "equality" and "a level playing field." Such ideologies gain credibility not only because of their sophisticated tech-

nologies of infiltration within national economies (e.g., offshore banking, flexible factories) but also because of capitalism's contemporary capacity to make itself understood as the only contemporary economic truth. This is the international political economy (IPE) of our postmodern world. Despite their very different points of departure, this is the world that each of these texts delineates and confronts.

Employing a traditional modernization analysis in *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World*, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris confront a simple yet overwhelming question: What are the factors that account for the rising tide of gender equality globally? In response, this ambitious and optimistic text tests two primary theses. The first is that "culture matters" (8): cultural traditions affect worldviews, and modernized shifts in attitude are precursors to gender equality (149). Their second argument of societal modernization maintains that due to economic growth societies experience a number of predictable patterns of social changes; economic development therefore equalizes gender relations (10–11). It is an argument that suggests that modernization reengineers cultural values and in so doing disrupts traditional gender roles by opening opportunities for women in the areas of education, work leading to mobility, empowerment, and parity (10–11).

V. Spike Peterson employs a decidedly more skeptical lens toward conventional international political economy analytical frames. *A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy*, as the title suggests, deconstructs and exposes the multifarious forms of power relations that exist among states. Peterson unmasks the supposedly apolitical nature of economistic models through her analyses of atypical categories such as reproductive and virtual economies. She also challenges the gender-neutral assumptions of macro political economy with an analysis of the importance of women's labor and bodies to the informal economy and to the global circulation of capital.

Similarly, Marianne Braig and Sonja Wölte's edited collection revisits the mainstream/malestream writing of international relations. The contributors explore the variable success that the women's movement has had in responding to "increasing global interlinkages and interdependencies [by] explicitly combin[ing] the local, national and international levels of political activism" (2). *Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion?* resuscitates the importance of forging strong transnational feminist linkages. A distinguishing feature of this text is the interdisciplinary dialogue that occurs among the contributors and across feminist camps to engage male, mainstream scholars and their views on the impact that feminism has had on the debates within their disciplines. The value of reading these texts as a

conversation among the authors is that they reflect, confront, or correct for what I see to be the three major forms of erasure prevalent in writings on political economy: erasure of place, politics, and personhood.

Inglehart and Norris employ a comparative quantitative analysis of approximately seventy nations, categorized by their level of societal modernization. Despite an extensive use of secondary country data, *Rising Tide* nonetheless reflects an erasure of place due to a number of homogenizing effects in the authors' writings. Their uncritical use of modernization theory reimposes a linear understanding of development, which in turn presents as innocuous the flows and exploitation of resources and bodies among differently empowered nations. As such the authors' conclusions are disconcerting but not surprising. Among their findings are the predispositions of richer postindustrial societies toward gender equality (29–48), that an Islamic religious heritage provides the "most powerful barrier to change" (49), and that women worldwide are more inclined to vote ideologically further left than men (75–126). However, because the authors never offer a comprehensive critique of modernization theory, many of their findings appear tautological. Variables such as race and ethnicity are strikingly absent from their cross-sectoral, gender, and generational analytical categories, producing a sense of homogeneity not only among but within nation-states.

While I agree that a country's cultural and socioeconomic climate can provide an important frame for gender equality, I remain skeptical that these two categories can offer a panacea for gender equality any more than modernization growth models have served to redress social inequity. Third-world feminists have long criticized the modernist assertion that "women's main problem in the Third World was insufficient participation in an otherwise benevolent process of growth and development."[1] In contrast, the contributors to Braig and Wölte's *Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion?* focus on the complexities of women's participation in development. As such they highlight the importance of a feminist lobby that is committed to the explicit politicization of the categories of culture and political economy as avenues toward gender equality as opposed to the predictable patterns of change that Inglehart and Norris suggest.

Rising Tide shows little awareness that modernization, as a form of liberal ideology, is primarily concerned with creating the conditions for profit maximization. Modernization is driven by what makes good cents; gender equality therefore remains incidental rather than pivotal to a mod-

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[1] Gita Sen, with Caren Grown, *Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), 15.

ernization framework. Inglehart and Norris's rendition of what can only be called trickle-down gender equality remains at best unattainable in a political economy where globalization demands new forms of feminized and racialized inequality to produce profit.

Peterson, in contrast, ensures that the politics of profit remains central to her arguments. She roots the historical antecedent of development firmly in competing systems of exploitation such as slavery, indentured labor, and imperialism (11). This continuity is today reflected in development narratives of cheap people (read women of color) and places (read the global South). Peterson is clear that the market matters, but not for the economistic reasons that are offered by neoliberal economists. The market matters because its survival now hinges on frequent shifts in production sites, shifts that result in feminized and racialized economic vulnerability within the South (59–68). The market matters because it bears within it forms of exploitation that rob newly emerging territories of any possibility of becoming sustainably competitive (54–58). The market matters, Peterson argues, because its very viability is premised on new forms of human rights infringements found in the conditions of work and new technologies of surveillance that discipline contemporary units of globalized labor (69).

Methodologically, Peterson seems to adhere to Christa Wichterich's call for the "reconstruction of knowledge and political systems through the systemic and coherent inclusion of the missing links" (Wichterich is a contributor in Braig and Wolte, 47). This is precisely the analytical approach that Peterson employs in her treatment of the reproductive economy. Caring work, Peterson argues, is discounted as a precontractual, natural phenomenon and therefore not recognized as integral to formal economic production, an erasure that results in gendered hierarchies of privilege. Her treatment of the (re)productive sphere blurs the boundaries between work and body, as well as between the private and public economies, by noting the increasing global trend toward informalization. However, in privileging the reproductive as biological, Peterson fails to explore the ways in which nonproductive aspects of women's sexuality are also manipulated within national economies to maintain heteronormative modes of capitalist production.[2] Beware, this is not an accommodating text, a feature that is most evident in Peterson's dogged unveiling of the

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[2] See M. Jacqui Alexander, "Erotic Autonomy as a Politics of Decolonization: An Anatomy of Feminism and State Practice in the Bahamas Tourist Economy," in *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*, ed. M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty (New York: Routledge, 1997), 63–100.

new forms of (il)legalities that provide the glue for the formal and informal economies, among them forms of tax evasion through offshore banking, the global drug and sex trades, and the exploitation and victimization of immigrants.

Another innovative feature of Peterson's work is her treatment of the virtual economy. She uses the term *virtual economy* to connote the increasing use of technology to facilitate exchanges of capital, symbols, and information (117–27). She characterizes this world of borderless banking and deterritorialized activity as "most crucial to adequately analyzing today's global political economy" (113). This quickly growing economy reconstructs the currencies and symbols that govern the transactions among states as well as the manner in which—and speed with which—these transactions occur. This is not an open sphere of abstraction but one that Peterson convincingly argues perpetuates and "reconfigures social power" (119). Peterson's categories are not merely new or expanded; rather, they contrast sharply with traditional positivist binaries. Employing the term *triad analytics*, Peterson advocates for a coconstituting approach where identity, meaning, and practice are read simultaneously as embedded in and coconstituting one another (40).

Peterson acknowledges that her work offers no blueprint for what to do, and while it would be desirable, a blueprint is not expected. Without being prescriptive, any critique of international political economy should sound a clear call to actors within the non-South to become agents of change and to demand greater levels of corporate and political accountability from within; trickle-down gender equality, like modernization approaches, is destined to fail. Some attempt toward the politicization of the individual within geographical realms of power, one that goes beyond the individual's role as a consumer, remains critical to confronting global inequity.

This need for a politicized personhood in the North is intimated by Nighat Said Khan, a contributor in Braig and Wolte's *Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion?* (45). This edited collection's strength is its analysis of the women's movement as a political actor and its various responses to the challenges of geopolitical subordination (see chapters by Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim, 136–44; Uta Ruppert, 147–59; and Akua Kuenyehia, 160–70). *Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion?* engages a long-standing debate around the effectiveness of locating women's rights as human rights within global politics (15). However, in the ongoing feminist critique of IPE and international relations, contributors, including Marysia Zalewski, remain skeptical that these masculinized and hierarchical macro systems can respond to a feminist critique given the gender inequity and resistance

that are embedded within them. This skepticism is exacerbated by the belief that the women's movement has lost its radical edge through the instrumentalization and professionalization of its agenda (see contributions by Khan, 36–43; Wichterich, 47; and Claudia von Braunmuhl, 55–77). Khan, for example, argues that the contemporary inclination to "do gender" compromises the subversive edge of the women's movement through its denial of patriarchy and, by extension, structure (40). The importance of maintaining the women's movement as a channel of transnational agency is present in Carolyn Medel-Añonuevo's contribution, which explores the clichéd use of the term *empowerment* (80–86). She nuances the term *empowerment* through ideas of "power to," as reflected in feminist capacity building and decision making, and "power with," in the context of social mobilization and alliance building. She contrasts these ideas with the less palatable but more mainstream "power over" (used to indicate a more conflicting, antagonistic use of power between the powerful and the powerless).

The question that arises for me from reading these three texts is if globalization has indeed eroded the integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state, can we expect the state to function as any kind of agent of change, much less one that is feminist? Where the state can so function, we should not expect that state managers will champion issues in response to moral suasion; gender-just change remains heavily dependent on strategic and goal-oriented forms of political advocacy by feminist agents. Nonetheless, these texts complement one another in interesting ways, which can encourage a lively and stimulating feminist critique, particularly among graduate students, of the hegemony and power relations embedded within international political economy.

Democrats/Republicans and the Politics of Women's Place. By Kira Sanbon-matsu. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

Anticipating Madam President. Edited by Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.

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Robert P. Watson and Ann Gordon's *Anticipating Madam President* and Kira Sanbonmatsu's *Democrats/Republicans and the Politics of Women's Place* approach obstacles to gender equality within the U.S. political system from different perspectives and aim at different audiences. Both, however, suggest the need for more women in public office, greater public support for gender equality, and a reenergized women's movement.

Sanbonmatsu's meticulous and insightful analysis moves forward the literature in the fields of parties and women and politics. She focuses on a simple question: If new issues have the potential to transform the party system by realigning partisan loyalties, why has the women's movement had so little effect on parties' agendas and electoral strategies in the United States? Looking only at gender role equality issues, narrowly defined, she concurs with the conventional wisdom that party activists have polarized on gender issues and that abortion has realigned the U.S. party system over the past three decades.[1]

Yet Sanbonmatsu challenges other aspects of the conventional wisdom. Her analysis of party statements (party platforms, convention acceptance speeches, State of the Union addresses) suggests that, with few exceptions (i.e., abortion), political parties have engaged in strategic obfuscation (rather than polarizing) when confronted with gender equity issues. Her longitudinal analysis of public opinion data suggests that ambivalence belies what many would prefer to see as a steady march toward acceptance of gender equality.

Drawing on a variety of data, she asserts that three factors converge to explain why the parties have disaggregated gender equality issues, po-larizing on abortion and gravitating to the center on other issues (though never treating any of these issues as more than peripheral): the moral

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[1] Her definition includes the subset of gendered policies relating most directly to women's roles in the public sphere. Thus, her concern is with issues such as women's role in politics and labor force participation but not with issues dealing with the feminization of poverty, for example.

nature of the abortion issue (it can be spoken of without explicit reference to women's place), the strategies of the interest groups (a more explicit focus on elections by single-issue abortion groups), and the costs and benefits of clarity (less to lose politically on abortion and more on gender roles). While the major parties' Downsian duel for the center has not fooled the public (who see the Democratic Party as better able to deal with these issues), the Democratic Party has failed to exploit its potential advantage on these issues partially out of fear that the topic of women's roles may be surrounded by political quicksand created by the ambivalence that belies public support for gender equality.

Sanbonmatsu is no apologist for the parties' marginalization of gender equality, for in her concluding chapter she clearly sees public ambivalence as a product of the party's disaggregation of gender equity issues and its ensuing struggle for the center on most others. Tying her findings in with the literature on women's impact in public office, she raises the possibility that "underrepresentation of women in politics and the absence of women presidential candidates may have decreased the likelihood that gender is discussed" (227), and she speculates that the gender equity issues raised by the women's movement might have had more effect on parties if there were more women in leadership. She takes party leaders to task, asserting not only that "if political leaders focus attention on inequalities facing women, then we can expect the electorate to react" (220) but also that this lack of focus on the part of political leaders has contributed to what Roberta Sigel has described as women's failure to recognize gender inequality as a collective problem with a political solution rather than as a personal problem that is the responsibility of the individual.[2]

Yet can political parties whose leaders are predominately male be expected to enthusiastically polarize on gender equality without pressure from their constituents? If women were to increase dramatically their power within the major parties, would they sufficiently heighten feminist consciousness to motivate women in the mass public to act collectively on behalf of women as a group? Although not raised by the author, these questions nevertheless seem to have informed her conclusion, for the remedy she offers for advancing gender equity on the political agenda is an inside-outside strategy: a reenergized women's movement that goes beyond reproductive choice to accelerate cultural change and educate women voters about the differences between the parties and the increased

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[2] Roberta S. Sigel, *Ambition and Accommodation: How Women View Gender Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

presence of women in party organizations and elected office. And we may have a better chance to pursue these questions empirically if the goal of *Anticipating Madam President* is realized.

Watson and Gordon's volume takes on an indicator of gender inequality within the U.S. political system—its failure to elect a woman president. The book's decidedly upbeat tone, highly accessible style, chapters by respected scholars, and clear connection to real-world politics make this a very attractive selection for undergraduates. It includes chapters on most relevant topics—the history of women as presidential candidates, public opinion and support of the women's movement, perceptions and images of women candidates within the mass public and in media coverage, fund-raising obstacles and myths, the role of parties and the recruitment process, and what the first woman elected president might face within an institution that has been previously shaped by men. My personal favorites were Carole Kennedy's chapter (which deconstructs encouraging poll numbers to explore how the lingering biases against women's participation in the public sphere create obstacles to women being elected president) and Gordon and Miller's experimental chapter, which challenges optimistic polling numbers, finding support is much lower for women than men candidates and that the disadvantages for women are even greater among Republicans. The only glaring weakness in the collection is the lack of a comparativist perspective that could shed light on what has happened in other countries when women have been elected president or prime minister.

Yet there is also a sense of struggle in how to discuss such a hypothetical situation. Is the challenge to confront the transgendered nature of the political environments in which candidates navigate or to act as a handbook of sorts for women to remind them of what any president faces? Some chapters seem to have been written originally about the presidency and presidential politics in general and then been altered (not completely successfully) to fit the focus of the book. In other cases, the lapse of time between women's candidacies makes generalizations from case studies to contemporary politics tricky. I kept looking for more insight into how the actions of the president might be transgendered, how masculinism might constrain women's actions in a different way than men's, and how these pressures might differ for Republicans and Democrats and for women with and without connections to the women's movement. Overall, however, this book should spark lively debates in undergraduate classes on elections, the presidency, and women and politics. ∎

Disciplining Feminism: From Social Activism to Academic Discourse. By Ellen Messer-Davidow. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.

Feminism in the Heartland. By Judith Ezekiel. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002.

No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women. By Estelle B. Freedman. New York: Ballantine, 2002.

Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century's End. By Sara M. Evans. New York: Free Press, 2003.

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Three decades beyond the heyday of second-wave American feminism, we stand at a unique time for analysis by individuals who not only lived through and participated in the movement but who also possess the historical distance and scholarly expertise to assess its nature, influence, and future. Ranging from the local to the global, these four books offer distinct perspectives on one of the most important forces for social and political change in twentieth-century America. Judith Ezekiel assesses the development of feminism in a single city, Dayton, Ohio, and considerably revises the narrative that has focused on a few, mostly eastern, urban areas. Locating her study in academe, Ellen Messer-Davidow investigates the development of women's studies as an academic discipline and evaluates the implications of institutionalization for feminism and for social reform in general. Moving to larger stages, Sara Evans surveys the vast breadth of feminism in the United States from the second wave to the twenty-first century, and Estelle Freedman examines women's movements across two centuries and around the globe. Together these scholars provide new answers to critical questions about the origins, nature, impact, and duration of second-wave feminism.

All of these scholars were entering adulthood when the second wave emerged. Evans participated in women's liberation and consciousness-raising groups in Chicago and Chapel Hill, North Carolina, wrote her dissertation on second-wave feminism, and in 1976 joined the faculty at the University of Minnesota as professor of women's history. Ezekiel lived in Dayton until 1973, when she left for the University of Michigan and subsequently moved to France, where she teaches American studies at the University of Toulouse. Except to recall "the political effervescence around

me" (viii) she does not reveal her own connections to feminism. Freedman experienced the movement as a graduate student at Columbia in the early 1970s; in 1976 she joined the history faculty at Stanford, where she helped found the Program in Feminist Studies. Messer-Davidow was a divorced mother, graduate student, and activist who helped institute women's studies at the University of Cincinnati; a member of the Modern Language Association's Commission on the Status of Women; and, beginning in 1986, an English and women's studies professor at the University of Minnesota.

Messer-Davidow's study is driven by the question, What went wrong? How did academic feminism, which began as an effort to transform the academy and society, instead become transformed by them and lose its connections to social activism? She begins with an adroit analysis of the structures and practices of scholarly disciplines and the academy as a whole, explaining their resistance to women as practitioners and to female concerns and experience and demonstrating how women began to challenge sex discrimination in the academy and the devaluation of women in scholarly practice. The second section—and heart—of the book focuses on the emergence of women's studies, its early connections to activism, its institutionalization, and its intellectual development and proliferation. Messer-Davidow acknowledges what feminists have accomplished—breaking down some of the barriers to women's representation in higher education and creating an enormously productive new area of scholarly inquiry and instruction. But she is much more impressed with the limitations of this change. Following Michel Foucault, she analyzes in detail how the institutions in which they operated constrained and disciplined academic feminists: "Fueled by the socioeconomic forces that grew higher education, formatted by the academy's intellectual and educational venues, and fractured by the rules of its own discourse, the project that had set out to feed social change became a discipline that fabricated esoteric knowledge" (127).

In the third—and only loosely connected—section of the book, Messer-Davidow turns her attention to the rise of the Right and examines the agents of social change that began to dominate American society in the 1980s. She analyzes in detail a handful of conservative and feminist projects designed to mobilize coalitions and train new generations of activists, concluding that feminist movement organizations were "lacking the long-range vision, robust purposefulness, and coherent agenda" (222) that she observed in conservative organizations. The vitality of the Right she attributes to its greater success at funding, its ability to establish coalitions, and its related capacity to escape the identity discourse that fractured feminists. The final chapter turns back to the academy and a close reading

of the affirmative action battles of the 1990s. While Messer-Davidow ends with a call for progressive academics to reestablish the connections to social activism that had characterized early second-wave feminism, it is not clear how she expects academic feminists to escape the institutional disciplining that she describes so well in the first sections of the book.

Ezekiel's study of second-wave feminism is not as bleak as Messer-Davidow's, but she too emphasizes the failure of a utopian vision and the limitations of feminist change. Like Messer-Davidow, Ezekiel casts important new light on aspects of the second wave, and her examination of feminist politics in a Midwestern city should stimulate more local studies that reveal rich variations in how the movement emerged and progressed in the United States. Using oral interviews with fifty-nine activists along with documentary sources from Dayton's feminist organizations, she challenges much of what we think we know about the second wave. Perhaps most strikingly, she has discovered that women's liberation did not grow up alongside women's-rights feminism; rather, women's liberation *was* feminism in Dayton throughout the 1970s. As proof of this Ezekiel cites several unsuccessful efforts to form a National Organization for Women (NOW) chapter, yet it is possible that liberal feminists were using other, not explicitly feminist, women's organizations to promote women's rights.

Ezekiel's research also produced a portrait of feminists that runs counter to the common wisdom. To be sure, she does find that, as was the case with radical feminists elsewhere, Dayton's activists were nearly all white. In other ways, however, they were different. While these women came out of the New Left, they did not break with their male comrades as was the case in eastern cities. Dayton's feminists were in their mid-twenties to late thirties, many were married, one-third were mothers, and most were not college students. Most of them came to political activism through church-related, overwhelmingly Protestant activities, and churches made substantial contributions to feminist projects, often providing space and financial support. Thus, Ezekiel's work should encourage further attention to the positive connections between religion and feminism.

Feminism in the Heartland chronicles Dayton's feminism as it began in consciousness-raising by New Left women and evolved through several organizations, of which the principal ones were Dayton Women's Liberation, the Dayton Women's Center, Dayton Women Working, and Freedom of Choice. Like Messer-Davidow, Ezekiel presents a trajectory of declension—from utopian visions and prefigurative politics to institutionalization and single-issue approaches. While pointing to the real gains achieved by Dayton feminists in their various manifestations—an abortion consultation center and clinic, a rape crisis center and improvements in

the treatment of rape victims and prosecution of rapists, implementation of Title IX in Dayton's schools, inroads against sex discrimination in Dayton's banks and other businesses—Ezekiel finds these paltry in comparison to the goals that initially fired feminists' activism.

Evans has produced the most comprehensive and balanced survey thus far of second-wave feminism in the United States, examining both the radical manifestations of women's protest in women's liberation and the more moderate feminist activism within the political mainstream, while giving careful attention to the various groups that make up the category women. As well as describing the history of women's liberation groups, cultural feminist productions, and liberal feminist organizations, with which we are most familiar, she traces the unfolding of feminist expression in a multitude of other locations—the federal bureaucracy, religious organizations, pink and blue collar work sites, sports, and more.

In a number of ways Evans complicates the understanding that second-wave feminism was white dominated, providing a thoughtful and thoroughly contextualized analysis of the constraints to cross-racial, cross-ethnic activism experienced by both white women and women of color. Like Ezekiel, she acknowledges the antiracist work of radical feminists, and both authors note how white feminists' respect for the black power imperative of separatism paralyzed prospects for a truly integrated women's movement. At the same time, Evans points out the irony in women's liberation groups' support of the Black Panther Party, "oblivious to its virulent sexism" (32). Evans further draws on recent scholarship to demonstrate that women of color—though not about to join with white feminists—challenged men in their organizations even in the face of charges that they were splintering the movement. Recognizing the agency and ambition of women of color, she reports that they were more active in mainstream than in radical feminism. For example, African American women, Chicanas, and Native American women played substantial roles in the National Women's Political Caucus from its beginning in 1971, where "at stake was access to public power, representation in parties, in elected office, in appointments" (74). And she observes that identity politics made unity elusive not just among women in general but also within specific groups of women such as Latinas, who discovered the need to create separate organizations representing Puerto Rican, Chicana, Cuban, and other categories.

Paying due attention to the backlash of the 1980s, which "gave a defensive cast to movement organizations . . . and drove a wedge between activists focused on the policy arena and those who withdrew even further into the utopian hopes of a self-sustaining women's culture or the abstract

theorizing of academia" (178), Evans denies that it sounded the death knell. Instead, she argues, the powerful opposition to feminism demonstrates its very success, how much American society and women themselves had changed since the 1960s. Agreeing with Messer-Davidow that feminism's institutionalization in colleges and universities drove a wedge between academics and activists, Evans insists that women's studies "became a crucial incubator for a new generation of women" (202). Readers may be skeptical about the potential of the self-identified third wave—described here as "assertive, multicultural, and unabashedly sexy" (215)—to secure power and justice for women, especially for the most disadvantaged ones, but Evans describes a variety of new ideas and organizations sprouting among young feminists in the 1990s. And she points to the potential for change growing out of newly formed international connections dedicated to improving women's condition throughout the world, a subject at the heart of Freedman's work.

By far the most ambitious of these books, *No Turning Back* takes as its subject no less than the entire world and two centuries in order to explain, according to Freedman, a "revolution [that] has transformed women's lives [across] continents, decades, and ideologies" (1). The book grew out of an introductory feminist studies course that Freedman has taught at Stanford for many years, and it rests on a vast array of studies by historians, sociologists, anthropologists, literary scholars, and others. After defining feminism as a belief that "women and men are inherently of equal worth" (7), that "most societies privilege men as a group" (7), and that "social movements are necessary to achieve equality between women and men, with the understanding that gender always intersects with other social hierarchies" (7), Freedman describes with enlightening examples women's status throughout the world before the nineteenth century and explains how feminisms arose. In the Western world, Freedman argues, feminism appeared in response to the rise of capitalism, which upset traditional gender relations and generally disadvantaged women, and in reaction to the spread of liberal ideas regarding individual rights and representative government. Although she insists that women's movements in other parts of the world were not simply imports from the West and attributes them to "varied origins" (96), she notes especially the importance of nationalist movements (themselves of course a response to Western imperialism) and the rise of international organizations as spurs to feminist mobilization.

From here, the book is organized thematically, with sections on women's domestic and wage labor; family relationships and responsibilities; health, sexuality, and reproduction; violence; creative and cultural

contributions; public policies; and politics. Freedman moves easily around the world, introducing readers to Muslim feminists, Japanese legislators, South Asian sex workers, Central American weavers, Argentinean mothers, Taiwanese lesbians, Egyptian nationalists, Zambian AIDS workers, Polish reproductive rights activists, and more, all the while making links and drawing comparisons.

As is the case with all broad synthetic studies, specialists may take issue with specific parts of Freedman's book, but a wide readership will find it invaluable, including students and nonscholars interested in feminism. It goes far in providing a context for feminists to see their movement in comparative terms, information and frameworks for teachers to design more inclusive courses in women's history and women's studies, and insights for scholars of women's movements around the globe. Like Evans, Freedman ends on an optimistic note, presenting a powerful argument about why feminism is here to stay and why feminist change will continue to transform the world.

All of these authors confirm the critical impact of the feminist realization that "the personal is the political." While Messer-Davidow stresses the negative flow of that insight into identity politics and the others too recognize how it "contained the seed of the movement's repeated episodes of fragmentation and self-destruction" (Evans, 4), they also celebrate its potential for empowerment and the ability of "feminists from diverse backgrounds [to build] cross-cultural support, sometimes painfully but also productively" (Freedman, 92). These books recognize as well both the gains and the co-optation resulting from institutionalization. Again, Messer-Davidow is more impressed with its perils, stressing the power of universities, disciplines, and publishers to "format feminist education and knowledge [in ways that] exhausted our energies, narrowed our vision, and insulated us" (165).

The subject each of these scholars chose to investigate accounts in part for their different conclusions about whether to celebrate feminism's accomplishments or mourn its lost opportunities. The expansive scopes of Evans's and Freedman's books offer more possibilities to discover the multitude of ways in which women have been empowered over the past three decades, even while they acknowledge how far all women, and particularly the most disadvantaged, are from genuine equality. Ezekiel and Messer-Davidow, on the other hand, explore areas in which radical ideals and utopian visions predominated, and these narrower domains enable them to conduct a more detailed accounting of opportunities lost and visions compromised. Disciplinary perspective and scholarly longevity may also be at work here. Ezekiel's study is her first book, while these studies

by Evans and Freedman extend the authors' long resumés of historical scholarship; moreover, historians' tendency to take the long view often results in more measured expectations. The location of Messer-Davidow, a scholar of literature, in a feminist studies program may provide a more critical edge, and yet that very condition leads me to question her pessimistic conclusions about the institutionalization of feminist knowledge.

Readers can learn from all of these books what went wrong and what went right with second-wave feminism. Messer-Davidow is most instructive about practical strategies for making progressive change once again, while Ezekiel inspires us to remember that "equal rights and choice do not carry enough weight. . . . We need to restore the 'liberation' to the women's movement" (251). With their emphasis on what feminists accomplished, Evans reminds us that "massive change is [still] possible" (238), and Freedman insists that "understanding the complex history of women's movements can help ensure that the feminist revolution will succeed" (347). ı

Has Liberalism Failed Women? Assuring Equal Representation in Europe and the United States. Edited by Jytte Klausen and Charles S. Maier. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Women, Europe and the New Languages of Politics. By Hilary Footitt. London: Continuum, 2002.

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I f the number of women members in political institutions remains low, even when women are achieving greater equality in the surrounding society, is it appropriate to take measures to increase the number, and if so, what measures should be taken? These apparently simple questions lead, as the first of these books effectively demonstrates, into a tangled web of argument both about theory (what is the justification?) and practicalities (what measures will achieve what ends?). The advantage of Jytte Klausen and Charles S. Maier's collection of essays is that it treats these central issues from multiple points of view and with different case studies, thus demonstrating the complexity of the issues. At the same time, because there is now a fair amount of experience on which to draw and because the book covers a solid span of material up to 2000, certain trends, which

can still be interpreted in different ways, begin to emerge from this treatment.

The first of these is that by far the most sustainable justification for special measures for women is the need to compensate for past discrimination, for the historical past, as contributor Jane Mansbridge puts it. This has the advantage of suggesting that measures should be time limited, and since they deal with the past rather than the future it does not encourage essentialism or suggest unrealistic assumptions about what greater representation might achieve. They also open the way for similar measures for other disadvantaged groups—racial minorities is the obvious example. Contributor Pippa Norris argues, however, that these temporary measures must affect structures in a permanent way if they are to be effective. She gives the example of the United Kingdom, where the decision of the Labour Party to have women-only short lists in a selected number of winnable seats was quite quickly overturned in a case brought by male candidates claiming discrimination. It has taken legislation (recently adopted) to give a secure legal base for even temporary positive action measures of this kind.

The second main trend concerns the methods to be adopted and the resistances to them. The issue of parity democracy (i.e., the demand for 50 percent representation of each sex in all decision-making bodies) is dealt with in detail. Parity as a demand developed particularly strongly in countries (most notably France and Greece) where almost nothing had been done, either by political parties or governments, to tackle the barriers that inhibited greater representation for women. These countries regularly appeared at the bottom of the European Union's league tables on women's representation. However, the initial demands saw representation in the context of and as a trigger for social transformation. The chapters on France give a detailed account of how these broad aims were gradually narrowed down until greater representation for women became the end rather than the means. As contributors Isabelle Giraud and Jane Jenson put it, the parity movement lost control of the agenda, which became detached from the "project of social transformation and became an instrument for rescuing the liberal democratic institutions of France" (84).

This raises the question of the resistance to such measures, an issue that comes up in a number of contributions. Most telling is Anna Coote's account of what happened in Britain after the New Labour victory of 1997. Here the young men around Tony Blair (the self-labeled "football team") showed themselves unwilling to support policies that might have the effect of changing their lifestyles and behavior. In this context, the demand for equality was replaced by the promise of equal opportunities.

Rogers M. Smith fills out this picture in his analysis of policies on race and gender equality in the United States. The "psychological wage" that many men gain from both gender and race discrimination provides a (mostly now) silent but still very strong inhibitor of change. Gender equality, while being more acceptable in theory to most white men than race equality, is something that they actually find more difficult to accept and implement. Smith sees concessions on representation as being too easily made cosmetic—an "acceptable" response to pressure from women.

In contrast to the broad sweep of Klausen and Maier's collection, Hilary Footitt concentrates on a microlevel study of a small group of women members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Her interest is in political language and whether, in the context of parliamentary debate and action, there are any significant differences in the way women and men members express themselves. To pursue these ideas she interviewed sixty women MEPs across the range of parties and countries and carried out a detailed analysis of the language used in three plenary sessions of the parliament in 1994–95.

As one might expect, the results show no clear gender divide, but there are different tendencies, with more women than men positioning themselves at certain points on the linguistic spectrum or using language in a way that suggests different preoccupations. The gender overlap, however, remains significant. To anyone used to accounts of political intrigue, or even voting records, the results of this research appear insubstantial. On a closer look, however, some nuanced and sensitive points emerge. For example, Footitt uses her analysis to indicate how the MEPs see their role with respect to three categories, which she calls "activist," "personal traveller," and "interpreter." More women than men come out as interpreters, more men than women as activists. Very few of either sex come out as personal traveler.

Footitt is rather apologetic about using the European Parliament as a site for her study, but in fact this pays off, for the parliament, at the time she is writing about, had a relatively high proportion of women members (25 percent in 1994). It also had fewer entrenched practices because of its comparatively recent origin and transnational composition. It was thus a space where women members might feel more able to speak freely and use the language that came naturally to them. In this context, her evidence shows that women MEPs were more likely than men to challenge the top-down view of citizenship prevalent in the European Union and to emphasize plurality, diversity, and the need for participation.

This book complements the first in showing that, while it is important to have women political representatives, the differences they are likely to

make if nothing else changes are fairly marginal. These are two thought-provoking studies. The great advantage of each is that it is open-ended and suggests further questions and paths for research. ∎

The Politics of Gender after Socialism. By Susan Gal and Gail Kligman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism. Edited by Susan Gal and Gail Kligman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in East Germany. By Rachel Alsop. New York: Berghahn, 2000.

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One of the most profound transformations of political and economic life of the twentieth century occurred with the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the "shock therapy" of a shift to market capitalism after 1989. In the years since this transformation began, feminist scholars have attempted to understand its impact on private and public life. Some have focused on civil society and institutions, others have examined political participation and representation, and still others have turned their attention to work and the labor market and to the ways in which the collapse of socialist regimes have affected the family and welfare policies, yet few of these studies have deployed an analytical frame of gender.[1] New work is beginning to illustrate how thinking about masculinity and femininity and their shifting meanings can illuminate both

[1] The literature on these topics is voluminous. For a few examples, see Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women's Movements in East Central Europe* (London: Verso, 1993); Valentine M. Moghadam, ed., *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Chris Corrin, *Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women's Experience of Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (Toronto: Second Story Press, 1992), and Corrin, ed., *Gender and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999), Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller, *Gender Politics and Post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (New York: Routledge, 1993); Tanya Renne, ed., *Ana's Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); and Ellen E. Berry, ed., *Postcommunism and the Body Politic* (New York: New York University Press, 1995).

the tremendous changes that have occurred since 1989 and the conti-
nuities with previous regimes. Susan Gal and Gail Kligman's two excellent
volumes—*The Politics of Gender after Socialism*, a theoretical examination
of the politics of gender in postsocialist Eastern Europe, and *Reproducing
Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism*, a collection of
case studies—move the study of regime change in Eastern Europe to a
new level by demonstrating the significance of the cultural and political
meanings of masculinity and femininity to the process of postsocialist
Eastern European reconstruction. Rachel Alsop's *A Reversal of Fortunes?*
represents another model of analysis that focuses specifically on women's
position in the German labor force.

Although *The Politics of Gender after Socialism* can be read as an ex-
tended introduction to *Reproducing Gender*, providing the conceptual
framework that drives the overall project, *The Politics of Gender* stands on
its own as an excellent example of how the theoretical and historical work
on gender can illuminate the process of twentieth-century political and
social transformation. Taking as their point of departure a critical stance
with respect to the gender regimes of socialist states, Gal and Kligman
reject the transition perspective with its implicitly teleological model of
regime change.[2] They stress, rather, the contradictions, paradoxes, and
continuities in the gender orders of both socialist and postsocialist regimes
while remaining attentive to how both Cold War and post–Cold War
politics have participated in constituting knowledge about these regimes
and about the meanings of gender. Indeed, one of the principal strengths
of the volume is the authors' attentiveness to the historical and cultural
dimensions of gender and to how gender has shaped practices and policies
comparatively, in both the East and West. Gal and Kligman address four
principal areas of social life in which gender influenced the rebuilding of
postsocialist societies: the politics of reproduction, economic restructur-
ing, social policies, and political action. Debates about reproduction and
population have contributed to recasting the relationship between states
and citizens; the practices and policies concerning reproduction (as in the
case of debates about abortion in Germany, Hungary, and Poland) pro-
foundly influenced politics and state building. Indeed, as scholars have
shown, debates over abortion in the process of German reunification very

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[2] As Gal and Kligman point out, the metaphor of transition that has been used to describe
the shift from communist to postcommunist regimes in the East "assumes evolutionary
progress from one well-known 'stage' of history to another It thereby inadvertently continues
the Cold War morality tale . . one that pitted two 'sides' against each other in an implicit
contest for who was 'ahead'" (*The Politics of Gender after Socialism*, 10).

nearly derailed the entire unification process, and Gal and Kligman point
to the powerful connections between nationalism and reproduction evi-
dent in the use of rape as an instrument of ethnic cleansing in the former
Yugoslavia. These actions incorporated and mobilized ideas about mas-
culinity and femininity in the service of ethnonationalist interests. Debates
about reproduction in postsocialist societies also helped to constitute the
morality and hence the legitimacy of new states, particularly through ex-
hortations to reproduce (as in Serbia) in order to strengthen the nation.
Reproduction also mobilized women politically around reproductive pol-
icies (such as women's mobilization in Poland to protest antiabortion
legislation).

The reworking of gender relations in East Central Europe has also been
intimately connected to the reconstitution of notions of masculine and
feminine and public and private and to the reconstruction of postsocialist
economies. Gal and Kligman contrast the gender regime of paternalistic
socialist states where women were defined primarily as workers yet were
also expected to serve men (the "big children") within the household,
with the postsocialist organization of gender relations.[3] In analyzing the
postsocialist shift, Gal and Kligman depart from a feminist literature that
has emphasized women's unemployment as the major consequence of the
state's withdrawal from the economy and point to how women have as-
sumed a major role in the small-scale marketization characteristic of re-
gendered East Central European economies.

In an excellent discussion of social policy, Gal and Kligman compare
Eastern European welfare states with their Western European counterparts
before and after the collapse of communism, suggesting the relative
strength of the male breadwinner model. Even though no explicit male
breadwinner model informs postsocialist welfare regimes, policy effects
are gendered. The post-1989 withdrawal of the extensive welfare state
supports once common in Eastern Europe, for example, has placed more
of the burden of care on families and particularly on women, a pattern
not dissimilar to some Western countries, even those with relatively strong
welfare states. At the same time, Gal and Kligman's nuanced analysis shows
how notions of dependency on and independence from the state are being
transformed in the context of a larger negotiation of gender relations.
Likewise, gender has transformed political activism in the postsocialist
period. Since 1989 politics has been redefined as a masculine activity.
Women active in civil society and voluntary organizations under socialism

[3] The term *big child* is Gal and Kligman's. See *The Politics of Gender after Socialism*,
59–60.

have become more active in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and in local-level politics, whereas men have become less active in civil society and more active in newly emergent national democratic parliamentary institutions. Yet the multiple feminisms that have blossomed in East Central Europe are far from identical to those of the West. As Gal and Kligman are quick to point out, not only have East Central European feminists not modeled themselves around Western feminist issues or organizations, but both varieties of feminism have displayed major differences in terms of how they understand work, Western feminist concepts such as the political dynamics of personal life ("the personal is the political"), and the meanings of autonomy and dependence. Indeed, the case of East Central Europe reminds us that, far from representing all women, feminisms are historically and locally constituted, and vary tremendously in their forms of political action depending on how subjectivities, interests, and notions of citizenship (for example) are constructed. *The Politics of Gender after Socialism* should be read not only by scholars interested in understanding the consequences of communism's collapse and the rebuilding of new regimes in Eastern Europe but by all who are interested in how gender operates in institutional change, in the building and rebuilding of states, and in how states make use of gender in reconstituting the meanings of both private and public.

Gal and Kligman's edited volume, *Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism*, brings together fourteen methodologically diverse studies, written as part of a collaborative research project, that examine how gender figured in the transformation of socialist societies, particularly with regard to the politics of reproduction, the gender relations of everyday life, and struggles for representation in political action. These excellent essays, based on original empirical research, not only show that men and women have experienced the collapse of socialist states and economies differently but also illuminate how the meanings of gender have shaped the process of postsocialist transformation. Among the most interesting points to emerge from the volume are the ways that debates over reproductive rights in Poland and Germany, for instance, emerged from and helped to shape the process of political democratization in those countries. For example, in Poland, as Eleonora Zielínska shows, debates over abortion were fundamental to the shaping of democratic politics while at the same time they revealed the political contingency of women's reproductive rights and the power of the Catholic Church to reassert itself in the postsocialist period. The work of Eva Malek-Lewy and Myra Marx Ferree supports this view of the significance of reproductive rights issues for postsocialist regimes. They trace the history of the contentious abor-

tion legislation in pre- and postunification Germany and show that abortion proved to be so central to the unification process because of how it constituted part of a "contest for control of the emerging principles of political rule."[4] The domain of political life and political representation constitutes another arena in which the postsocialist regendering of politics marks a departure from past practices. As several authors demonstrate, the democratization of politics gave new meaning to political power. Women virtually disappeared from formal parliamentary politics as men took up positions of power in Poland, Romania, and elsewhere. This did not mean that women withdrew from politics, as their vibrant activity in NGOs in both countries attests. However, the reassertion of political and cultural traditions of the precommunist period has meant that even women's activity in NGOs has not been unproblematic; in Romania, especially, women continue to struggle for representation.

At the same time, attention to the remapping of gender relations in postsocialist states shows that rather than breaking completely with the past, societies in the period after 1989 displayed important continuities with the socialist period. These continuities emerge particularly when gender divisions in the economy are analyzed. Contributor Julia Sazlai shows, for example, the different options for men and women that emerged in Hungary after the collapse of communism. Whereas men lost jobs in mining and steel and rates of illness and alcoholism rose, Hungarian women's strong participation in the secondary economy as a way of making ends meet under socialism prepared them for the small-scale marketization after 1989. Work that was previously unpaid, particularly service work such as cleaning, child care, and household accounting, is now paid, and many women often juggle multiple part-time jobs, all resulting in lower unemployment rates for women than for men. This expansion of the service sector through the deployment of women's skills has been one of the most dynamic features of what Sazlai calls "marketization from below" (200). As Sazlai points out, her findings have important implications for the role of markets and states in women's work, a role that differs from that of Western European economies.

Overall, in addition to providing excellent cases studies that develop and expand on the conceptual framework elaborated by Gal and Kligman

⁴ Susan Gal, "Gender in the Post-socialist Transition: The Abortion Debate in Hungary," *East European Politics and Societies* 8, no. 2 (1994) 256–87, cited by Eva Malek-Lewy and Myra Marx Ferree, "Talking about Rights and Wombs: The Discourse of Abortion and Reproductive Rights in the G.D.R. during and after the *Wende*," in Gal and Kligman, *Reproducing Gender*, 113.

in *The Politics of Gender after Socialism*, the essays in *Reproducing Gender*
show how differently constituted masculinities and femininities in arenas
as diverse (but hardly disconnected) as abortion rights, employment, and
voting rights shape policy and political life in the relatively new public
sphere of East Central European states. These essays are also enormously
valuable in more general terms, beyond the specific national cases, for
what they reveal of the permeability of boundaries between public and
private, the relations between men and women in the family and in eco-
nomic life, and the complex relationships between women, states, markets,
and politics.

Read against these volumes, Rachel Alsop's *A Reversal of Fortunes?
Women, Work and Change in East Germany* contributes a more expanded
empirical case study that examines the implications of regime shift for
employment in the former East Germany. Although Alsop notes the dif-
ferent ways men and women have experienced German reunification, her
work has less to say about the processes and debates that have shaped the
transformation of the German economy than about their outcomes for
women's labor force participation. Alsop presents a complex picture of
both continuity and change. The mixed record of gender equality poli-
cies—the contradictions between rhetoric and practice in East Germany,
indeed, the serious gender inequalities—under socialism profoundly
shaped women's experience in the reunified Germany in the realms of
both politics and the labor market, and in this respect 1989 marked a
continuity with rather than a radical rupture from the socialist state. Under
socialism, although women were well represented in the Volkskammer
(parliament) in East Germany, they lacked political influence in the real
decision-making body, the Politburo, where no women sat as voting mem-
bers. Although women and men were represented in the labor market
almost equally, gender difference shaped the nature of the work they
performed and their conditions of employment: women's access to man-
agerial positions was limited, and significant wage gaps between men and
women remained. And while extensive and generous family policies such
as maternity leaves and child care made it possible for women to combine
work and motherhood, the state did not make a comparable effort to
reconcile work and parenthood or fatherhood. Nor were state socialism's
largely successful efforts to bring women into the labor force accompanied
by an effort to establish gender equality in the realm of domestic labor.
As Alsop notes repeatedly, although state socialism constructed women
as both mothers and workers, no corresponding state discourse supported
men's social identities as fathers and workers. State policies that failed to
address men at the same time as they addressed women inevitably had

negative consequences for gender equity after state socialism came to an end.

Alsop charts the effects of the postsocialist transition on women's labor force participation. The collapse of state supports for women's employment on the same or similar bases as men and the decline of state support of social services such as child care compromised women's position in the new German economy. What makes the German case different from much of the rest of Eastern Europe are the enormous costs of reunification, which have magnified the negative consequences of regime change for women. Some industries that employed large numbers of women, such as the textile industries in the former East, have shifted from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production and have become more heavily automated. While unemployment rates have soared for both men and women, women's unemployment has outpaced men's—what Alsop calls the "defeminization of waged labor" (85). Moreover, the process of state and economic rebuilding has meant that the former East Germany has adapted to Western standards of gender-based work and family models. Whereas before 1989 state supports in the East had been designed to facilitate combining work and motherhood, women in the West were encouraged to work part-time as a way of reconciling employment and child care, and West Germany lagged in complying with European Union equality legislation. Since 1989, the high costs of reunification have made it difficult for the former eastern *Lands* to provide continuity in supports for women workers. Even in Brandenburg, in the former East Germany, where the socialist government rhetorically supported women's full-time employment and child care, in the post-1989 period insufficient economic resources made it difficult to realize these goals in practice.

In two of the most interesting chapters of the book Alsop charts the effects on women of the transformation of the German economy through an examination of women in the textile and clothing industries and through interviews with thirty-two East German women who lost their jobs at the Textilekombinat Cottbus (TKC), a Brandenburg textile and clothing firm that underwent massive technological change during the collapse of state socialism. A shift from labor-intensive production for a domestic market to high-tech industry in the East reduced the need for all workers, but women suffered greater unemployment than men and shifted from industrial jobs to white-collar jobs in the firm. This pattern was not confined to the former East Germany; in the former West Germany as well, women lost blue-collar production jobs to more skilled men in some industries. Alsop's interviews provide a valuable picture of how

women themselves experienced the collapse of socialism, how they combined work and motherhood, and how they coped with unemployment.

A Reversal of Fortunes? provides an enormous amount of information about women's trajectories in the postsocialist German labor market but also leaves some areas untouched. Read against the essays in Gal and Kligman's collection, *Reproducing Gender*, Alsop's study might have benefited from consideration of whether or not women's high unemployment as seen through government statistics masks alternative forms of wage earning in the secondary economy—a pattern that was common in other East Central European postsocialist states. Moreover, with the exception of a brief discussion of the place of abortion politics in the reunification process, little mention is made of reproductive policy and its effect on women's working lives. Although Alsop implies that a West German family model led economic planners to assume that married women and especially married women with children would withdraw from full-time work in the transition (93), this important line of argument is not pursued. In this regard a gender analysis that interrogated more thoroughly the relationship between reproduction and work, the place of gender in reunification, and particularly in the state's effort to balance economic transformation, family policy, and employment policy might have enriched the analysis of the interviews of the former TKC workers. Thinking about gender and culture can also help to explain patterns of women's higher rates of unemployment and part-time work, and the resurgence of harassment of women by men on the job after the collapse of socialism. Indeed, as the essays in *Reproducing Gender* imply, the sexual politics of the labor market are not accidental nor are they only the product of structural shifts in production. Instead, they are part of how employers and the state have deployed models of public and private, masculine and feminine, in enacting employment and social policies.   ▪

The Portable Kristeva. Edited by Kelly Oliver. Updated edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

The Feminine and the Sacred. By Catherine Clément and Julia Kristeva. Translated by Jane Marie Todd. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

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For more than two decades, a certain readership (philosophy, literature, women's studies) has enjoyed the offerings of Julia Kristeva, a practicing psychoanalyst, cultural critic, and professor of linguistics at the Université de Paris VII. Kristeva's numerous books and essays are concerned primarily with the "subject-in-process": a subject posited through psychoanalysis as fundamentally divided by and in language, a subject that consequently can never fully submit to the sociosymbolic order that founds it. Importantly, by exploring aspects of primary narcissism overlooked by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, and by adding theoretical workings on abjection and love necessary to understanding the elements of narcissistic structuring, Kristeva affords readers with a vision of the human adventure that restores the imaginary, creative, and innovative to the trials and difficulties of differentiation. For Kristeva, we are alive because we speak *and* because we have an inner psychological space (or "soul") that opens meaning to re-creation and subjectivity to revolution and revolt.

The coherence of Kristeva's work lies in her uncompromising defense of this vision, as demonstrated by the selection that comprises the updated edition of *The Portable Kristeva* edited by Kelly Oliver. The collection begins with an essay in which Kristeva situates her project in relation to existential philosophy, linguistics, literature, structuralism, and deconstruction. The collection swiftly moves to the earliest elaborations of the subject in the signifying process: the theorization of a semiotic modality in language that confirms the heterogeneous presence of the drives (materiality) in subjectivity and meaning and that creates an opening for both psychic and social revolution.

Parts 3 and 4 contain material (although not exclusively) from the psychoanalytic trilogy of the 1980s (*Powers of Horror, Tales of Love,* and *Black Sun*), where Kristeva expands her thinking on the semiotic by exploring the murky waters of Narcissus only to discover that the mirror stage and castration (entry into the universe of signs) presuppose a ternary structure and material signifying processes so thoroughly maternal and

feminine that they are excluded by the paternal preferences of the fathers of psychoanalysis.[1] The twin concepts of abjection and love have their place in these texts, and Oliver has appropriately organized the material into the themes of rejection and identification. Given, however, the diachronic primacy of a maternal authority that from the beginning demarcates the body into territories and compels exclusions and separations, it is unclear why the material on love precedes abjection in the collection.

Part 5 gathers material from a range of sources around the themes of maternity, feminism, and female sexuality, although as one reads the text what emerges more clearly as a unifying theme is women, particularly their role in Kristeva's "antimetaphysical preoccupation" with identity and the sociosymbolic order (448). As Kristeva puts it, "The symbolic is a matter for speaking beings, and we women are first of all speaking beings. That must not be left to the patriarchy alone" (382). Three pieces stand out in this respect. First is "Stabat Mater," a discourse on maternal experience that also reflects on the contributions of women in giving "flesh, language and *jouissance*" to the law that divides us (332).[2] Second is "Women's Time," a discourse on feminism that similarly considers the possibilities that differentiation leaves each of us, particularly women, for innovation and play. These thoughts on women and the sociosymbolic are then expressed in a third piece—the general introduction to Kristeva's most recent work on female genius—which explicitly considers the singular contribution each woman makes to the creations central to keeping culture in permanent revolt. Indeed, this relationship between revolt and women's place at the forefront of such a "social and ethical scene" is featured in the material in part 6 (438). Given these threads, Oliver might have more appropriately designed part 5 around the theme of women rather than maternity, feminism, and female sexuality as it currently stands.

Kristeva writes that the role of the analyst is to give the analysand access to her own lowly dwelling (429), the unconscious as time undone, a lost time. This mode of analytic practice relates particularly to the benefits of certain fantasies in maintaining the unique psychic structuring of each patient. The transference, however, is only in part a repetition. More

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[1] Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), *Tales of Love*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), and *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

[2] As with the first edition, the updated edition of *The Portable Kristeva* has not reproduced the bold typeface of the left-hand column of the original French publication. The bold typeface was meant to reflect a scar or wound of maternal experience. See Julia Kristeva, "Hérethique de l'amour," *Tel Quel* 74 (Winter 1977): 30–49.

important, there is always "a new part which is added and which makes [the] transference a sort of innovation" (345) and "opens psychical life to infinite re-creation" (439). This psychical restructuring—which is contained in language and which implies, necessarily, the maternal or feminine semiotic in the subject's journey toward object relations—gives us our human distinction. And for Kristeva, this human distinction—namely, that we exist at the threshold of language and the body—is "sacred" (447). Thus, if there is anything feminine about the sacred, it resides in the maternal space of differentiation, an "economy" that gives meaning and creativity to the human adventure.

Such is the position taken by Kristeva in *The Feminine and the Sacred*, a book containing letters exchanged between Kristeva and Catherine Clément over the course of a year. The themes of the feminine and the sacred were first proposed by Kristeva. "But as soon as it was proposed," writes Clément, "I knew we would get along well, like a violin and piano, soprano and mezzo" (2).

The book begins with examples of women in the grip of the sacred, and Kristeva is quick to point out how their thoughts have gravitated toward black women (in Senegal and New York), thus linking not two but three enigmas: the feminine, the sacred, and "the various fates of *Africanness*" (21). Kristeva makes it clear that her interest is not only from an anthropological perspective but in "trying to understand them [the feminine and the sacred] from the inside" (22). "What if the sacred were the unconscious perception the human being has of its untenable eroticism," Kristeva asks, "always on the borderline between nature and culture, the animalistic and the verbal, the sensible and the nameable?" (26–27). And what if this splitting of subjectivity—which also paves the way for the imaginary in human existence—presupposed a maternal or feminine space, since "love opens the time of life, of the psyche, of language—the time of the unknown" (56)? Several letters are then devoted to this feminine element of the sacred contained in our separations and exclusions, and in the love that safeguards the transition toward becoming a differentiated self. Along the way, Kristeva reflects on aspects of the feminine concealed beneath the robes of the sacred figure of the Virgin Mary, recalling her essay, "Stabat Mater."

"How many more letters will there be on the subject of the Virgin, Julia?" responds Clément (120), who prefers Claude Lévi-Strauss to Freud and who draws the conversation away from maternal love through a dazzling commentary on Hindu widows, Indira Gandhi, and Eva Perón (a sample of the breadth of Clément's contribution to the book). On their differences, Clément writes: "I find a tension between us there, in the

musical sense of the term: soprano on the one side, mezzo on the other. One rises to the high notes, the other descends to the bass" (147–48). The result of this tension—propelled by the particular truths and intellectual trajectories of each woman—is a book that is "fussy, personal, rough, quick-tempered, incomplete, inexact as a result of abridgments and cursory glances" and important not for the answers it holds but rather for the "permanent questioning" (178) of its approach. But perhaps more revealing is the tenacity of Kristeva's hold on her vision of the human subject. For it is ultimately this subject (as subject-in-process) that propels Kristeva's truth in *The Feminine and the Sacred* and ties this book to the psychoanalytic explorations (and intellectual coherence) of *The Portable Kristeva.*

United States and International Notes

Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society welcomes announcements of fellowships, calls for papers, upcoming special issues, and new journals for the "United States and International Notes" section.

Calls for papers

For a special issue on religion and politics, *Radical History Review* solicits article proposals from scholars across the disciplines, in fields including history, anthropology, religious studies, sociology, philosophy, political science, gender studies, and cultural studies. The journal encourages potential contributors to explore the following issues, among other possibilities: religion and state violence; religious identity within transnational migrations and diasporic communities; links between religion/secularism and political and/or social radicalism; gender, sexuality, and religious belief; missionaries and imperialism; the politics of religious iconography; and "religion" as a category of analysis in history, anthropology, and sociology. The journal also encourages submissions from scholars who teach religious history for the special section titled "Teaching Radical History." In TRH pieces, scholars discuss their methodological, theoretical, and pedagogical frameworks, along with course syllabi and reflections on the classroom experience. Please submit an abstract of up to two pages to rhr@igc.org. Deadline is March 15, 2006.

Women's Studies Journal invites submissions for a special issue on women and spirituality to be edited by Kathryn Rountree and Mary Nash. The journal welcomes submissions from all academic disciplines and from those working in the area of women and spirituality in the community. The journal has a primary but not exclusive focus on New Zealand and the Pacific region. Each submission will be peer-reviewed by two reviewers. Contributions should be 5,000–8,000 words, including tables, notes, and references, and should use either APA reference format or endnotes. Contact Kathryn Rountree at k.e.rountree@massey.ac.nz and Mary Nash at m.nash@massey.ac.nz. Send submissions to Jenny Coleman, j.d.coleman@massey.ac.nz, Women's Studies Programme, School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, Massey University, Private Bag 11 222, Palmerston North, Aotearoa/New Zealand. Deadline is April 15, 2006.

The Swedish Secretariat for Gender Research is seeking papers on the topic of "Debating a Gender Encompassing Economic Citizenship" as part of the Fourteenth International Economic History Congress, to take place in Helsinki, Finland, August 21–25, 2006. For more information, contact Kirsti Niskanen at kirsti.niskanen@tema.liu.se. Deadline for papers is May 1, 2006.

The international feminist art journal *n.paradoxa* announces a call for proposals for a forthcoming issue on curatorial strategies. To propose an article, send an outline (one to two paragraphs) and a short resume (one page only) to k.deepwell@ukonline .co.uk well in advance of the copy deadline, May 15, 2006.

The organizers of a panel on "Gender, Identity, and Technology in the West, 1850–1905," to be held at the forty-sixth annual Western History Association in St. Louis, seek panel members. Prospective panelists should contact Mark S. Anderson, Department of History, 234 UCB, Hellems, Room 204, University of Colorado-Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309, marks_anderson@yahoo.com. Deadline is July 21, 2006.

Artists, theorists, journalists, and activists interested in participating in an (Eastern) European Project on the question of (non)existence from a gendered, political, or media-based point of view are invited to submit proposals for a traveling exhibition titled do not exist: Europe, Woman and the Digital Medium, to be held in Bremen, Germany; Ljubljana, Slovenia; Tallinn, Estonia; and Sofia, Bulgaria, among other sites. The organizers invite (women) presenters who epistemologically, politically, or artistically pursue a gender-conscious approach through their works. Proposals should include descriptions of your artwork or film, or abstracts of the paper you wish to present. To submit proposals for the symposium, workshops, and exhibitions, including film, video, and Net art, e-mail kontakt@thealit.de. Questions, ideas, and suggestions should be sent to info@thealit.de. Submissions will be considered on an ongoing basis.

Michigan State University's "Women and International Development" (MSU-WID) series invites papers on a range of topics, including women's historical and changing participation in economic and political spheres, intra- and interfamily role relationships, gender identity, women's health and health care, and the gender division of labor. The series editors particularly encourage manuscripts that bridge the gap between research, policy, and practice. The Working Papers on Women and International Development series features article-length manuscripts by scholars from a broad range of disciplines, while the WID Forum series features short research papers, policy reports, and policy analyses and disseminates papers that are brief or at an early stage of development. To submit a manuscript for the series, contact Dr. Anne Ferguson, WID Publication Series Editor, Women and International Development Program, 206 International Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1035.

Intersections: Gender, History, and Culture in the Asian Context seeks submissions for a forthcoming issue on "Vietnam and Colonialism" to be published in February 2007. *Intersections* emphasizes the paramount importance of research into the region's multiple historical and cultural gender patterns—patterns that are crucial for the understanding of contemporary globalized societies, where identities and social relations are constantly being negotiated against the background of dominant

narratives. Submissions should be e-mailed to intrsect@central.murdoch.edu.au or mailed to the Editors, *Intersections*, SSHE, Murdoch University, South Street, WA 6150, Australia. Deadline for submissions is June 15, 2006.

thirdspace_: Feminist Journal for Emerging Scholars is committed to the promotion of new feminist work in all areas of study. The mandate of this e-journal is to produce a top-quality, refereed journal that demonstrates the broad range of applications for feminist theory and methodology and that gives emerging feminist scholars a venue for their work. The editors also seek to make *thirdspace_* a portal for connection with the wider feminist academic community. Submissions should be original work done by an emerging scholar—graduate student, postdoctoral fellow, new independent scholar, junior professional, or someone of similar status. *thirdspace_* welcomes submissions in English, French, German, Spanish, and Arabic; submissions in other languages may be considered as well. Submissions should be sent electronically in Word, WordPerfect, or Rich Text format (rtf) to submissions@thirdspace.ca. Send one paper copy of your submission to *thirdspace*, c/o K. Snowden, #6-2526 West 4th Avenue, Vancouver, BC V6K 1P6, Canada. For more information, contact info@thirdspace.ca or go to http://www.thirdspace .ca. Deadline is ongoing.

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About the Contributors

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Jelisa Lijn Peterson's love of photography began as a young child, but it was not until her early twenties when she began to pursue a career as an artist. She holds degrees from the University of Utah in anthropology and women's studies. She has traveled to Africa and Central and South America to create images, primarily on her own. Beginning in 1993, she has worked in nine African countries and has spent almost four years in Africa. Since 1995, her photographs have been featured in juried exhibitions in art centers and galleries in California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Utah. She lives in Salt Lake City, Utah.

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
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